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ABSTRACT 
I was driven to this study by witnessing dramatic changes in urban education in recent 
years and began to ask the questions: What is going on? And why now? This dissertation will 
show that an extremely powerful and pervasive global phenomenon and ideology known as 
neoliberalism is at the core of the answers to these questions. As a result, understanding the Rise 
of Neoliberalism has become a passionate mission for me.  
Ferguson (2009) argues that a different approach to the study of neoliberalism is needed 
because the current scholarship is unsatisfactory; generating common pejorative and unsurprising 
conclusions like ‘it is bad for poor and working people therefore we must oppose it’. Neither 
Ferguson (2009) nor I disagree with this, but he asks why he should bother to read study after 
study coming to this same conclusion. This paper argues that the reason for this common 
conclusion is because of much of the scholarship on neoliberalism lacks causal and motivational 
connections between people and events that creates a holistic understanding. This prevents the 
creation of emergent ideas from the data. Without this holistic view, researchers arrive at 
conclusions in the same manners as those from scientific experiments that use rationality alone. 
Rudolph Otto (1923) from his book: The Idea of the Holy warns us about the error in our 
thinking that we have exhausted our means of investigating a phenomenon via rationality alone.    
To address these issues, this paper will employ a methodology that combines Heuristic 
Inquiry with Narrative Historiography. This unique combination will use the faith and passion I 
have as a means to search for a deeper understanding of neoliberalism and at the same time, 
prevent the error brought to light by Otto (1923). Heuristic Inquiry and Narrative Historiography 
as methodologies combine the rational and the non-rational in a usage I term transrationality. 
Howard (1991) tells us that the non-rational falls under narrative or storytelling as an approach to 
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increasing human knowledge. It is important to point out that rational and non-rational thinking 
are not opposites but used in this study as a seamless means of thinking, as they both fall under 
the umbrella of reason and logic as a path to create a fuller understanding of a phenomenon. 
Building on and extending the thoughts of Marx (1973), Habermas (1968) and 
Schopenhauer (1909), this paper will attempt to show that the nature and power of capital, as 
understood by this researcher, is at the root of what has created neoliberalism and made it into 
such a dominant global phenomenon and ideology. 
 
Key Words: Neoliberalism, Heuristic Inquiry, Narrative Historiography, Transrationalism, 
Rational, Non-rational 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
What drove me to this study?  
From the Corporate World to the World of Education. I spent the majority of my adult 
life in the private sector in the banking industry as a senior operations manager of a large 
international bank. During my career, I established a reputation for managing high morale and 
high performing departments. As a result, managers north of me gave me significant freedom to 
run my department the way I wanted with negligible interference.   
A good percentage of my staff, especially those who worked nights, were African 
American single mothers.  Part of my management style was to have an open door policy where 
employees on all levels would feel free to come into my office and speak to me about anything in 
their personal lives. Time and time again, I would listen to many of these women tell me about 
the concerns they had for their children’s performance in school; often with tears in their eyes. I 
learned to keep a box of tissues nearby. The connection between their performance on the job 
and their kids' education became clear. I had to do something that would kill two birds with one 
stone; help them and their children, thereby helping the department. 
I went to my boss with an idea that he not only liked, but enthusiastically endorsed and 
supported. The idea was a new program I coined ‘Saturdays-One-On-One’. It was composed of 
volunteer managers and supervisors who donated their Saturdays to come in to tutor and mentor 
the kids of fellow employees in our high-tech conference rooms. We would buy them lunch after 
‘class’ and take them on trips several times a year. To my pleasant surprise, news of this program 
spread quickly throughout the bank and became a huge hit practically overnight.  I had to turn 
away employees from other departments whose kids were also having problems in school.  
2 
 
Since this program was funded by the corporation, as a manager, I wanted and expected 
results. To that end, each child was required to hand in their report cards. There was not a single 
one who had not shown solid improvement; something that made me realize that I was on the 
right track.  I received accolades from managers all over the world within the organization telling 
me what a great this thing was for the bank.  While very hard work, it was incredibly rewarding 
for me personally. I knew I had to continue helping these urban children in some form down the 
road and that I could actually make a difference. 
I decided to take early retirement because the packages offered would allow me to travel 
around the world for a few years, complete my education, write a play and plan a second career 
in urban education. I returned to school at DePaul and took my first graduate course in secondary 
education. It was clear right away that I could not possibly work in the bureaucratic environment 
of the Chicago Public School system; I was too used to running my own business. I switched 
programs to obtain a Masters in Educating Adults. While attending, I decided to do volunteer 
work in a small south side adult education program. I fell in love with it; especially the students.  
The organization was in existence for over twenty years in five locations in the city 
serving the adult poor of all races by providing a free education. To me, it was an absolutely 
wonderful thing. I got to know the executive director who hired me, personally. She was a 
brilliant well educated woman with a gigantic heart to help those who needed help. She 
dedicated herself to that mission and worked tirelessly. With this brief background in place, this 
is where the story as to why I chose this topic of The Rise of Neoliberalism to research, really 
begins. 
After two years doing this volunteer work, I began to see major changes in the 
organization. Funding, the lifeblood of non-profits that used to be automatic over that 20-year 
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period, now required voluminous and incredibly sophisticated detailed forms to fill out on line. 
We had no internal structure with those skilled in modern internet-based business practices to 
handle these new requirements. The executive director was under a stress level that broke my 
heart as she struggled, for the first time, trying to keep the doors open. As a result of the inability 
to meet these new funding requirements, layoffs and cut backs began. For the majority of our 
adult students, many who have been unemployed for a very long time, this chance at a free 
education amounted to a last hope to turn their lives around.  
Concerned with this, I started doing some research on the state of community based non-
profit adult education organizations like ours and discovered some shocking data that led me to 
ask; what on earth is going on? To begin, Dolnicar, Irvine & Lazarevski (2008) argued that the 
new challenge facing nonprofits is to manage competitive funding without sacrificing mission 
imperatives. They argued that a corporate model stresses strategy, risk taking and competitive 
positioning; abilities that have been identified as incompatible with the non-profit model. The 
authors were right on target. The first thing that came to my mind was, after successfully 
educating and serving the poor for all these years, why now? Sadly, it gets much worse. There is 
an actual graveyard of long serving community based organizations created by these new 
corporate and philanthropic requirements. This study will show that these changes are tied into 
urban education in general and that they stem directly from a phenomenon known as 
neoliberalism.  
The following cases represent examples of urban adult education organizations, similar to 
the one I volunteered in, that have recently closed after serving the poor for many years. These 
organizations also represent additional services to the poor besides education, like homeless 
shelters, food pantries, child care, counseling etc. The list below, or what I refer to as “the 
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graveyard”, also shows that these closures are national in scope impacting tens of thousands of 
adult students and the poor in general. I begin with the most recognizable organization that has 
been serving right here in Chicago for over a century. 
Knight (2012) stated that one of the nation’s oldest and most famous settlement houses, 
Hull House in Chicago, well known for its service to the poor, announced that it was closing its 
doors and filing for bankruptcy. He went on to add that “Chicagoans are shocked that a 123-
year-old institution providing crucial human services, will disappear” (p. 1). We also have 
United Teachers Los Angeles (2012) who posted that on Wednesday, February 29, 2012, there 
will be two demonstrations of 300 to 400 adult education students protesting the closing of all 
adult education schools in Los Angeles. They add that the elimination of these programs would 
have a significant impact on the economic and social structures of Los Angeles, already 
burdened with the most under-educated and under-employed population of any metropolitan 
region in the United States. Garramone (2012) who is the principal of the Sonoma Valley Adult 
Education School, posted that the Sonoma Valley Adult School has “proudly served the 
community for 74 years and it is with great sadness that we close our doors. We thank all of you 
who have attended our classes or benefited from our services - it has been a great run!” (p. 1). 
Next we have Gebb (2012) who posted the closing of the Marysville Adult Education 
School saying that, with bittersweet pomp and circumstance, Monday night marked the end of an 
era for Marysville Adult Education. After nearly a century of guiding students toward long-
awaited achievements, the program's last group of graduates walked across the stage to receive 
their diplomas. Sad School Principal Tim Kelly said he “wanted to remember the years we were 
able to change lives for tens of thousands of people. It created more jobs for them and their 
families. It created more opportunities and doors opening. It created hopefulness” (p.1). Finally, 
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we have Lerner (2009) who announced that Blue Gargoyle, a nonprofit literacy and tutoring 
program that served many South Side residents here in Chicago, closed last week after 40 years 
of service.  Allison Toback-Hofeld, assistant director of Blue Gargoyle’s family learning 
program, explained that many of Blue Gargoyle’s clients rely on public aid, which requires them 
to be enrolled in classes like Blue Gargoyle’s or face losing their benefits. “It’s a very dangerous 
time for them; they could be sanctioned and lose their aid, lose their housing, she said. We have 
teen mothers with young children” (p. 1). As stated, these cases are connected to the recent 
changes in urban education in general.  
Troubles in Urban Education. This section is an introduction to a special section of the 
literature review of Chapter Two that details the connections between neoliberalism and 
education.   
The negative impact of corporate business demands causing the death of many non-profit 
organizations around the country serving the adult poor, discussed above, has extended into 
urban education in general.  Kozol (2005) gives us many examples detailing this corporate 
influence in our urban schools. In chapter four of his book: The Shame of the Nation, he 
describes, in detail, the blatant corporate influence now found in urban elementary schools.  He 
tells us that as early as kindergarten, children in these schools were asked to think about what 
kind of jobs they might choose. All the jobs were described as management positions: pencil 
sharpener manager, door manager, soap manager, coat room manager, etc. Nothing like a 
lawyers’ job, a doctor’s job, a poet’s job, a preacher’s job, an engineer’s job was to be found. “In 
another kindergarten class, there was a poster that displayed the names of several retail stores 
such as JC Penny, Wal-Mart, Kmart, Sears and a few others” (p. 90). 
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Kozol (2005) detailing his observations at another school, interviewed the principal who 
told him that “we want to make them understand that, in this country, companies will give you 
opportunities to work, to prove yourself, no matter what you’ve done” (p. 93). Curious, he asked 
her what she meant by her statement, no matter what you’ve done, where she responded “even if 
you have a felony arrest, we want you to understand that you can be a manager someday” (p. 
93).  
Expanding on this corporate influence, Kozol (2005) claims that as result of the poor 
performance of these urban schools, the Wall Street Journal in 1990 wrote: some 60 of the city’s 
giant corporations have taken over the production lines themselves. This was in reference to their 
investment in the creation of a school model in a predominantly black neighborhood that was 
intended to embody corporate ideas of management and productivity. At a power breakfast of 
top corporate executives, a school principal said that “he was in the business of developing 
minds to meet a market demand” (p. 96).  
Kozol (2005) reminded us that prominent educator William Bagley once said that the 
problems faced in managing a class ought to be regarded by the teacher as primarily a problem 
of economy; as a business problem. He also added the first rule of efficient service for a teacher 
must be unquestioned obedience to his or her superiors. This situation is entirely analogous to 
that in any other organization or system such as a business enterprise. 
In all fairness, Scott & Dimartino (2009) reminded us that many researchers have 
observed the use of the private sector in education and that is has a long history. It has 
traditionally involved pragmatic strategies for cost saving or efficiency; such as the common 
practice of districts contracting out for particular services. In discussing what has changed, they 
argued that within the last three decades, educational privatization has been attached to an 
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ideological argument about the superiority of the private sector over the public, especially with 
regards to remedying what many conservative and neoliberal advocates regard as the failure of 
public schools to provide excellent education given public resource allocations.  
Adding to what has changed, Scott & Dimartino (2009) argued that recent conservative 
visions for schooling include a retreat from race-conscious reforms of recent decades and a 
radically altered state role in the provision of public schooling, with private sector actors at the 
leadership helm, and emphasizing parents’ unfettered ability to choose schools for their children. 
Ironically, some conservatives and progressives, including new civil rights organizations, have 
found philosophical common ground in the potential of privatization and choice to provide more 
equitable schooling by empowering parents with the choice to flee struggling public schools. 
Clearly, fixing these troubled schools was not even under consideration. 
In detailing the scope of these changes in urban education, a recent quantitative study by 
the Southern Education Foundation (2013) presented some disturbing trends. According to them, 
schools that have the largest proportion of low income students spend the least in support of their 
students. Their data also suggests that low income students are more likely than students from 
wealthier families to have lower tests scores, fall behind in school, dropout, and fail to acquire a 
college degree. They conclude by claiming that within the next few years, it is likely that low 
income students will become a majority of all public school children in the United States. They 
add that with the huge, stubbornly unchanging gaps in learning, schools in the South and across 
the nation face the real danger of becoming entrenched, inadequately funded educational 
systems. They will also enlarge the division in America between haves and have-nots and 
endanger the entire nation’s prospects. In a passionate ending, they argued that without 
fundamental improvements in how the South and the nation educate low income students, the 
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trends that this report documents will ricochet across all aspects of American society for 
generations to come. They ended by stating that “a wise American leader once reminded a 
troubled nation: A house divided against itself cannot stand” (p. 13). Wilson (1982) appears to 
agree with this dire assessment when he argued that while there are many ironies in public 
education in America, the bitterest, are those associated with the education of black children.  He 
argued that “the bitter irony comes from a serious disregard of the heroic struggles, 
contributions, dedication and value of the black teacher to the American public school system” 
(p. 404). He says that there are literally thousands of such unsung stories of dedicated black 
teachers virtually living to help their students learn in a world where the cards are 
overwhelmingly stacked against them.  
So far, we’ve discussed significant changes in urban education that point to corporate 
influences as a causal factor. Furthermore, the data shows that this trend is not likely to reverse 
itself any time soon and portends a dismal future for our country. We need to ask ourselves what 
some of the fundamental underpinnings of these changes are, how these changes actually work in 
practice to control urban schools, and finally, is this just an American problem.  
The literature review will show that a phenomenon called neoliberalism is at the core of 
these obstacles that prevent real change in urban education; along with some of the major social 
ills of today like poverty and racism. Carter & Welner (2013) argue that we deceive ourselves if 
we think that urban school outcomes will change without addressing the social ills of poverty, 
discrimination and racism. The literature supports that argument. 
My emotional attachment to this study. As a result of my initial research on the causes of 
these changes in urban education combined with what I’ve seen with my own eyes, it is 
important for me to state in the beginning of this study that I am an African American Male 
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(AAM). The reader may understandably respond: fine, but what does that have to do with 
anything? My response is that it has a lot to do with everything. First, as an AAM, I am VERY 
ANGRY at the state of urban education and to be honest, the state of the world for that matter; as 
I see them as inextricably tied together. For sure this will come across to many readers as an 
emotional outburst; and I will not disagree with them. Why do I mention this? I believe my 
emotion of anger may fall within Kuzmic’s (2014) ‘outlaw emotions’ where he, using a feminist 
perspective, challenges the dominant positivist epistemology that tends to marginalize such 
emotions and refer to them as being ‘suspect’; thus reducing the value such emotions bring to 
research, which in turn reduces the value of the research itself. This is a very serious thing to say 
and therefore needs further explanation. 
Kuzmic (2014) using the work of several authors, defines emotions as “emergent 
properties located at the intersection of physiological dispositions, material circumstances and 
socio-cultural elaboration” (p. 78). He reminds us that as researchers, we are part of a larger 
discipline and culture that is dominated by an ideology of professionalism and science embedded 
in an objective stance and rationality perpetuated through patriarchy. He uses Campbell (2002) 
who referred to this as “learning not to feel” (p. 79).  
This really hit home for me inasmuch as this represents by far the single largest 
complaint I’ve had in my graduate study to date. I’ve coined it the ‘robotic approach’ to 
education. In my view, it only results in continued hegemony via endless circular discourse that 
prevents any real breakthroughs in research. Just reading that others like Kuzmic (2014) and 
Campbell (2002) also see this, has been warmly therapeutic for me and gives me a welcomed 
sense of hope.  
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Adding more substance to this line of thinking, Kuzmic (2014) adds that “one's emotional 
self is intimately connected to one's professional self. Just because one adds the role of the 
researcher to that identity doesn't mean that we have to take up the traditional separation between 
analytic distance and emotional participation.  In fact, as Krieger (1991) further articulates, to 
fail to do so limits our ability to understand social and educational phenomena” (p. 82). I was 
always certain that the passion and emotion that drives me in this research adds to its value, not 
subtracts. This is now affirmed by Kuzmic (2014). Finally, Aune (2003) tells us that the pagan 
wisdom of Aristotle says that “anger is a rational emotion when it is directed at the right cause, 
for the right amount, and at the right time” (p. 521). The usage and connection of my emotional 
attachment to this study will be explained in detail in Chapter Three where I introduce the 
combined methodologies of Heuristic Inquiry and what I term the Transrational Approach. 
Bolstering the Current Scholarship  
Introduction. Much of this study will build on the work of James Ferguson (2009) 
currently chair of the Anthropology Department at Stanford University with his article: The Uses 
of Neoliberalism. He begins enunciating his view on the current scholarship quite directly stating 
that: 
I am struck by how much of the critical scholarship on the topic 
arrives in the end at the very same conclusion – a conclusion that 
might be expressed in its simplest form as “neoliberalism is bad for 
poor and working people, therefore we must oppose it”. It is not 
that I disagree with this conclusion. On the contrary. But I 
sometimes wonder why I should bother to read one after another 
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extend scholarly analysis only to reach, again and again, such an 
unsurprising conclusion. (p. 166)  
His brilliant clarity makes clear that he sees the current scholarship on neoliberalism as 
unsatisfactory. I am in agreement. But the question this poses is: how can we bolster the current 
scholarship so as to not arrive at these same conclusions?  
In my view, what is missing in his article and something that cannot be adequately 
addressed in any single article, is a deep understanding of where neoliberalism really comes 
from, and on what intellectual grounds it rests. In truth, this was not an omission per se; as it was 
not, as I see it, the intent of his work. However, I argue that such an analysis may yield 
additional insights and different conclusions than found in the current scholarship; something he 
clearly stated is needed. 
Study purpose. The purpose of this study is to build upon Ferguson’s (2009) work and go 
in a different direction by searching for the intellectual history of neoliberalism that leads to its 
dominance in today’s global society. I argue that such a history may shed new light and add new 
insights to his work by coming to new conclusions about neoliberalism. How? Ferguson’s work 
is constructed around the assumption that neoliberalism is already here and firmly in place; 
which of course is true. This study makes no such assumption and seeks to find the intellectual 
genesis of neoliberalism first, and then draw conclusions from there.   
Ferguson (2009) places extraordinary emphasis in opposing all the denunciatory 
conclusions about neoliberalism that are wholly negative; with researchers expending a lot of 
intellectual energy on ‘what we are against’; as opposed to the same energy spent on ‘what we 
want’. He readily admits that ‘want we want’ is a far more difficult question to answer than 
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‘what we are against’.  I am in strong agreement but add that such a search also needs to answer 
why we want it. Understanding the deep connection between the genesis of neoliberalism, its 
intellectual foundations and its social dominance in today’s global society will, in my view, 
provide our answers to ‘what we want’ and ‘why we want it’. The reader will see that at the root 
of this line of inquiry is the nature and power of capitol; an underlying central theme of this 
study that I argue will bolster the current scholarship.  
To accomplish this, this paper will use Narrative Historiography as one of two 
methodologies that will be explained in detail in Chapter Three. As a very brief introduction, 
White (2010) tells us that the term narrative history is used to distinguish histories that tell stories 
from those that do not. He is referring to stories that have a beginning, middle and an end. 
Stories, according to him, often have dramatic and explanatory effects; both objectives of mine.  
In short, this paper will address the concerns of Ferguson (2009) by telling a story on the Rise of 
Neoliberalism from this researcher’s perspective that will hopefully generate additional thinking 
on the part of the reader that may not be conceptualized from the current scholarship. 
The Research Question 
 Can a narrative historiography of neoliberalism provide a deeper explanation of its 
genesis, growth and dominance in today’s global society?  
Study Limitations  
Unfortunately, the depth of this topic forces some important aspects of neoliberalism to 
be left out of the analysis in order to manage its size and scope. These are incredibly wide and 
deep topics in and of themselves. Among the most important of these topics is neoliberalism’s 
impact on women, specifically feminist thinking in general. In addition, the question of how does 
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neoliberalism impact culture is not included. For example, questions like how does it impact 
family life and does it impact different cultures differently, and is it actually creating a new 
global culture still need to be addressed.  
Another very critical component of neoliberalism that is not addressed in this study is its 
ecological impact. How does neoliberalism impact the health of our planet? Specifically, what 
concerns me most in this topic is the clearly unsustainable relationship between profit 
maximization, global warming and finite resources. I may have left it out subconsciously 
because it is almost too scary to contemplate. 
Order of the Presentation of This Study 
Chapter One has been a short synopsis on what led me to this topic, and why the topic is 
so personal and important to me. It included key introductory points from the literature on urban 
education, study purpose, research question, study limitations and the order of presentation.  
Chapter Two is the literature review and will begin with an introduction that connects 
back to Chapter One. Next, it will address what neoliberalism is as a phenomenon followed by 
how it impacts various important aspects of society; including politics, poverty, racism, with an 
emphasis on education. Included is an introduction to the central underlying theme of this study: 
the nature and power of capitol.  Chapter Two will conclude with a summary of the common 
themes found in the review and end with a discussion that will segue us to Chapter Three. 
 Chapter Three presents Heuristic Inquiry (H-I) and Narrative Historiography (N-H) as a 
combined methodology to be used in search for answers to the research question. This unique 
combination of methodologies will ground the qualitative nature of this study. Included in this 
chapter will be an autobiographical narrative detailing where my passion and faith come from; a 
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critical aspect of H-I. Additionally, a detailed understanding of N-H will hopefully answer why 
this specific methodology will bolster the current scholarship and generate new thinking about 
neoliberalism; thus satisfying the concerns of Ferguson (2009). 
Chapter Four critically examines what I term the twin intellectual pillars that actually 
ground neoliberalism: Homoeconomicus and the Division of Labor. Habermas (1968), leaning 
on the thoughts of Karl Marx, will introduce capitol as the common philosophical roots of both.  
A detailed explanation of my understanding of the nature and power of capital will be included 
in the beginning of this chapter. 
Chapters Five will discuss the actual intellectual, political and social engineering of 
neoliberalism via narrative using the underlying theme of the power of capitol.  Chapter Five will 
include a strong focus on what is known as the Chicago Tradition; a hard-nosed conservative 
view of economics associated with the University of Chicago. I will show that the intellectual 
epicenter of neoliberalism began right here at this school in Chicago beginning with its founding 
by Standard Oil magnate John D. Rockefeller in 1890. I will examine, in detail, the battle of 
ideas between the two major warring camps of institutional and orthodox economic theories at 
the school and present what I believe to be the ultimate cause of why the intellectually weaker of 
the two sides prevailed and led to the global spread of neoliberalism that we see today. This the 
reader will see, is the power of capitol.  
Chapters Six and Seven will, via narrative, look into the lives of such prominent and 
relevant names as Frederick von Hayek, Henry Simons, Milton Friedman, William Volker, his 
nephew Harold Luhnow, Margaret Thatcher, Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan and several others; 
all of whom played very significant roles in my understanding of the Rise of Neoliberalism. As a 
whole, this narrative history is intentionally designed to lead to a very specific date: August 5th 
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1981 that I will argue as the day Ronald Reagan ‘lit the fuse of the neoliberalism bomb’ that 
ignited its spread in our country, and by default, the world. 
Chapter Eight will be the final chapter and will begin with an introduction followed by 
answering the research question. After that will be a chapter by chapter high level review of the 
findings from the body of this study. Following this will be a diagram that connects the answer to 
the research question with the main events that led to the rise of neoliberalism.  I will end by 
circling all the way back to Chapter One and what precipitated this study in the first place: to see 
if I can help find solutions to the problems in urban education and present a very preliminary 
view into the follow up study whose mission is to forthrightly address the ominous argument but 
correct argument by Carter & Welner (2013) with a new vision for the future of urban education. 
I will argue as best I can that only a new paradigm of thinking can lead to real solutions. 
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Chapter Two: Neoliberalism and Society 
Introduction 
Chapter One showed how and why I came to this study so the reader can see why this 
topic has become a strong passion of mine. Recall that Ferguson (2009) quite emphatically asked 
himself why he should bother to read study after study that comes to the same unsurprising 
conclusions on neoliberalism. 
We still need to see what support there is to explain all the common pejorative 
conclusions that troubles Ferguson (2009) so much. In other words, what does the scholarship 
actually say? Our first objective then is to dissect the current scholarship to better understand the 
phenomenon of neoliberalism before moving further. Next, we need to address the question of 
why the current scholarship produces the same common unsatisfactory conclusions. This will be 
discussed in detail in Chapter Three that explains the philosophical grounds for using Narrative 
Historiography that I argue will bolster the current scholarship. 
The following literature review will divide the topic between its broader conceptual 
aspects and its social impacts on society. For its conceptual aspects, since the topic is rather 
dense, the review will begin by assisting the reader with a quick overview by presenting several 
summary quotes on neoliberalism found in the literature. The review will then present definitions 
of neoliberalism starting with the obvious linguistic connection to liberalism. After this, 
additional definitions and concepts of neoliberalism will be presented to broaden its scope. For 
its social impacts on society, the review will then focus on its connections to politics, poverty, 
racism and an expanded emphasis on its connection to education.  
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The end of this chapter will include a cursory introduction into the nature and power of 
capital as it relates to neoliberalism; a central underlying theme in this study. Finally, an ending   
discussion will highlight the major themes and include a segue to Chapter Three. 
Concepts of Neoliberalism  
Neoliberalism: a quick overview. The purpose of these summary quotes is to provide the 
reader with a quick yet thorough overview of a dense topic prior to the details. With this, the 
literature is replete with powerful quotes about neoliberalism that indicate its economic meaning, 
pervasiveness, power, moment in history, social value and future prospects. We find Jessop 
(2002) calling it “the privatization of state-owned enterprises and state-provided services” (p. 3). 
Hill (2004) said “for neo-liberals, profit is God, not the public good” (p. 3). Giroux (2005) 
argued that neoliberalism “thrives on a culture of cynicism, fear, insecurity, and despair” (p. 
494). Peck & Tickell (2002) stated that “it seems to be everywhere” (p. 380).  Chopra (2003) 
calls neoliberalism “a global social science able to explain all rational conduct, or even simply all 
behavior” (p. 422). Forest & Hirayama (2009) argued that “neoliberalism has dominated policy 
discourse, policy formulation and policy implementation” (p. 998). Ong (2007) said that 
neoliberalism is a “capitalist machinery that is structuring a new planetary geography” (p. 3). 
Peck & Tickell (1994) powerfully argued that “Neoliberal jungle law is a regulatory expression 
of capitalism's predatory, and ultimately self-destructive dynamic” (p. 320). Brenner & Theodore 
(2002) call neoliberalism “a utopia of unlimited exploitation” (p. 350). Finally, in what in my 
view, may be the most serious and damning aspect of neoliberalism can be found in Davies 
(2005) where he uses the words of Dan Watson (2003) who said that within the language of 
neoliberalism you are unable to convey any human emotion, including the most basic ones such 
as happiness, sympathy, greed, envy, love or lust. You cannot he says, tell a joke in this 
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language, or write a poem, or sing a song.  Davies (2005) elaborates on this when he argues that 
“yet it is the language through which most organizations currently define themselves, including   
universities. In adopting this neoliberal language, we don’t know, and we haven’t known for 
some time, whether we have just adopted some superficial and laughable language that will 
appease government, or whether the professional knowledge that guides and informs teaching 
and learning is reshaped in neoliberal terms” (pg. 1). This is a very powerful statement with far 
reaching implications.  
Composite definitions of neoliberalism will be discussed below in a separate section. We 
turn now to the etymology of the word neoliberalism itself to begin the details of our review.  
Definitions of neoliberalism.  As one might rightfully suspect, from a linguistic 
perspective, neoliberalism must be, at least to some degree, connected to liberalism. It is. Both 
neoliberalism and liberalism are, in essence, reactions to what is commonly referred to as the 
welfare state, or what economists call, Keynesian economics. A good starting place for our 
understanding of the difference between the two, and why neoliberalism has become the 
phenomenon depicted by all the summary quotes above, will be to discuss, at least in a cursory 
fashion, theories of the welfare state. Before this, a very brief history of the welfare state and 
how it fits in this study should prove helpful. 
The welfare state. Flora & Heidenheimer (1981) tell us that the “prehistory of the modern 
welfare state was referred to as the ‘Poor Law Period’ and was closely related to the early state 
building efforts of fifteenth and sixteenth century Europe” (p. 22). They add that national 
differences within Europe in the creation of states with strong bureaucracies and paternalistic 
traditions may explain the earlier beginnings of the welfare state.  As a good segue into this study 
of neoliberalism, the authors argued that the real beginning of the modern welfare state: 
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Had to await the transformation of the absolutist state into 
mass democracy in the last third of the nineteenth century, 
after a variable intermediary period of liberal democracy 
with restricted suffrage.  In thus linking welfare state 
development with the evolution of mass democracy, one 
may interpret the welfare state as an answer to increasing 
demands for socioeconomic equality or as the 
institutionalization of social rights relative to the 
development of civil and political rights. (p. 22)  
From this we can now discuss the modern welfare state as we know it today as it relates to the 
differences between liberalism and neoliberalism. 
Barr (2004) argues that the welfare state is not a subject apart from but fits naturally into 
the framework of economic analysis. He says that theoretical arguments support the existence of 
the welfare state not only for the well-known equity reasons, but also for concepts of efficiency. 
He argues that from a policy perspective, the welfare state is clearly ideological and hence falls 
into the arena of politics. The welfare state, according to him, is like poverty and equality of 
opportunity; not an easy concept to define. 
Barr (2004) also argues that the welfare state exists to enhance the welfare of people who 
are poor, weak and vulnerable, mostly by providing social care via redistributive income 
transfers and cash benefits. The reasons for the problems we face in the welfare state, he claims, 
stems from rising expenditures over the past decades. He points to industrialization as requiring 
higher skilled labor where the demand for unqualified workers is lower. The consequence of this 
is that those on the lower end have more precarious employment. The author states that the 
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neoliberal approach to these new conditions was to increase demand for labor by liberalizing 
labor markets through increased wage flexibility. The problem with this approach, according to 
him, was an increase in inequality and poverty particularly among unskilled workers and single 
parent households.  
Bambra (2007) continues this line of thinking further and in more detail, when he argues 
that welfare state theorists have developed a complex multitude of competing typologies and 
taxonomies, each based on different classification criteria, and each trying to capture what a 
welfare state actually does. He goes on to argue that the literature on welfare state theories, 
which is relatively recent, is in a state of confusion. His article attempts to bring more clarity to 
the subject by creating just three classifications of a welfare state, by country: liberal, 
conservative and social democrat. As a measuring stick, he uses Esping-Andersen’s original 
analysis which refers to the extent to which individuals and families can maintain a normal and 
socially acceptable standard of living regardless of their market performance; and then places 
each country under one of three categories. Under this scheme, the U.S., along with Australia, 
Canada, Ireland, New Zealand and the UK, is defined as a liberal welfare state. This 
classification should come as no surprise as all these ‘liberal’ countries are known for very 
similar societies and have strong relationships.  
Tensions between Keynesian economics, liberalism and neoliberalism. I find this 
measuring and defining of our welfare state quite intuitive and meaningful, as it captures the crux 
of why liberalism and neoliberalism came into existence in the first place: to combat the very 
notion that market performance on the individual level does not matter. For within liberalism and 
neoliberalism, an individual’s market performance is absolutely critical and amounts in the end 
to a nation’s survivability; a point not to be dismissed lightly. The two central economic 
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ideologies that make up the current, and to a large extent, historical tensions, are Keynesian 
economics representing the welfare state, and free market economics representing liberalism and 
neoliberalism.  
With this background of the welfare state and competing ideologies in place, we need to 
ask; what started the tensions that have us where we are today? Myles & Quadagno (2002) tell us 
that the first generation of welfare state studies typically turned to theories of industrialism to 
explain the common trajectory of rising welfare state expenditures throughout the developed 
world. They argue that the main themes are centered on industrialization, which creates new 
demands for public spending as systems of social support are eroded and replaced by modern 
machines and efficient production techniques. Industrialization now creates growing dependence 
on wage labor which in turn creates new vulnerabilities among those with little or no labor to 
sell; namely the uneducated, the old, the sick, and the young. This supports Barr (2004) when he 
discussed industrialization as the cause of the problems of the welfare state. 
The following brief quantitative summary should serve to illustrate why there is a 
growing tension between those favoring a pro-welfare state, normally thought of as Democrats 
and the left wing, and those favoring a more market-oriented economy, and normally thought of 
as Republicans and the right wing.  According to Myles & Quadagno, (2002) “in 1960, average 
expenditures on social transfers (welfare, social security, Medicare, unemployment payments, 
etc.) were 7.5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in the affluent democracies, only slightly 
more than the 6 percent being spent by the United States. In just 20 years, in 1980, average 
expenditures on social transfers had increased to 9.75 percent in the United States representing 
an increase of nearly 63%” (p. 35). Even more than the actual percentages were, from the right 
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wings’ perspective, the alarming direction, which was something they saw as threatening their 
worldview, if not changed. 
From this background of the welfare state and industrialization as one of the main reasons (there 
are others of course) for the growing tensions between the left and the right, we can now discuss 
definitions of liberalism and neoliberalism. 
Liberalism defined. Jessop (2002) starts off with defining liberalism as a complex, 
multifaceted phenomenon. He adds that it is a conceptual ensemble in economic, political, and 
ideological discourse and a strategic concept for restructuring market-state relations; with many 
disputes over its scope, application, and limitations. Of importance, he makes a point of saying 
that liberalism rarely, if ever, exists in pure form; it typically coexists with elements from other 
discourses, strategies, and organizational patterns. Thus, he argues that it is better seen as one set 
of elements in the repertoire of Western economic, political and ideological discourse, rather 
than as a singular, univocal, and internally coherent discourse in its own right. 
Jessop (2002) further defines liberalism ideologically, where he argues that within 
liberalism, economic, educational, political, and social relations are best organized through free 
choices. Additionally, it involves rational actors who seek to advance their own material or ideal 
interests in an institutional framework that maximizes the scope for free choice. Economically, it 
endorses expansion of the market economy. Politically, it implies that collective decision making 
should involve a constitutional state with limited substantive powers of economic and social 
intervention, and a commitment to maximizing the freedom of actors in the economy and the 
substantive freedom of legally recognized subjects in the public sphere. In short, liberalism 
rejects the basic tenet of the welfare state and believes that the market, not government, can and 
should provide solutions.  We now move to defining neoliberalism. 
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Neoliberalism defined. I’ve coined neoliberalism as, ‘liberalism on steroids’. Jessop 
(2002) in my view, supports this as he defines neoliberalism as the liberalization and 
deregulation of economic transactions, not only within national borders but also; and more 
importantly; across these borders. Getting more specific, he argues that neoliberalism is the 
privatization of state-owned enterprises and state-provided services; the use of market proxies in 
the residual public sector; and the treatment of public welfare spending as a cost of international 
production, rather than as a source of domestic demand.  As a political project, it seeks to roll 
back forms of state intervention associated with the mixed economy and the Keynesian welfare 
state defined above, both here and abroad.  
Jessop (2002) completes his definition of neoliberalism by claiming that is also involves 
enhanced state intervention to roll forward new forms of it that are purportedly more suited to a 
market-driven and, more recently, to a knowledge-driven globalizing economy. This typically 
involves the selective upgrade of state capacities and securing conditions for a smoothly 
operating world market. He also asserts that within a neoliberal environment, urban and regional 
governments and growth coalitions may gain a key role as strategic partners of business (and 
education) in this changed context. We will see how this is actually manifested here in the U.S. 
in an urban environment in the works of Kozol (2005) and Lipman (2004); where they discuss 
neoliberalism’s direct impact on urban education. 
In summary, Jessop (2002) and Bambra (2007) describe and compare both liberalism and 
neoliberalism as both having their core meanings as rejections and repudiations of Keynesian 
economics, or the welfare state. The main point of contention between liberalism/neoliberalism 
and Keynesian economics is that an individual’s market performance, be that individual young, 
sick, unemployed or old, either does or does not matter; with the former arguing that is does and 
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the latter that is does not. Finally, neoliberalism has taken liberalism in a far more forceful and 
powerful direction inasmuch as its ambitions are global, not national, which reconfigures and 
increases hubs of power that become borderless, resulting in increases of influence that appear 
limitless and at the same time, reducing the traditional influences of national governments.  
This in my view may be the most critical aspect of neoliberalism. Assuming that national 
governments in democratic societies theoretically represent the ‘will of the people’; such will be 
clearly thwarted in favor of corporate interests represented by only a few like-minded people 
whose sole intent is wealth accumulation and the power it brings them. There are of course 
additional definitions of neoliberalism that need to be discussed. 
Additional definitions of neoliberalism. Harvey (2005) in his book: A Brief History of 
Neoliberalism provides a definition that is useful in understanding the political nature of this 
phenomenon: “Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that 
proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial 
freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property 
rights, free markets and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional 
framework appropriate to such practices” (p. 2).  
While this ‘static’ composite definition adds value to our understanding, I am inclined to 
agree with Hay (2004) who argues that neoliberalism is best understood as a paradigm; inasmuch 
as paradigms evolve where static definitions do not. With this, he argues that neoliberalism be 
defined as a paradigm by the following seven traits: 
1. A confidence in the market as an efficient mechanism for the allocation of scarce    resources.  
2. A belief in the desirability of a global regime of free trade and free capital mobility. 
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3. A belief in the desirability, all things being equal, of a limited and non- interventionist role for 
the state and of the state as a facilitator and custodian rather than a substitute for market 
mechanisms.  
4. A rejection of Keynesian demand-management techniques in favor of monetarism, neo-
monetarism and supply-side economics.  
5. A commitment to the removal of those welfare benefits which might be seen to act as 
disincentives to market participation (in short, a subordination of the principles of social justice 
to those of perceived economic imperatives)  
6. A defense of labor-market flexibility and the promotion and nurturing of cost competitiveness.  
7. A confidence in the use of private finance in public projects and, more generally, in the 
allocative efficiency of market and quasi-market mechanisms in the provision of public good. (p. 
508).  
Continuing with additional definitions, we next have Giroux (2004) who provides an 
excellent albeit scathing definition of neoliberalism that covers a lot of ground. He describes 
neoliberalism as one of the most pervasive and dangerous ideologies of the twenty-first century. 
He argues that the ascendancy of neoliberal corporate culture into every aspect of American life 
both consolidates economic power in the hands of the few and aggressively attempts to break the 
power of unions, decouple income from productivity, subordinate the needs of society to the 
market, and deem public services and goods an unconscionable luxury. As a note, ‘decoupling 
income from productivity’ is his way saying that neoliberal corporate culture gives legitimacy to 
such immensely high paying occupations as bond trading, derivatives, swaps and other exotic 
financial instruments and practices where nothing is actually produced; yet highly rewarded. But 
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it does more. “It thrives on a culture of cynicism, fear, insecurity, and despair” (p. 494). 
Neoliberalism attempts to eliminate an engaged critique about its most basic principles and 
social consequences by embracing the market as the ‘arbiter of social destiny’. Its pervasiveness 
is evident not only in its unparalleled influence on the global economy, but also by its power to 
redefine the very nature of politics and sociality. Free-market fundamentalism rather than 
democratic idealism is now the driving force of economics and politics in most of the world.  
Giroux (2005) continues his attack on neoliberalism; this time even more forceful. He 
argues, using the work of Henry (2003) that under the reign of neoliberalism, capital and wealth 
have been largely distributed upwards, while civic virtue has been undermined by a slavish 
celebration of the free market as the model for organizing all facets of everyday life. He charges 
straightforward by arguing that when proponents of neoliberalism invoke politics, they substitute 
ideological certainty for reasonable doubt, and deplete the national reserves of political 
intelligence just as “they endorse the illusion that the future can be bought instead of earned” (p. 
4).  In other words, he, in my view, argues for the case that neoliberalism has in effect 
successfully rendered our collective critical abilities, impotent. The result of which makes it 
unquestioned, and more importantly, unchallenged. 
We also have Peck & Tickell (2002) who tell us that neoliberalism is a sort of an OS 
(operating system), to borrow a phrase from computer science, which directs global competition 
inducing far reaching programs to restructure a wide range of national and local contexts. 
Examples of this on the national level would be the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) of 2001; 
and for a local context here in Chicago, Renaissance 2010.  
In a local perspective of neoliberalism, Gulson (2009) argues that “neoliberalism is 
commonly equated with the decline, or perhaps more accurately, the rejection of the Keynesian 
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welfare state, and the ascendance of the ‘Chicago School of Economics’, leading to the 
legitimacy of free trade and market competition as the organizing principles of a global economy 
and policy enactments within, across, and between nation states” (p. 151). His comment of the 
ascendance of the Chicago School is critical and will be discussed in detail when I look into the 
engineering of neoliberalism; or how it started intellectually; and was constructed to grow. 
Martinez & Garcia (1997) contribute to our definitions list offering a simplistic general 
definition of neoliberalism that, in my view, sums up the heart of a complex concept in as few 
words as possible. They emphatically state, right in the beginning of their article, that 
neoliberalism is a set of economic policies that have become widespread during the last 25 years 
or so. In the United States, you can clearly see the effects of neoliberalism as the rich grow richer 
and the poor grow poorer. Latching on to this, Lewis (2009) provides another general definition 
when he states that neoliberalism is charged with reconfiguring freedom and choice and 
redistributing opportunities and wealth from the poor and marginalized, to the privileged. He 
does, however, warn us that this is an overly simplistic framing that needs much more depth to 
use in any thorough analysis.  
Global dimensions of neoliberalism. I now begin to expand the scope of our literature 
review on neoliberalism by discussing its global dimensions. To begin, Jessop (2002) argues that 
neoliberalism is, among other things, a global concept.  As examples, in Chile, we have Unger et. 
al. (2008) who define neoliberalism as an economic and political movement that gained 
consensus in the 1980s among international organizations like the International Monetary Fund 
and the World Bank. This movement demands reforms such as free trade, privatization of 
previously public owned enterprises, and limited government intervention.  Next we have 
Grimson (2008) discussing neoliberalism in Buenos Aires who states that since the 1990’s, the 
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city’s spatial dynamics have facilitated neoliberalist transformations. Houses are increasingly 
separated from the street and there is a growing sense of insecurity and new urban fears among 
residents. Ahonen (2002) continues situating our global definition of neoliberalism in Finland, 
where he claims that the 1980’s and 1990’s became characterized by an ethos that was radically 
different from the 1970’s. “The rampant neoliberalism of Reaganism and Thatcherism had a 
special attraction to the Nordic people, who had started to feel the life in a planning society with 
its control systems and social engineering, unnecessary and awkward” (p. 177). Ahonen (2002) 
next argues that “The economic boom of the 1980s gave rise to ‘new middle classes’, who were 
prosperous enough to be able to afford individualistic tastes and egoistic attitudes. Institutions 
like the common school lost a part of their credibility, as new life styles and a new post-industrial 
labour market required individual choices” (p. 177). In other words, their long history of socialist 
thinking quickly changed with the rapidly increased lifestyles as a result of neoliberalism. 
Continuing with global dimensions of neoliberalism, Demissie (2008) presents a very 
heartbreaking analysis from Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. He begins his analysis with great emotion 
by stating that “it would have been better if the government had killed us rather than destroy our 
homes. They have violated our rights as people as citizens of Ethiopia” (p. 505). He is referring 
to Addis Ababa as a city that has adopted structural features that caused urban problems that 
reflect broadly the new condition of the country; as the country began to adopt market-oriented 
neoliberal policies. The author uses the work of Brenner & Theodore (2002) who define 
neoliberalism as a doctrine that justifies the deregulation of the state control over major 
industries, assaults on organized labor, the reduction of corporate taxes, the shrinking of and 
privatization of public services, the dismantling of welfare programs and the criminalization of 
the poor.  
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Next, due to its size and population alone, the most important country where we need to 
examine the global impact of neoliberalism, is China. He & Wu (2009) in discussing the major 
changes neoliberalism has brought to the cities of China, claim that “as major arenas for market 
competition and economic growth, cities have become increasingly important geographical 
targets and institutional laboratories for various neoliberal experiments, e.g. place-making, urban 
development corporations, public– private partnerships, new forms of local boosterism, and 
property-led redevelopment” (p. 283). They next add to this by saying that these new elements 
gave birth to emerging neoliberal urbanism, and created spaces of neoliberalism involving 
drastic socio-economic and spatial changes. Among these changes, urban redevelopment has 
become an important component of capital accumulation; a primary feature of neoliberalism.   
He & Wu (2009) present an interesting view of neoliberalism from the Chinese 
perspective looking out at the rest of the world that seems like a mirror of us looking at China 
from our perspective. What do I mean? Using the work of Peck and Tickell (2002), they define 
neoliberalism as ‘offering an operating framework for competitive globalization, state 
restructuring and rescaling across a wide range of national and local contexts, the accumulation 
strategy and market-oriented approaches of neoliberalism not only prevail in its heartlands, 
North America and Western Europe, but also intensively affect urban policies and practices in 
developing countries. They next claim that since the ideology of neoliberalism has extended its 
influence from developed capitalist countries to the rest of the world, different countries have 
experienced their own path-dependent political economic transformations. This supports our 
look into Chile, Finland, Brazil and Ethiopia above, where we saw very similar albeit highly 
contextualized differences.  The authors point to the East Asian countries of Japan, Korea and 
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Taiwan to illustrate that each has its own process of state restructuring in response to the 
influence of neoliberalism. 
  Giving special attention to the redevelopment of urban areas in China, He & Wu (2009) 
tell us the elements of neoliberalization (e.g., privatization, commodification, drastic inter- and 
intra-urban competition and radical urban socio-spatial transformation), are emerging in China. 
In short, they argue that neoliberalism has penetrated urban China.  
He & Wu (2009) critically discuss the rationale for the acceptance of these drastic 
neoliberal urban changes. They state “to cope with the problems of economic stagnancy and 
dilapidated urban appearance after the devastating 10 years of the Cultural Revolution, (1966-
1976) a series of market-oriented reforms in all aspects has been carried out in China since 1978. 
Various forms of state restructuring and institutional reconstitution were implemented to 
introduce and institutionalize neoliberal urbanization” (p. 285). While clearly unique, this, in my 
view, sounds very similar to the initial tensions in the U.S. between Keynesian and market-
oriented economic philosophies discussed earlier. 
Supporting this, He & Wu (2009) add that commodification and privatization also have 
key roles in creating a new mode of regulation within the process of neoliberal urbanization, 
which simultaneously reduces the costs of providing public services and provides new sources of 
capital accumulation for the private sector. They make clear reference to a Chinese shift from a 
welfare state, similar to what was discussed above here in the U.S., when they claim ‘a regime of 
capital accumulation has been formed to facilitate economic and urban growth: from an 
egalitarian society characterized by low production, low wages, high state welfare provision, and 
high state expenditure to a marketized society characterized by mass production, higher wages, 
lower state welfare provision, and lower state expenditure. This will all coalesce in Chapter Five 
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when I discuss Richard Nixon’s trip to China in 1972 as a significant social engineering factor in 
explaining the global rise of neoliberalism. 
Besides China, there are additional global cases of neoliberalism that extends to nations 
where one would not expect. For example, Elyas & Picard (2013) discuss the neoliberal 
educational changes in Saudi Arabia, where they show cases of how western global neoliberal 
discourses are reflected in general education and university policy and practice. The authors 
point to a very specific case where spending of $293 million has been allocated for the 
“Tatweer” project for the development of general education in Saudi Arabia. “The primary 
objective of this program will be to focus on the quality of education to ensure that students of 
public education in the Saudi Kingdom are equipped with the necessary skills to participate in an 
increasingly globalized society and engage with the complex and myriad problems that 
globalization brings” (p. 36). This, in my view, shows that the Saudi rulers see that the future of 
neoliberalism is such that they cannot avoid it and must therefore be prepared to be involved. 
One of the more interesting cases of the nations where one would not expect to see a 
spread of neoliberalism’s impact, is that of Cuba. Powell (2008) argues that revolutionary Cuba’s 
resistance to capitalism, and its neoliberal hegemonic form since the collapse of the Soviet bloc, 
remains important symbolically and materially to the Latin American left and beyond.  They add 
that while the political classes of other countries in the region have introduced neoliberalism with 
varying degrees of enthusiasm, the Cuban state’s resistance to neoliberalism as an ideological 
project, and to US dominance in particular, has been emphatic. Nonetheless, the authors argue 
that Cuba has been significantly constrained in practice by the imperatives of neoliberal 
hegemony, and has entailed a degree of accommodation. “Special Period reforms which saw the 
establishment of sectoral or ‘enclave’ capitalism and a dual economy within a socialist political 
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framework gave rise to some intractable contradictions, most notably a sharp increase in 
inequality” (p.177).   
Another even more exceptional case is Venezuela.  Parker (2005) discusses the election 
victory of Hugo Chavez that surprised political pundits and academics alike. He adds that 
political scientist Luis Gomez Calcano (2000) asserted that, despite the widespread recognition 
of the existence of a political crisis, the only alternative discourse in Venezuela seemed to be that 
of 'modernization,' understood as the replacement of political parties by civil society, of ideology 
by pragmatism, of social utopias by technocratic thinking, and of the state by the market.  
Dissecting this, Parker (2005) argues that any debate over neoliberalism and its 
alternatives in Venezuela requires a discussion of oil and state energy policy and that the debate 
over neoliberalism in Venezuela has tended to underestimate the crucial importance of the oil 
industry; specifically, PDVSA, the state-owned oil company. He tells us that PDVSA was 
successful in projecting an image that differentiated it from the rest of the public sector; that of 
an efficient modem corporation resembling the private international oil giants. The implications 
of this were significant: 
As a result, the political parties (including those on the left) largely lost interest in oil as a 
topic for debate and as a central feature of their programs. At the same time, Congress, which 
had closely supervised the industry while it was in foreign hands, also lost interest. What is more 
significant is that the national executive itself, and particularly the Ministry of Energy and 
Mines, gradually lost its capacity to establish policy and ended up as a mere rubber stamp for 
decisions made by the company managers (p. 41).  
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Returning to the Chavez impact, Parker (2005) brings up a very critical point when he 
claims that since the government considered a degree of macroeconomic stability a prerequisite 
for structural changes, it rejected the option of directly confronting the international financial 
institutions. Nonpayment of the foreign debt was ruled out, currency reserves were maintained 
high, and macroeconomic policy was designed to bring inflation under control. “Indeed, it was 
precisely these ‘orthodox’ aspects of economic policy that led some analysts to conclude that the 
balance was neoliberal” (p. 43). All these cases of neoliberalism’s impact on nations one would 
not expect, give added credence to Pick & Tickell (2002) who argued that ‘neoliberalism seems 
to be everywhere’. 
Additional concepts of neoliberalism. Jessop (2002) provides us with the far reaching 
effects of neoliberalism that describe why it is such an important a topic to understand. He 
emphasizes that it promotes market-led economic and social restructuring.  Specifically, this 
means that in the public sector, it involves privatization. In the private sector, it means 
deregulation that is backed by a new legal framework that offers strong support for market 
solutions. Additionally, he tells us that it created specific new labor arrangements that have 
become popular and familiar to most of us. As examples, he says that neoliberalism is reflected 
in government and private measures to promote hire-and-fire, flexi time, and flex wage labor 
markets. These measures are in essence ‘economic tools of efficiency’ that when implemented, 
have the ability to increase profits. Neoliberalism also supports free trade and capital mobility 
and expects innovation to follow spontaneously from freeing entrepreneurs and workers to seize 
market opportunities in a state- sponsored enterprise culture. In other words, neoliberalism 
believes that freeing individuals and companies from all restraints, as opposed to an intervening 
government, is the best way forward.  
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In discussing another important aspect of neoliberalism that is very relevant to the reason 
for this dissertation, Jessop (2002) introduces two terms; ‘neocorporatism’ and ‘neostatism’; both 
which help explain the issues facing urban education. Neocorporatism reflects the diversity of 
policy communities and networks relevant to innovation-driven growth, as well as the increasing 
heterogeneity of labor forces and labor markets. It is also more directly and explicitly oriented to 
innovation and competitiveness. Thus, neocorporatist networks include policy communities 
representing functional systems such as science, health, and education. With this, policy 
implementation becomes more flexible through the extension of self- regulated public-private 
partnerships. In neoliberalism, states use their resources to support decisions reached through 
corporatist negotiation. These negotiations produce intended outcomes by becoming selective in 
their deliberations. This is accomplished by excluding some entrenched industrial interests and 
marginal workers, like unions, while promoting new sectors of their choosing and privileging the 
necessary core workers. The result of these negotiations is greater flexibility for corporate 
interests and a shift away from centralized macroeconomic concentrations (i.e., national and state 
power hubs). 
Jessop (2002) now combines this concept of neocorporatism with neostatism. He defines 
neostatism as involving a state-sponsored approach to economic and social restructuring where 
the state seeks to use market forces in support of a national strategy. This definition implies 
‘state’ in the context of the fifty states of the U.S. This is done while the state depends heavily on 
its own powers of decision making, knowledge bases and organizational intelligence. We need to 
add here that since education is not specifically defined in the U.S. Constitution, it is a state 
responsibility by default. Consequently, neostatism, along with neocorporatism create 
partnerships on the state level that influence the direction of education towards the interests of 
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corporations. The author adds that these new partnerships provide “guidance to ensure that they 
serve public as well as private interests” (p. 13). Further connections between neoliberalism and 
education will be discussed in more detail later in this review.   
As a further explanation of this connection, Hankins & Martin (2006) in their study of 
charter schools in Atlanta tell us that “the new institutional structures such as charter schools 
offer a window onto the complicated neoliberal shifts happening in both public education and in 
urban governance” (p. 531). In critically analyzing what is actually taking place in urban schools, 
they argue that structural theories about business dominance are insufficient for understanding 
exactly how business wields such power. Their answer comes from Logan and Molotch’s (1987) 
‘growth machine theory’. This theory “illustrates the interconnected interests and actors that can 
comprise an urban regime: political officials, local corporate leaders, local media, arts and 
cultural industries, and so on” (p. 532). They see this theory as the best way to understand just 
how the connection between business and urban schools are manifested; clearly connecting to 
Lipman (2010) and her example of the Commercial Club of Chicago being responsible for 
closing many urban schools. 
In another area of the importance of neoliberalism, and where it impacts the poor 
disproportionately, Forest & Hirayama (2009) explain that an important consequence of 
neoliberal policy shifts are generational fractures in housing and homeownership opportunities. 
According to them, this signifies a structural transformation in the homeownership-based 
societies. What do they mean? Situating this within a common timeframe we will see throughout 
this review, they further add that during the period of high-speed economic growth, the early 
1970s, many households ascended housing ladders towards property ownership attainment. Since 
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the 1980s, however, housing and employment markets have become unstable making it more 
difficult for young generations to obtain a foothold on the property ladder.  
Supporting this housing aspect of neoliberalism and expressing how it impacts the poor, 
Lipman (2008) argues that real estate development has become a key speculative activity with 
properties essentially operating as financial instruments. Speculation, in turn, causes increases in 
property values and rising property taxes, driving out low-income and working-class renters and 
home-owners. Following this and making its impact clearer, Lipman (2008) refers to Haymes 
(1995) in describing the neoliberal discourse as having helped rationalize the destruction of 
public housing, displacement of communities of color and gentrification of their neighborhoods. 
This also means new patterns of spatial containment and the expulsion of people of color from 
the city center and out of the city entirely. Finally, Hackworth (2007) connects this concept of 
gentrification to neoliberalism when he argues that “the location, history and demographics of a 
particular neighborhood are all important factors in how neoliberalism gets localized through 
gentrification” (p. 123).  
I now turn to the second part of this review and what the scholarship says about the social 
impacts of neoliberalism.  
Neoliberalism Connections to Politics, Racism, Poverty and Education. 
 Neoliberalism and politics. Pedwell (2012) will present important thoughts that suggest 
that neoliberalism’s connection to politics actually meshes the once opposing views of the 
Democrats and Republicans into a common perspective. This idea is of paramount importance in 
understanding the power of neoliberalism in our everyday lives.  
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Viewing neoliberalism from a political perspective reveals its extensiveness and breadth to an 
alarming and one might conclude, frightening degree. In looking into neoliberalism’s impact on 
politics, Peck & Tickell (2002) assert that what began as a starkly utopian intellectual movement 
was aggressively politicized by Reagan and Thatcher in the 1980’s. The new religion of 
neoliberalism combines a commitment to the extension of markets with a profound antipathy 
towards all kinds of market interventionist (welfare state) strategies.  
In taking a deeper look into neoliberalism’s connection to politics, we start by recalling 
the British Newspaper, The Daily Telegraph, when on 22 May 1980, it introduced Margaret 
Thatcher’s now well-known and famous acronym TINA, which stands for: There Is No 
Alternative; where she defended fundamental neoliberal thinking to her many critics as the only 
way forward from the economic malaise that plagued much of the world at that time. There is 
reason to give her seemingly narrow view a significant degree of credibility. Why? 
Referring back to the opening paragraph that suggested a new common perspective 
among the major political parties, Pedwell (2012) analyzes the impacts on the writings of 
President Obama; specifically, his book, The Audacity of Hope, where he argues that the United 
States is suffering the effects of an ‘empathy deficit’. The author attempts to theorize the politics 
of empathy in a context in where visions of community and social justice premised on 
empathetic engagement need to be situated within prevailing neoliberal discursive political and 
economic frameworks emanating from both sides of the political spectrum. He uses the work of 
Ong (2007) who describes neoliberalism as involving processes where by market-oriented logics 
come to order and refigure modes of political governance and citizenship.  From this, the author 
clarifies that his intent is to offer a critical understanding of the discourses of neoliberalism in the 
context of the U.S.; those discourses that fragment and exceeds its borders, and condition and 
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shape the understanding of empathy. President Obama’s writings are used as a primary source 
for his analysis.  
Pedwell (2012) using the work of several authors, argues that the link between empathy 
and social justice has long been discussed within feminist and antiracist social theory. For 
example, he says that Jacqui Alexander and Chandra Talpade Mohanty argue that in a 
contemporary world order structured by transnational capital (i.e., global neoliberalism), 
engagement based on empathy is integral to processes of fostering social justice and building 
solidarity across otherwise debilitating social, economic and psychic boundaries. Springing from 
this thinking and from a political perspective regardless of which side it comes from, empathy is 
thus claimed by all and defined in all cases as positive. Understood in shorthand as the ability to 
put oneself in the other's shoes, empathy is, according to these narratives, what we want to 
cultivate in ourselves and others.  It is the affective attribute that we want to define our society 
and which we hope will characterize our interactions with those living outside our borders. 
“When empathy is lacking or deficient, we need to nurture it. Where there is oppression or 
violence, empathy can heal” (p. 280). With these utopian definitions, I ask, who will argue 
against this idea of empathy? However, here’s where it gets interesting. 
Pedwell (2012) next argues that the political fortunes of George Bush, Bill Clinton and 
George W. Bush, all turned on a national discourse of empathy.  For Bill Clinton it was the ‘I 
feel your pain’ that he benefited from and for the Republicans, the ‘compassionate conservatism’ 
worked for them as well. The author goes on to argue that Obama did not shy away from the 
affective use of such rhetoric. However, his thinking and elaborations, according to them, 
intentionally or not, still reflect the central aspects of a dominant neoliberal framework. 
Reminding his audience that the power of the market in our country to generate wealth and 
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expand freedom is both unquestioned and unmatched; Obama thus impels the American citizen 
to cultivate empathy as an emotional capacity alongside the imperatives to challenge yourself 
and take greater risks in the face of greater odds as a means to realize your full potential. Pedwell 
(2012), using the work of Ahmed (2004) argues that from these Obama narratives, “empathy 
sustains that very difference that it may seek to overcome” (p. 283). How so? The rationale they 
use is that subjects assume that they can feel what another feels in ways that fail to take account 
of the differences in history, power, and experience. I am in agreement and argue that they 
cannot, and that this is a false idea; as true empathy must take these extraneous factors into 
consideration to generate real feelings; which cause real behavioral changes; otherwise it is 
merely an emotionless intellectual exercise. In other words, I argue that ‘true empathy’ as an idea 
is one thing that is independent of external issues and is grounded in human biological and 
psychological emotional capacities to feel for one another. However, its application outside of 
these emotions as we are discussing here, is another thing entirely.  
In concluding our analysis of the connection between neoliberalism and politics, Pedwell 
(2012) admits that the Republican discourses of compassion served merely as a code for the 
privatization of the state, and for the federal government's divestiture of responsibility for 
ameliorating social suffering by impelling individuals, local institutions, and faith-based 
organizations to take up this obligation themselves. On the other hand, the author argues that 
upon closer inspection, Obama's image of the empathetic American as a risk-taking individual 
who not only cultivates appropriate (albeit false) emotional capacities and skills, but also 
engages in healthy economic competition, is in essence, an ideal neoliberal citizen. Thus one 
may conclude that Margaret Thatcher’s TINA, may indeed have some merit, as it has 
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foundations of neoliberalism coming from both sides of the political spectrum. Next in 
discussing specific impacts, we have arguments about neoliberalism’s connection to racism. 
Neoliberalism and racism. Roberts & Mahtani (2010) assert “there is a seductive, 
common-sense logic to neoliberalism that reproduces racist ideologies” (p. 250). In a more in-
depth look into the racism connection, the authors introduce David Wilson’s book: Cities and 
Race: America’s New Black Ghettos (2006) that also examines the connection between 
neoliberalism and race. Wilson, in his analysis, argues that race is mobilized to show that 
racialized subjectivities are essential in justifying certain impacts of neoliberalization that are 
experienced disproportionately within racialized communities. The authors however are critical 
of this book and claim that it is more evocative than explanatory. They argue that in his book, the 
racist eruptions that result from neoliberal policies and practices are cited, but race is imagined as 
a fixed category, where individual racialized groups are seen as distinct and mapped onto 
neoliberal policy outcomes. From this they conclude that within neoliberalism, Wilson places 
racism as a socioeconomic process that has racial implications, but little is said about the ways 
that neoliberalism modifies the way race is experienced or understood in society. Thus they 
classify Wilson’s work as a theorization of neoliberalism and race that is incomplete; at best.  
To correct this, or perhaps to enhance it, Roberts & Mahtani (2010) recommend a move 
from analyses of race and neoliberalism towards analyses of race neoliberalism. What do they 
mean? To them, this kind of analysis more clearly delineates how race and racism are 
inextricably embedded in the neoliberal project. To begin the process of racing neoliberalism, it 
is essential to understand neoliberalism as a facet of a racist society that works to both reinforce 
the racial structure of society, while also modifying the processes of racialization. The violent 
racial history of the U.S. clearly supports this. They mention other researchers, Gilmore 2006; 
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McKittrick 2006 & Pulido 2006, as having pointed out that race is a fundamental organizing 
principle in society. In formulating their position more clearly, Roberts & Mahtani (2010) use the 
work of Davis (2007) below, who claims that under neoliberal racism, the relevance of the raced 
subject, racial identity and racism is subsumed under the auspices of meritocracy. For in a 
neoliberal society, individuals are supposedly freed from identity and operate under the limiting 
assumptions that hard work will be rewarded if the game is played according to the rules. 
Consequently, any impediments to success are attributed to personal flaws, not race. This 
attribution affirms notions of neutrality and silences claims of racializing and racism. In short, 
racism and neoliberalism are not just as causal connections the way Wilson describes them, but 
instead are imbedded in the very way neoliberalism is used to define society in general. 
In a different look into the connection between neoliberalism and racism, Pedroni (2011) 
uses the city of Detroit for his analysis. He begins by arguing that in Detroit, the region’s largely 
neoliberal corporate and political leadership maneuvers to reposition the city as the global hub of 
mobility technology, all the while it advances particular development strategies in urban   
education, housing, infrastructure, and governance; all with implications for social exclusion. He 
adds that in this process, strong connections to racist policies are created by reimagining the city 
to supplant the present dominant racially-coded narrative of a Black, chaotic, crime-ridden 
industrial hulk, with a vision of a metropolitan region as a gleaming, dynamic, hip and 
discursively white, global hub of emergent mobility technology. In a critical view of this, he adds 
that while such deployments are framed as both inevitable and in the best interest of everyone, 
they are also “deeply implicated in the restructuring and deepening of social and educational 
containment and exclusion, particularly for the city’s overwhelmingly impoverished Black and 
immigrant residents” (p .204). 
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Davis (2007) adds to our discussion concerning neoliberalism and racism with a study 
she began by collecting data on battered women on welfare. She begins her analysis by claiming 
that her study sits squarely in the dramatic roll-back of the welfare state and a free- market 
enterprise of race-blindness, a strategy coordinated at the intersection of neoliberalism, welfare 
reform, and white privilege. What exactly does she mean by race-blindness?  
Davis (2007) answers by telling us about the decades old Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 that institutionalized invidious restrictions on 
access to federal support for poor people. According to her, it simultaneously forced recipients 
into a low-wage market with the stunning expectation that nothing would interfere with their 
individual effort to move out of poverty; not even racism. She argues that this expectation was 
generated by conservative public intellectuals like Murray (1984) and ‘think tanks’ such as the 
Manhattan Institute. She then says that improvising race-blindness was so effective that by the 
1990s, it was respectable to make it more difficult for Blacks to access public assistance and, due 
to the triumphant growth of the service sector, more difficult to secure employment at a decent 
living wage. As a result of this, although most people associated welfare negatively with Blacks, 
it was not viewed as racist to be against welfare. She asserts that the supposition that society is 
race-blind, is organized around a political agenda that forces claims of racism into silence. How 
is this connected to neoliberalism? 
Davis (2007) answers this by arguing that race and racism are inextricably connected to 
historical, political and economic moments. She adds that it is crucial to contextualize altered 
expressions of race and racism to see how they are cast. Neoliberalism is typically characterized 
as a set of economic tenets promoting more efficient government.  This efficiency is said to help 
individuals and countries compete better by proclaiming the private free market as the solution to 
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social problems. From here she gets very specific by claiming that neoliberalism involves 
decreased government responsibility for addressing social problems, privatization of public 
services, with examples running the gamut from schools run by the Edison Corporation to job 
placement in the Departments of Social Services being managed by companies like Wildcat. 
Davis (2007) extends her understanding of the impact neoliberalism has on racism past 
these specific points where she argues there is much more to it than the reverence of free market 
principles.  Neoliberalist practices pull into its sphere a market of ideas about a lot of things 
including family, gender and racial ideology. She references Lisa Duggan (2003) who discusses 
neoliberalism as being ‘saturated with race’; using capitalism to hide racial and other inequalities 
by relocating racially coded economic disadvantage and reassigning identity-based biases to the 
private and personal spheres. What does she mean here?  
Davis (2007) responds to this question by arguing that within neoliberalism, the 
government absolves itself from its historic role in the intervention and managing of racial 
disputes; especially those involving education.  What does she mean? A good place to bring to 
light her point is with Stephen Eisdorfer (1994) who discusses public school choice and racial 
integration in the Seton Hall Law Review. He tells us that “the Reagan administration initiative 
was perceived as an overt strategy to undo efforts to desegregate public school systems in the 
north and east. Thus, for historical reasons, even public school choice proposals trigger fears and 
suspicions that one of the intended effects of school choice is to terminate efforts to desegregate 
schools in the north and west and re-segregate schools in the south” (p. 943). These fears are 
historically based and show the dire need for government intervention to enforce integration on 
those who oppose it.  
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An example of this necessary government intervention exploded in the public eye in 
1963. Then Governor George Wallace told his constituents that ‘in the name of the greatest 
people that have ever trod this earth, I draw the line in the dust and toss the gauntlet before the 
feet of tyranny, and I say segregation now, segregation tomorrow, and segregation forever’. This 
was his response to an attempt by two black students to register in the University of Alabama. 
President Kennedy was forced to federalize the Alabama National Guard to enforce the law 
forcing Governor Wallace to back down. 
This now famous historical incident provides a powerful and dramatic example and 
understanding of the absolute need for government intervention in racial disputes in our country. 
This is what Davis (2007) argues is being relinquished by the current neoliberal imperatives. We 
now turn to the impact neoliberalism has on poverty; a related concept.  
Neoliberalism and poverty. The idea of poverty is itself a very complex topic with many 
dimensions. Yapa (1996) in his book: What Causes Poverty? A Postmodern View where he uses 
Foucault’s thinking on power as his foundation in analyzing the causes of poverty. The author 
starts by arguing that poverty is represented in the literature as essentially an economic problem; 
i.e., people are poor because they do not have enough money to purchase a market basket of 
basic goods and services. In other words, they cannot afford to buy food, clothing, shelter, and 
health services.  This, to me, is a somewhat simplistic yet very meaningful description of poverty 
for our purposes. From this, one can easily see the neoliberal connection; where the situation of 
lack, can be corrected through investment, economic growth, job creation, improved education, 
and so on; precisely what we all hear as part of the modern discourse on poverty elimination.  
Yapa (1996) next becomes a bit more technical, but provides a connection between 
poverty and neoliberalism when he adds that “within the academic terrain, the discourse on 
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poverty has been constructed at a particular theoretical locus whose principal defining 
characteristic is economism, the dominant worldview of the social order composed of a market at 
the economic base, a superstructural value system to facilitate the working of the market, and an 
academic discourse constructed to rationalize the general commodification of use values” (p. 
718). What does he mean? 
In my view, Yapa (1996) is referring to Foucault’s (1973a) thinking on power 
foundations inasmuch as neoliberalism creates in its discourse, a reductionist argument which 
claims that the lack of food, shelter, and health care is an economic problem that in turn calls for 
economic solutions. By defining poverty as an economic problem, as a lack of, (here’s where 
Foucault’s thinking really comes in) we are prevented from seeing how the scarcity of basic 
goods is in reality, socially constructed. Supporting this, Yapa (1996) provides a set of examples 
and illustrations that should suffice to make this conclusion of economic scarcity being socially 
constructed very clear.  
Yapa (1996) spells out a number of ways of improving the nutrition of poor families. 
These include reducing the purchase of expensive processed foods, establishing cooperatives to 
encourage bulk buying of produce, giving access to community kitchens, raising food in home 
gardens, and, in rural areas of the Third World, disseminating knowledge of edible leaves and 
plants with food value. From this, the author concludes that we intentionally neglect a myriad of 
options and possibilities by approaching poverty as an economic problem related to income, and 
thus prevent the resolution of the very problem that we are trying to solve. I think it fair to say 
that all these solutions listed by the author (there are obviously many, many more one can think 
of) are not in line with the neoliberal worldview, since none of them even come close to the idea 
of profit maximization and its close cousin, wealth creation; both of which are at the heart of the 
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neoliberal soul. In my view, poverty is not only created by neoliberalism, it is required as part of 
its very survival.   
The key to explaining this, is the idea of maximization. Profits are inescapably tied to 
both supply and demand as something fundamental. Inserting poverty into this economic view, 
in obtaining profit maximization, demand is assured through the Foucauldian idea of poverty 
being constructed and defined as a ‘lack’; where neoliberalism presents itself as a solution to this 
lack. From the perspective of poverty, no ‘lack’ means no maximization of the demand side 
which is why I argue that neoliberalism needs poverty for its very survival. It should be noted 
that this explanation of survival does not apply to liberalism, even though it too is a function of 
supply and demand. The difference is that in liberalism, the idea of profits is not based on 
maximization; just market fundamentals; making it an entirely different animal. 
Following this line of thinking, Bush (2007) in his book: Poverty and Neoliberalism, 
argues that data and material on poverty and income distribution are voluminous, but are almost 
entirely driven and conceptualized within a ‘neoclassical’ framework. He says that is 
accomplished by stressing the benefits that a liberalizing of the markets brings to the poor and 
insisting that the exclusion of the poor from these markets needs to be reduced; points that would 
seem, by many, to be an attempt to help the poor. However, he points out that this discourse 
neglects how poverty is created in the first place and how it is reproduced. He argues that 
poverty does not emerge because of exclusion, but because of poor people’s incorporation into 
economic and political processes; agreeing with Yapa (1996) when he said that we intentionally 
neglect viable options that can help the poor. Another way of looking it this is that the very idea 
of poverty prior to industrialization, is a philosophical one; not an economic one. In other words, 
poverty is a socially constructed idea of the modern industrial age. 
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With a dire conclusion, Bush (2007) claims that neoliberal mechanisms look everywhere 
to commoditize and control resources of labor, food, land, minerals and finance. The hierarchy of 
states (nations) and especially Africa’s position within it, has been sustained by the neoliberal 
agenda to universalize the rule of capital and subordinate resistance to it.  He adds that the 
representation of capitalist’s interests is deemed as universally good for poor countries and that 
there is no possible alternative seen by global leaders.  In support of this, we can recall 
Thatcher’s TINA in the neoliberal connection to politics. Here again, I see this as a case where a 
Foucauldian analysis would view this idea of eliminating poverty via economics as a power play 
that forces people to view it as a natural condition solvable by economics, when in fact it is a 
socially constructed one to the sole benefit of the elite. 
Additional views on the connection between poverty and neoliberalism can be found in 
Lazzarato (2009) who claims that one of the consequences of the intervention of neoliberal 
politics in the domain of the social, is an increase in poverty. Also we have Quiggin (1999) who 
asserts that neoliberal reforms have contributed to labor market inequality in two ways. First, 
they have, in general, favored managers and highly-skilled workers and have removed 
interventions that protected the interests of less-skilled workers. Increasing wages for highly-
skilled workers and reducing wages for less-skilled workers obviously leads to greater inequality 
and poverty.  
Continuing with the connection to poverty, Huber & Solt (2004) provide a quantitative 
analysis of poverty and its relation to neoliberalism. They use what is referred to as the Gini 
index, which measures the extent to which the distribution of income or consumption 
expenditure among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal 
distribution. It is a well-regarded index among researchers studying global poverty. It plots the 
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cumulative percentages of total income received against the cumulative number of recipients, 
starting with the poorest individual or household. Bypassing the purely technical terminology 
and formulations, a Gini index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies 
perfect inequality. Looking at many countries that have adopted neoliberal reforms, the authors 
conclude: 
We see that the more radical reformers started out and ended up 
with lower levels of inequality than the more moderate reformers, 
as both sets of countries saw an increase in inequality.  However, 
the gap between the two sets of countries narrowed considerably, 
as the more radical reformers increased their Gini index twice as 
much as the more moderate reformers.  The greatest costs in terms 
of inequality were incurred by drastic reform episodes; countries 
that had more drastic reform episodes increased their Gini index 
nine times more than countries that avoided them. There is no 
doubt, then, that higher levels of neoliberalism and more 
aggressive tactics of liberalization are associated with rising 
inequality. The picture on poverty is equally consistent. More 
liberalized economies and more radical reform approaches are 
associated with higher levels of poverty (p. 156). 
It is clear, from my view, that this data suggests that the connection of neoliberalism and 
inequality, with its resultant impact on poverty, is proven, at least within their study. The study 
also suggests that the global aspect of neoliberalism that was addressed earlier may indeed make 
global poverty another requirement to the continued growth of neoliberalism. It also provides an 
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intuitive connection to Martinez & Garcia (1997) when they said with neoliberalism, the rich 
grow richer while the poor grow poorer.  
In a final look into the connection between neoliberalism and poverty, Dixon (2012) 
presents us with probably the most insensitive analysis yet. He begins his article by saying that 
neoliberalism postulates that living in a state of poverty is an objectively knowable social 
phenomenon. It theorizes that the causal explanation for people living in poverty is grounded in 
the inappropriateness of their intentional mental states, the content of their hopes, aspirations and 
goals. Neoliberalism also moralizes this by claiming that the poor have an obligation to critically 
assess the consequences of their own situations of not working when there is work available and 
that they should be held responsible and accountable for not doing so. From this, neoliberalism 
claims that the undeserving poor can be counted on to abuse tax-financed welfare support. In 
other words, the poor choose to be poor to their benefit. This may very well neatly sum up and 
describe the soul of the neoliberal view; as it relates to the poor. 
In a critical rebuttal of this neoliberal position concerning the poor, Dixon (2012) argues 
that neoliberalism’s predisposition to a naturalist epistemology means that it is blind to poverty’s 
ideational and structural dimensions and is thus unable to speak with any degree of certainty 
about the nature, causes and consequences of poverty and its solution. He concludes that the 
neoliberalism’s discourse on poverty is in essence a discourse on human nature; asserting that the 
poor can choose not to be poor. This, in my view, serves to support the neoliberal right wing 
political position that the poor are on their own; and that the rich getting richer, is their only 
legitimate concern. 
We have now reached the last segment of our review. Here we will specifically look to 
refine and focus our understanding of Carter & Welner’s (2013) argument via the neoliberal 
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connection to urban education. This will hopefully provide a more direct link between the 
phenomenon under study and the real impacts it has on education and urban life. We begin with 
examining the purpose of education, then discuss diversity, pedagogy, economics, class struggle 
and privatization before concluding the review with a summary of common themes. 
Neoliberalism and education. This special section will build on the Chapter One section 
entitled Troubles in Urban Education. It was described there as the reason for this study in the 
first place. Recall Kozol (2005) who claimed that as result of the poor performance of urban 
schools, the Wall Street Journal in 1990 wrote: some 60 of the city’s giant corporations have 
taken over the production lines themselves. This was in reference to their investment in the 
creation of a school model in a predominantly black neighborhood that was intended to embody 
corporate ideas of management and productivity.  Also recall Scott & Dimartino (2009) who 
argued that many researchers have observed the use of the private sector in education and that is 
has a long history. They argued that within the last three decades, education privatization has 
been attached to an ideological argument about the superiority of the private sector over the 
public; especially with regards to remedying what many conservative and neoliberal advocates 
regard as the failure of public schools to provide excellent education given public resource 
allocations. The reader will see later in the analytic chapters that this timeframe synchs with the 
explosive growth of neoliberalism. 
In possibly the most direct, powerful and blatant connection between neoliberalism and 
education that happens to be local, Lipman (2010) discusses the decay of urban schools here in 
Chicago. She tells us that on June 24th 2004, then mayor Richard J Daley announced the 
Renaissance 2010 school plan to close 60 to 70 public schools and open new schools; two thirds 
to be managed by private organizations or companies and staffed by non-union teachers and 
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school employees. It was initiated by the Commercial Club of Chicago, a potent private 
organization of the most powerful corporate and banking CEO’s and civic elites. Just one month 
after announcing Renaissance 2010, the mayor presided over the opening of Millennium Park, a 
half-billion-dollar public private project; a world class park, sculpture garden and performance 
space on Chicago’s Lakeshore. This new park was to be a crown jewel in a reconstructed 
downtown of corporate towers, tourism and leisure.  
Lipman (2010) argues that these two seemingly unrelated events exemplify the 
intersection of education policy, economic restructuring of the city, and the cultural politics of 
race; as both represent important milestones in a neoliberal urban agenda developed and driven 
by the most powerful corporate and financial interests of the city in conjunction with the mayor 
and key city officials. Her analysis shows, in very explicit fashion, how neoliberalism creates a 
solid connection between state government and private interests that heavily impacts urban 
education.  
  We can locate an important historical quantitative methodology used to ground the 
modern connection between neoliberalism and education in Goldstein (2014) from her book 
Teacher Wars. She reveals the economic thinking that creates much of the methodology used for 
current teacher, student and school evaluation.  She starts by reminding us that during the 1950’s 
and 1960’s most of education research was done not by testing experts but by psychologists and 
sociologists. Back then, researchers would seek to answer questions like: what makes a teacher 
successful? They looked for personality traits like warmth, extroversion and conscientiousness. 
Because of these twenty plus years of research, there was an enormous amount of data to 
analyze. Since the 1970’s “statisticians and economists have used this data to ask a much 
narrower question: which teachers raise or lower a child’s test scores?” (p. 205). To answer this 
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question, they developed a concept called value-added measurement. This will be a key idea in 
the rest of this section. The early somewhat crude method used a student’s score on an end-of-
year standardized test to predict her score on the following year’s test. Teachers who presided 
over larger than expected jump scores received larger value-added ratings.  
A more nuanced value-added formula was developed in Dallas in the 1990’s. Statisticians 
and economists now recognized that disadvantaged students tended to experience slower 
academic growth regardless of how good their teachers were. It was determined that factors like 
poor nutrition, homelessness and other social circumstances contributed to their performance. 
From this the Dallas research team created a value-added formula that gave teachers bonus 
points for working with disadvantaged kids. “Value-added measurement changed pretty much 
everything in our national conversation about student teaching” (p. 205). Goldstein (2014) adds 
that this new statistical technique grounded the No Child Left Behind Act where student 
snapshots from one year to the next produced the teacher and student achievement scores that 
guided policy and action. Goldstein (2014) states clearly that these snapshots made the teachers 
and schools that serve poor children look especially bad because they earned low scores year 
after year.  
Continuing with further discussion of the impact of these value-added statistical 
techniques on education, we now look at the work of Ravitch (2010) from her book The Death 
and Life of the American School system: How testing and Choice Are Undermining Education. 
She argues that NCLB changed the nature of public schooling across the nation by making 
standardized test scores the primary measure of school quality. “The rise or fall of test scores in 
reading and mathematics became the critical variable in judging students, teachers, principals 
and schools” (p. 15).  
53 
 
This connects directly back to Lipman (2010) where she discussed the Renaissance 2010 
school plan to close 60 to 70 public schools and open new schools; two thirds to be managed by 
private organizations or companies and staffed by non-union teachers and school employees. I 
believe it valid to suggest that it was the use of data generated by the value-added statistical 
techniques that was used by the Commercial Club of Chicago as rationale for the school 
closings. Chapter Four will detail why this quantitative use of numbers to predict things that have 
a social nature like education is problematic at best. 
Continuing with the connections between neoliberalism and education, recall from 
Chapter One that I stated that the reason I began this study was the first hand experience I had in 
the negative rapidly changing environment in adult education. Malcolm Knowles (1969) from 
his book Higher Adult Education in the United States: The Current Picture, Trends and Issues 
discusses what he views as the ultimate issue in adult education. It is worth quoting at length as it 
strikes at the very heart of the neoliberal connections with education we are seeking to establish: 
The educational establishment for all its size and strength cannot help but to take notice 
of the size and strength of the corporate goliaths which have entered the field of education. 
Xerox, Time, General Electric, I.B.M., Raytheon, R.C.A., C.B.S., Minnesota Mining and 
Manufacturing Co., Litton Industries, Lear Stigler, and Westinghouse have all taken on one or 
more educational activities which go beyond the manufacture of materials and equipment or in-
service training programs for their own employees. Clearly the survival of higher adult education 
as a university function is threatened unless university policy-makers successfully resolve the 
issues now confronting them (p. 46). In my view, Knowles’ (1969) bold listing of these specific 
corporate entities directly into the arena of education is a satisfactory example of the connections 
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to neoliberalism. Also recall Kozol (2005) from Chapter One who detailed the direct corporate 
influence in urban schools as early as kindergarten. 
Diane Ravitch (2010) now provides a neoliberal connection to education in New York 
that preceded but is very similar to Pauline Lipman’s Chicago connection. She tells us that in the 
fall of 2001, Mayor Michael Bloomberg and his schools chancellor Joel Klein applied business 
principles to overhaul the nation’s largest school system which had a student population 
exceeding one million. They reorganized the management of the schools, battled the teacher’s 
union, opened large numbers of charter schools, advocated for merit pay, closed dozens of low-
performing schools and institutionalized the idea of choice. 
As a note to the school closings just mentioned, this is a good time to recall the above 
discussion by Goldstein (2014) who revealed the history of value-added statistical techniques 
developed by economists and statisticians in the 1970’s. She reminded us that these techniques 
made poor schools look exceedingly bad thus providing a rationale for the closings. This should 
not be underestimated as quantitative analysis in and of itself often has the power to reduce or 
even eliminate critical questions about the findings.  
As a specific example of this, Ravitch (2010) admits forthrightly that she at first 
supported the mayor’s takeover of the school system. But soon after said “I was increasingly 
disturbed by the lack of any public forum to question executive decisions and by the elimination 
of all checks and balances on executive power” (p. 77). This had such a significant impact on her 
that she joined with Randi Weingarten, president of the New York City United Federation of 
Teachers to co-write an opinion piece in the New York Times denouncing the automatic nature 
of the school system. The article concluded that under this new system, the public had been left 
out of public education. 
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In response to this and to emphasize the dominant quantitative power-driven nature of 
this new system of education Ravitch (2010) tells us that:  
The mayor and chancellor staunchly maintained that any attempt 
by the state legislature to erode the mayor’s total authority over the 
schools or to reestablish an independent board, especially one 
where members had fixed terms, would destroy mayoral control. 
Chancellor Klein told a legislative hearing that if you have divided 
authority what you have is no one in charge. An independent board 
would return this this city to the politics of paralysis. (p. 77) 
 At the risk of being redundant it is important for me to reemphasize that in my view much of 
this drama in education is grounded on the findings and use of quantitative analysis only. This 
cannot be overstated. The reader will see in Chapter Four that this same thinking where 
economists predict human behavior solely from quantitative analysis, represents a core principle 
of neoliberalism known as homoeconomicus. It will show that it is problematic at best. 
Recall Lipman (2010) who specifically mentioned the Commercial Club of Chicago, a 
group of banking CEO’s and civic elites as responsible for closing many urban schools. Ravitch 
(2013) provides a fuller analysis of this private/corporate influence in education in her book: 
Reign of Error: The Hoax of the Privatization Movement and the Danger to America’s Public 
Schools. She asks the question: who are these corporate education reformers? She begins by 
arguing that the education reform movement must be defined in terms of its ideology, strategies 
and leading members. They, the reformers, begin by placing themselves on a lofty perch. They 
proclaim universally accepted desires for education: excellent education for all students, closing 
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of the achievement gap, innovation and effectiveness; in short the best of everything for 
everyone. Who would be against that?  
Ravitch (2013) then states her position unequivocally. Reform, she argues, is really a 
misnomer because “advocates for this cause seek not to reform public education, but to 
transform it into an entrepreneurial sector of the economy” (p. 19). She also suggests that the 
those who constitute today’s education reform movement have hijacked the word reform because 
if its positive connotations in American political discourse and American history. In fact, she 
argues “the roots of this so-called reform movement may be traced to a radical ideology with a 
fundamental distrust of public education and a hostility towards the public sector in general” (p. 
19). This paper argues that that radical distrustful ideology she is referring to is neoliberalism. 
Chapter Six will specifically detail the social genesis of this distrust of the public sector in favor 
of private interests and Chapter Seven will detail how this same distrust was transformed into 
policy. 
Ravitch (2013) argues that business leaders expect schools to compete by cutting costs. 
“The only way to do this is to reduce the number of teachers or lower the costs of teachers. That 
means schools must have larger class sizes or must replace teachers with technology or substitute 
low-wage, inexperienced teachers for costly experienced teachers” (p. 303). But the obvious 
question is does this produce better education? Her response is small classes matter, especially 
for minority students in the elementary grades, students who do not speak English, students with 
disabilities and students who can’t keep up with the pace of instruction.  Of special importance in 
response to todays’ deluge of personal of computers in education she argues: 
there is no evidence that students learn more or better when taught on computers. Computers 
have exciting uses in the classroom as a supplement to good teaching, as a vehicle for research 
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and exploration as a means for cooperative learning and student projects. But computers are not a 
satisfactory substitute for a human teacher (p. 303).  
Ravitch (2013) ends her important book in the arena of politics with a rather scathing 
denunciation of the overall education reform movement. She argues that now with the hindsight 
of more than a dozen years, we can see the damage done by NCLB to the nation’s educational 
system. The Race to The Top Initiative announced by President Obama and his education 
secretary Arnie Duncan made matters even worse: 
They actually doubled down on the wrongheaded assumptions of NCLB and further 
promoted its demoralizing and punitive policies. The practice of closing schools because of low 
test scores has become routine, barely getting notice in the media; before year 2000, it was a rare 
occurrence. In the past, those in charge of school systems were expected to fix troubled schools, 
not shut them down (p. 314). The very last sentence in her book says “protecting our public 
schools against privatization and saving them for future generations of American children is the 
civil rights issue of our time” (p. 325). 
Continuing with our look into the connections between neoliberalism and education, we 
now discuss the thoughts of Russakoff (2015) from her book The Prize: Who’s in Charge of 
America’s Schools? She begins by reminding us that in 1983, what she referred to as a five-
alarm federal report, A Nation at Risk, claimed that American children had fallen significantly 
behind those in other industrialized countries, jeopardizing the nation’s economic 
competitiveness. The report categorized the state of U. S. education claiming that if such a poor 
system were imposed on us by a foreign power, it would properly be viewed as an act of war.  
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Russakoff (2015), using a newly defined group of people known as venture 
philanthropists, reminds us that generations ago, prior to the rise of neoliberalism, the 
foundations of early twentieth century industrialists had dominated education philanthropy. 
“Beginning in 2000 there was a rapid changing of the guard as living billionaires - Bill Gates of 
Microsoft, the Walton Family, Michael Dell of Dell computers, and Eli Broad, the California 
insurance and real estate magnate, became the nation’s top donors to K-12 education” (p. 8). 
These new donors specifically directed their significant newly acquired financial muscle at urban 
education in a reaction to the Nation At Risk report. Just before these new philanthropists began 
influencing education, the most spectacular of these donors was Walter Annenberg who in late 
1993 stood with Bill Clinton in the White House Rose Garden and committed 500 million dollars 
to ‘guarantee our nation’s future’ by financing reforms in thousands of urban and rural schools.  
Russakoff (2015) reminds us that in addition to these specific billionaires, top corporate 
leaders worked alongside governors to raise state academic standards and institute standardized 
testing to monitor student progress. Their efforts ultimately led to the No Child Left Behind law 
signed by President Bush in 2002. Assuming this history, along with the findings from the 
Nation at Risk report are accurate, what is wrong with pouring significant amounts of money into 
the problems of urban education? After all, it would be hard to imagine changing the future of 
urban education and hence our country’s competitiveness, without a large investment. A return 
look at the people behind this new investment, people now referred to as venture philanthropists, 
will expose our connection between neoliberalism and education. 
Russakoff (2015) argues that these new philanthropists see themselves as investors as 
opposed to donors. This is an important distinction not to be underestimated and a major change 
in the idea of philanthropy: 
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In the past, if you gave money to say housing or the arts, the need would be perpetual. You 
didn’t believe it would one day sustain itself. But this group of people understand leverage. If 
you get education right, you’re going to get people jobs, reduce incarceration rates, etc. So the 
idea was to help people analyze what’s not working and inspire entrepreneurs to solve problems. 
(p.9) 
  This places us at the heart of our connection. These new venture philanthropists now, as 
opposed to the old idea of perpetual giving, seek returns in the form of sweeping changes to 
public schooling. With knowledge gained from their economic success, they use management 
consultants and the kinds of analytic tools that fueled the rise of their own companies. They 
pressed for data-driven accountability to measure the effectiveness of teachers and schools.  
Recall the discussion by Goldstein (2014) on value-added measurement where she 
reveals the brief history of the current data analysis methodology Russakoff (2015) is now saying 
is used by these new venture philanthropists. Goldstein (2014) argued that value-added 
measurement changed pretty much everything in our national conversation about education.  
Next we have Sleeter (2008) who argues that neoliberalism has become a tool for the 
restoration of elite power in which education serves as a resource for global competition and 
private wealth accumulation. The author goes on that state that teacher education has come under 
assault in the context of neoliberal pressures on education and on society broadly. In concluding 
remarks, the author states that in the long run, the socio-political restructuring under 
neoliberalism is probably detrimental to historically underserved communities. She ends her 
article by arguing that teacher educators now must become more aware of what neoliberalism is 
and how it is impacting a range of social institutions in order to mount what Weiner (2004) refers 
to as a political defense of education’s value as a public good.  This gives us an initial idea of 
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how neoliberalism guides and intimidates the thinking of others, in this case, educators. It seems 
to put them on the defensive for the first time in needing to justify their actions that were once 
thought good for society by nearly everyone.  
Giroux (2004) provides a deeper look into the connection between neoliberalism and 
education where he terms the current state of education as the dominant public pedagogy with its 
narrow and imposed schemes of classification and limited modes of identification which uses the 
educational force of the culture to negate the basic conditions for critical agency. Giroux (2004) 
uses the term ‘liquid modernity’, which means that the power of the dominant order, is not just 
economic, but also intellectual; lying in the realm of knowledge, information, beliefs, and ideas.  
In my view, he is getting at with this term is a sort of neoliberal brainwashing of the populace, 
particularly those connected to the field of education. In other words, neoliberalism has greatly 
curtailed educators’ ability to critically analyze their own situations. If true, and I believe that is 
it, nothing is more dangerous to the future of education. 
Giroux (2004) continues and provides an even more direct connection to education. He 
claims that under neoliberalism, pedagogy has become thoroughly reactionary as it constructs 
knowledge, values, and identities through a variety of educational sites and forms of pedagogical 
address, that have largely become the handmaiden of corporate power, religious fundamentalism, 
and neo-conservative ideology. This supports Kozol (2005) who spoke in detail of the influence 
of corporations in urban schools in Chapter One. 
Hursh (2004) continues our connection between neoliberalism and education; here 
specifically looking into public education. He begins with re-stating a primary objective of 
education that has been known to most for some time now, then proceeds to discuss what has 
changed. He states that knowledge that education exists in large part to develop productive 
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workers is not new. Throughout most of the twentieth century, compulsory education in the USA 
focused on efficiently preparing students for the workplace. He next states that over the last 
several decades, neoliberal policies have replaced Keynesian (welfare state) economic and 
political policies while, at the same time, economies have become increasingly globalized with 
the growth of multinational corporations. From this he discusses the so what. He argues that the 
rise of neoliberal policies and globalized economies has produced changes in the U.S. 
educational system. Until recently, education was primarily a local concern, with comprehensive 
high schools preparing students for university or semi-skilled jobs. Also, teachers’ work was 
bureaucratically controlled via administrative rules and regulations. What has changed? 
Hursh (2004) argues that over the last decade, educational purposes and processes have 
changed and been transformed; as political and corporate leaders demanded a response to 
increased international economic competition. He goes on to add that policy makers at the local, 
state, and federal levels use international economic competition to insist that schools become 
more efficiently managed and produce productive workers. At the same time, bureaucratic 
methods of governance have been replaced by systems of standardized testing and accountability 
in which schools are compared with one another and in which they face both rewards and 
sanctions. As specific examples of this, he supports the work of Lipman (2009) when he tells us 
that with the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB), the Bush administration has not only mandated 
a massive testing and accountability program but also introduced markets and privatization as a 
central means of reforming education. By designating large numbers of public schools as failing, 
the administration hopes the public will demand that public education be replaced by private 
education.  
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We continue with Hill (2003) who examines the neoliberal connection to education from 
an economic viewpoint. He argues that the restructuring of the schooling and education systems 
across the world is part of the ideological and policy offensive by neoliberalism. The 
privatization of public services, destabilization of non-conforming governments and, ultimately, 
the armed forces of the USA and its allies, have resulted in the near-global establishment of 
competitive markets in public and welfare services such as education. These education markets 
are marked by selection and exclusion and are accompanied by and situated within the rampant 
and exponential growth of national and international inequalities. 
 Hill (2003) is telling us, albeit indirectly, that there is indeed a force behind these 
neoliberal changes that have impacted education. He says that it is the power of capital 
accumulation that creates the organizations, who in turn create and maintain the ideology that 
now permeates education. Here, in my view, the author is introducing the real force behind 
neoliberalism that few, in my opinion, discuss and analyze in length, i.e. the power of capital 
itself. This will become the critical underlying theme of this study and will be elaborated on in 
detail in Chapter Four. 
To support my argument that capital accumulation is the root force behind these 
neoliberal influences in education, Hill (2003) discusses work by Harvey (2005) who argues that 
while the intellectual roots of neoliberalism reach back to the 1930’s, its material origin stems 
from a crisis in capital accumulation of the late 1960’s and 70’s. Harvey believes that this crisis 
constituted a political and economic threat to the elite class across all capitalist countries. In a 
powerful and very provocative assertion, he states “the upper classes had to move decisively if 
they were to protect themselves from political and economic annihilation” (p. 14). 
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Returning to education, Hill (2003) posits that education is now big business; as he refers 
to it as ‘edu-business’. He uses the work of Santos (2004) who, in a quantitative study, claims 
that current worldwide spending on education is estimated to be nearly 2 trillion dollars, which is 
more than global automotive sales. His work is more targeted to our look into education when he 
claims that capital growth in education has been exponential, showing one of the highest earning 
rates of the market. For example, in London, it represented an increased value of 240% while 
during the same period, the London stock exchange posted increased value of only 65%. One can 
easily deduce from this data the powerful incentive for corporations to invest in education; thus 
explaining their new influences; as expressed by Lipman (2009) and Kozol (2005) in Chapter 
One. 
In analyzing neoliberalism’s connection to education, with class struggle as an additional 
variable, Weiner (2004) makes the point that as workers throughout the globe struggle to gain 
control over the conditions in which they labor, as well as the means by which capital is 
produced, the importance of understanding class struggle, class formation and class 
consciousness as they relate to education and schooling takes on a new urgency. His rationale 
here is that class consciousness should be a historical actor within education. With this, he argues 
that by erasing class as a historical actor, social and educational theorists, as well as other 
political workers, miss significant pedagogical opportunities to heighten class consciousness, 
create class formations, and enliven class struggle so that the future has an opportunity to 
become something other than what the present suggests it will be. Since it is clear, in my view, 
that the present suggests that only a select few will be successful, this is yet another form of 
neoliberal brainwashing; possibly even more insidious inasmuch as its objective is to eliminate 
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hope as a possibility for the oppressed. In other words, the poor and those without much means 
should simply accept their lot in life as life and be satisfied. 
In yet another look at the connections between neoliberalism and education, we now 
focus on the concept of privatization; particularly as it impacts urban schools. Scott & DiMartino 
(2009) begin with discussing exactly what privatization means. They claim that educational 
privatization is well underway in all major cities in the country with unprecedented shifts in 
school leadership, governance, management, and accountability. They next add that this new 
movement enjoys the support of policy elites in government and foundations as well as the tacit 
approval of many local school stakeholders, including new educational leaders, teachers, and 
community groups. Yet privatization remains a controversial and contested issue in public 
education where significant constituencies, such as teachers’ unions, civil rights groups, and 
many community-based organizations, strongly oppose it. 
Scott & DiMartino (2009) explain that pro-privatization advocates often frame 
privatization as a last-ditch effort to address educational inequality, especially the racial 
achievement gaps on standardized assessments. They argue that with privatization comes 
innovation, parental choice, efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability. It is easy for one to see 
how the position these advocates of privatization take, stands on somewhat solid grounds. Those 
opposing privatization argue that the prospect of profits being generated from under-resourced 
schools represent a loss of democratic governance and community input. In addition, they 
question the qualifications of those who come into leadership and policy roles under 
privatization reforms.  
In a critical look at education and privatization, Scott & DiMartino (2009) discuss the 
lack of consensus on just what privatization actually means. They argue amidst the debates pro 
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and con, there is also disagreement about what “privatization” is. In bringing to light the impact 
of a lack of understanding, they argue that teachers, leaders, parents, and community members 
are often making decisions about whether and/or to what extent they will participate in reforms 
falling under the privatization umbrella with inadequate information about the scope and 
implications of their participation. In other words, opponents, according to them, often act 
without adequate knowledge of what it is they are opposing. Add to this, they claim that popular 
depictions of privatization often portray it as primarily a shift in fiscal management or economic 
processes, and ignore the social and political shifts it harkens. The authors conclude that these 
renderings fail to provide a more complex exploration of privatization that can clarify what it is, 
how it is expanding, where it is taking hold, what implications it has for urban school reform, 
and why particular school districts seem to be hotbeds for privatization activity. This is where 
privatization’s connection to neoliberalism will begin to emerge.  
In developing a workable theory of privatization in education, Scott & DiMartino (2009) 
rely on the work of Minnow (2002, 2003) who argues that the private sector need not be seen 
just as rivals but also as partners to the public sector. The authors claim that this perspective on 
privatization calls for a broader public debate about the possible contributions the private sector 
can make as partners to government in providing social services, rather than merely operating as 
rivals. This debate would include deliberation about the political and philosophical aspects of 
such partnerships in terms of democracy, accountability, transparency, and equity. I am strongly 
in favor of this debate but ask; what does it really mean and where would it lead us?  
In formulating a response to these questions, Scott & DiMartino (2009) use work done by 
Wells & Scott (2001) who argue that the prevailing definitions of educational privatization tend 
to underemphasize its political and social aspects, and instead focus on the administrative, 
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economic, or technical characteristics. The authors, with this in mind, define privatization as a 
range of reforms that redistribute resources and control over most aspects of schooling away 
from traditional public governance structures to a disparate assemblage of parents, teachers, 
school leaders, community members, private sector actors, and private organizations.  
The dissecting of this somewhat complex definition will direct us to privatization’s 
connection to neoliberalism and comes under a separate title the authors refer to as: Educational 
Privatization: Ideology, Race and Scale. Under this heading, the authors point out that within the 
last three decades, educational privatization has been attached to an ideological argument about 
the superiority of the private sector over the public, especially with regards to remedying what 
many conservative and neoliberal ‘advocates’ regard as the failure of public schools to provide 
excellent education given public resource allocations.  
Scott & DiMartino (2009) boldly tell us that these ‘advocates’ are influenced by the work 
of Milton Friedman (1962) and regard public education bureaucracies as monopolies beholden to 
the constraints of unions with little market incentive to fundamentally change practices. 
Furthermore, more recent realizations of neoliberal and conservative visions for schooling 
include a retreat from race-conscious reforms of recent decades and a radically altered state role 
in the provision of public schooling, with private sector actors at the leadership helm. 
Rist (2002) in his book on Urban Schools as Factories of Failure, begins to close our 
investigation into the connection between neoliberalism and education with a very sorrowful but 
powerful summation taken from his study of the St. Louis public school system. He writes that 
throughout the various levels of the school system were found commonly shared assumptions 
about how things really are. The ‘basic tenets’, as he calls them, may be summarized as follows: 
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Middle class students can learn, lower class students cannot; white schools are good, black 
schools are bad; control is necessary, freedom is anarchy; violence works, persuasion does not; 
teachers can save a few, but will lose many; the school tries, the home will not; and finally, only 
the naïve would dispute these beliefs, as the wise know (p. 241). 
In my view, these ending thoughts of Rist (2002) should not be dismissed lightly; as they 
are not totally devoid of truth. With this sad, nihilistic and hopeless commentary, when asked 
what is to be done with America’s schools, the author responds that any answer will be like 
opening a Pandora’s Box. I am in agreement. According to him, the alternatives range from a 
return to traditional emphasis upon such skills as reading and writing, to the creation of 
‘discovery centers’ where children would be free to plot and chart their own courses in what they 
seek to learn, to the ultimate disbanding of schools as a distinct institution. These ideas are worth 
considering. 
Hopefully, the connections between neoliberalism and education have now been 
established. Before concluding this special section, I wish to show how this connection has 
changed the historical view of education as a tool for social mobility; an important perspective 
that ties back to the reason for this study. 
Urciuoli (2010) reminds us that Americans have always thought of higher education as a 
vehicle for career opportunities. However, over the last quarter century higher education like 
U.S. education generally, has become increasingly restructured, reexamined, and subjected to 
outcome-oriented and cost reduction assessment. Students now go to college in an atmosphere 
saturated with a new neoliberal imaginary; a frame of mind characterized by an ethic of 
entrepreneurial self-management.  
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Urciuoli (2010) tells us that each student now becomes responsible for parsing 
himself/herself into elements whose primary function is productivity; making profit for oneself 
or one’s organization. Career counselors provide students with self-assessment devices and 
workshops that urge them to consider their personal skills inventory. Within this conceptual 
framework, every piece of knowledge one acquires can be interpreted and assessed as a skill; an 
aspect of oneself that can be considered productive by prospective employers.  Skills thus 
become a form of self-marketing, and students readily come to imagine themselves as ‘bundles 
of skills’. What’s wrong with this? 
According to Urciuoli (2010), this new neoliberal imaginary creates a subordination of 
learning to skill production, which then becomes the reimagining and reification of 
communication and diversity as mutually coherent skills that become pieces of the self that can 
be marketed as productive. What this means to diversity is critical. The now flourishing 
‘diversity industry’ emerged in the 1990’s as a corporate response to affirmative action hiring 
policies.  According Urciuoli (2010), this corporate response shifted diversity from a quest for 
social justice grounded in the civil rights movement, to a kind of social commodity. What does 
she mean and how is it accomplished?  
Diversity itself is predominantly institutionalized through the recruitment/ admissions 
process, program structures and course selection. Referring back to the idea of students as 
bundles of skills, the cumulative effect of much of this institutional production, is the discursive 
restructuring of diversity as a thing that people have. Urciuoli (2010) next uses work by Handler 
& Gable (1997) who argued that what people identify and reify as a culture is cumulatively 
produced by institutionalized processes and discourses, and particular aspects of that production 
may well reflect corporate processes and interests. From this they claim that diversity itself has 
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no a-priori existence apart from said institutionalized processes from which it emerges, and when 
those institutional processes are subsumed, wholly or partially, into contemporary corporate 
actions and policies, what emerges is a strikingly neoliberal version of diversity.  
In addition, Urciuoli (2010) argues that diversity is used in ways that align its users with 
a marketized skills perspective. From this, the use of diversity within this new neoliberal 
framework transposes the important aspect of diversity from the group to the individual, thus 
aligning it to the bundles of skills concept. In other words, corporate influences in education 
have used the very structures and processes that schools use to ensure diversity, and transformed 
them into productive skill additions of each individual student to the benefit of their own 
interests. This explains the common reference to black women going into the work world as 
‘two-fers’. i.e., they are doubly valuable to corporate interests, as they satisfy two aspects of their 
diversity requirements in one person. One can say that this is satisfying music to lovers of 
efficiency.  
Literature Review Summary: Major Themes 
The etymological similarities between liberalism and neoliberalism indicate that both 
came into existence to combat the idea of the welfare state, or what is also known as Keynesian 
economics. It was shown that neoliberalism has taken this opposition to welfare policies global 
in a very powerful way that has significant and far reaching implications. The global dimensions 
of neoliberalism were clearly and emotionally established by Unger et.al. (2008), Grimson 
(2008), Ahonen (2002), Demissie (2008) and He & Wu (2009); where each gave remarkably 
similar yet highly contextualized versions of neoliberalism’s impact in their respective countries. 
It was also shown the neoliberal impacts are seen in countries besides China that one would not 
expect, like Cuba and Venezuela. This wide range of differing national contexts gives support to 
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Peck & Tickell (2002) when they argued that neoliberalism “seems to be everywhere”. This also 
indicates, in my view, that the phenomenon of neoliberalism is above national politics.  
In additional definitions, Giroux (2004) described neoliberalism as one of the most 
pervasive and dangerous ideologies of the twenty-first century. Harvey (2005) told us that 
neoliberalism believes that human well-being is best advanced by liberating entrepreneurial 
freedoms within an institutionalized framework while elevating the centrality of private property. 
As far as its direct impact on people around the world, Martinez & Garcia (1997) summed it up 
quite neatly when they argued that the result of neoliberal social and economic policy, the rich 
get richer while the poor get poorer.  
It was argued that neoliberalism has very strong connections to politics. Specifically, 
Peck & Tickell (2002) told us that it was aggressively politicized by Margaret Thatcher and 
Ronald Reagan in the 1980’s. It was Margaret Thatcher who coined the phrase TINA, which 
stands for: there is no alternative. Pedwell (2012), intentionally or unintentionally, gave credence 
for that phrase when he analyzed the speeches and writings of President Obama. He concluded 
that in his book The Audacity of Hope, Obama ironically actually embraced the very idea of the 
neoliberal citizen with his intent to promote more empathy around the world.  
Some of the more pernicious aspects of neoliberalism found in this review were that it 
supports, encourages and actually needs poverty to survive. This pejorative aspect of 
neoliberalism cannot be overstated in its importance. Recall Yapa (1996) who used Foucault’s 
thinking on power, concluded that poverty is in essence an economic problem defined in terms of 
lack. The neoliberalism connection now is one of dependence; in that this self-defined situation 
of lack in turn can be can be corrected through investment, economic growth, job creation, 
improved education and so on; all now under the firm control of neoliberalism.  Yapa (1996) 
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presented many simple ideas on improving nutrition of poor families like reducing the purchase 
of expensive processed food, establishing cooperatives to encourage bulk buying of produce, 
giving access to community kitchens, raising food in home gardens, and, in rural areas of the 
Third World, disseminating knowledge of edible leaves and plants with food value. I argued that 
there are limitless other ideas; all of which oppose the very essence of neoliberalism and as such 
are firmly discouraged. The rationale for arguing that neoliberalism actually needs poverty to 
survive, is based on the concept of maximization where demand is assured, by the socially 
constructed notion of poverty; which in turn creates the need for a solution. This is not the case 
with liberalism. 
In terms of racism, Roberts & Mahtani (2010) told us that there is a seductive, common-
sense logic to neoliberalism that reproduces racist ideologies. Pedroni (2011) used the city of 
Detroit telling us that neoliberalism’s intent there is to re-image the city from a racially-coded 
narrative of a Black, crime ridden area to a gleaming, dynamic, hip, white, global hub of 
emergent mobility technology.  
Additionally, Davis (2007) presented a very powerful analysis of an idea she called race-
blindness. She argued that under neoliberal racism, the relevance of the raced subject, racial 
identity and racism is subsumed under the auspices of meritocracy. Consequently, any 
impediments to success are attributed to personal flaws, not race. This attribution affirms, albeit 
falsely, notions of neutrality and thereby silences claims of racializing and racism. 
In supporting the initial reason for this study, the review ends with a significant effort 
establishing the connections between neoliberalism and education. In this section, Lipman 
(2010), Goldstein (2014), Ravitch (2010, 2013), Knowles (1969), Russakoff (2015), Sleeter 
(2008), Giroux (2004), Hursh (2004), Hill (2003), Weiner (2004), Scott & Dimartino (2009), 
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Rist (2002) and Urciuoli (2010) all gave compelling reasons to connect the changing and current 
state of education to neoliberalism.  
In my view, the most significant analysis of this section that connects all the others came 
from Hill (2003) where he suggests that there is a force behind these neoliberal changes that have 
impacted education. He argued that it is the power of capital accumulation that creates the 
organizations, that in turn create and maintain the ideology that now permeates education. With 
this, Hill (2003) has introduced the underlying theme of this study of neoliberalism; the nature 
and power of capitol.  It will be detailed at length in the first section of Chapter Four.  This 
concludes the literature review.    
Ending Discussion - Segue to Chapter Three. 
I believe the density and pervasiveness of the topic of neoliberalism has had researchers 
totally consumed with defining it, analyzing it and understanding its significant impacts on 
society at all levels; a formidable task in and of itself. According to Ferguson (2009), the results 
of the current scholarship are unsatisfactory; as they have the generated common unsurprising 
conclusions that neoliberalism is bad for poor and working people and that we must therefore 
oppose it. Ferguson (2009) does not disagree with this conclusion and neither do I. However, he 
argues that there has to be much more to it than just stating what we are against. He argues that 
we need to answer the more difficult question of what are we for. I agree and therefore want to 
build on Ferguson’s work; but take it in a different direction. 
This paper argues that the reason for Ferguson’s dissatisfaction and his claim that 
researchers seem to arrive at very similar conclusions is because the research on neoliberalism 
has, like this review above, been chronicled to create understanding. This needs explanation. 
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According to Merriam-Webster (n.d.), chronicled means an historical account of events arranged 
usually without analysis or interpretation. This, in my view, is an epistemological definition; as 
chronicled here really means the grounds used to create understanding. Stated differently, mere 
historical accounts of events in history have the capability of creating understanding because 
they are rational; one of the essential elements needed to create understanding. However, I 
strongly argue that in attempting a fuller understanding of a highly complex phenomenon like 
neoliberalism and to arrive at different conclusions, this is not enough! 
From my perspective, what is missing in the current scholarship is a deep understanding 
of neoliberalism’s true genesis. The means to obtain this genesis is the main objective of Chapter 
Three. I argue that from knowing the true genesis of neoliberalism, new insights will be brought 
to light and hence new conclusions. 
For a preview of the next chapter, the question is: how will we be able to discover a true 
genesis of neoliberalism to bolster the current scholarship? The answer is: a unique 
methodological combination of Heuristic Inquiry and Narrative Historiography will be used to 
uncover it. To lessen the possible suspense and to give the reader a ‘peek ahead’ of where this 
methodological combination will lead us and what it will yield; we will learn from it that the true 
genesis of neoliberalism is a combination of the nature and power of capital and the powerful 
influence it bears on individuals and organizations. This will become our more satisfactory 
explanation of neoliberalism and provide grounds for new insights and conclusions. 
.   
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Chapter Three: Transrationality, Neoliberalism and Methodology 
Introduction 
Chapter One stated that the very reason I decided to pursue this study was due to the 
experience I had as a volunteer in an adult education organization. I watched a sudden economic 
stress force major reductions in operations after over twenty years of service to the poor in 
Chicago. Initial research showed the same economic stress was happening to adult education 
organizations all over the country. For a stark example, Hull House was forced to close after 
serving the poor for over one hundred years. Early findings began to point to a phenomenon 
called neoliberalism as a causal factor. 
This experience and early research had a powerful impact on me. As a man of faith, my 
experience turned into a life mission; an energy to do something. Section One of this chapter will 
show the reader exactly how I came to have such a strong faith; as I am stating unequivocally 
that this is the source of my passion and energy to do something.  
As it turns out, there is a specific methodology that uses my personal passion and energy 
in a structured way to accomplish a research task; it is called Heuristic Inquiry (hereafter referred 
to as H-I). Connecting back to Chapter One, the next question is: now that I have a methodology 
that uses my faith and passion, how can I use it to bolster the current scholarship on 
neoliberalism? The answer to this question is: using Narrative Historiography (hereafter referred 
to as N-H). Explaining both methodologies and their interlocking natures is the main objective of 
this chapter. 
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Chapter Objective  
Interpreting the diagram below. This diagram is specifically addressing what Ferguson 
(2009) and I both see as less than satisfactory results from the analysis of the current scholarship 
on neoliberalism. Recall the common pejorative conclusion of ‘neoliberalism is bad for poor and 
working people therefore we must oppose it’ Ferguson (2009) emphatically stated in Chapter 
One. A deeper analysis is called for. 
 
Literature Review -  Current Scholarship
Satisfactory? Yes
No - Ferguson (2009) 
Analysis End One
Analysis End TwoSatisfactory? Yes
Transrationality:
Heuristic Inquiry/Narrative Historiography
The Research Question:
Can a narrative historiography of neoliberalism provide a deeper 
explanation of its genesis, growth and dominance in today’s global 
society? 
Common Conclusions
New Insights/Conclusions 
ADD
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According to the diagram, the objective of this chapter is to bolster the current 
scholarship by including a different form of data. This new form is a fully integrated use of 
rational and non-rational data found in both H-I and N-H.  The use of this unique methodological 
combination is being referred to as ‘transrationality’ and can be seen in the blue cloud of the 
diagram.  Its expressed purpose is to heed the warning of Otto (1923), which will be explained 
soon, and obtain a deeper understanding of neoliberalism. From this we should be able to arrive 
at new insights that may put us in a better analytical position to arrive at different conclusions. 
This thinking was introduced at the end of Chapter Two when I discussed the difference between 
chronicled and narrative history. A fuller explanation of the power of this combination of 
rational and non-rational data will be part of Section Two on N-H later in this chapter.   
The following two sections will define and detail each methodology, including 
philosophical grounding. The ending discussion will reconnect the idea of the nature and power 
of capitol from the end of Chapter Two and show how it will be integrated in this study. I will 
introduce a new research method I’ve coined ‘prismatic analysis’, borrowed from the science of 
physics, that will provide the reader with a visualization of how the idea of the nature and power 
of capitol will be used in this study as a central underlying theme of the analytic chapters and 
idea source for new insights on neoliberalism. This idea will be discussed further at the end of 
the chapter. 
Section One - Heuristic Inquiry 
H-I Definitions. Douglass & Moustakas (1985) tell us that H-I in its purest form is a 
passionate and discerning personal involvement in problem solving; an effort to know the 
essence of some aspect of life through the internal pathways of the self. The private and 
imaginative nature of H-I introduces a unique challenge in research investigations and in 
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philosophical conceptualizations of human science. “When utilized as a framework for research, 
it offers a disciplined pursuit of essential meanings connected with everyday human experiences” 
(p. 39). To my mind, these authors highlight the ‘constructive meaning-making nature’ of H-I 
that bears a large dissimilarity to the opposing positivistic certainties of science in researching a 
phenomenon, specifically one like neoliberalism that involves human behavior. Hiles (2008) a 
contributing author to the SAGE Encyclopedia of Qualitative Research Methods, credits Clark 
Moustakas, American psychologist and one of the leading experts on humanistic and clinical 
psychology, as the pioneer of H-I. 
Carl Moustakas (2001) Columbia University President Emeritus and Co-Founder, Center 
for Humanistic Studies argued that from the beginning and throughout an investigation, H-I 
involves self-search, self-dialogue, and self-discovery. He says “the research question and 
methodology flow out of inner awareness, meaning and inspiration” (p. 263). He next adds that 
in the heuristic search, one may challenge, confront and even doubt a human concern or issue, 
but when one persists, one deepens one’s knowledge of the phenomenon; in this case 
neoliberalism. The author also argues that one may be entranced by visions, images and dreams 
that connect one to one’s quest. In response to this, I can assure the reader that I have long lost 
count on the number of dreams and visions I’ve had concerning a solution to the current 
problems in urban education discussed in Chapter One. They persist to this day. 
Moustakas (2001) continues defining H-I by claiming that through the guides of a 
heuristic design, you are able to see and understand in a different way. This is its link to 
transrationality; to be introduced shortly. In heuristics, an unshakeable connection exists between 
what is out there, in its appearance and reality, and what is within me in reflective thought, 
feeling and awareness. The exact methods of H-I are completely open-ended and they point to a 
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process of accomplishing something in a thoughtful and orderly way. “Each research process 
unfolds in its own way. The goal of every technique is to help the phenomenon reveal itself more 
completely than it does in ordinary experience” (p. 266).  
Additionally, H-I also falls within postmodern research which challenges traditional 
qualitative research methods. With this, Merriam (2002) supports the open ended structure of H-I 
argued by Moustakis (2001) when she said that “a postmodern research report does not follow a 
specific format; each has its own rhythm and structure” (p. 10). Summarizing these authors, the 
heuristic researcher develops a creative synthesis, that is, an original integration of ideas that 
reflects the researcher’s passion, intuition, imagination, and personal knowledge.  
Douglass & Moustakas (1985) further define H-I as a subjective process of reflecting, 
exploring, sifting, and elucidating the nature of the phenomenon under investigation. Its ultimate 
purpose is to cast light on a focused problem. In this case, the problem is obtaining a more 
satisfactory understanding and explanation of neoliberalism. The authors go on to add that 
pursued through intimate and authentic processes of the self, in H-I, what emerges are 
autobiographical, original, and accurately descriptive textures and structures of lived experience; 
an important aspect of H-I that will be detailed shortly.  
Critical Views of H-I. There are however critical views and warnings on the use of H-I.  
Finlay (2009) warns us that Giorgi (1994) offers a more specific argument against the dangers of 
researchers’ over-emphasizing their own self-awareness and attention to the research 
relationship. Giorgi (1994) would argue the need to keep clear the intentional objects to which 
the researcher’s acts are directed. He claims that work like Moustakas’ (1990) use of ‘self-
dialogue’ in his heuristic research approach is not consistent with the phenomenological project, 
as the goal appears to be a researcher’s own growth and self-development rather than the 
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explication of a phenomenon. For this reason, Finlay (2009) argues that while some 
phenomenologists might include ‘heuristic research’ as part of the broader field of 
phenomenological inquiry, others would not. “This kind of approach might be criticized for 
mixing up the focus of the inquiry and for collapsing therapeutic and research interests” (p. 19). 
Obviously these are valid critiques and warnings.  
Theoretical Foundations and Challenges of H-I. Hiles (2008) gives a great deal of credit 
for the foundations of H-I from the ideas of Michael Polanyi, a philosopher of science. I believe 
it important to discuss some of his fundamental ideas and how they connect to my use of H-I as a 
research methodology; in some detail.  
To begin understanding the philosophy that supports H-I, Polanyi (1958) said 
comprehension is neither an arbitrary act nor a passive experience, but a responsible act claiming 
universal validity. Such knowing is indeed objective in the sense of establishing contact with a 
hidden reality; a contact that is defined as the condition for anticipating an indeterminate range 
of yet unknown (and perhaps yet inconceivable) true implications. Furthermore, he argued “in 
truly understanding the incomprehensible vastness of the universe, any attempt to rigorously 
eliminate our human perspective from our understanding of the world must lead to absurdity” (p. 
3). Of direct importance to this study, he also tells us that “complete objectivity, as normally 
attributed to the exact sciences, is a delusion, and is in fact, a false ideal; a proper substitute is 
personal knowledge” (p. 18).  
Within Chapters Four and Five, I will show that the ‘science’ supporting neoliberalism is 
indeed a false ideal that is highly problematic at best. The reader will see that the foundations of 
neoliberalism are instead actually manufactured by the influence of personal beliefs and 
intentions of specific individuals and organizations like Milton Friedman, F. A. von Hayek, 
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Harold Luhnow of the Volker Fund, The University of Chicago, School of Economics and the 
Mont Pèlerin Society; to name a few. 
Continuing with the theoretical foundations of H-I, Polanyi (1958) argues that “any 
process of inquiry unguided by intellectual passion would inevitably spread out into a desert of 
trivialities” (p. 135). Our vision of reality, to which our sense of scientific beauty responds, must 
suggest to us the kind of questions that it should be reasonable and interesting to explore. In fact, 
“without a scale of interest and plausibility based on a vision of reality, nothing can be 
discovered that is of value to science, and only our grasp of scientific beauty, responding to the 
evidence of our sense, can evoke this vision” (p. 135).  
In my view, Polanyi’s continued suggestion of the connection between passion and 
reason is being used here to give added support to my including below a short autobiography of a 
ten-year span of my life. It will explain my intellectual passion and faith and where it comes 
from; in other words, what drives me so strongly in this study. 
Finally, Polanyi (1958) argues that H-I seeks no personal possession. “It seeks out not to 
conquer, but to enrich the world; yet such a move is also an attack” (p. 150, emphasis added). 
In my view, neoliberalism is such a ‘strong in-your-face’ phenomenon, that using any tepid 
unemotional analysis searching for solutions to mitigate its powerful negative impact on human 
beings will yield little; if anything at all. In other words, I agree with Polanyi (1958) and argue 
that it must be attacked forthrightly with emotion and intellectual vigor. 
The Lived Experience. The following is a short autobiographical segment of my life that 
explains the genesis of my faith and passion and why it connects to H-I. 
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I had a younger brother who died from kidney failure at the ripe old age of 20; I was 21 at 
the time. While I obviously knew that death happens to us all; his death, completely and 
permanently changed my life. How? My older brother whom I respected and looked up to, was 
totally engulfed and enamored with the fast life: making money in the streets, riding in nice cars, 
hanging and partying with the pretty ladies, getting high, etc., etc. My younger brother, on the 
other hand, was practically the opposite. While not very intellectual, he had no attraction at all 
for any of the fast life but was only interested in helping people, especially our relatives, with 
anything they needed done. He would do this with absolutely no agenda other than that was what 
he wanted to do. Nice and kind are two adjectives that surely fit him well. I fell somewhere in 
the middle; sort of a reluctant and introspective fast lifer.  
I went to my parent’s home one day and my mother told me that he was taken to the 
hospital; I knew he had not been feeling well lately. I just assumed that he would be OK and be 
home within a few days at most.  He was gone in less than two weeks. When I arrived at their 
house that day and was told that he had passed away, I simply went numb. While there were 
many people at the house that wanted and tried to console me and the rest of my family, I knew 
that I needed to get out of there immediately and go for a walk alone. I wound up in a nearby 
park that happened to be completely empty; which amazes me to this day, as it was still light 
outside. I then sat on a bench in the baseball field and stared into empty space for hours on end; 
completely losing track of time. 
The question in front of me was simple, clear and right to the point: Why him and not 
either me or my older brother? For sure, if GOD exists, why would He do such a monstrously 
cruel and unfair thing by taking the life of a truly good person and leave the selfish sinners 
untouched to continue in their ways? It made absolutely no sense to me whatsoever. How can 
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GOD possibly exist with an outcome such as this? From that day on, to about eight to nine years 
later, I embarked on a maddening path to discover the truth for myself: Does GOD exist?  
At that time, there was a Barnes and Noble bookstore in New York on 5th Avenue in 
Manhattan, where I grew up and was living at the time. I became a 21-year-old recluse and spent 
every last dollar I had buying books on philosophy and religion. I may have nearly gone through 
the entire Penguin classics. I went to this store so often, that I would play games with myself 
when I came in by closing my eyes and going directly to the philosophy/religion section as if I 
were blind. After about six years of this, I realized one day that while there were many, many 
books that I still had not read, I somehow knew that I needed something more than what I would 
find there. A few salespeople who got to know me over that time span and must have noticed a 
look of dissatisfaction on my face. One day, one of them approached me and told me that he 
thought I needed to go to a special bookstore uptown from them. I proceeded there immediately.  
It was a very small inconspicuous bookstore on the East side near First Avenue and, I 
think, 71st that specializes in somewhat rare religious books. After about a year and a half of 
reading many of those books, mostly written by some of the great Saints, like Augustine of 
Hippo, Anselm, Thomas Aquinas, Nicholas, Peter, Bernadette and yes, there was even a Saint 
Gregory; I one day somehow mysteriously realized that I was finished reading, and that it was 
time to move on and live the rest of my life. I have no clue what it was that made me feel that 
way.  
Unfortunately, the huge problem that remained was that my original question of whether 
GOD exists was still unanswered. In all honesty, after years and years of reading and 
‘intellectualizing’, I finally concluded that there was a 50/50 chance that GOD exists; for the 
logic of the arguments on both sides were equally compelling to my own small mind. The 
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problem with this conclusion was that I’ve always been a person who was very confident in his 
own abilities. However, this uncertainty about GOD, after all those years of trying to ‘figure it 
out’, left me walking around totally unsure of myself and, to be blunt, scared. I walked around 
and felt that if someone were to sneak up behind me and yell BOO!!.................... I would have 
literally jumped right out of my skin!   
Then one day, I was playing basketball in the neighborhood park with my usual buddies; 
no problem. I was in the air in the middle of a jump shot when all of a sudden, I felt and heard 
my left calf muscle rip apart. In addition, and even more remarkable, was that I actually saw, 
while in the air, several muscles cells in my left calf rip apart right before my very eyes! When I 
eventually got to the hospital, I was able to draw a picture of what I saw to the doctor. He almost 
could not believe how accurate my drawing was. I even had the bands in each long cell that, if 
you remember your early biology, represents volunteer muscle cells. 
But, here’s the real outcome of all this: As my friends gathered around me to see if I was 
OK, the pain had not yet subsided and I knew that I could not continue playing. As is the way it 
is in street ball, a replacement for me stepped in and the game continued. After about ten 
minutes, I was able to get up and walk, albeit with tremendous pain and a very significant limp. 
As I was slowly making my way back home, it hit me like a silver bullet: YOU IDIOT! I 
screamed out loud right there on St Nicholas Ave and 141st Street. In truth, I will never win an 
award for being the world’s most emotional man, but I actually started crying, yes,……crying… 
for it was tears of joy because I knew what had just transpired. Yes, you heard me right, tears of 
joy amidst severe pain!! GOD HAD JUST SPOKEN TO ME. All those years of 
intellectualizing about GOD came down to this: my own small mind almost sent me down a 
terrifyingly wrong path and GOD saw this, and decided to slap some sense into me for my own 
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good. To this very day, I have a permanent reminder of that event because even though I 
fortunately, after about a year, lost the severe limp (I still have a slight one); my left calf is now 
forever noticeably smaller than the right. I will never forget why. Below, you can see what I 
mean in the image and judge for yourself whether or not this is evidence of faith. 
                     The Evidence    
 
 
With this brief story of how and why I got ‘smacked in the face by God’, the words of 
Polanyi (1958) ring incredibly true: “I shall never see the world again as before. My eyes have 
become different; I have made myself into a person seeing and thinking differently. I have 
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crossed a gap, the heuristic gap, which lies between problem and discovery. The change is 
irrevocable” (pg. 143).  I can now say with great confidence that the problems of the current state 
of the world and with the question of does God exist; no longer puzzle me.  
My use of this lived experience is also very much in line with Hiles (2008) when he 
argued that in many respects, H-I bears a striking resemblance to such qualitative approaches as 
autoethnographic research, and also with autobiographical research, which emphasizes the life-
story. This lived experience also shows the combination of H-I and N-H as a tool in research. It 
brings together the personal encounter of H-I discussed by Moustakis (2001) coupled with the 
next to be discussed narrative/story-telling of N-H. 
Section Two- Narrative Historiography 
 Definitions. Rusen (1987) begins our definitions of N-H by asking the question: What is 
historical narration? He argues that this question brings philosophy and linguistics much nearer 
than usual to historical studies. Leaning on the work Hayden White (1973) he says that historical 
work is manifestly a verbal structure in the form of a narrative prose discourse. He claims that 
this definition shocked and disturbed most historians who did not take kindly to someone 
defining their work as generally poetic and linguistic in nature. They felt that it “robbed them of 
their hard earned dignity as scholars of a highly rationalized, methodologically confirmed 
discipline” (p. 87). 
 Bypassing what many historians see as denigrating, Rusen (1987) plows ahead arguing 
that the word poetical should be understood in the original Latin sense of poiesis, which simply 
means making or producing something. “Indeed no historian could deny the fact there is a 
creative activity of the human mind working in the process of historical thinking and recognition. 
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Narration is the way this activity is being performed and history, more precisely a history – is the 
product of it” (p. 87).  
In a more detailed interpretation of White’s (1973) work, Rusen (1987) says:  
narration is a process of poiesis, of making or producing a 
fabric of temporal experience woven according to the need 
to orient ourselves in the course of time. The product of this 
process of narration, the fabric capable of so orienting, is a 
history. With respect to the threat of death, narration 
transcends the limits of mortality into a broader horizon of 
meaningful temporal occurrences. (p. 88) 
I cannot emphasize enough to the reader how powerful and beautiful this explanation of 
narration is; and its value to this study of neoliberalism. We will see this vividly in Chapter Six 
when I use the Van Horn & Mirowski (2009) central thesis on the rise of neoliberalism. We will 
see that is a narrative, based on archived documents, that is used to tell a story where the reader 
may find a simple understanding of how a highly complex phenomenon like neoliberalism came 
into being. This is the power of narrative. 
 Continuing with a better understanding of the nature and power of narrative, Dray (1971) 
tells us that the question of narrative as a type of knowledge has received a good deal of attention 
from philosophers of late. His thinking is worth quoting at length as he does a superb job, in my 
view, of synthesizing the various dimensions of narration that pertain to this study: 
History simply is narrative, or that is it essentially narrative, or that 
a history must contain some narrative elements, or that one form of 
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history, at any rate, and perhaps the most important one, narrates. It 
had been held, too, that it is through narrative that historians 
achieve whatever is specifically historical about historical 
understanding; or that historical explanations get their distinctive 
structure by reason of their occurring in the course of historical 
narratives. It has been held that narratives can themselves be 
explanatory in a special way; or that narrative is per se a form of 
explanation, if not indeed self-explanatory. (p. 153) 
Supporting this thinking of Dray (1971) and adding further analysis on the nature of 
narrative, Mandelbaum (1967) argues that history is interpreted as a linear sequence of 
intelligible human actions and that that constitutes a proper reconstruction of the past. He then 
discusses what in my view is an absolutely vital aspect of narrative if it is to be used in this study 
of neoliberalism: its logical nature and how it actually creates understanding. He asks what 
relationships must exist if a temporally related series of events is to be taken as constituting the 
elements which, together, form a single history? His response is once more, something worth 
quoting at length: 
The theories which regard historiography as narrative would have us regard the events 
which form a unitary strand of history as a linear, sequential series: a leads to b, b to c, c to d and 
so on. The historian then has the task of finding the proper continuous series by means of which 
he can trace how elements a, at the beginning of the story, was connected through a series of 
steps to element t, which constitutes the terminus, or point, of the story being told. (p, 416, 
emphasis in original)  
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While this quote is logical and straightforward, it is not without issues. I will address these issues 
when I discuss the critical aspects of N-H soon. For now, I continue with defining N-H and its 
various dimensions. 
Hernadi (1976) presents an aspect of N-H that, as a playwright myself, I would be remiss 
not including. My intent, in all honesty, is to create drama as well as fact in narrating the rise of 
neoliberalism. For creating understanding, adding drama as well as fact for the reader makes for 
a more effective learning combination than fact alone, in my opinion. This also supports my use 
of the Van Horn & Mirowski (2009) central thesis on the rise of neoliberalism as it uses archived 
documents to create their story. I create (actually increase) the drama of their narrative by 
including the very interesting and relevant history of the life of William Volker to enhance their 
story.  
With this said, Hernadi (1976) tells us that “It has often been noted how eagerly 
playwrights go to historical events for their plots. One reason for this is suggested in the ninth 
chapter of Aristotle’s Poetics: dramatic works need an air of plausibility, and what better 
indication that a series of events is possible than the fact that it has actually occurred?” (p. 45).  
Continuing with our definitions of N-H, Ankersmit, (2009) tells us that the term narrative 
is derived from the Latin word ‘narrare’ which means to tell, relate, recount; as applied to 
historiography about some aspect of the past. He argues that historiography is not written to 
prove but to tell. Of critical importance, he also argues that “narrative analysis of historiography 
can find the cognitive message of historiography in the text as a whole rather than in its 
constituent parts” (p. 199, emphasis added). I interpret this by borrowing a principle from 
quantum physics saying that in narration, meaning or understanding is an emergent idea of the 
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combined individual parts of the story. In other words, the cognitive message is greater than the 
sum of its parts.  
 This will become quite clear in Chapter Six as I expound on the Van Horn & Mirowski 
(2009) central thesis on the rise of neoliberalism; a potent story. In this narrative, the emergent 
idea I hope the reader discovers is that the rise of neoliberalism and its impact on society is, for 
the most part, a direct manifestation of the nature and power of capitol. As researcher, I will 
assist in the discovery by detailing my understanding of the nature and power of capitol and 
where it comes from. I will present thoughts from Habermas (1968) who, interpreting Karl Marx, 
argues that gigantic social forces are created by this nature and power. This explanation and 
discussion will be found in the beginning of Chapter Four as an introduction to the analytic 
chapters. I will have a bit more to say on this in the ending discussion to make this key idea 
clearer.  
Continuing with defining N-H, White (2010) tell us that the term narrative history is used 
to distinguish histories that tell stories from those that do not. He is referring to stories that have 
a beginning, middle and an end. Stories, according to him, often have dramatic and explanatory 
effects; both objectives of mine in telling the story of the rise of neoliberalism. 
By taking the literal meaning of the term narrative “we highlight the relationship between 
the narrator’s voice and its purpose in directing our attention to evidence organized in a 
particular way” (p. 120). The reader will see that this is precisely the intent in Chapter Six. My 
goal in that chapter, which is this study’s main chapter, is to make a case for a clear connection 
between the rise of neoliberalism and the power of capitol; through narrative. This is the value of 
transrationality. The reader will see that is a story whose expressed intent is to show how the 
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power of capital influences people and institutions while producing and maintaining a specific 
ideology in the process. 
White (2010) argues that storytelling or narration in historiography has for quite a while 
been deprived of its traditional function of explaining historical events and consigned to the more 
modest roles of explication and illustration. “It is because of the subordinate function of 
narrativity in contemporary historiography that the recent call for a ‘return to narrative’ in 
historical writing invites attention from theorists of the social and human sciences” (p. 273). 
White (2010) quotes Fernand Braudel, leader of the Annales group of structuralist 
historians who discusses narrative historiography. “In fact in its own way covert way, narrative 
history consists of an interpretation; an authentic philosophy of history. To the narrative 
historians, the life of men is dominated by dramatic accidents, by the actions of those exceptional 
beings who occasionally emerge, and who often are masters of their own fate and even more of 
ours” (p. 275). We will see that such a man in this study is William Volker; whose very life 
powered the chain of events that led to the rise of neoliberalism. 
Next, presenting an important and highly relevant dimension of N-H, we have Carr 
(1986) who discusses the structure of narrative, the narrator and the audience. He argues that in a 
good story, all extraneous noise or static is, by its nature, cut out. The audience is told just what 
is necessary to ‘further the plot’. A selection is made of all the events and actions that characters 
may engage in, and only a small minority finds its way into the story. In life, by contrast, 
everything is left in; all the static is there. “This selection is possible because the story-teller 
knows the plot in a way that the audience most likely does not. This knowledge provides the 
principle for excluding the extraneous” (p. 58). 
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Carr (1986) suggests that this point is related to the distinction, long standard in the 
philosophy of history, between narrative and chronicle. Chronicle simply describes what happens 
in the order in which it happens. Narrative, by contrast, in virtue of its retrospective view, picks 
out the most important events, traces the causal and motivational connections among them and 
gives an organized coherent account. This cannot be overstated. 
Referring back to Chapter One, this may help at least partially to explain Ferguson’s 
(2009) frustration about the scholarship on neoliberalism and why the common conclusions. It 
also explains the limitations of the literature review in this study. For the most part, causal and 
especially motivational connections between events and people are missing in both cases, i.e., 
they are chronicled; as Carr (1986) points out. This, in my view, places the analysis of events 
wholly within a positivistic framework where rationality alone automatically generates common 
predictions; the way it does in scientific and quantitative experiments.  In other words, I am 
suggesting that an underlying connecting theme that adds an emergent perspective, is missing in 
the current chronicled scholarship leaving readers to apply rationality alone in arriving at 
conclusions. This is obviously a key aspect of this study and will be addressed further in the 
ending discussion that concludes this chapter on methodologies and segues us to the analytic 
chapters. For now, some final thoughts on N-H. 
Critical and analytic views of N-H. Bruner (1991) begins with an interesting critical 
definition of narrative. He argues that it is a conventional form that is transmitted culturally but 
is unlike constructions generated by logical and scientific procedures that can be weeded out by 
falsification, connecting back to Carr (1986). From this he suggests that narrative constructions 
can at best only achieve verisimilitude, or a quality of seeming real. In what in my view is a 
problematic definition, Bruner (1991) claims that “narratives are a version of reality whose 
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acceptability is governed by convention and narrative necessity rather than by empirical 
verification and logical requiredness, although ironically we have no compunction about calling 
stories true or false” (p. 5). I reject this positivistic view as this amounts to, in my opinion, a 
nihilism of history in general as not having any ‘real meaning’ because it is not science. 
Another critical view and my final thoughts on N-H comes from Mink (1970) who claims 
that philosophers have always held a certain scorn for both history and romance. “In recent 
years, however, there has come into being a new and still developing interest among 
philosophers in what is call (rather misleadingly) the logic of narration” (p.541). Mink (1970) 
now presents a brilliant, albeit a bit lengthy, explanation of the real power of narrative history 
that nicely grounds and describes the essential underlying theme of this study on neoliberalism. 
It will also lead to the ending discussion: 
The methodological preoccupations of psychology, sociology and other social sciences in 
recent years have in effect resulted from the adoption of positivist prescriptions as imperatives 
for the organization of research. In history, however, these prescriptions have seemed least 
applicable and also least able to account for the fact that some historical accounts seem to 
explain and illuminate although they cannot by any Procrustean efforts be restated in such a way 
as to exhibit the required form. Yet the case for positivism is strong. Do you claim to have 
explained why this event occurred? it asks. Well, then, you are claiming more than that it 
happened; you are claiming that given whatever you refer to as bringing it about or causing it to 
occur, it must have happened as it did, in fact, that it could not have not happened. (p. 543) 
This is both potent and beautiful but needs to be simplified and clarified. In my mind, 
Mink (1970) is arguing that narrative logic is of a different kind of logic as it is itself not science-
based but equally valid as a means for creating understanding. I would add that he, in my view, 
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is arguing that it is actually more powerful than science in creating understanding because it has 
the potential to invoke firm causality in the minds of the reader; from the reader’s own entire 
range of mental faculties. In other words, narrative or story-telling has the ability of building 
logic and understanding in the minds of the reader as he/she reads; ending with an emergent 
understanding that is superior to that gained by empiricism. I argue that empiricism does not 
intermix one’s emotions, experiences, culture, hopes, dreams, ego, faith, etc. into its 
understanding mechanism as narrative can.  
For analytic views of N-H, I turn to the thoughts of Howard (1991) from his article: A 
Narrative Approach to Thinking, Cross-Cultural Psychology and Psychotherapy and Otto (1923) 
from his book: The Idea of the Holy. They both discuss, from entirely different perspectives, the 
central concept of the non-rational that the reader will see increases our understanding the 
formidable logic and power of narrative while providing grounds for the use of N-H as an 
investigatory methodology in this study of neoliberalism.  
Dr. Howard, a faculty member in the psychology department at the University of Notre 
Dame, suggests that several traditional research methods are inadequate to many of the tasks to 
which they are put. This is exactly my argument with the positivist epistemology and the 
chronicled nature of the data in the current scholarship on neoliberalism. I also argue that it 
grounds Ferguson’s (2009) dissatisfaction.   
Directly connecting to Mink (1970) and the use of N-H, for Howard (1991), the non-
rational is narrative or story-telling and is a way of thinking. For our purposes, Howard (1991) 
asks the very important and salient question: does story-telling degrade our thinking? This is 
another way of directly asking: does N-H degrade the intellectual rigor of this study? In 
answering this, he argues that one of the oldest views of mental processes is that humans are 
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rational and logical beings. But are humans always rational and logical? He responds that 
sometimes they are, sometimes they are not. Few should disagree with this.  Furthermore, 
according to him, psychological research continually turns up ways in which humans are 
imperfectly logical or at best, logical thinkers with limited capacities. With specific relevance to 
this study, he argues “there are many instances in which one is instructed to entertain story lines 
other than those that are logical and rational” (p.189).  
Clearly stating his position on the differences between the natural and social sciences, 
Howard (1991) argues that scientific and humanistic thought do indeed represent separate and 
non-comparable modes of knowing.  He adds that that is because they have evolved to fit 
different intellectual, ecological niches. “And, just as one would never say, for example, that a 
squirrel was a better animal than a chipmunk, one should not make the bold assertion that 
scientific insights are superior to the wisdom of the humanities” (p. 189). I take the less agreed 
upon view and argue that science is actually inferior to the humanities for reasons explained 
above. From this, the idea of the non-rational, as used in this study, is now to be understood as 
thinking through narrative and story-telling; as opposed to thinking and understanding through 
the positivistic dictates of the natural sciences; i.e., using rationality alone. 
Continuing with analytic views of N-H, much of the sublime and transcendent thoughts 
of Otto (1923) go far beyond the scope of this study. However, I include some very relevant 
ideas of his that lend support to using N-H as a methodology. In a deeper discussion on 
rationality, Otto (1923) tells us that it is essential to every theistic concept of God that it 
designates and precisely characterizes deity by the attributes spirit, reason, purpose, good will, 
supreme power, unity and selfhood. The nature of God is thus thought of by analogy with our 
human reason and personality. He tells us that “in ourselves, we are aware of this but as qualified 
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by restriction and limitation, and as such, these ideas appear to us as ‘completed’, i.e., thought of 
as absolute and unqualified” (p. 15). Of great importance, he goes on to add that all these 
attributes constitute clear and definite concepts: as they can be grasped by the intellect, analyzed 
by thought and even admit of definitions. An object thus thought conceptually, can be termed 
rational.  
First, in my view, this represents a solid explanation for why a positivist epistemology 
has the strong appearance of certainty that appeals to us. In the case of the current scholarship on 
neoliberalism, it explains the appeal and complete belief of the common conclusions by most. In 
other words, our own mental limitations make things appear complete by allowing for analysis 
and definitions. This is the foundation for rational thinking and what, according to him, gives 
Christianity and other religions as well, their source of strength beyond just ‘feeling’; i.e., God, 
Allah, Moses, Buddha, etc. are all rational thoughts.  
This is quite meaningful as it explains the power of positivism, but it is not the truly 
critical and relevant idea. Recall that Howard (1991) suggests that some epistemological 
approaches are inadequate for the tasks for which they are put. I said that I agreed. Following 
this line of inquiry, Otto (1923) argues that we need to be on guard against the error that we have 
exhausted our interpretation and understanding of things. He admits that such an error is not 
unnatural because all language, in so far as it consists in words, purports to convey ideas and 
concepts, and that the more clearly and unequivocally it does that, the better the language.  
Finally, Otto (1923) argues that instead of these rational thoughts exhausting the idea of a 
deity, they in fact imply a non-rational Subject of which they are predicates. They are essential, 
not merely accidental attributes of that subject, but they are also, it is important to note, synthetic 
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essential attributes. That is to say, we have to predicate them of a subject which they qualify, but 
which in its deeper essence is not, nor indeed can be, comprehended in them.  
Simplifying these thoughts at least somewhat, Otto (1923) as I interpret this, is saying 
that rational thoughts have the comprehensive power to include definitions within its range of 
explanatory capabilities. However, this gives us a false sense of certainty that we have exhausted 
our ability to understand things. In other words, to obtain a fuller understanding of the 
phenomenon of neoliberalism in this study, a comprehension of a different kind is required. We 
will see soon that a different kind of comprehension ‘needs to be added’ is a more accurate way 
to state this. This added comprehension, I argue, is the non-rational way of thinking discussed 
above by Howard (1991).  
My final thoughts on the philosophical grounding of N-H and to prepare us for the ending 
discussion, is that the reader, in my view, needs to understand that rational and non-rational 
thinking are not opposites; they are just different ways of thinking. This is critical. The opposite 
of rational is irrational not non-rational. Each way of thinking by itself may be inadequate for a 
deeper investigation into specific phenomenon; in this case neoliberalism. In short, both the 
rational and non-rational are needed together.  
This combination is something I term ‘transrationalism’ and is defined as the seamless 
integration of rational and non-rational thinking in an effort to obtain a deeper understanding of a 
phenomenon. Connecting back to the diagram at the beginning of this chapter, it is found in the 
blue cloud that leads to obtaining different conclusions from the current scholarship on 
neoliberalism. In other words, transrationalism represents the investigatory capability needed to 
obtain a deeper understanding of the Rise of Neoliberalism, in this researcher’s opinion. 
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Ending Discussion  
 Recall from Chapter One that the very reason for this study  was for me to obtain a full 
understanding of the phenomenon of neoliberalism. I also mentioned that it has become a 
passionate life mission for me; as the deteriorating state of urban education in general makes me 
very angry. In the literature review of Chapter Two in the section that discussed the connections 
between neoliberalism and education, I argued that Hill (2003) and Harvey (2005) combined to 
presented an economic view that I suggested was an underlying theme as a causal factor that 
summarizes all the other authors.  
Hill (2003) argued that the restructuring of the schooling and education systems across 
the world is part of the ideological and policy offensive by neoliberalism. Harvey (2005) argues 
that while the intellectual roots of neoliberalism reach back to the 1930’s, its material origin 
stems from a crisis in capital accumulation of the late 1960’s and 70’s. Recall that Harvey (2005) 
claims that this crisis constituted a political and economic threat to the elite class across all 
capitalist countries. In a powerful and very provocative assertion, he states “the upper classes had 
to move decisively if they were to protect themselves from political and economic annihilation” 
(p. 14).  
Together Harvey (2005) and Hill (2003) along with many other researchers, ground my 
conclusion that the connections between neoliberalism and education, the very reason for this 
study, must be seen through the perspective of the power of capitol. This is the reason for the 
chapter title. With this, the question became: what methods will I use to connect these ideas with 
the understanding that my long range objective is to provide a new vision for urban education? 
The intent of this chapter, therefore, was show how H-I and N-H are used as methodologies that 
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can help explain the rise of neoliberalism; with the power of capital as an underlying causal 
theme.  
This chapter formally introduced and explained both H-I and N-H in detail with an 
emphasis on the philosophical grounding of each. As a quick summary, H-I is used as a 
structured qualitative method that takes my own faith, passion and personal journey, factors that 
are immensely important to me, to aid in my research efforts. Recall Polanyi (1958) who argues 
that H-I seeks no personal possession. It seeks out not to conquer, but to enrich the world; yet 
such a move is also an attack. This connects to Chapter One where I used the work of Kuzmic 
(2014) with his idea of ‘outlaw emotions’ to show that my anger at the state of urban education is 
an added bonus in my research efforts. 
With my ‘psychic energy’ now methodologically established by H-I, the next question 
became: what method will I use to gain a deeper understanding of neoliberalism; with the power 
of capitol as an underlying theme? Very briefly, this chapter argues that N-H is an adequate 
epistemological method to answer this question. Why? Two main reasons: Recall Howard (1991) 
who argues that several methodologies are inadequate for the tasks that they are intended. Also 
Ferguson (2009) from Chapter One who emphatically asked himself why he should bother to 
read study after study on neoliberalism; all coming to the same pejorative conclusion that ‘it is 
bad for poor and working people therefore we should oppose it’.  
This chapter argues that most of the current scholarship on neoliberalism is 
fundamentally logical in nature and structured chronically; lacking in causal and motivational 
connections between people and events. This, in my view, is the source of its inadequacy. As a 
response, the power of N-H lies in the capability of creating a deeper understanding of a 
phenomenon by combining the rational with the non-rational. 
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Segue to the Analytic Chapters  
For my final comments on this chapter, I would like to present the reader with a 
visualization to aid in understanding the heart of the intellectual approach I am taking in this 
study. The question now is: how will the underlying theme of the nature and power of capital be 
integrated into the analytic chapters? That integrative process is what is now being illustrated. 
  Early in the chapter I introduced the idea of a ‘prismatic analysis’ that I said will be used 
in this study. It is another concept borrowed from the science of physics. The idea of a prism in 
general is to take a central beam like light and ‘refract’, or separate out, its constituent parts. This 
is how a rainbow comes from a beam of white light directed into a prism. In this study, the idea 
is to use the nature and power of capitol, direct it into a prism and refract out its constituent parts. 
The prism itself can be understood as transrationality, or the combined explanatory power of H-I 
and N-H that seamlessly integrates the rational with the non-rational.  
As the below diagram will show, the output, in this case the analytic chapters, will all be 
undergirded by this central theme as having their origin in it. My hope is that this rudimentary 
visualization of this idea of ‘refracting’ may aid the reader in understanding my overall intent of 
bolstering the current scholarship on neoliberalism by seeing and understanding it through the 
lens of the power of capitol: 
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Interpreting the diagram: Here, reading from left to right, the nature and power of capital 
is seen as the single white light in the left side of the diagram which is directed into the prism for 
refraction. The colored separate individual outputs on the right side of the diagram represent the 
analytic chapters. In other words, the reader should interpret this as Chapters Four through Seven 
having the nature and power of capital as an underlying theme and force that actually makes 
things happen. Another way of interpreting this is that the diagram represents a visualization of 
the causal and motivational elements that connects events, individuals and institutions found in 
the analytic chapters to the central theme of the power of capitol. Simply stated, the colored 
outputs represent the various narratives that explain how capital has greatly influenced the rise of 
neoliberalism. We are now in a position to begin the analytic chapters. 
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Chapter Four: The Intellectual Foundations of Neoliberalism 
Introduction  
Chapter purpose. This chapter critically discusses what, in my view, are the two 
intellectual concepts that actually make neoliberalism work. I’ve coined them the two pillars of 
neoliberalism. The first is known as homoeconomicus; defined by Yamagishi, Takagishi, 
Matsumoto, & Kiyonari (2014) as a model for the human agent in neoclassical economics; a 
rational maximizer of self-interest. The reader should be aware of the importance of the word 
model in this definition because it means that is amenable to mathematics and prediction; which 
are the tools and objectives of economists. For a more thorough understanding of the term 
homoeconomicus; it is also captured by the term ‘economic man’ which is defined nicely by 
Investopedia (n.d.) as a term: 
First coined in the late 19th century, the term 'Economic Man' has 
developed to refer to a hypothetical individual who acts rationally 
and with complete knowledge, but entirely out of self-interest and 
the quest to maximize personal utility. Economic Man is an 
imaginary figure who is able to satisfy economic models that push 
for consumer equilibrium. All of Economic Man's choices are 
based on the fulfillment of his or her "utility function", meaning 
the ability to maximize any situation that involves choice. (p. 1, 
quotations in original text)  
These two terms, homoeconomicus and economic man, will be deemed equivalent and used 
interchangeably in this chapter and study.  
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The second intellectual foundation that will be critically analyzed is known as the 
division of labor; defined by Merriam-Webster (n.d.) as the breakdown of labor into its 
components and their distribution among different persons, groups, or machines to increase 
productive efficiency. Of critical importance to this study of neoliberalism, it is a theory of 
wealth creation. We will see that Adam Smith (1952) in his famous book: An Inquiry into the 
Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations is given credit as the originator of this idea.  
To the reader, they may sound like disparate concepts requiring separate chapters, but I 
will present views by Jürgen Habermas (1968) from his book: Knowledge and Human Interests 
and Karl Marx (1973) from his book: Grundrisse: An Introduction to the Critique of Political 
Economy that shows that they both emanate from the common philosophical concept of capital. 
Building on their thoughts, this chapter begins with my understanding of the nature and power of 
capital. After reflection, I’ve taken liberty to build on and extend the transcendent thoughts of 
these two brilliant men to argue that capital may be a prime causal factor in the actual creation of 
social structure and associated social knowledge; now being cemented by neoliberalism.  
This chapter will start with Habermas (1968) and Marx (1973) to begin the discussion on 
my understanding of the nature and power of capital. In addition, this analysis will provide the 
reader my rationale for including the nature and power of capital as the central idea stream in the 
prismatic analysis introduced at the end of Chapter Three. This is then followed by two main 
sections; one for homoeconomicus and one for the division of labor. Last, an ending summary 
and discussion that segues us to Chapter Five.  
Preview of Sections One and Two and the final discussion. The first section begins with 
homoeconomicus, also captured by economic man, by defining both classical and neoclassical 
economics and their historical contexts that will be necessary for understanding the rest of the 
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section.  Next, Persky (1995) discusses what he terms the ethology of homoeconomicus within 
historical contexts up to the modern view. Hinnant (1998) then discusses the widely accepted 
origination of this concept from the thoughts of John Stuart Mill’s political economy. Continuing 
along the line of historical contexts, Bowles & Gintis (1993) discuss the German Historical 
School and present it as an explanation of how we arrived at the modern understanding of 
homoeconomicus; with a special emphasis on a concept known as contested exchange.  Next, 
Myers & Papageorgiou (1991) give us a clear understanding of how the human mind actually 
makes so-called rational choices; as we will see, a central aspect of homoeconomicus.  
Stinging critical views on homoeconomicus from both Amartya Sen (1977) and Karl 
Marx (1971) is next that dissects and questions the foundations of rational choice theory. Finally, 
an additional critical view of homoeconomicus by Tsakalotos (2005) who uses six theses to 
analyze Mill’s Political Economy via its lack of human values. He strongly suggests that its 
theorizing is entirely unsupportable. I conclude this section with a summary of all these thoughts 
that segues us to Section Two. 
The second section will be based on Adam Smith’s (1952) classic work: An inquiry into 
the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations; which, as an idea, is what I refer to as the 
engine or raison d’etre of neoliberalism i.e., the creation of wealth; specifically, capital. This 
section will also include common high level symbolic examples of the division of labor, like that 
of a modern fast food restaurant that will show, in an intuitive and common sense way, what this 
idea really means in the everyday life of modern times. Of critical importance, this section will 
also discuss how this idea is directly related as a strong causal factor to the social stratification 
that permeates all aspects of our society. I will argue how these ideas are far more fundamental 
to our very way of living than most may be aware of. This chapter now begins with my analysis 
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on the nature and power of capital, a central undercurrent theme throughout this study; followed 
by Sections One and Two. 
The Nature and Power of Capital 
Introduction. Habermas (1968) in his book: Knowledge and Human Interests starts to 
construct our common philosophical foundation for both homoeconomicus and the division of 
labor with a quote from Karl Marx who describes the fundamental nature of labor as a “condition 
of human existence that is independent of all forms of society, a perpetual necessity of nature in 
order to mediate the material exchange between men and nature, in other words, human life” (p. 
27).  
First, obviously Marx defines labor as core to man’s existence. The reader should be able 
to begin see how these brilliant rational definitions of labor by Marx can serve to explain and 
ground many ideas in life. In my opinion, they make great theory. While a full analysis of the 
thinking of Marx on labor is far beyond the scope of this study, the following specific thoughts 
of his will begin to lay the common philosophical foundation between homoeconomicus and the 
division of labor mentioned above. They will also lead to my understanding of the nature and 
power of capital.  
Relying on the transrational approach used in this study, Habermas (1968) next shows us 
how Marx’s ideas on labor relate to this study of neoliberalism. The following transcendent non-
rational thinking of Marx is important and central enough to this study to quote at length:  
In its combination this labor of scientized production appears just 
as much in the service of an alien will and an alien intelligence, 
which directs it. It has its psychic unity outside itself and its 
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material unity subordinated to the unity of machinery, of fixed 
capital, which is grounded in the object. Fixed capital, as an 
animated monster, objectifies scientific thought and is in fact the 
encompassing aspect. It does not relate to the individual worker as 
an instrument. Instead he exists as an animated individual detail, a 
living isolated accessory to the machinery. (p. 52, italicized words 
in original text) 
Without question, these uniquely transcendent and dramatic thoughts from Karl Marx 
above say a lot and therefore need to be unpacked prior to further discussion. First, this quote is a 
narrative and clearly non-rational; falling within N-H. It uses the thoughts of Howard (1991) and 
Otto (1923) who argued that the non-rational, or narrative, is such that we are still able to grasp 
meaning from it. Recall that the rational and the non-rational both come under the umbrella of 
reason. The reader may begin to sense the value of this study’s transrational approach which 
seeks to increase our understanding of neoliberalism. 
On the nature and power of capital: a transrational analysis. Let’s first take a look how 
Habermas (1968) interprets the above quotes of Marx. I will then include quotes from Marx 
(1973) himself and add my own interpretation of how these transcendent and non-rational 
thoughts of Marx connect to this study of neoliberalism; and hopefully make clear why they are 
central to the prismatic analysis described at the end of Chapter Three. 
According to Habermas (1968) Marx takes a bold stab at the nature of capital. The reader 
will see that Marx’s concept of capital is indeed a bit quixotic and confusing; even to the 
brightest of economists; according to Marx himself.  As an example, Marx (1973) responds to 
Italian economist Pellegrino Rossi who asks the questions: What is capital? Is raw material 
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capital? Marx responds to Rossi as follows: “The way of conceiving capital in its physical 
attribute only, as instrument of production, while entirely ignoring the economic form which 
makes it the instrument of production into capital, entangles the economists in all manner of 
difficulties” (p. 591). 
Marx and Rossi then debate this question of capital in relation to several different 
perspectives including land, wages and labor. It seems, in my view, that their discussion appears 
circular in nature; reaching no firm conclusion satisfactory to the other; while raising far more 
questions than answers. To my mind, even someone as obviously brilliant as Marx has a difficult 
time explaining the true nature of capital; resorting to dramatic transcendent narratives and 
literary descriptions that the reader will soon see. I see this as a clear expression of the non-
rational nature of capital in the eyes of Marx himself. For if Marx’s understanding of capital 
were of a purely rational nature, it would obviously not be so difficult a concept to explain; 
especially to a fellow economist, as we’ve just seen. This said, since this study employs 
transrationalism as a means to search for deeper understanding, I will push forward in an effort 
to make Habermas’ and Marx’s thoughts on capital more meaningful to the reader and relevant 
to this study of neoliberalism. 
In a drive for clarification and connection, I start with Habermas’ (1968) interpretive 
thoughts of Marx’s ideas on the nature of capital. To start, the following quote sheds light on 
what I believe explains the deepest nature of neoliberalism’s impact on society; the grand and 
bold attempt at a possible permanent solidifying of class structure; a global caste system if you 
will. He argues that Marx believes that capital: “Calls to life all the powers of science and of 
nature as of social combination and social intercourse to make the creation of wealth relatively 
independent of the labor time expended on it” (p. 52, emphasis added). 
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He continues this invigorating interpretation of Marx’s thoughts on capital by next adding 
that, and this is critical, “gigantic social forces are generated in this way” (p. 52, emphasis 
added). After reflecting on his interpretation many times over, it has unlocked a deep mystery 
I’ve been trying to solve for many years and one that directly connects to this study of 
neoliberalism. It represents the core of my argument in this study on the unfathomable power of 
capital and hence what makes neoliberalism so incredibly dominant in society. As the reader is 
about to see, it seeks to explain the very nature of social structure and even how we know things 
in general. This obviously needs considerable explanation and unpacking. 
I begin this discussion on the nature and power of capital claiming straightforward that 
the raison d’etre of neoliberalism is to satisfy the desire to generate an unlimited accumulation of 
capital by a few. This is the starting point. Now, Marx (1973) begins this unlocking of the nature 
of capital; in and of itself: 
Before accumulation by capital, there is presupposed an 
accumulation which constitutes capital, which is part of its 
conceptual determination; we can hardly call it 
concentration yet, because this takes place in distinction to 
many capitals; but if one still speaks of capital generally, 
then concentration still coincides with accumulation or with 
the concept of capital; i.e. it does not yet form a particular 
aspect. However, capital does indeed exist from the outset 
as one, or unity; as opposed to the workers as many. (p. 
590, italics in original text) 
How do I interpret this?  
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First, Marx (1973) uses his pure genius to argue that capital exists in itself as a ‘unitary or 
singular’ phenomenon prior to any kind of distribution/accumulation. So, when we speak of an 
individual accumulating capital, it should be viewed not as something that he/she ‘adds to the 
stock of capital’ but only as his/her ability to access this singular unitary phenomenon already in 
existence in full. In a possible support of this interpretation of mine, Marx (1973) next says this 
about the nature of capital: 
And thus it appears as the concentration of workers as 
distinct from that of work, as a unity falling outside them. In 
this respect, concentration is contained in the concept of 
capital- the concentration of many living labor capacities for 
one purpose; a concentration which does not in any way 
need to have been established in production, or penetrated 
production at the origin. Centralizing effect of capital on 
labor capacities, or positing of itself as the independent and 
external unity of these many available existences. (p. 590, 
italics added) 
From this, Marx has clearly established, at least in my view, capital as a separately existing 
phenomenon; wholly outside yet potentially connected to the individual; something I’ve believed 
for many years, but have been unable to explain. My next step is to build on this Marxian view 
of capital and attempt to explain it as a formative power for social structure; and social 
knowledge itself. From this, its connection to neoliberalism, and its intellectual foundations of 
economic man and the division of labor, will become evident.  
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I argued a moment ago that this Marxian view of capital represents a ‘key’ that unlocks a 
deep mystery I’ve had for many years. What deep mystery? Habermas (1968) argues that Marx 
always takes account of social practice that encompasses both work and interaction. From this, 
he argues that these relations, backed by the force of institutions, are subject to the norms that 
decide how responsibilities and rewards are distributed among societies’ members. He claims 
that “The medium in which these relations of subjects and groups are normatively regulated, is 
known as cultural tradition. It forms the linguistic communication structure on the basis of 
which subjects interpret both nature and themselves in their environment” (p. 53, emphasis 
added). This is the key to unlocking the deep mystery that is the nature and power of capital and 
its incredibly dominant impact on our society.  
According to Habermas (1968) Marx believes that capital actually creates, via language, 
our knowledge of the social world. Recall that he said ‘gigantic social forces are generated in this 
way’. In my opinion, Habermas (1968) using Marxian thinking on the nature of capital, presents 
a theory for the foundation of the ‘value-laden dual-hierarchical language structure’ that actually 
creates our knowledge of the social world.  
To explain this relatively complex idea, a few simple examples should suffice. Let us 
examine the common dual terms of man-woman and white-black. First, I begin by assuming the 
reader may agree that the ‘opposing duality’ of words is necessary for cognition. We know what 
a man is because we know what a woman is; we know what day is because we know what night 
is, we know what black is because we know what white is; etc. This is, in my view, conceptually 
neutral and allows for cognition. But, here is where the problems begin. We all know that in 
most all modern societies, and especially strong in industrial societies, there exists a clear social 
value relation associated and imbedded within each cognitive dual set. Man has a higher social 
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value than woman and white has a higher social value than black. Truth of these relational values 
aside, I think the reader will not disagree when I say that it is not a stretch to call this common 
knowledge.  
But here lies the deep mystery that was before me for many years: Let’s take a look at the 
cognitive value-laden duality of ‘man having a higher social value than woman’ for starters. 
How do we know this? Who actually stated this? Is there proof of this? Where did this value 
come from? How are we taught this? And even more important, given so much credible 
disagreement and disdain with this specific social value relation, is it possible to change it? The 
reader can apply this same line of thinking and questions to many other dualities; like white-
black where white has a higher social value than black; etc. 
Leaning and building on the thoughts of Habermas (1968) and Marx (1973) I argue that 
the mystery of these questions may be solved. Its answer lies in the manifestation of the true 
nature and power of capital. The ideas presented here by Marx (1973) and Habermas (1968), 
make this clear, at least in my view. How so? Recall Habermas’ understanding of Marx’s view of 
capital when he says ‘capital calls to life all the powers of science and of nature as of social 
combination and social intercourse’. The operative words here are ‘capital calls to life’.  
Returning to our value-laden dual-hierarchical language structure, it is crystal clear, at 
least to my mind, that the language structure itself which values men over women and whites 
over blacks unquestionably benefits white men with capital exclusively; as if they somehow have 
the power to ‘command all people, in all times, to understand that this is the way of life’. I equate 
this to Habermas’ (1968) ‘capital calls to life’. I further emphatically argue that no one can 
confidently point to a person, place or time where such a ‘commandment for society in general’ 
originated. As an important note, the reader should understand that within this analysis, race is 
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actually not the central factor; capital is. Blacks with capital would create the exact same social 
structure and problems where whites would be viewed as socially inferior.    
Yet, with all this, something important is still missing from this Habermas/Marxian view 
of capital. In my opinion, what is missing is its direct connection to the will of the individual. 
Miriam Webster (n.d.) defines ‘will’ from different perspectives: 
1- Used to express determination, insistence, persistence, or willfulness as in ‘I have made up my 
mind’ 
2- Used to express a command, exhortation, or injunction as in ‘you will do as I say, at once’ 
What does this connection to the human will mean and on what grounds do I say this?  
I start with the thoughts of Arthur Schopenhauer (1909) in his work: The World as Will 
and Ideas; originally, and more aptly in my view, titled: The World as Will and Representation. 
One of the central and fascinating ideas in that great work was his philosophically connecting the 
will of the individual to human existence in general. In short, a transcendent and brilliant insight 
into how our wills actually create our existence.  
For a more simplistic and intuitive idea that represents these thoughts on the nature and 
power of capital, that I now suggest are connected to the human will, I ask the reader to think of 
their own lives. Consider what happens when you have access to capital and see how your own 
will ‘calls things to life’. You can now ‘will’ a new house, ‘will’ a new car, ‘will’ a college 
education for your kids, ‘will’ your spouse a gift, ‘will’ a vacation, etc. It is clear that these 
things exist in your mind and as a result of your access to capital, you can ‘call them to life’ or 
into existence.  
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This is the connection between capital, the human will and existence, in my view. Hence 
my main argument in this study of neoliberalism is:  
Building on and extending the collective thoughts of 
Habermas, Marx and Schopenhauer, I argue that it is the 
will of (mostly but not exclusively) white men with high 
access to the unitary external phenomenon of capital that 
uses the cognitive abilities of the structure of language to 
create gigantic social forces that ‘call their will to life’ so 
that they are able to influence and dominate society to their 
exclusive benefit. 
 Actually how this is done is a fascinating topic that goes far past the scope of this study. It will 
be addressed in the proposed follow-up study when I discuss Eric Beinhocker’s (2006) brilliant 
idea of what he refers to as the evolutionary algorithm.  
In summing up my analysis on the nature and power of capital, the reader should 
understand that first, I am not claiming a complete understanding; far from it. The purpose of this 
analysis, as I stated in Chapter One, is to bolster the current scholarship. This effort begins with 
my above interpretation on the nature and power of capital. I am therefore suggesting that we 
begin to discuss neoliberalism from this perspective. I argue that such a new discourse may lead 
to ideas and subsequent solutions not yet realized.  
As a final comment on this analysis, I realize that what I have put forward is part rational 
and part non-rational, but remember that Otto (1923) warns us against the error in our thinking 
that by using reason and rationality alone, we have exhausted our investigation of a 
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phenomenon; in this case - neoliberalism. Recall the important point that the idea of non-rational 
is not the opposite of rational; irrational is. Non-rational, or increasing human knowledge 
through narrative is also, like rational, based on logic. This is why Otto (1923) argues that we 
can still grasp it. In short, non-rational is simply a different way of thinking and understanding. 
The thoughts presented in this analysis will hopefully have shown not only the 
connection of capital to homoeconomicus and the division of labor, since both are fundamental 
human activities, but also help to explain the supreme danger of neoliberalism; which is itself 
created for the extreme accumulation of capital by a few.  
I now end this analysis on the nature and power of capital from this researcher’s 
understanding and proceed to Section One of this chapter to begin the critical analysis of the 
concept of homoeconomicus; also captured as economic man; a pillar of neoliberalism.  
Section One – Homoeconomicus 
Classical vs. neoclassical economics. Before embarking on the specific aspects of 
homoeconomicus, especially its various historical contexts, it will be helpful to first understand 
the difference between classical and neoclassical economics. The reader will see that much of 
this section depends on this understanding.  Classical Economics (2015) tells us that it originated 
during the late 18th century with Adam Smith (our main theorist in Section Two) and that it 
reached maturity in the works of David Ricardo and John Stuart Mill; whose thinking we will 
discuss at length later in this section. The theories of the classical school, which dominated 
economic thinking in Great Britain until about 1870, focused on economic growth and economic 
freedom, stressing laissez-faire ideas and free competition. In other words, it is ‘classical’ 
because it is based on the belief that competition leads to an efficient allocation of resources, and 
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regulates economic activity that establishes equilibrium between demand and supply through the 
operation of market forces.  
  Weintraub (2015) provides us with a nice and interesting contrast with the classical view 
in explaining what neoclassical economics is; again in lay terms. We will see that it is more of a 
refining than a rejection of classical economics; as one might surmise by the term itself.  He tells 
us that neoclassical economics can be summarized as such:   
Buyers attempt to maximize their gains from getting goods, and they do this by 
increasing their purchases of a good until what they gain from an extra unit is just balanced by 
what they have to give up to obtain it. In this way they maximize ‘utility’—the satisfaction 
associated with the consumption of goods and services. Likewise, individuals provide labor to 
firms that wish to employ them, by balancing the gains from offering the marginal unit of their 
services (the wage they would receive) with the disutility of labor itself—the loss of leisure. 
Individuals make choices at the margin. This results in a theory of demand for goods, and supply 
of productive factors. (pg. 1) 
Even using lay terms, this needs explanation. The key point here in neoclassical 
economics is the idea of ‘maximum utility’; which requires an extensive use of mathematics. 
Weintraub (2015) tells us that neoclassical economics depends on the following three 
assumptions:  
1. People have rational preferences among outcomes.  
2. Individuals maximize utility and firms maximize profits.  
3. People act independently on the basis of full and relevant information. 
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In the coming details of homoeconomicus with both classical and neoclassical economics 
now defined, at least on a cursory level, we will see that the core differences lie mostly in the 
changing nature of the far more complex, at least on the surface, modern man from the Victorian 
gentleman times of John Stuart Mill towards the end of the 18th century. In other words, the 
added complexities of modern man, like the guile developed to navigate through more 
sophisticated and nuanced choices, will change how economists analyze the new economic man; 
hence the move from classical to neoclassical economic theories. 
Homoeconomicus: historical context. To achieve a better understanding of 
homoeconomicus, a few words on its historical context should prove helpful. We begin by 
placing ourselves in the midst of what can accurately be called the ‘heyday’ of Great Britain; the 
reign of Queen Victoria from 1837 to 1901. Domeyer (n.d.) paints the following picture of those 
times and its connection to John Stuart Mill, given credit by Habermas (1968) and many others 
as the creator of homoeconomicus: 
The 19th century marked the heyday of the British Empire. 
After the defeat of Napoleon, Britain had few serious rivals 
in Europe. Through balance of power diplomacy and 
unchallenged naval dominance, Britain underwrote a 100-
year peace, lasting from the 1815 Congress of Vienna until 
WW I. At the same time, Britain carried out a vast 
expansion of its overseas colonies and reaped the fruits of its 
extensive global trade network. As Chief Examiner of the 
East India Company and a leading thinker on colonial 
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policy, Mill played an important role in this golden age of 
British imperialism. (pg. 1) 
The above quote is important because it highlights a turning point in history where British naval 
dominance established a global presence that enabled the idea of trade on a much larger scale; 
actually enabling a long period of peace. 
In a more detailed view of what science looked like at that time, Porter (2001) in his 
article Economics and the History of Measurement tells us that “from about 1830 there occurred 
an enormous increase in the acquisition and use of quantitative information about nature, 
technology, and society alike. That date also marks, however, the appearance of a growing split 
between the measurement ideals of the physical and the social and economic sciences” (p. 14). I 
argue that from this history we can better see the kinds of powerful influences generated from an 
unprecedented increase in commerce that grounded and sparked a more quantitative look at the 
social sciences, specifically economics, that guided Mill in his work. This idea will be explained 
in much more depth and detail when I introduce the German Historical School shortly. For now, 
an official introduction to homoeconomicus is next. 
Persky (1995) begins his analysis with a line of prominent authors who argued for and 
predicted the end of homoeconomicus, or economic man. As examples, he tells us that as early 
as 1939, Peter Drucker warned of The End of Economic Man. By 1976, Harvey Leibenstein 
could see Beyond Economic Man. In 1986, David Marsden asked the perennial question: The 
End of Economic Man? And recently, Marianne Ferber and Julie Nelson have described the 
territory Beyond Economic Man: Feminist Theory and Economics.  In a response to these 
various authors he adds “despite these warnings, I suspect that the majority of economists remain 
confident in the survival of their favorite species” (p. 221). Persky (1995) even went so far as to 
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say that many now see economic man as virtually the only civilized species in all of social 
science. From these wildly and diametrically opposing views, a look into the origins, early 
character and natural history of economic man became the reason for the title of his article: The 
Ethology of Homoeconomicus. 
According to Persky (1995) “John Stuart Mill is generally identified as the creator of 
economic man” (p. 222). Following this, he says that Mill never actually used this designation in 
his own writings, but the term did emerge in reaction to Mill's work. For a descriptive look at its 
early history, Persky (1995) tells us “in its first appearances in the late nineteenth century, 
economic man carried a pejorative connotation reflecting the widespread hostility of the 
historical school toward Mill's theoretical abstractions. Economic man also raised the indignation 
of Victorian moralists shocked at the postulation of such blatant selfishness” (p. 222). Persky 
(1995) further details the original hostility towards economic man as such: 
The earliest explicit naming of economic man that I have identified is in John Kells 
Ingram's A History of Political Economy (1888). Ingram, an advocate of a broad sociology in the 
tradition of Auguste Comte, took considerable pains to disparage John Stuart Mill's political 
economy, which dealt not with real but with imaginary men- 'economic men' conceived as 
simply 'money-making animals'. (p. 222) 
Persky (1995) next goes on to add that a few years later, John Neville Keynes (1890) 
picked up and established the phrase ‘economic man’ in his much more extensive 
methodological treatment. Keynes’s efforts though were considerably less hostile than Ingram's, 
yet still painted 'economic man,’ whose activities are determined solely by the desire for wealth; 
and ascribed the origins of this abstraction to John Stuart Mill.  
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With this contentious beginning of homoeconomicus established, the question becomes; what 
exactly is this abstraction of Mill in his famous theory of Political Economy? Persky (1995) 
argues that while Mill’s economic man was admittedly simple, he was not trivial. He then turned 
to Mill’s early field notes for a better understanding. As an important note, the word ‘abstraction’ 
as used here is a technical term that means classifying and defining things as consistent and 
general; which makes them eligible to be represented by mathematical relationships.  
John Stuart Mill’s abstraction.  Persky (1995) tells us that in John Stuart Mill's (1836) 
famous essay On the Definition of Political Economy; and on the Method of Investigation Proper 
to It described a hypothetical subject whose narrow and well-defined motives made him a useful 
abstraction in economic analysis. In it, Mill describes ‘political economy’ in a very 
straightforward way arguing that it “does not treat of the whole of man's nature as modified by 
the social state, nor of the whole conduct of man in society. It is concerned with him solely as a 
being who desires to possess wealth, and who is capable of judging the comparative efficacy of 
means for obtaining that end” (p. 223). Here, Mill stated quite clearly that he is solely interested 
in this singular facet of man and was not constructing man with the other aspects of his life. At 
first glance, this would seem like quite a reasonable and somewhat unobjectionable position to 
take, making one wonder: why the almost venomous denunciations by Marx and others? The 
answer can be found on the same page; where he qualifies what he really means. It is worth 
quoting at length because this is at least one point where Marx and others, in my view, ground 
their staunch criticism of Mill’s political economy:  
It [political economy] makes entire abstraction of every 
other human passion or motive; except those which may be 
regarded as perpetually antagonizing to the desire of 
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wealth, namely, aversion to labor, and desire of the present 
enjoyment of costly indulgences. These it takes, to a certain 
extent, into its calculations, because these do not merely, 
like other desires, occasionally conflict with the pursuit of 
wealth, but accompany it always as a drag, or impediment, 
and are therefore inseparably mixed up in the consideration 
of it. (p. 223, emphasis added) 
From this articulation, with Mill saying that ‘political economy makes entire abstraction 
of every other human passion or motive’ suggests that he includes such things like love, faith, 
friendship, empathy etc. and that they are somehow intertwined with man’s desire for wealth 
accumulation. I believe that this, among other considerations, is what stirred the strong 
objections of Marx and others. But what was Marx’s strong objection to Mill’s political economy 
based on? We will see next that Marx thought that Mill had things backwards. Understanding 
these strong polar views between Karl Marx and John Stuart Mill is very important to this study 
and therefore a very brief detour is warranted to explain just how wide a gulf there is.  
The explanation of the above deep gulf between Marx and Mill can be found in Marx 
(1977) in his work: Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. Recall from Habermas (1968) that 
Marx argues that capital, what he refers to as an ‘animated monster’, controls man and not the 
other way around, like Mill appears to argue in his defining political economy above. On what 
grounds do I say this? Marx (1977) argues: 
Every kind of capitalist production, in so far that is it not 
only a labor process but also a process of creating surplus 
value has this in common, that it is not the workman that 
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employs the instrument of labor but the instrument of labor 
the employs the workman. By means of its conversion to an 
automation, the instruments of labor confront the laborer 
during the labor process, in the shape of capital, of dead 
labor that dominates and pumps dry living labor power. 
The separation of the intellectual powers of production 
from the manual labor and the conversion into the might of 
capital over labor is finally completed by modern industry 
erected on the foundation of machinery. (p. 423, emphasis 
added) 
For now, from this, the reader can see the clear connection to the quotes of Marx used by 
Habermas (1968) where Marx argues that capital, ‘as an animated monster’, controls man while 
Mill on the other hand, argues that political economy makes ‘entire abstraction of every human 
passion or motive’. The two sides could not be farther apart, in my view. We now return from 
this very brief diversion to more details of homoeconomicus.  
In interpreting Mill’s own definition of political economy, or the foundation of 
homoeconomicus, Persky (1995) deduces from this that things like luxury, leisure, and the 
enjoyment of costly indulgences, while sometimes conflicting, are all in fact tied together with 
the idea of his desire to create wealth and are therefore taken into its calculations. Mill, himself 
being a Victorian, felt obligated to include, even at the level of abstract theory, man’s passion for 
producing babies; as summarized in his ‘Principle of Population’. From all this, Persky (1995) 
argues that Mill’s economic man has four distinct interests: wealth accumulation, leisure, luxury 
and procreation. This then makes economic man more than his critics maintained, but less than 
121 
 
what they would have desired. In other words, economic man is not simply a money-hungry 
caricature, but is in fact far more complex than his critics allege; including of course, Karl Marx. 
Persky (1995) now changes course a bit and argues “we make a serious error if we read 
into this animal the modern identification of economic man with rationality itself. In much 
contemporary usage, the essence of economic man lies not in what he picks, but in his rational 
method for making choices” (p. 223). In other words, the more sophisticated nature of modern 
man has made his rationality itself far more complex and hence far more difficult to predict. This 
is something that will be addressed shortly by Bowles & Gintis (1993) when they discuss a 
concept known as contested exchange. Since we are far removed from 18th century Victorian 
times, this is a good segue into a view of economic man that matches modern society.  
As a prelude to this, Persky (1995) argues that Mill's economic man provides just enough 
psychological complexity to make him interesting. “On the one hand Mill argued that an 
expansion of economic man's range of motives risked indeterminacy. On the other, he 
recognized that without this modest psychological complexity, economic man would have no 
alternative but to work all day, regardless of incentives” (p. 224). From this view, economic man 
would in essence be a workaholic behaving exactly the same way in any institutional 
environment.  
Persky (1995) argued that Mill had recognized that a wide range of economic 
behaviors could be observed across industries, nations and epochs.  Consequently, Mill 
reasoned that a large portion of this variation in behavior could be traced to differing 
economic institutions. Indeed, Mill's central theoretical and empirical project was to use 
economic man, with his rudimentary but manageable psychology, to prove that 
institutions did matter. This now brings us to a modern view of economic man. 
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A modern view of economic man – economic institutions matter. Persky (1995) begins by 
arguing that Mill (1848) began his great work, Principles of Political Economy, with the thoughts 
of Adam Smith in a discussion of the historical record of the wealth of nations; the subject of the 
next section. He observed that among modern societies, wide differences persisted in the level 
and distribution of wealth. These differences, Mill asserted, could not be traced merely to 
differences in physical conditions and knowledge. For Mill, the key to comparative economics 
“lay in exploring the interactions between human nature and institutions” (p. 224). He then added 
that as soon as we recognize that economic man considers several key tradeoffs in his behavior, 
we can imagine a society of economic men, each with strong interests in wealth, luxury, leisure 
and procreation and attempt to determine the likely effects on them of differing institutions. This 
is of course another way of describing homoeconomicus, or economic man as a model of self-
interested behavior; where one theoretically inputs these four variables to determine an outcome.  
Setting aside the mathematics of Mill’s model, Persky (1995) gives him credit for some 
modern institutional innovations like incentives for workers that stem from his calculations. For 
example, when Mill discussed peasant proprietors, his concern centered on the influence of 
small-scale ownership as an incentive to work effort and accumulation and a discouragement to 
luxury and leisure. Acknowledging that there may be economies of scale associated with large 
agricultural enterprises, Mill's purpose was to “determine whether the incentive effects of small-
scale ownership were strong enough to act as an offset and raise overall production” (p. 225). His 
conclusion, based largely on reviewing empirical and often anecdotal writings, is that the 
incentive effects in question are quite strong indeed.  
The reader should keep in mind that this is the result of mathematical calculations. While 
clearly serving the interests of owners, Mill’s model, at least in my view, argues that workers 
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should not be just worked to death and that by applying incentives, their behavior will change for 
the benefit of the institutions and the workers alike. This, one could credibly argue, is a benefit 
from Mill’s quantitative model of self-interested behavior. From this view of economic man and 
institutions, Persky (1995) next introduces what I believe to be an aspect of Mill’s thinking that 
can help explain the enormous global acceptance and power of neoliberalism. 
The ethology of homoeconomicus. In providing a strong connection between 
homoeconomicus and this study of neoliberalism, Persky (1995) begins this critical analysis by 
arguing that “throughout the Principles, Mill’s discussions of incentives slipped almost 
seamlessly into explorations of the social psychology of tastes and character” (p. 226). He next 
adds that Mill viewed efforts to analyze the development of character as the proper task of 
ethology, a science he placed logically subsequent to elementary psychology. Ethology, 
according to Mill, was that science which determines the kind of character produced in 
conformity to those general laws of psychology. 
Here is where Persky (1995) begins to make the connection of Mill’s thinking to this 
study of neoliberalism. He says that working from the base of general ethology, Mill argued that 
‘economic ethology’ would then construct a theory of the causes which determine the type of 
character belonging to a people or to an age.  Mill thought economic ethology was still in its 
infancy. Despite that, (this is where the strength of his thinking builds up) "the causes of national 
character are scarcely at all understood, and the effect of institutions or social arrangements upon 
the character of the people is generally that portion of their effects which is least attended to, and 
least comprehended" (p. 226). 
Persky (1995) now tells us that despite Mill's assertion that little was known of economic 
ethology, in the Principles, he repeatedly attempted deductions as to the ethology of economic 
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man. Of great importance, he argued that at any given time, economic man could be expected to 
respond differently to different institutions. This was political economy. Over time, continuous 
exposure to a particular set of institutions could be expected to influence the very tastes of 
economic man; this was economic ethology. It is this brilliant fundamental thinking from Mill, as 
far back as 1848 that, in my view, partly grounds the incredible global acceptance of 
neoliberalism today. How so? 
Persky (1995) builds this connection starting from early the 19th century by arguing that 
“an early life of luxury predisposes the younger children of the nobility to extravagant 
consumption” (p. 227). Specifically, he argues that as far as the development of an individual’s 
character is concerned, the notion that more or less rational choices made by one generation 
predispose the tastes of subsequent generations to reinforce similar choices. He then adds next 
that a choice of luxurious consumption by the parents becomes a taste in the children. In my 
view Mill, using his own model for self-interested behavior, is providing a theory of family and 
class-based wealth that is very strong to this day.  
Looking at Mill’s thinking critically, Persky (1995) does add that Mill wavers on 
precisely how persistent an effect such acculturation has on economic man. At some points, he 
implies that national characteristics rooted in long custom can only be changed gradually. On 
other occasions, he suggests a change of institutional regimes will have almost instantaneous 
results. Despite the wavering, Mill was not alone in this thinking.  
Persky (1995) tells us that Walter Bagehot (1879), held that the motives and tastes typical 
of economic man were themselves a product of the spread of commerce. Bagehot saw economic 
man as a product of societies where the commercial element is the greatest element. Thus, the 
logic of economic man implicit in political economy could only be applied to such communities: 
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"In so far as nations are occupied in 'buying and selling,' in so far will ‘political economy’, the 
exclusive theory of men buying and selling, come out right, and be true. Bagehot thought 
political economy an appropriate tool for studying England where it might be exactly true” (p. 
227). 
Persky (1995) using the thoughts of Walter Bagehot (1879) brings the idea of 
homoeconomicus, or economic man, into modern neoliberal times where the spread of 
commerce has proliferated into the powerful concept of the global market we see today. How so? 
The reader will likely suspect, and rightly so, that this is obviously an important connection to 
make as part of this study. For now, recall that one definition of homoeconomicus has it tied into 
neoclassical economic theory. Chapters Five and Six will provide in-depth detail of how 
neoclassical theory developed from a contested idea into a global phenomenon; ironically 
emanating from right here in Chicago.   
In concluding his thoughts, Persky (1995) ends his article by arguing “the message to 
derive from Mill's homoeconomicus is not that humans are greedy, not that man is rational, but 
that social science works best when it ruthlessly limits its range” (p. 230). This cannot be 
overstated. To my mind he provides an overall strong argument against the very foundation of 
neoliberalism inasmuch as today’s level of consumption and drive for wealth can only be 
maintained by disregarding and totally submerging many important variables in the basic 
psychology of human beings. 
Using Persky’s (1995) conclusion, I argue, somewhat harshly, that in today’s 
homoeconomicus, neoliberalism intentionally and ruthlessly eliminates such human 
psychological factors like love, faith, friendship, empathy, etc. from gaining any prominence in 
overall human behavior; as they are all squashed under the model’s dominance of Mill’s four 
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essential elements: wealth, luxury, leisure and procreation. In other words, these four dominant 
elements are what creates and allows its success; at the expense of the other human dynamics 
just mentioned. 
Recall Watson (2003) from Chapter Two who told us that within the language of 
neoliberalism, you are unable to convey any human emotion, including the most basic ones such 
as love, happiness and empathy. You cannot he says, tell a joke in this language, or write a 
poem, or sing a song. I argued that that was the most damning aspect of neoliberalism. A deeper 
and more critical look into modern homoeconomicus, who now exists in a neoliberal world, and 
how he evolved in history is next. 
Homoeconomicus – a critical history. Bowles & Gintis (1993) bring us up to date with 
exactly what homoeconomicus has become that the reader will surely recognize. They begin with 
a connection to the 19th century Victorian background of John Stuart Mill discussed in Persky 
(1995) and Domeyer (n.d.) earlier.  
The strength of the neoclassical paradigm, generations of students have been told, lies in 
its hardheaded grounding in a general model of self-interested action. But recent developments in 
microeconomic theory have shown that the self-interested behavior underlying neoclassical 
theory is artificially truncated: it depicts a charmingly Victorian but utopian world in which 
conflicts abound but a handshake is a handshake. (p. 83)  
This, in my view, suggests a certain ethical and even moral foundation to 
homoeconomicus who lived in the neoclassical economics of the Victorian era. It would seem to 
me that this foundation was the direct product of the times Mill lived in when he developed his 
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theory of political economy and just assumed that this is what man would be like in the future. 
After all, he had no reason to think otherwise; as clearly no one knows the future.  
As you will soon see, homoeconomicus has changed dramatically from these Victorian 
times. An analysis of these changes is where it gets real interesting; as Bowles & Gintis (1993) 
argue that “abandoning the Victorian world of neoclassical theory will redirect economists to an 
older conception of their profession: what once was called political economy. Adam Smith and 
Karl Marx alike knew that a handshake was not always a handshake” (p. 83). To unpack this 
very important chronological point of abandoning neoclassical economics, we need at least a 
cursory discussion of what they mean by returning to the older idea of political economy. I begin 
with Ingram (1923) who provides a useful historical background that we can use in 
understanding the changing and vacillating economic contexts Bowles & Gintis (1993) discuss 
above.  
The German Historical School. Ingram (1923) in his book: A History of Political 
Economy spends under twenty pages discussing what he terms ‘ancient times’, where he focused 
on the political and social thinkers of that era like Plato, Aristotle, Seneca, Cicero, etc. For our 
purposes, the precursor to classical economics, according to him, can be seen beginning from the 
Middle Ages: circa 400 -1300 AD.  In laying out the important contexts of that era, he tells us 
“no large or varied economic activity was possible under the full ascendency of feudalism” (p. 
23). He adds that most historians present that way of life as indispensable for the preservation of 
order, for the public defense and also contributed important elements to a civilized society. 
Ingram (1923) next claims that during the latter portion of the Middle Ages, several 
significant circumstances emerged that greatly changed the social impact of feudalism and began 
the segue into a different and expanded era of economic activity. Most notably: 
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The Crusades produced a powerful economic effect by transferring in many cases the 
possessions of the feudal chiefs to the industrious classes, whilst bringing different nations and 
races into contact by enlarging the horizon and widening the conceptions of the populations as 
well as by affording a special stimulus to navigation, they tended to give a new activity to 
international trade. (p. 24) 
From this very brief overview of a segment of economic history, the reader should begin 
to sense the beginnings of political economy as naturally stemming from the latter part of the 
Middle Ages. However, in explaining this economic history, and especially the movement to 
current economic times, he introduces what he calls the Historical School.  
Ingram (1923) begins our analysis of the contextual understanding of economic history 
through time, starting in 1848 by discussing Bruno Hildebrand, whom he calls a thinker of ‘real 
high order’. He went so far as to say the there was no other German economist endowed with a 
more profound and searching intellect. According to Ingram (1923) Hildebrand’s work contained 
a masterly criticism of the economic systems which preceded or belonged to his time; including 
that of Smith, Muller, List and others. “The object of his work, he tells us, is to open a way in the 
economic domain to a thorough historical direction and method, and to transform the science 
into a doctrine of laws of the economic development of nations” (p. 197).  
Ingram (1923) uses the thinking of Karl Knies in his work entitled: Die Politische 
Oekonomic von Standpunkie der geschichtlichen Methode, where, five years later in 1853, he 
develops Hildebrand’s thinking and shows the connections I just mentioned. He argues that 
Knies’ work is an elaborate exposition and defense of the historical method in its application to 
economic science and its most systematic and complete manifesto of the new school. Knies’ 
defense of the historical methodology in economic history is so fundamental and profound an 
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idea that, while a bit long, it is necessary to quote at length for full understanding and 
appreciation: 
The fundamental propositions are that the economic 
constitution of a society at any epoch on the one hand, and 
on the other, the contemporary theoretic conception of 
economic science, are the results of a definite historical 
development; that they are both in vital connection with the 
whole social organism of the period, having grown up 
along with it and under the same conditions of time, place 
and nationality; that the economic system must therefore be 
regarded as passing through a series of phases correlative 
with the successive stages of civilization and can at no 
point of their movement be considered to have attained an 
entirely definitive form; that no more the present than any 
previous economic organization of society is to be regarded 
as absolutely good and right, but only as a phase in a 
continuous historical evolution, and that in like manner the 
now prevalent economic doctrine is not to be viewed as 
complete and final, but only as representing a certain stage 
in the unfolding or progressive manifestation of the truth. 
(p. 198)  
First, as a researcher, I was awestruck and unbelievably grateful; as I have never come 
across such powerful holistic thinking that meaningfully connects so much in such an insightful 
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manner as Ingram’s (1923) interpretation of the work of Karl Knies. In my view, this is a very 
strong analysis of the essence of the German Historical School. First, it properly debunks all 
fallacious arguments of ‘original thought’ stemming from the minds of specific individuals or 
even specific locations, and places the genesis of ideas (economic or others) where they really 
belong; as functions of continuous time. In the beginning of Section Two of this chapter, the 
reader will see this very idea validated by a secret association of 10th-century CE Muslim 
thinkers; as I briefly discuss the history of ideas.  
Second, Knies’ thoughts are, in my view, the highest rejection of positivism as 
epistemology. How? He clearly says that ‘any contemporary theoretic conception of economic 
science, are the results of a definite historical development; they both infer that any political 
economy is in vital connection with the whole social organism of the period’. What does he 
mean here?  In my view, his reference to an organism represents the holistic nature of his 
thinking; as he is arguing that political economy should be properly understood in a biological 
sense in that it ‘lives and grows’ which also means that it changes with time.  
From this I argue that in analyzing any political economy, to dissociate and decouple any 
of the components of this ‘social organism’ for separate analysis is illegitimate and creates false 
meaning. For example, in our case, in trying to analyze and make sense of Mill’s political 
economy without fully integrating the Victorian times he lived in that created his thoughts is 
incorrect, and, more importantly, in trying to insert Mill’s thinking into future times is baseless 
and will lead to things that are no longer true. In doing so you are more likely to find yourself 
trying to force a square peg into a round hole. 
Knies defends the German Historical School as a proper way to think about political 
economy. He is arguing that it is correct to say that John Stuart Mill’s famous political economy, 
131 
 
the foundation of current classical and neoclassical economic theories, emanate from his time in 
history as he passed through it; they have no separate distinct originating scientific validity in 
and of themselves that can accurately predict future times; something that science claims to be 
able to do.  In other words, his place in time actually made his thinking and not the other way 
around. This has profound implications for this study of neoliberalism. Chapter Five will pick up 
on this holistic thinking from a different perspective when I introduce the opposing economic 
philosophies of neoclassicism and institutionalism fought at the early pre-war University of 
Chicago, School of Economics.  
    This now gives us the theory that allows us to return to Bowles & Gintis (1993) above, who 
discuss modern homoeconomicus and how the changes have taken place over time. Recall that 
we wished to unpack their statement that ‘abandoning the Victorian world of neoclassical theory 
will redirect economists to an older conception of their profession: what once was called political 
economy’. The objective of this unpacking it is to better understand how we come to modern 
homoeconomicus.  
Using Ingram’s (1923) discussion of economic history and his interpretation of the 
German Historical School, we now have a theory to do this. In a very high level historical 
chronology, we can begin our unpacking of their statement with the middle ages where 
feudalism reigned. Next, the Crusades ushered in powerful economic vitality via new 
international trade that created a working class and redistributed much of the wealth in the hands 
of the feudal lords to new classes with a rising social status.  
To begin our connection to Bowles & Gintis (1993), next in our high level chronology, 
we have the reign of Queen Victoria from 1837 to 1901. This timeline connects back to Ingram 
(1923) where he discusses the Crusades as a causal factor in the very beginning of political 
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economy. To begin, Mays (2011) makes clear use of the German Historical School thinking 
when he discusses aspects of the Victorian era and John Stuart Mill, creator of homoeconomicus, 
by using history as explanation for the thoughts of the economists of that era. For example, Mays 
(2011) investigates the comparative historicist perspective through which ‘the Victorian’ came to 
imagine themselves as ‘Victorian’. That perspective can be seen in what some Victorians might 
well have labeled a pre-Victorian text—John Stuart Mill’s 1831 essay ‘The spirit of the Age’. In 
heavy usage of the historical school of thought, he argues that in it, Mill suggests that the 
distinctive feature of his transitional age is its penchant for historical comparison. “He describes 
this comparative gaze as looking in two directions simultaneously—both backward to former 
ages and forward to those which are yet to come” (p. 446).  
This, in my view, is exactly what Ingram (1923) meant by using the German Historical 
School thinking as theory that not only explains the present but grounds the future. In other 
words, when looking to analyze a political economy of a future time one needs to look at both 
current environmental conditions of that time as well as historical conditions from which it grew. 
The return to political economy. With this history in mind, we can now return to Bowles 
& Gintis (1993) and ask the question: what was it that fueled that change in economic thinking 
from the powerful and proud hey-day of Victorian times when ‘a handshake was a handshake’ 
back to political economy, where many economists realized that that was not always true? The 
answer is strongly suggested in the title of their article: The Revenge of Homoeconomicus: 
Contested Exchange and the Revival of Political Economy. But what is contested exchange?  
We can begin to understand what contested exchange is by reviewing what exchange 
relationships meant in the textbook neoclassical model of Victorian times. We will first need to 
delve, at least in a cursory fashion, into a few technical concepts of classical economics to better 
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understand the idea of contested exchange: The late 1870’s Arrow-Debreu and Leon Walrus 
models of general equilibrium. As a note: Levin (2006) defines general equilibrium analyses as 
addressing precisely how “vast numbers of individual and seemingly separate decisions referred 
aggregate in a way that coordinates productive effort, balances supply and demand, and leads to 
an efficient allocation of goods and services in the economy” (p. 1). In lay terms, this means the 
workings of the entire economy explained mathematically as an abstraction. From this the reader 
can better see how the idea of homoeconomicus, an abstraction itself, fits into and makes sense 
in the minds of economists and why it is such an important idea to them. 
While the full technical explanations of these models are out of scope with this study, the 
significance and influence of them are discussed by Geanakoplos (2004) where he starts by 
arguing that it is not easy to separate the Arrow-Debreu models of general equilibrium from 
mathematical economics itself. “In an extraordinary series of papers, Arrow & Debreu, two of 
the oldest and most important questions in neoclassical economics; the viability and efficiency of 
the market were shown to be susceptible to analysis in a model that was completely faithful to 
the neoclassical premises of individual rationality and rational expectations” (p. 116). For over 
twenty years after its creation, the model was still yielding fresh new insights of economic 
thinking. Both Arrow and Debreu, at different times, won the Nobel Peace Prize for their work. 
The reader should keep in mind that this thinking was created in the middle of Victorian times.  
For our second model, Bowles & Gintis (1993) tell us that Leon Walrus, by contrast, had 
defined the pure science of economics to which he aspired, as the study of relationships among 
things, not people and sought, with notable success, to eliminate human relationships from his 
purview.  In a humorous comment, they next add that his device for accomplishing this, Walras' 
fiction as we call it, was the notion that interactions among economic agents might be 
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represented as if they were relationships among inputs and outputs. With these two models now 
very briefly defined in lay terms, where does that leave us?  
First I believe the reader will begin to see the overuse of ‘rational’ mathematics in 
economic theory to describe reality and that that was not going to last forever. Also the reader 
will begin to see that there is no room for the kinds of human behavior, i.e., greed, avarice, 
treachery etc., that we all know too well in these neoliberal times. The abandoning of this 
economic worldview should begin to make more sense. 
To make this point clearer, Bowles & Gintis (1993) introduce a very short story called: A 
Roadside Stand Outside Blacksburg that should prove helpful in interpreting and understanding 
the main points of their article:  
I do not know the fruit salesman personally, and I have no 
particular interest in his well-being. He reciprocates this 
attitude.  I do not know, and have no need to know, 
whether he is in direst poverty, extremely wealthy, or 
somewhere in between. Yet the two of us are able to 
transact exchanges efficiently because both parties agree 
on the property rights relevant to them. (p. 4) 
What does this short story mean to our discussion?  To begin, this story is best viewed as 
a literary expression of the Victorian phrase ‘a handshake is a handshake’. In addition, this 
fictional story is a literary manifestation of the Victorian ideals that both neoclassical economic 
models described above represent. What do I mean here? The reader can see how neatly such a 
transaction based on this idealized human behavior would fit into both models. In addition, it 
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gives a solid picture of the Victorian world view that came under attack for its lack of realism 
and its lack of ability to model far more complex human behavior. With this background, the 
authors have painted a nice path for us to follow, placing us at the point where we can now 
explain the concept of contested exchange. This in turn will lead us into better understanding the 
arrival of modern homoeconomicus; as understood by Bowles & Gintis (1993). We are now at 
the end of the Victorian age and the beginning of the twentieth century. 
Modern homoeconomicus. Bowles & Gintis (1993) tells us that beginning in the 1970s, 
economists in a variety of fields reintroduced homoeconomicus to the profession. However, 
many economists doubted that it was really the same person. The reader should keep in mind 
here that economists use this in a quantitative sense to make predictions about economic 
behavior; so accuracy is a chief concern. They realized that this new economic man was not a 
Victorian gentleman: he is uncompromisingly thorough in pursuing objectives, and often he is 
less benign. “Not satisfied with calculating marginal rates of substitution while shopping for 
groceries, he now optimizes while deciding how hard to work for his employer, how truthfully to 
transmit information to his exchange partners, and whether the benefits exceed the costs of 
defaulting on a loan” (pg. 84). The reader can now see why I said earlier that the new 
homoeconomicus is an abstract of a person we will all recognize.  
Bowles & Gintis (1993) next add that these troublesome activities of the new 
homoeconomicus include the full set of efforts to lie, cheat, steal, mislead, disguise, obfuscate, 
feign, distort and confuse. They claim that Williamson (1984) refers to this phenomenon as self-
interest-seeking-with-guile. But here’s a critical point: ‘guile’ according to them, is included in 
the very concept of optimization and is no less an example of sophisticated self-interest than 
buying cheap and selling high. In other words, this long list of non-virtuous characteristics of the 
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new homoeconomicus are now seen as intrinsically a part of his very nature. This brings us to the 
idea of contested exchange. 
Bowles & Gintis (1993) define a modern economic transaction as a ‘solved political 
problem’. From this they argue that economics has gained the title of queen of the social sciences 
by choosing solved political problems as its domain. “Through the lens of contested exchange, 
the economy looks considerably different” (p. 86). What do they mean by this? We must use the 
language of economists and how they think in our explanation.  
In lay terms, markets have become far more complex inasmuch as they handle the 
modern homoeconomicus with all his non-virtuous impulses described above. Returning to the 
economist’s thinking, Bowles & Gintis (1993) point out for example, that the labor market not 
only allocates workers to jobs, it also provides an environment governing the regulation of the 
quality and pace of work. Similarly, credit markets do more than allocate capital among 
borrowers. Because the promise to repay a loan is not enforceable by a third party (the borrower 
may be bankrupt or enjoy limited liability), credit markets also provide non-contractual 
mechanisms for the enforcement of prudent levels of risk. Similar observations apply to the 
goods markets, in which consumers typically pay a price in excess of marginal cost, while their 
implicit threat to switch suppliers if dissatisfied induces firms to supply high quality products. 
Again in lay terms, markets now reflect the new homoeconomicus. Bowles & Gintis (1993) now 
ask; if markets perform disciplinary as well as allocative functions, we might reasonably ask how 
good a job they do: under what conditions do markets provide efficient solutions to disciplinary 
problems arising from the contested nature of exchanges? They answer: they operate quite 
imperfectly, and the competitive pressures favoring the emergence of more efficient mechanisms 
are themselves imperfect.  
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Bowles & Gintis (1993), connecting to our discussion on the nature and power of capital, 
next discuss power in modern homoeconomicus. They begin with an interesting definition of the 
power economics affords people. “While the concept of power is far from settled in political 
theory, we can offer a relatively uncontroversial sufficient condition for the exercise of power, 
namely, the ability of furthering one's interests by imposing (or credibly threatening to impose) 
sanctions on another agent when the converse is not also true” (p. 88).  They next add that 
credible sanctioning power in the above sense is often present in contested exchanges, the threat 
of dismissal and the termination of a credit relationship being examples. Contested exchanges 
thus have an essentially political aspect, and mechanisms designed to enforce claims through 
monitoring and sanctioning are political structures in the everyday sense that they govern the 
exercise of power. It should be easy for the reader to now see that this is indeed a description of 
how the poor, marginalized and the working classes are controlled in modern times via the social 
power economics affords those with money.  
Bowles & Gintis (1993) conclude their article by arguing that the very idea of contested 
exchange may also reflect the growing malaise amongst economists and others concerning what 
appears to be an unravelling of valued social norms. In a hopeful view they claim that “the post-
Walrasian paradigm is likely to expand the disciplinary boundaries of economics to include, as in 
the 19th century, the selective study of law, history, sociology, psychology, and politics” (p. 
100). In other words, in my view, they are saying we need to return economics to its rightful 
place within the social sciences and remove it from the false-fitting grip of the natural sciences. 
This, as we will see in Chapter Five, is the essence and argument of institutionalism.  
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Before summarizing the thoughts of Bowles & Gintis (1993) I need to look deeper into the mind 
of the individual that makes up modern homoeconomicus. In other words, how ‘rational 
decisions in humans’ are actually made. 
Human rational decision making. Recall Persky (1995) argued that “we make a serious 
error if we read into this animal the modern identification of economic man with rationality 
itself. In much contemporary usage, the essence of economic man lies not in what he picks, but 
in his rational method for making choices” (p. 223). Myers & Papageorgiou (1991) provide us 
with a more thorough understanding of this idea of rational choice behavior in humans.  
The connections to Bowles & Gintis (1993) are evident as these authors begin with their 
position that the allocation of resources among users and the distribution of wealth among 
individuals represent two fundamental categories of issues in neoclassical economics. Myers & 
Papageorgiou (1991) argue that “allocation of resources in an efficient manner is a technological 
problem, while distribution, on the other hand, of welfare among individuals is a philosophical 
and a political problem, a problem of social justice” (pg. 386). Since this is a study of 
neoliberalism with its social impacts and not an in-depth analysis of economic theory, I will 
focus on the latter.  
The following analysis of limited human mental processing capabilities provides, in my 
view, possibly the strongest argument that neoliberalism stands upon very shaky grounds; at 
best. Myers & Papageorgiou (1991) start their explanation of how individuals make their choices 
by claiming that the currently dominant view in psychology and the behavioral sciences is 
expressed by ‘information processing’ theories of individual choice behavior. To connect this to 
Persky (1995), it is necessary to quote this bit of technical detail that these authors use to explain 
their critique of homoeconomicus: 
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Since individuals have limited information-processing capacity, they avoid excessive 
computations. Instead, they depend on simple and myopic algorithms that adapt their behavior to 
their capacity limitations. Thus, the choice process involves processing capacity, motivation, 
attention, perception, information acquisition and evaluation, use of memory, decision rules and 
processes, and consumption and learning. Choice is indeed a very complex phenomenon. (p. 
386) What does this mean and how does it connect to Persky (1995) and his criticism of 
homoeconomicus?  
Myers & Papageorgiou (1991) provide a very straightforward albeit technically detailed 
answer. They begin by telling us that neoclassical economics, where homoeconomicus began and 
where Bowles & Gintis (1993) have shown why we have returned, favors analytically tractable 
models. Making a direct connection to Persky (1995) they claim “since the choice process is 
complex, there is a limit on the level of detail one could incorporate in any analytically tractable 
model of individual behavior” (p. 386). They go on to add that even if it were possible to build a 
comprehensive model of an information-processing theory, and even if this model was 
analytically tractable, it would perhaps be useless. They argue, technically, that the reason is 
since the choice process is strongly cyclical, goals, attention, perception, decision rules, and 
other components of the choice process can be modified during the process through feedback 
from any component of the process. This, they claim, makes information-processing theories in 
their most general form so flexible that no description useful for something else, such as 
prediction or explanation, can be made, since any type of behavior is justifiable. Thus, even 
when the interest is in individual behavior itself, it is better to reduce the scope of information-
processing theories enough to obtain predictions or explanations about the behavior of 
individuals in the hope of achieving insight. This, in my view, not only connects to Persky 
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(1995) but also provides sound philosophical grounding using the information processing 
hypothesis model of rational choice found in modern psychology, on why homoeconomicus, as a 
model of human behavior that supports neoliberalism, will always produce the social injustice 
Myers & Papageorgiou (1991) mentioned above. How so?  
In short, these authors are saying, in my opinion, that the very limitations of our own 
mental capabilities prevent us from processing increasing amounts of complex detailed data. In 
other words, the sheer amount and complexity of human variables needed for a proper 
calculation of what we should or should not do forces us to reduce our thinking to more 
simplistic levels where things like wealth, luxury, leisure and procreation, the four elements of 
Mill’s political economy, are easy to understand and choose.  
This all now sums up what, in my view, Bowles & Gintis (1993) meant when they argued 
that “abandoning the Victorian world of neoclassical theory will redirect economists to an older 
conception of their profession: what once was called political economy, where Adam Smith and 
Karl Marx alike knew that a handshake was not always a handshake” (p. 83). I now turn to a few 
critical views of homoeconomicus and will begin to ground my rejection of the very idea itself. I 
begin with a discussion on rational choice in humans; a foundation of homoeconomicus and a 
pillar of neoliberalism. 
A critical view of human rational choice. Sen (1997) in his article: Rational Fools: A 
Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory begins our investigation. He leans 
on the thoughts of Francis Ysidro Edgeworth, famed philosopher and economist. He starts by 
directly connecting his work to the thinking of Mill’s Political Economy discussed above. He 
claims that “in his Mathematical Psychics, published in 1881, Edgeworth asserted that the first 
principle of Economics is that every agent is actuated only by self-interest. This view of man has 
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been a persistent one in economic models, and the nature of economic theory seems to have been 
much influenced by this basic premise” (p. 317).  Sen (1997) sets out to critically analyze this 
very statement by Edgeworth. 
Sen (1997) interestingly, adds that Edgeworth himself was not entirely sold on this first 
principle of economics and called 19th century economic man an impure egoist and mixed 
utilitarian. He then asks the question: why did Edgeworth spent so much of his talent and time on 
a line of inquiry he believed to be false? He argues that this question is of continuing interest to 
modern economists as well.  
Sen (1997) extends this same line of thinking to ask the very interesting and purely 
hypothetical question: how would someone not exposed to capitalism answer the question: what 
will an economy motivated by individual greed and controlled by a very large number of 
different agents look like? The answer, he claims, is most likely there would be chaos. While this 
may seem like a meaningful question for economists to ponder, he replies the primary concern 
here is not with the relation of postulated models to the real economic world, but with the 
accuracy of answers to well-defined questions posed with preselected assumptions which 
severely constrain the nature of the models that can be admitted into the analysis. “A specific 
concept of man is ingrained in the question itself, and there is no freedom to depart from this 
conception so long as one is engaged in answering this question” (p. 322). What is he saying 
here?  
In my view, he is pointing out the vast gulf between theory and the real world. He adds 
that the nature of man in various theoretical economic models continues, then, to reflect the 
particular formulation of certain general philosophical questions posed in the past.  He argues 
that a more thorough conception of man is simply not a part of this inquiry. In other words, he 
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sees little value in pursuing this purely theoretical line of thinking; at least in this article. He does 
however present something he sees as simpler to explain as to why the conception of man in 
economic models tends to be that of a self-seeking egoist.  
From this Sen (1997) next argues that “it is possible to define a person's interests in such 
a way that no matter what he does he can be seen to be furthering his own interests in every 
isolated act of choice” (p. 322). This appears to take into account far more elements of human 
psychology found in Mill’s political economy than just the basic four of wealth, luxury, leisure 
and procreation. He points out that this line of thinking, while relatively recent in the theory of 
revealed preference, has a long history; as Joseph Butler argued against Mill’s thinking more 
than two centuries ago in the Rolls Chapel. His argument, a bit mathematical but very relevant, is 
summed up as follows:  
The reduction of man to a self-seeking animal depends in this approach on careful 
definition. If you are observed to choose x rejecting y, you are declared to have ‘revealed’ a 
preference for x over y. Your personal utility is then defined as simply a numerical 
representation of this ‘preference’, assigning a higher utility to a ‘preferred’ alternative. With this 
set of definitions, you can hardly escape maximizing your own utility, except through 
inconsistency. (p. 322)  
He next quickly adds that you can of course choose x and reject y on one occasion and do 
the exact opposite on another, thus categorizing yourself as inconsistent. What does all this 
mean? He is saying that it is quite easy to confuse revealed-preference theorists into labelling 
you as inconsistent or as one whose preferences are changing. In either case, you cannot be 
placed in a model that shows how you maximize your preferences; the very reason for the model 
143 
 
itself. “You can frustrate the revealed-preference theorists through more sophisticated 
inconsistencies as well” (p. 323).  
Sen (1997) brings this all together when he says: 
This approach of definitional egoism sometimes goes under 
the name of rational choice, and involves nothing other 
than internal consistency. A person's choices are considered 
‘rational’ in this approach if and only if these choices can 
all be explained in terms of some preference relation 
consistent with the revealed preference definition, that is, if 
all his choices can be explained as the choosing of ‘most 
preferred’ alternatives with respect to a postulated 
preference relation. (p. 323)  
This, in my view, is a stinging denunciation of the very idea of rational choice; which of course 
is at the heart of homoeconomicus. In other words, Sen (1997) is telling us how weak this 
abstraction of Mill’s economic man holds up under the most rudimentary inspection of the so-
called human observations that give it credence. I believe this to be why he chose the wording of 
Rational Fools in the title of his article.  
Finally, in another serious and powerful blow to the neoclassical idea of quantifying 
rational choice, Marx (1973) in his book: Grundrisse: Introduction to the Critique of Political 
Economy discusses the essence of capital that connects to Sen’s (1997) above critique. Marx 
(1973) argues “when a consumer refuses certain commodities, it is not always, as is assumed by 
the new economists, because he wants to purchase others in preference, but because he wants to 
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reserve entire the general power of purchasing” (p. 600). Here, Marx discusses the nature of 
capital in itself that the neoclassical economist clearly does not see or dismisses outright. In my 
view, classical and neoclassical theory assumes money, a form of capital is to be spent. From this 
it becomes a matter of how the consumer will spend. This in turn becomes ‘rational choice’ and 
applied quantitatively to the fictional economic man or homoeconomicus. Marx (1973) argues 
that this assumption may be baseless. This segues us nicely into the next critical view of 
homoeconomicus; an examination of its engagement with values. 
Role of values in economics: six theses. Tsakalotos (2005) begins by arguing that if 
political economy is to dislodge neoclassical economics from its position of dominance, it must 
become more interdisciplinary” (pg. 893). He then questions whether critics of mainstream 
(current) economics are merely opposed to the specific theoretical toolbox adopted by particular 
classical economists in the nineteenth century or neoclassicals in the twentieth; or whether, on 
the contrary, the critique encompasses the very category of economics itself as understood as a 
set of propositions about the economy and abstracted from politics, culture and values. He argues 
for the latter.  His position is that abstracting values, and in more generally, culture, as is done in 
classical economics, does not constitute a methodologically neutral stance but instead in fact 
actually takes up a value position; all the more pernicious for it going unrecognized. Getting to 
his point, he argues that this has important consequences for how social reality, including 
economic institutions and policies, are understood.  
He starts off giving a temporary semi-endorsement of neoclassical economics. However, 
he says that the literature is unlikely to make much of a dent. The reason has to do with the 
commitment of most neoclassical economists, if not to perfect competition itself, then at least to 
the ideal of perfect competition. (Recall our charming neoclassical Victorian short story of A 
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Roadside Stand Outside Blacksburg) Even with this temporary semi endorsement of the 
neoclassical school, Tsakalotos (2005) goes further to include the classical thinkers as part of the 
main thrust in his critique of both. He argues that “there has been a growing interdisciplinary 
literature examining the ethical limitations of both markets and neoclassical economics” (p. 895).  
His thrust is that this common commitment to the market that both classical and 
neoclassical thinkers alike have, is actually the theoretical underpinning of their understanding of 
economics in general. This is a critical point. However, this commitment to the market is not the 
case for most political economists in the tradition of post-Keynesianism, Marxism and 
institutionalism.  “Economists here would, to be sure, have many differences between them on 
the scope of the market, the role of other institutions of economic governance and so on. But 
there is no basic commitment to the market” (p. 895). This idea of a basic commitment to the 
market will become a central theme taken up in detail in Chapter Six where I introduce Frederick 
von Hayek and his part in the rise of neoliberalism. 
Tsakalotos (2005) argues from this that a ‘revitalized political economy’ can take on 
board the ethical critique far more readily. Why this has not happened, at least yet, to any large 
degree, according to him, is because of the fear of many political economists that an engagement 
with values necessarily diminishes the scientific status of their approach. To dispel this fear and 
to provide a counter argument, is the task of his article entitled: Homo Economicus and the 
Reconstruction of Political Economy: Six Theses on the Role of Values in Economics.  
Thesis one- The centrality of values to economic theory. This first thesis says that values 
are crucial to peoples’ understanding of reality and helps them to make sense of that reality. 
Since economics purports to be concerned with reality it cannot avoid values. With economics 
defined as a social science, he argues here that “values may or not be integral to the natural 
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sciences, but it is difficult to see how they can be avoided in the social sciences” (p. 895). He 
then makes the claim that we should accept two almost self- evident propositions. The first is 
that people are for the most part self-evaluating beings who have some understanding (however 
incomplete) of the practices they are involved in. They also debate such understandings with 
others and are often keen to justify not only the social practices that matter most to them but also 
their own role within them. The second is that social theory has as its main object such practices, 
not only describing them, but informing them and even criticizing them.  
Of special importance to this study, Tsakalotos (2005) discusses the fundamental 
homoeconomicus model that recommends self-interested behavior. He argues that such behavior 
is not a logical necessity but nevertheless may be difficult to resist in practice.  He asks: how can 
neoclassical economists ignore this? The answer, according to him, is to think of values as 
constraints. But what is it that is being constrained, he asks next? He uses the thinking of 
Sunstein (1997) who points out that it is “very difficult to make sense of economists’ separation 
of rationality from social norms” (p. 896). He argues that a norm-free conception of rationality 
would have to depend on a conception of what peoples’ rational ‘interests’ are in a social 
vacuum; an obviously unintelligible thought since people never act in a social vacuum. 
In an interesting and refreshing move, he flips the switch on the fundamental idea of 
homoeconomicus by asking “why can we not start with models that associate rationality with 
what can be publicly defended on ideal considerations with self-interest as a constraint? Would 
economic theory not look different and privilege different social practices?” (p. 896). The reader 
can begin to see how this author is questioning the very foundations of neoliberalism and posits 
that its base (homoeconomicus or the model of self-interested behavior) is not only arbitrary, but 
wholly illogical and unsupportable. 
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Thesis two - Avoiding value analysis leads to bias that is all the more pernicious for 
being unaccounted for. This second thesis argues that economic models that purport to avoid 
values while at the same time privileging certain behavioral traits, such as self -interest, can 
never hope to be value-free. As has often been said, the rejection of a norm is itself a norm. 
Abandoning the terrain of values is a position that is value-laden to the core. The author defines 
homoeconomicus in terms of its vision of how people behave in a self-interested manner. Sadly, 
this human is clearly recognizable in today’s neoliberal times. According to Tsakalotos (2005): 
She is interested in satisfying given preferences, and in consuming privately ‘bundles’ of 
goods, rather than investing in relationships. She is basically asocial, acting more through ‘exit’ 
than ‘voice’, and most (if not all) of her relationships with others are through markets or 
contracts. Since these exchanges and contracts are entered into voluntarily there need be little 
conflict. What conflict there is will result from the existence of scarcity which itself can be 
attenuated by an orientation to ever greater production.  Politically she is interested in negative 
freedom; minimizing the interference to the satisfaction of preferences from either other 
individuals or the state. (p. 897) 
From here, this sad quote shows the neoliberal engine of ever increasing productivity. 
Additionally, a non-caring stratification of society or the widening of the gap between the rich 
and poor, rests. These ideas will be discussed in detail in the next section of this chapter when we 
discuss the division of labor. 
Thesis three- Values are endogenous to institutions. Here Tsakalotos (2005) posits that 
not only are values important, they are deeply rooted in the institutional setting. He says that the 
neoclassical approach fails to see this because in most models when the issue of a variety of 
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behavioral traits is discussed at all, ‘the subject is theorized as inserted into, rather than shaped 
by, the context in which he or she is situated.  
In a somewhat stinging rebuke to neoclassical economics, he remarks “the question of 
how to decide whether to act as homo economicus, homo reciprocans or homo altruist is never 
posed because it would challenge some of the most basic methodological tenets of neoclassical 
economics” (p. 899). In other words, human actions that are not based in self-interest, are not 
even discussed; as they would undermine the very essence of their theorizing. This connects 
directly back to Mill’s political economy where man is simplified to a being who desires but four 
things: wealth, luxury, leisure and precreation. 
Thesis four- Economic actors and policies seek to alter or influence values. Here 
Tsakalotos (2005) argues that economic actors and policies often have values as their target. This 
is opposed to policies being about the best way to satisfy given preferences. His point is that it is 
often the case that policies work best if they are associated with a change of values. According to 
him, neoclassical economics, and the image of homoeconomicus, has no space for positive 
freedom, where people determine the limits and frameworks in which to operate. The 
neoclassical approach, he argues, seems untroubled by the fact that firms are seeking to influence 
values all the time. If it could even once be argued that advertising was merely providing 
information, telling consumers about the nature of the product; this now strikes us as incredibly 
naive. As is commonly known, advertising has increasingly focused on proposed lifestyles with 
attached values. Adding fuel to the fire, he claims that “of course different advertisements are 
aimed at different audiences but that some common values are being proposed can scarcely be 
doubted: individualism, autonomy as expressed through shopping, the disappearance of politics 
and so on. Moreover, there is no hint of the fact that in order to enjoy such goods, we may need 
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capacities in order to use them (training for instance) and the appropriate social context or 
environment (clean air or safe streets for instance)” (p. 902).  
Thesis five- The contestability of all values. This thesis follows the main ideas from 
thesis four where he argues that “if economic actors, the state, and economic policies target 
values then they must expect opposition at this level” (p. 903). What does he mean? First, he 
claims that neoclassical economists misunderstand the opposition to economic policies. Using 
the thoughts of Thompson (1978), he says that we should remember that every contradiction is a 
conflict of value as well as a conflict of interest; that inside every ‘need’ there is a ‘want’ on its 
way to becoming an ‘ought’ (and vice versa).  
He next adds a dramatic element when he refers to Marxist historians who, according to 
him, have always argued that the struggle against capitalism has included an opposition to the 
acquisitive ethos of homoeconomicus. “For men desire, fitfully, not only direct economic 
satisfactions, but also to throw off this ‘grotesque economic disguise’ which capitalism imposes 
on them, and to resume a human shape” (p. 903).  
Tsakalotos (2005) concludes this thesis with an explanation of the thinking that is used in 
today’s neoliberal times that the reader will certainly recognize, and that sounds quite Marxian 
and Foucauldian in tone. He claims that this thesis brings to the fore the idea that the traditional 
focus on power is still of paramount importance. The critical piece here is where he says that 
“the extent to which an economy is regulated will not be just a matter of how these regulations 
bear on economic performance” (p. 903). This is because the level of regulations would not be 
distributed to the benefit of the power enjoyed by many groups in society. Thus capitalists, those 
in power, may quite rationally oppose an increase in such regulations, even if this is associated 
with superior economic performance, because they fear a slippery slope of workers pushing the 
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economy even further in the direction that they would like to see. Here the reader will recognize 
today’s neoliberal mindset: “similarly capitalist support for deregulation is also not irrational, 
once it is seen that this diminishes the power of workers” (p. 904).  
Thesis six- No value can act as trumps. Here Tsakalotos (2005) claims that since societies 
carry out basically the same set of functions, they are bound to be normatively significant. He 
argues that neoclassical theorists ignore this because they believe that they are not in fact 
committed to any such claims, and that what they are committed to at the normative level, 
follows from common sense and uncontroversial notions such as economic efficiency. The fact 
that there is amongst neoclassical economists such widespread agreement over what counts as 
success in the economic domain should thus come as no surprise This final thesis suggests that 
“alternatives to the neoclassical approach need, on the contrary, to be based on the existence of a 
plurality of values while, at the same time, seeking to promote procedures and institutions in 
which these can be debated and acted on” (p. 904). What does he mean? 
He answers this when he uses the thoughts of Stiglitz (1994) who argues that the 
fundamental point is that there is no reason to believe that market economies ‘naturally’ make 
the right trade-offs or that, in particular, market economies with more ruthless competition are 
more efficient than economies in which competition is more gentle. Using this as a background, 
he uses as an example the problem of working time, both the length of the working day and the 
issue of ‘flexible’ hours, with respect to just the issue of those who have dependents and those 
that do not. He then uses Sayer (2000) who points out ‘those who do have such commitments, 
primarily women at present, risk being categorized at work as unambitious or not proper ‘team 
players’. In other words, it is not only capitalist pressures which create the problems that are the 
subject of the politics of time, but excessive ambition and the overvaluing of achievement 
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relative to other goods, particularly those concerning relationships. Clearly this is a direct 
byproduct of a strenuously competitive market environment. 
Summing up the six theses. Tsakalotos (2005) ends his provocative article with a once 
common reference to the Soviet Union. He claims that “it used to be said of the Soviet Union 
that it would have been better placed to outperform the West if it had stopped trying to run in the 
same direction; that is sacrificing all other considerations in favor of economic growth. Whatever 
the merits of that contention for the ex-communist societies, this paper has suggested that a 
similar argument may hold for political economy” (p. 906). In my view, with his detailed look at 
homoeconomicus, concluding that its essence of self-interest cannot be defended, he may have a 
point; in that it may just be a matter of time before its arbitrary, pernicious and unsupportable 
theorizing crumbles on itself.   
Section One summary. We began with discussing the common philosophical connections 
between homoeconomicus; also captured as economic man and the division of labor, and why 
these two seemingly disparate concepts were combined into a single chapter. Using Habermas’ 
(1968) interpretation of the thoughts of Karl Marx, we see that both originate from Marx’s very 
dramatic thoughts on the idea of capital. A critical diversion at this point suggested a connection 
between the nature of capital and social structure; using language as the key. Next the differences 
between classical and neoclassical economics was discussed to show that they are mostly due to 
the changing nature of modern man with his increasing complexity; shown later to be caused by 
his increased non-virtuous characteristics.  
Persky (1995) then provided us with details of John Stuart Mill’s original abstraction of 
neoclassical homoeconomicus which asserts that it is based on four elements: wealth, luxury, 
leisure and procreation. Neoclassical economics was discussed with its clear connection to the 
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Victorian era of Great Britain, and based on the gentlemanly ethos that a ‘hand shake was a 
handshake’. Connecting to that and of great importance, Bowles & Gintis (1993) argued that 
homoeconomicus is in essence a function of history and used the German Historical School of 
thought as a means of explaining that. They argue that the complexity generated by modern man 
with his extensive non-virtuous characteristics, forces economists to return to Mill’s simpler 
political economy.  
Critical views of homoeconomicus was provided by Sen (1977) and Marx (1973) who 
dissected Mill’s political economy and neoclassical thoughts with a strong denunciation of the 
idea of calculating rational choice by showing how shaky and easily manipulated any such 
calculation really is. Tsakalotos (2005) ended this section in what is, in my view, a hopeful 
reexamination of all these classical and neoclassical economic thoughts with the inclusion of 
human values. 
The bottom line from section one is that homoeconomicus, or economic man, as an idea 
in and of itself, is an invented abstraction that is, and maybe has always been, something that 
benefits a few, but is in fact far removed from reality and thus an unreliable and quite possibly 
very dangerous social concept. The information gained from this section leads me to conclude 
that homoeconomicus is an unsupportable and weakly theorized concept, yet something I still 
refer to as one of the twin pillars of neoliberalism. The reader should not forget that is it capital 
that undergirds this analysis as something right beneath the surface making things happen; or as 
Habermas (1968) would say, ‘calls things to life’. We now turn to critically analyzing the other 
pillar of neoliberalism; the division of labor. 
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Section Two: The Division of Labor 
History of the idea. I begin this section with the Hosseini (1998) article: Seeking the 
Roots of Adam Smith’s Division of Labor in Medieval Persia. He starts his analysis of Adam’s 
Smith’s division of labor idea with an excerpt from the writings of a secret association of 10th-
century CE Muslim thinkers who lived in the Lower Mesopotamian river port of Basra. They left 
behind a standing monument of their intellectual achievements in an encyclopedic compendium 
known as the Epistles of the Brethren of Purity (Ar. Rasa’il Ikhwan al-Safa) which is comprised 
of 52 ‘epistles’ (Ar. rasa’il) with writings on subjects ranging from mathematics to natural 
science, to theology. It is worth quoting this specific epistle at length. In my view, it is thinking 
of the very highest order and presents a view of history that must be respected if one is to be an 
honest researcher. 
The enterpriser addressing a Greek who had been boasting 
of the achievements of his people, says: "You boast most 
unreasonably of these sciences; for you did not discover 
them by your own penetration, but attained them from the 
scientific men among the Jews of Ptolemy's times; and 
some sciences you took from the Egyptians in the day of 
Prammetichus, and then introduced them into your own 
land, and now you claim to have discovered them"; the 
King asked the Greek philosopher: "Can it be as he says?" 
He replied, saying, “It is true; we obtained most of the 
sciences from the preceding philosophers, as others now 
receive them from us. Such is the way of the world for one 
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people to derive benefit from another”. (p. 653, quotations 
in original) 
Hosseini (1998) also tells us that the concept of the division of labor has been known 
since the time of ancient Greece, particularly in the writings of Plato and Xenophon. In addition, 
Adam Smith’s analysis of the division of labor that was central to his analysis of economic 
growth had been considered before the publication of his famous Wealth of Nations by William 
Petty and other English writers during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The thrust of 
Hosseini (1998)’s argument is that “medieval Muslim scholars in Persia, who were the most 
productive of medieval Muslim intellectuals, discussed the division of labor in some of its 
various forms” (p. 654).  
My intent here is not to attempt to dislodge Adam Smith from his well-earned perch in 
economic history; quite the contrary. I am more than satisfied with using his brilliance as a valid 
starting point in history to discuss the division of labor even though there is evidence of such 
thinking centuries before him. Why? As the ancient Muslim thinkers strongly suggest, there can 
be no valid starting point that one can claim with absolute certainty of the origination of an idea. 
By a ‘starting point’ I take it to mean a date in history.  
This connects with Garrison (2009) who argues that the origination of a phenomenon 
cannot be given by a date, but by those conditions that cause its arrival. Nevertheless, Adam 
Smith’s definition and analysis of the division of labor will be used as a foundation in this study 
of neoliberalism. But the thoughts of Hosseini (1998) concerning the ancient Muslim thinkers 
that argue all ideas stem from previous ideas, still raises a valid a question: how did Adam Smith 
then formulate his ideas? 
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Smith’s potential formulations. In a very interesting speculation that appears intuitive and 
may indeed therefore have merit, Tipton (2001) uses thoughts from Aristotle’s work: Parts of 
Animals, to argue that Adam Smith may have used the combination and division of labor seen in 
organs at the organismal level in the beginning formulations of his own economic theories.  
According to Tipton (2001), in Aristotle’s work, he claims that:  
It is better when possible, that one and the same organ 
should not be put to dissimilar uses; that is, there should be 
an organ of defense which is very sharp, and another organ 
that to act as the tongue, which should be spongy and able 
to draw up nourishment. And thus whenever this is possible 
to employ two organs for two pieces of work without their 
getting in each other’s way, nature provides and employs 
two. (pg. 52) 
As an example of this rendering of Aristotle’s division of labor seen in animals, Tipton (2001) 
describes the functionality of an elephant’s trunk. He argues that “a nose has a double function as 
an organ of smell and respiration. In the elephant, another function is observed in its use as a 
hand. It can function as a hand would function because it is prehensile, a quality that is 
dependent on its material make up. Such a combination of labor is useful and beneficial to the 
elephant” (p. 53).  
This is but one reason why I argue that the division of labor is far more intrinsic to our 
way of life and being than most could ever imagine. It is also why I connect it to the discussion 
on the nature and power of capital discussed earlier. In addition, the reader will soon see that this 
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elephant analogy sounds very much like the base assumptions fundamental to Adam Smith’s 
work. Before proceeding further, a few words on Adam Smith the man and his environment 
should prove helpful. 
Dilthey (1961) viewed the very lives of humans and their social intercourse with life as 
central to any meaning generated from historical research. With that, M. Adler (Ed.) in Smith 
(1952), provides a short biography of the life of Adam Smith that should therefore prove 
meaningful:  
He was born in a small town in Scotland called Kirkcaldy, ten miles from Edinburgh in 
1723. He lived to 1790. His father, a successful administrator who worked as controller of the 
customs, died four months before his birth leaving his mother to care for him for most of the 
remaining 61 years of her life. After finishing his term at the Kirkcaldy grammar school, Smith 
at the age of fourteen entered the University of Glasgow. The editor tells us “although his 
favorite studies were mathematics and natural philosophy, he came strongly under the influence 
of Francis Hutcheson, who, as professor of moral philosophy, taught a benevolent theory of 
morals which had as its end the greatest happiness for the greatest number” (p. v).  The editor 
adds next that Smith devoted much of his studies to moral philosophy. We will see that this 
strong influence from Professor Hutcheson gives substance to modern critiques of Adam Smith’s 
work where scholars to this day ponder where and how his moral bearings situate and inform his 
economic thinking. This important point will be addressed in more detail later in this section. 
Continuing to look at Adam Smith’s life through the lens of powerful influence, in 1751, 
Smith was called to the University of Glasgow first as a Professor of Logic and after a few 
months, a Professor of Moral Philosophy. I think the reader can begin to see that these 
diametrically diverse intellectual interests of Smith will certainly compete with each other in the 
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public’s view for supremacy at some point. This is stated more succinctly by Myers (1983) when 
discussing Smith’s contribution to society claimed, “I speak of Smith’s use of economics to 
provide a definitive solution to the classic philosophical problem of private interests and the 
public welfare which faced the 18th century” (p. 93). I will show how Smith attacked this 
problem with incredibly deep insights gained from his moral understandings of the world that are 
imbedded in his other famous work: Theory of Moral Sentiments. Smith’s views will be detailed 
and explained via lofty imaginative metaphors in Evensky (1993) when he discusses Smith’s 
famous ‘invisible hand argument’ shortly.  
For now, in my view, reconciling logic with morality to mass audiences with powerful 
personal agendas on wealth creation may prove too difficult a challenge; thus the continuing 
polarizing debate on his work to this day. As I hope to show, Smith actually believed quite 
strongly in both; but understanding that the combination is not an easy task. I will argue that this 
boils down to the battle of private interests versus the public good; which leads us to the very 
marrow of neoliberalism; hence the critical role of Adam Smith.  
Of interest, the editor claims that Smith occupied these professorial positions at the 
University of Glasgow for twelve years and later declared that they were “by far the most useful, 
and therefore by far the happiest and most honorable period of his life” (p. v). During this time, 
his lectures centered around four categories: natural theology, ethics, jurisprudence, and those 
political regulations which are founded upon expediency, and which are calculated to increase 
the riches, the power, and the prosperity of the state. Smith had become quite a famous lecturer 
and thus naturally gained prominence.  
However, here is where I believe the power of N-H provides a clear explanation from 
history. I will show that it ties into the core of this study of neoliberalism which argues that its 
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strength and growth is due to powerful of capitol that influences throughout history and not a 
result of sound theoretical formulations. The question now is how does this specific piece of 
history show this? 
I mentioned that as a sought after lecturer, Smith became an important man of high 
esteem in the university as well as in the town of Glasgow. Though it was only a provincial 
center with only 23,000 inhabitants, the rising trade gave promise to the town’s future industrial 
and commercial prominence. This is key. As a result of Smith’s popularity, he gained many 
friends of its principle merchants and financiers.  
It is a good time now to recall Dilthey’s (1961) thoughts that things like the ‘clashes of 
wills’ between people is what gives history meaning. According to the editor, Sir James Stuart, 
referred to as the last of the mercantilists, also Smith’s rival for favor, claimed that it was Smith 
who converted Glasgow’s business leaders to a policy of free trade. Speaking to the Glasgow 
Economic Society, founded by his friend the eminent merchant Andrew Cochrane, Smith in 
1755, claimed credit for the novel system of economic liberty then beginning to attract 
supporters.  
Connecting to my argument on the power of capital and also directly in line with using 
N-H, in 1732, Smith gave up his university posts to accept the offer of a life time pension by 
Charles Townshend in return for acting as tutor to his young step-sons on an eighteen-month tour 
of France. Of importance, Townshend (2015) tells us that Charles Townshend “proved to be 
financially brilliant and determined but devoid of sound political judgment. In his last official act 
before his death, he obtained passage of four resolutions that threatened American colonial 
traditions of self-government and imposed revenue duties on a number of items necessary to the 
colonies” (p. 1). Without question Townshend was an ultra-conservative man of great wealth 
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influence that he used on Adam Smith; so much so, that he was able to, via promised financial 
gain, have him leave his prestigious posts at the university just to tutor his step sons. This seems 
to me that one may see this as a significant degradation in personal intellectual status for mere 
financial gain; reflecting on the power of capital. 
However, we need to keep in mind that we have no way of knowing what the long term 
consequences are of being influenced, nor all the possible ramifications. For all we know, Smith 
may have himself been very influential to Townshend’s two stepsons in guiding them to a more 
moral life while on that 18-month tour of France. Additionally, Smith may have calculated that 
such a very close personal relationship with a prominent conservative and wealthy person like 
Townshend may lead to connections with more such people who in turn could boost his stature 
past what would have come from his university posts. We have no way of knowing exactly what 
his thinking was in leaving his university positions. 
From Smith’s acceptance to become closely involved on a personal level to such an ultra-
conservative man like Townshend, the reader may think that his initial love and abilities in moral 
philosophy all but disappeared in clear favor of personal economic gain. But we will see that that 
is not the case, and that his love for moral philosophy will resurface in a potent way. The editor 
tells us that after his time with Townshend ended, Smith spent the next five years in London 
where he lived on terms of intimacy with many of the leading figures of the day; including 
Gibbon, Burke and Reynolds.  
In 1776, the Wealth of Nations was published. David Hume, in a congratulatory letter 
declared “Euge! Belle! dear Mr. Smith, I am much pleased with your performance” (p. vi). 
Within six months, the first edition was exhausted and went through five more editions during 
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his life. The editor tells us that Smith’s work ‘had considerable influence’ on the budget of Lord 
North in 1777 & 1778. 
The only other work published by Adam Smith besides revisions of his two earlier books, 
was his letter on the death of David Hume in 1776. This is where things get truly meaningful 
from a historical view and brings out the great value in Dilthey’s (1961) thinking about history. 
“Because of its unqualified praise of Hume’s moral qualities, the letter aroused a storm of 
controversy throughout the British Isles, and was denounced as a piece of daring effrontery” 
(Smith 1952, p. vi). The importance of this cannot be overstated as it illustrates the beginning of 
a clear and striking dichotomy between wealth creation and morals that exists so strongly in 
today’s neoliberal world. How so? A few brief words on David Hume should serve to indicate 
this and why I believe it to be so important to this study of neoliberalism. 
Adam Smith and David Hume. Morris & Brown (2014) generally regarded Hume as one 
of the most important philosophers to write in English. David Hume was also well known in his 
own time as an historian and essayist. According to the authors, Hume was a master stylist in any 
genre: his major philosophical works; A Treatise of Human Nature (1739–1740), the Enquiries 
concerning Human Understanding (1748) and Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751), as 
well as his posthumously published Dialogues concerning Natural Religion (1779), remain 
widely and deeply influential.  
Morris & Brown (2014) argue that “although Hume's more conservative contemporaries 
denounced his writings as works of skepticism and atheism, his influence is evident in the moral 
philosophy and economic writings of his close friend Adam Smith” (p. 1).  The authors also add 
that today, philosophers recognize Hume as an expert in philosophical naturalism, seen as a 
precursor of contemporary cognitive science. Additionally, his work is seen as the inspiration for 
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several of the most significant types of ethical theory developed in contemporary moral 
philosophy. It is here that the reader can see that Adam Smith’s early love for the idea of 
morality, buttressed by the powerful moral intellect of David Hume, makes its way into history 
in a major way; as each clearly influenced the other.  It also questions the current pejorative 
scholarship and debate on neoliberalism where the literature argues it to be bereft of morality.  
Before proceeding to a more mechanistic and modern understanding of the division of 
labor itself, much more needs to be discussed on this dichotomy between wealth creation and 
morals. This discussion will lead us into the very core of Adam Smith’s thinking in an attempt to 
better understand his original intent versus its modern usage that I argue intentionally warps his 
thinking. 
To accomplish this, I will use three theorists; Evensky (1993), Bishop (1995) and 
Rothschild (1994) in providing very different perspectives on an absolutely critical idea in Adam 
Smith’s thinking that is popularly known as his ‘invisible hand argument’. My intent is to present 
all three views; then argue why I agree with both Evensky (1993) and Bishop (1995) but disagree 
with Rothschild (1994). 
Adam Smith’s Invisible Hand Argument. The reader will see that this argument may very 
well be the single idea that modern economists, politicians and conservative policy makers alike 
use to ground their firm belief in their worldview; and do so quite boldly. The ubiquitous nature 
of it fuels the dichotomy between private interest versus morality and the public good. It also 
grounds my own position as a researcher on why neoliberalism has become the dominant global 
phenomenon of our times. Finally, the reader will see that it fits neatly with using N-H and its 
narrative power will reveal through history, what I argue are true causal factors that help provide 
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a more satisfactory explanation of the Rise of Neoliberalism. The reader will also sense the 
unspoken nature and power of capital as simmering just beneath the surface. 
   I begin with Evensky (1993) who provides, from an economist’s perspective, a very 
straightforward and clear definition of what this ‘invisible hand’ argument is all about and how it 
relates to the above mentioned dichotomy:  
We use Adam Smith's "invisible hand" metaphor confident 
that we all know what it means in our discourse: it reflects 
our admiration for the elegant and smooth functioning of 
the market system as a coordinator of autonomous 
individual choices in an interdependent world. But in Adam 
Smith's moral philosophy, the invisible hand has a much 
broader responsibility: if individuals are to enjoy the fruits 
of a classical liberal society, the invisible hand must not 
only coordinate individuals' choices, it must shape the 
individuals into constructive social beings-ethical beings. 
(p. 197, quotations in original)   
Evensky (1993) argues that in revisiting Smith’s famous metaphor, a valuable lesson is 
learned. The foundation of success in creating a constructive classical liberal society lies in 
individual’s adherence to a common social ethics. But there is much more to this than meets the 
eye. To fully appreciate this idea of the invisible hand, and how it connects to this study of 
neoliberalism, we need to understand its philosophical genesis.  
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I will show that this invisible hand argument, especially as understood and interpreted by 
Evensky (1993), my first theorist, represents the precise same bedrock I laid bare in my brief 
autobiography explaining my own belief and faith in God and the essence of Milton’s (1974) 
epic poem from Chapter Three.  
The critique of Adam Smith’s invisible hand.  My first theorist, Evensky (1993), argues 
that Smith did not believe that philosophers are engaged in discovering truth. In his view, 
philosophers can only imagine what connecting principles give rise to the order we observe. I 
agree with this. The author next provides us with an analogy to understand what he means.  
Smith contrasts a philosopher's perspective on nature with that of a spectator who is awed by the 
wonder of the special effects at an opera. “Upon the clear discovery of a connecting chain of 
intermediate events, it [our wonder] vanishes altogether. Who wonders at the machinery of the 
opera-house who has once been admitted behind the scenes?” (p. 198). He next adds that in the 
wonders of nature, however, it rarely happens that we can discover so clearly this connecting 
chain; as we are not really admitted behind the scenes.  
From this analogy, Evensky (1993), in explaining Adam Smith’s thinking, argues that 
nature’s truth lies in the machinery behind the scene while philosophy pretends to lay open the 
concealed connections that unite the various appearances of nature. The great philosophers are 
the ones who have the creativity to imagine what those ‘concealed connections’ might be. And 
Smith believed that the greatest of all philosophers was Sir Isaac Newton, whose brilliance he 
saw as a triumph of the imagination. Here is where it gets really interesting and beautiful; in my 
opinion. 
Evensky (1993) now argues that Smith seeks to do for moral philosophy what Newton 
had done for natural philosophy.  He wants to tell a story of the connecting principles of the 
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human order with commanding and compelling persuasive power. But, as with Newton, Smith's 
story does not begin with these principles. Both men take the story back to the origin of these 
principles, and it is here that we meet the ‘invisible hand’. Newton and Smith believed that the 
connecting principles which give rise to the order we observe, reflect the planning and 
handiwork of a designer.  But who is the artificer that designed and constructed this great work?  
“Smith and Newton both believed in the Deity as designer” (p. 199, emphasis added). This 
cannot be overstated; as I hope to show it as creating a dichotomy between Smith’s real 
intentions, and the usage of his great work. In turn, I will also show how it grounds the main 
thrust of this study which is to provide a more satisfactory understanding of the phenomenon of 
neoliberalism. 
Extending this argument, the author next tells us that in this classic enlightenment 
analogy, the Deity is to the universe as the watchmaker is to a watch. In each case, it is the hand 
of the designer that arranges the springs and pins and wheels, and sets the system in motion. But 
in both cases, that hand is invisible to the spectator who observes only the product of the effort. 
In our analogies, the orderly progress is that of the hands of the watch, or of the sun, the moon, 
and the planets. We see nothing of the designer, we see only the effects of the design. To better 
understand this important idea, we need a brief discussion of Adam Smith’s other great work that 
explains his invisible hand argument in more detail.  
This classic work: The Theory of Moral Sentiments was published in 1759, some 17 years 
before his Wealth of Nations. It is my firm opinion that in not knowing or simply disagreeing or 
discarding Smith’s moral positions, much of the thrust of his real intent for the Wealth of 
Nations is open for significant misunderstanding and intentional warping. This is obviously a 
strong statement and as such, needs unpacking for clarity.   
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Evensky (1993) claims that in this great work on the philosophical foundations of 
morality, Smith had his invisible hand metaphor as center in his thinking when he published his 
Wealth of Nations. He argues that “Smith's Wealth of Nations is the story of those socially 
desirable unintended consequences of individual action that result when events are allowed to 
follow their ‘natural course’, the course consistent with the Deity's design” (p. 200). What does 
he mean? The explicit answer can be found in Smith’s (1976) The Theory of Moral Sentiments. 
It is worth quoting at length: 
Human society, when we contemplate it in a certain 
abstract and philosophical light, appears like a great, an 
immense machine whose regular and harmonious 
movements produce a thousand agreeable effects. As in any 
other beautiful and noble machine that was the production 
of human art, whatever tended to render its movements 
smoother and easy, would derive a beauty from this effect, 
and, on the contrary, whatever tended to obstruct them 
would displease upon that account: so virtue, which is, as it 
were, the fine polish to the wheels of society, necessarily 
pleases; while vice, like the vile rust, which makes them jar 
and grate upon one another, is as necessarily offensive. (p. 
316) 
What sublime thinking on the part of Adam Smith. I feel the utmost of confidence in 
arguing that with this beautifully imaginative definition of human behavior conforming to the 
‘concealed movements emanating from the design of a benevolent Deity’ from Adam Smith 
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himself; and with the Wealth of Nations, with its division of labor, being a firm pillar of 
neoliberalism; something has gone terribly astray. In other words, I believe those who did not 
share Smith’s deep moral convictions and ideas were yet intelligent enough to envision an 
enormous future of domination by completely segregating the wealth creation power of the 
division of labor from any moral bearings. Recall the discussion on the nature and power of 
capital where Marx referred to it as an ‘animated monster’.  
This also, as the reader may see, touches the very core of this study. I intentionally added 
the adjective benevolent to Deity because Smith (1976) argues that virtue acts as a fine posh to 
the gears while vice serves as a vile rust. It is precisely here that I fall back on Milton’s (1974) 
poetic vision and Dilthey’s (1961) thinking on creating meaning from history that I attempt to 
expose what went wrong; thus providing a more satisfactory explanation of the phenomenon 
known as neoliberalism. We still have a way to go and there are two more theorists who have 
different views on Adam Smith’s invisible hand argument.  
 My second theorist, Rothschild (1994) takes a different view to that of Everest (1993). 
She begins by arguing that Smith did not particularly esteem the invisible hand but instead 
thought of it as an ironic but useful joke. She does however admit that his views are of a 
continuing and even increasing interest in modern times. She supports her position by referring 
to Smith’s (1976) Theory of Moral Sentiments where Smith is describing some unpleasant rich 
proprietors who are quite unconcerned with humanity or justice but who in their natural 
selfishness and rapacity, pursue only their own insatiable desires.  
She appears to substantiate her argument when she next includes that they, the rich 
proprietors, do however employ thousands of poor people to produce luxury commodities. The 
reader can clearly see that this sounds just like the core of the commonly known trickle-down 
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economics of today’s neoliberalism; where the poor are looked at as those who should be 
grateful for their menial jobs and earnings, and whose only reason to give them work is to 
support the lifestyles of the wealthy.  
Next, Rothschild (1994) still speaking about the rich proprietors, concludes that “they are 
led by an invisible hand to, without intending it, without knowing it, advance the interest of the 
society” (p. 319). This is an extraction of the thinking of Adam Smith (1976) based on, in my 
view, cherry-picked words to support her conclusion of what Adam Smith means by the invisible 
hand. On what grounds do I say this? 
A more detailed inspection of Smith’s (1976) work hopefully explains my position. To 
her credit, the words she quoted do indeed come from page 184 in Smith (1976) as she indicated; 
but in her own summary form; which I admit she is entitled to. However, she does not bother to 
include what Smith actually says about the invisible hand on the next page that will show why I 
so strongly disagree with her conclusions. It is lengthy, but a very necessary insertion that will, at 
the same time, address the very heart of what this study hopes to expose about neoliberalism; 
especially its intellectual foundations. I will argue in this study that neoliberalism’s intellectual 
foundation may be the result of an intentional misuse of some moral thoughts of Adam Smith 
and others; grounded on their belief of a benign Deity as the designer that controls everything; 
something neoliberals cannot and will never accept, in my opinion.  
Remember Smith (1976), here discussing his invisible hand argument, is talking about 
those same rich proprietors as Rothschild (1994) and their unintended helping of society; despite 
their selfishness and rapaciousness:  
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They are led by an invisible hand to make nearly the same 
distribution of the necessities of life, which would have 
been made, had the earth been divided into equal portions 
among all its inhabitants, and this without intending it, 
without knowing it, advance the interest of the society, and 
afford means to the multiplication of the species. When 
Providence divided the earth among a few lordly masters, it 
neither forgot nor abandoned those who seemed to have 
been left out in the partition. These last too enjoy their 
share of all it produces. In what constitutes the real 
happiness of human life, they are in no respect inferior to 
those who would seem so much above them. In ease of 
body and peace of mind all the different ranks of life are 
nearly upon a level, and the beggar, who suns himself by 
the side of the highway, possesses that security that kings 
are fighting for. (pg. 185) 
This is immensely powerful and holistic thinking. It shows Adam Smith, 17 years prior to 
his Wealth of Nations, displaying a supremely deep understanding of his moral view of the world 
based on the common thinking of himself and Sir Isaac Newton. In addition, David Hume’s 
strong and close friendship with Adam Smith is verified here. Furthermore, and this is critical, it 
shows his incredible foresight into the genesis and foundation of stratification theory, the natural 
consequence of the division of labor that I will be discussing shortly.  
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Recall that Adam Smith came strongly under the influence of Francis Hutcheson, who, as 
professor of moral philosophy, taught a benevolent theory of morals which had as its end the 
greatest happiness for the greatest number. Also recall that at the University of Glasgow, he was 
a Professor of Logic and a Professor of Moral Philosophy and that I argued that reconciling both 
logic and morality to mass audiences with their own agendas for wealth creation prove too 
difficult a challenge; generating the continuing polarizing debate on his work.  
I present now a very short personal narrative that will aid in further unpacking the above 
quote by Smith especially, when he said ‘In what constitutes the real happiness of human life, 
they are in no respect inferior to those who would seem so much above them’. He is of course 
referring to ‘those on the lower level of life’: 
This unpacking comes from a lesson I learned when I was a manager of large 
departments in the private sector. One of my areas consisted of about 100 employees who 
worked on machines that encoded financial data on the bottom of checks so they could be read 
and digitally stored by larger high speed machines downstream. As many managers do, I was 
always on the lookout for people I could promote to supervisory and management positions from 
the lower ranks; something I felt great doing. In this one case, there was a woman who was by 
far the most stellar machine operator I had ever seen with exemplary work habits and a warm 
smile to everyone each and every day without fail. She worked on that same machine for many 
years. Everyone liked her. She was clearly a prime candidate for promotion.  
I recall meeting with her one day in my office and told her how much I appreciated the 
work she did for the bank. I asked her if she would be interested in being promoted. Understand 
that each and every time I was able to promote someone, they were usually ecstatic about 
‘moving up’. However, in this case, without the slightest hesitation, she very warmly, and with 
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her usual smile, told me no. I told her that she may wish to reconsider because I could not pay 
her any more than what she was already making as she had hit the limits of the pay scale for a 
machine operator. Once again, with a warm smile she responded; ‘no thank-you’. What does this 
have to do with Adam Smith’s quote?  
When Smith said ‘in what constitutes the real happiness of human life, they are in no 
respect inferior to those who would seem so much above them and ease of body and peace of 
mind all the different ranks of life’; I see this woman as clear as day. Adam Smith (1976), in his 
philosophical brilliance on morality, understood what I believe many are not willing to admit of, 
nor may not understand fully; i.e. life’s natural human stratification as Divine Providence. This is 
a very difficult topic to broach because it is fraught with significant emotional land mines; but 
one I will discuss in a follow-up in Chapter Eight, the final chapter.  
For now, I argue that Smith had a vision, based on his moral philosophy, that his Wealth 
of Nations could produce a Divine Inspired society with ‘virtue, as it were, the fine polish to the 
wheels of society’ and not the ‘vile rust, which makes them jar and grate upon one another’, as 
we see in today’s neoliberal society; in my opinion. 
I see the position of Rothschild (1994) as one where the disregards for those on the lower 
levels of society, whom she appears to view as there only to support the rich in their insatiable 
desire to accumulate wealth, claiming that in the process, they are helping society, via Smith’s 
invisible hand argument, as the ‘vile rust’ Smith speaks about in his Theory of Moral Sentiments.  
Ironically, I do find myself in agreement with her on one point. She winds down her 
analysis by arguing that the difficulty which is at the heart of Smith’s use of the invisible hand in 
his Wealth of Nations, is that of distinguishing between licit and illicit expressions of self-
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interested agents in a society in which the norms governing such distinctions are rapidly 
changing. She is right. She ends by saying that she “predicts that the invisible hand will loom 
much less large in the next century than it has in the 20th century” (p. 322).  I completely agree 
with her but argue that that is exactly the problem. 
My third theorist debating Smith’s invisible hand argument is Bishop (1995) who begins 
by going directly to the heart of my point. “It is common practice in the business world today to 
justify pursuing profits and self-interest by quoting Adam Smith's invisible hand argument. 
Pursuit of one's own interests is morally justified, it is said, because the invisible hand of the 
market place will ensure that this will result in the general good of society” (p. 165). Bishop 
(1995) claims that an empirical study of the ethical thinking of sixty top managers found that the 
majority explicitly or implicitly rely on the 'invisible hand' of the market.  He next poses the 
questions: what did Smith really say about the invisible hand and what did he say about the 
morality of self- interest? He mentions here that Smith was a moral philosopher by profession 
and that his writings deal with ethics as much as economics; a major point that somehow, in my 
view, seems to have escaped Rothschild (1994).  
I mentioned earlier that in my view, Smith’s diametrically opposing intellectual interests, 
i.e., logic and morality, would prove very difficult to reconcile to mass audiences with strong 
personal agendas of wealth creation and that they would wind up competing with each other in 
the public’s eye. In support of this, Bishop (1995) argues that “there are numerous passages in 
The Wealth of Nations in which Smith directly states that the interests of business people, 
merchants and manufacturers as he calls them, are in fundamental conflict with the interests of 
society as a whole, and that business people pursue their personal goals at the expense of the 
public good” (p. 165).  He claims that some of these passages seem blatantly to contradict the 
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invisible hand argument and questions: is Smith guilty of major contradictions? He next appears 
to defend Smith. 
His argument claims, and this is important, that “first, we can safely say that Smith was 
aware of the possibility of using the invisible hand to justify self-interest; it was a topic of the 
moral writers of his day often addressed in the context of criticizing Bernard Mandeville” (p. 
168). In explaining this, he tells us that in the Fable of the Bees, first published in 1714, 
Mandeville had argued that the personal vices of greed, avarice, envy, etc. were public virtues in 
that they led people to the kind of activities that drove all thriving economies. This specific 
naming of human vices as public virtues by Mandeville should not be underestimated. It suggests 
that many have felt that way for a very long time. 
In my view, this position should not to be taken lightly. Supporting this, plus my 
argument that claims that Smith’s work was intentionally bastardized, the author says that “in so 
far as modern business people use the invisible hand argument to show that the pursuit and 
flaunting of personal wealth should not be viewed as a vice (or sin), they are referring to a form 
of the argument which originates with Mandeville, not Smith” (p. 168). This position, in my 
view, is an attempt to theoretically ground what is commonly referred to as ‘trickle-down 
economics’. It argues that by ensuring that the environment is such that it satisfies the desires for 
rich to get richer first, the effects of that will benefit everyone else via a sort of gravitational 
trickle-down effect.  
Also, Bishop (1995) stated “in conclusion, Smith did not morally justify self-interest by 
using the invisible hand argument, although he was familiar with Mandeville's view that the 
private vice of luxury could be a public benefit” (p. 169). (Note how this ties into Mill’s political 
economy where one of his four elements included luxury) Instead, he argues that Smith based his 
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belief in the moral neutrality of self-interest on its consistency with natural liberty, a concept 
which he derived from the natural law tradition; natural law here referring back to his ‘Deity as 
designer’ analogy in his Theory of Moral Sentiments.  
Bishop (1995) brings Smith’s invisible hand metaphor into current neoliberal times in a 
very straightforward manner that speaks to directly to modern corporate leaders: 
A deliberate amorality in the executive suite is encouraged 
in the name of systemic morality: the common good is best 
served when each of us and our economic institutions pursue 
not the common good or moral purpose, advocates say, but 
competitive advantage. Morality, responsibility, and 
conscience reside in the invisible hand of the free market 
system, not in the hands of the organizations within the 
system, much less the managers within the organizations. (p. 
169, emphasis added) 
This is a perfect rendering of the mindset of the corporate elite in our country today that explains 
much. How so? I remember in the heat of the economic downturn that nearly collapsed our 
economy shortly after the election of President Obama, many of the corporate leaders of our 
giant financial organizations converged on Washington seeking a financial bailout of tens of 
billions to keep them afloat. The public was aghast at their seemingly massive arrogance to 
arrive for a life-saving hand-out in their private corporate jets when so many millions of 
Americans were seriously suffering from what many viewed as their reckless financial decision 
making. Where did they get such gall?  Bishop (1995) has just provided us with a possible 
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explanation with how they saw themselves within the larger picture: they were doing good for 
society. 
Bishop (1995) concludes his argument claiming “many people currently use Smith's 
invisible hand argument to morally justify greed, avarice, and the unbridled pursuit of money” 
(p. 173). He then asks: can Smith be used in this fashion?  Unfortunately, the answer to that 
question is highly technical; dealing with the differences between maximizing total revenue in 
the economy and something called Pareto optimality; which looks at grossly unequal 
distributions and sub-maximum total revenue; putting the discussion past the scope of this study.  
Intentionally bypassing the technical explanation of the use of Smith’s invisible hand 
argument in today’s environment, I find myself enthusiastically supporting Bishop (1995) as he 
concludes his article: 
But the nature of this argument must be noted closely; it 
applies only to economic activities such as investing capital. 
It does not apply to the pursuit of self-interest in general, or 
to the pursuit of self-interest in any area outside of economic 
activities. Smith thought the general pursuit of self-interest 
by business people in particular was in fundamental conflict 
with the public good, and he thought that if business people 
successfully pursued their interests in other areas, the results 
would be disastrous. In particular, if business people 
pursued their self-interest in the political arena, they would 
only seek the overthrow of the free market system for their 
own benefit and everyone else's loss. Smith had nothing but 
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contempt for a nation governed by shopkeepers. (pg. 177, 
emphasis added) 
Recall my statement earlier that the reader will sense the ‘power of capital simmering 
beneath the surface’ in this discussion on Smith’s invisible hand argument. With this, Bishop 
(1995), in my view, has really pinpointed precisely the most warped and malicious manifestation 
of the invisible hand argument that we see today; the use of business people extending their self-
interests into the arena of politics; themselves deeply believing that they are justified in doing so.  
Without question, the literature has shown that this force, the power of global 
corporations, fuels neoliberalism’s global dominance. Recall from Chapter Two where Forest & 
Hirayama (2009) argued that “neoliberalism has dominated policy discourse, policy formulation 
and policy implementation” (p. 998) and Ong (2007) who said that neoliberalism is a “capitalist 
machinery that is structuring a new planetary geography” (p. 3). It gives seemingly unlimited 
financial and political power to corporate leaders and renders many intelligent people, again in 
my view, to see current neoliberal times as hopeless and possibly irreversible. Recall Margaret 
Thatcher’s famous argument TINA; an acronym for: ‘there is no alternative’. 
In summarizing the three critiques of Smith’s invisible hand argument, I agree with 
Evensky (1993) and Bishop (1995) mainly because they clearly insist on including Smith’s 
moral thinking as grounding his economic texts. Rothschild (1994) on the other hand, uses 
Smith’s thinking to endorse and rationalize current trickle-down economics that argues the 
primacy of the rich getting richer being good for society. 
It is now time to discuss some of the fundamental manifestations of the division of labor 
and how it actually works in modern times. We will see that it boils down to the creation of 
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wealth and how that is accomplished. After this, we will connect this thinking to theories of 
social stratification that the reader will see appears to be a natural consequence of the division of 
labor. This is yet another manifestation of the power of capital. 
Adam Smith’s Division of Labor and the Creation of Wealth. I begin with a basic 
definition from Adam Smith (1952): “The greatest improvements in the productive powers of 
labor, and the greater part of the skill, dexterity, and judgment with which it is anywhere 
directed, or applied, seem to have been the effects of the division of labor” (p. 3). The operative 
words here are the ‘productive powers of labor’ meaning that in its simplest case, given the same 
amount of time, two or more people will create more output using the division of labor than if 
they had not. This still needs to be broken down for a fuller understanding. Over the next several 
paragraphs, I will use simple commonly known visualizations and short narratives in an effort to 
better explain the division of labor as an idea in modern times. 
Examples of the division of labor. As the first example, during the warm weather months, 
every Thursday there’s a farmer’s market right across the street from where I live and where I 
stop by each vendor to see if there is anything I need to purchase. This one specific vendor sells 
homemade pies of various varieties; from apple to peach to cherry, etc. I fell in love with the 
strawberry- rhubarb crumb. Every week I stopped by his stand and bought one. Since he was 
always a very affable fellow, one day I stopped by his stand and told him how much I loved his 
pies and looked forward to buying one each week. He responded: thank you very much; that was 
nice of you to say…. but, and here’s the important point of this; he told me; I only make the 
crusts. He pointed to a woman vendor a few booths down selling vegetables and said that she 
makes all the fillings, and to another one who does the baking. This is the division of labor.  
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It is not hard for the reader to imagine that these farmers are not getting rich in what they do; and 
that they need to devise ways of making as much money on their efforts as possible to stay 
afloat. This is what Adam Smith means by the productive power of labor in his definition.  
Let us assume that they sell ten varieties of pies with various crusts. Just try to imagine if 
one farmer was responsible for making each different type of pie from scratch i.e., making the 
crust, the filling, baking it, packaging it and selling it along with other products like string beans 
and potatoes. It will be easy to see that their output would be far lower. Furthermore, their 
profits, knowing that they can only raise their prices but so much before people stop buying, will 
be also be far lower; possibly putting them out of business.  
For the second example; let’s take a quick look into my own family life when I was very 
young. There were three of us kids and our parents posted our chores for the week on the 
refrigerator in the kitchen. On any week you may have seen that Dennis had to wash the dishes, 
Claudia had to dry them and put them away and Brian had to clean the tables, sweep the floors 
and take out the garbage. Again, imagine if only one of us were responsible for everything. The 
other two would be free to play and to do other things while one was tied up doing all the chores. 
This would have created animosity and tension among the kids for sure; with my parents 
continually settling heated disputes.  This too, is the division of labor. I am confident that the 
reader can look into his or her own family everyday life a see examples of the division of labor at 
work. 
For our third example, and one that really demonstrates the power of the division of 
labor, let us visualize ourselves in a modern fast food restaurant. We look on the menu and 
decide to order a #4 which consists of a hamburger, fries, a cookie and a drink. When we observe 
our order being produced, we see several different hands in the process; one person is working a 
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machine that prepares burgers; another is working the machine that fries the potatoes, while one 
is working the oven that bakes the cookies and yet another works a machine that pours drinks. 
Still yet, we see one person that combines the orders, takes our cash and serves it to us; all the 
while someone, usually in a tie, seems to be supervising the entire operation. I argue that the 
reader cannot even imagine any other way of doing this on a large scale other than by use of this 
division of labor. In this case, it is so powerful that it has created global giants out of these 
organizations.   
For my final example of the division of labor, I turn to a highly sophisticated technical 
environment.  I recall a two-day seminar I attended many years ago at MIT on ‘managing highly 
technical teams’. I was witness to an unbelievable level of sophistication of this idea of the 
division of labor that may be hard for some to imagine. On the first night, they randomly selected 
four attendees to go out to dinner together as a networking and communications exercise. My 
group included me plus three real NASA rocket scientists. Two mentioned that they were from 
India and I believe from an Asian country; and me.  As we started introducing ourselves over 
dinner, no one knew anyone else. It was then when we realized that we had three NASA 
employees (all PhD’s) among us and me; a senior Banking operations manager. What shocked 
me to this day is that as each scientist began to discuss their occupation, none had much of a clue 
about what the other one’s were doing! If I recall correctly, one was in propulsion, one was in 
materials and I believe the third was in wing design. Each clearly did their thing not knowing 
what the other two were involved in…. all working for the same company. This too, is the 
division of labor. This is what Adam Smith meant in his definition when he said ‘anywhere 
directed or applied’.  
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The reader can see in all examples, this same idea of the division of labor in use. I also 
believe that the reader will be hard pressed to even imagine any other way of accomplishing the 
end tasks in each case. To conclude this section, a much needed discussion on a major impact 
that the division of labor has on society is required. To start, recall the discussion on the nature 
and power of capital and especially how it ‘calls things to life’.  
The Division of Labor and Social Stratification. While not novel, Adam Smith’s brilliant 
use of this idea was much more than simply a statement about economics and creating wealth. I 
argue that it simultaneously created, as a natural consequence of its own essence, the stratifying 
of society that we see today. In simpler terms, the very idea of wealth creation via the division of 
labor creates a means for its own continuance via a social structure to support it. What do I mean 
by this?  
Let us return to our fast food example above for an illustration. I argue that what we 
witnessed, while waiting for our order, is a microcosm of the social stratification the division of 
labor creates in our society. Supervisors often wear ties while other workers do not for example. 
It also becomes evident from this same observation that different skills are needed which in turn 
creates different levels of compensation, which in turn creates different levels of lifestyles. It also 
is obvious from this same example to us that we need far more workers on the lower levels i.e., 
making burgers, fries, pouring drinks, etc. than we need supervisors. Try to image any fast food 
organization with many higher paid supervisors than low paid workers. I argue that such a vision 
would appear oxymoronic to the reader. In any event, this simple example will suffice to 
introduce ourselves to stratification theory; as the reader can see an intuitive connection to the 
division of labor to get us started. 
180 
 
Runciman (1974) argues that “the study of stratification has been claimed to be the 
central question of sociology in much the same way that kinship has been claimed to be the 
central question of anthropology” (p. 55). Stratification, according to him, is a cultural universal. 
He adds that a task of a theory of stratification is to describe, classify, and ultimately explain this 
aspect of social organization over the whole range of known and documented cases. Here is 
where he gets really meaningful for our purposes.  
Runciman (1974) argues that stratification exists in a ranking of three separate 
dimensions; economic, social and political. Interestingly, he seems to wonder whether or not it is 
necessary to use these three ‘dimensions’ or whether all three should be subsumed under the 
heading of power. “Since the three are always connected in practice, there is no need to indulge 
in abstract speculation about whether a society is conceivable in which they would be quite 
separately explicable” (p. 57). This clearly connects to our fast food example where we observed 
the connection between economic and social factors, i.e., the person who makes burgers lives 
differently from the person who supervises because of the income differentials of their respective 
positions in the company. 
Getting more detailed about theory building for social stratification, Runciman (1974) 
argues that “any system of stratification requires not simply a specification of the relative 
positions of all persons within it at some point in time, but also an account of the mechanisms 
which determine their position over the course of their lives” (p. 58) He next claims that 
therefore, each person should be assigned a place in ‘stratification space’ from an initial position 
of parental or quasi-parental origin. In response to this, I argue that the division of labor is such a 
mechanism; as it has shown to exist from basic family household functions to ultra-complex 
industrial organizations like NASA.  
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In a final very interesting observation and view that relates strongly to this study of 
neoliberalism, and especially its future, Runciman (1974) says “it is a perfectly reasonable 
request to put to the stratification theorist that he should be capable of specifying the conditions 
under which inequalities of economic, social or political privilege will be set to a minimum” (p. 
81). Keep in mind that this was written in 1974; just a few years prior to the real explosive 
growth in neoliberalism. His answer appears to be one of hopelessness. Why?  
He responds to this very provocative and highly relevant query by arguing that the 
overwhelming plausible answer, however, is that such a near-egalitarianism is attainable only in 
small pre- or non-industrial societies. He says that this condition seems to be a necessary one 
“and it follows from this that for societies to evolve in such a direction, they would somehow 
have to reverse what for the moment is not merely an immensely powerful but also a world-wide 
trend” (p. 81). This, in my view is both absolutely correct and at the same time, as ominous as it 
gets. The literature review, sadly, wholly supports his gloomy conclusions.  
Next I provide further current relevancy to the division of labor-stratification theory 
combination, and its connection to this study of neoliberalism; especially as it impacts 
minorities. To accomplish this, I add an additional perspective from Wiley (1967) where he 
discusses what he refers to as the mobility trap. The author argues that “the mobility chances of 
ethnic group members are often subject to special complications, not only because of 
discrimination, but because of features within the ethnic structure itself; for the group is usually 
internally stratified to some degree. This duality of intra versus extra-group mobility is further 
complicated if the group is moving upward as a bloc” (p. 147).  
He then goes on to extend this idea by claiming that the individual ethnic may have to 
make special decisions concerning his career plans. Not only must he choose, for example, 
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whether to aim for a job in the professions, a bureaucracy, or small business but he also faces the 
question of ethnicity; whether to move with it or against it, to capitalize on it or disregard it. As 
an African American myself, I can attest to these thoughts as being quite real and meaningful. 
Wiley (1967) next adds that “if he makes the wrong decision, he may find himself in a mobility 
trap, and these exist in abundance in all fluid stratification systems” (p. 148). The obvious 
question is: what exactly is a mobility trap? 
In sounding like a form of meritocracy theory, Wiley (1967) provides this important and 
practical understanding of a mobility trap that the reader should be able to visualize:   
To give a clearer definition of the mobility trap it will be necessary to sketch the picture of the 
opportunity structure which it assumes. Such pictures are usually related to some simple 
metaphor, and much of the theorizing in this area is influenced, perhaps unconsciously, by half-
hidden metaphors. Before giving our own, mention will be made of two others in relation to 
which ours can be more clearly seen. Perhaps the most common metaphor is that of the ‘social 
ladder’, or the ‘ladder of success’. (p. 148, quotations in original text)   
Wiley (1967) further argues that within this framework of a mobility trap, social strata 
are visualized in a continuous hierarchical line; that is, the ladder is a straight one and no rungs 
are missing. Secondly, it can be climbed, and the means of climbing are the same at all levels. It 
is implicit that ability and hard work determine one's place on the ladder. “This optimistic picture 
is favored by people who are themselves in the upper strata and feel a bit guilty about being 
there” (p. 148). First, with this clarity from the author, the reader can see why I referred to the 
mobility trap as some form of meritocracy theory.  
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Following this thinking that addresses economic movement for ethnics, Watson & Barth 
(1964) support Wiley (1967) when they discuss what they see as the two general building blocks 
to a general theory of stratification: the family as a unit of equivalent evaluation, and the utility 
of occupation as a basis for class placement. For our purposes, I will use the latter. They claim 
“some sociologists postulate that it is the occupational position which is ranked, while others 
assert that occupation is the best ‘index’ of placement within the prestige hierarchy. Whatever 
the argument, there seems to be an almost unanimous agreement that occupation is an extremely 
important determinant of class placement” (p. 12).  
Watson & Barth (1964) support this by claiming “few studies of class omit a reference to 
occupation and most of them incorporate occupational measures into the research design. In 
short, occupation and occupational prestige have become symbols of class, not only in the 
scientific but in the popular mind as well” (p. 12). This provides a further connection between 
the division of labor and social stratification theory.  
For my final connection between the division of labor and social stratification, I turn to 
Rothbard (1991) who does not use the actual terms social stratification in this brilliant work but 
instead addresses the essence of the division of labor as a fundamental dividing force of nature 
prior to examining the results of such division. This clearly closely connects to the discussion on 
the nature of capital. He analyzes the division of labor through the movement of time while 
referencing Adam Smith.  What do I mean here?  
Rothbard (1991) argues that “while a continuing and advancing division of labor is 
needed for a developed economy and society, the extent of such development at any given time 
limits the degree of specialization that any given economy can have” (p. 227). As examples, he 
argues that there is no room for a physicist or a computer engineer on a primitive island, as these 
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skills would be premature in those contexts. He next claims that Adam Smith argued that the 
division of labor is limited by the extent of the market. He explains this by telling us that 
economic and social development are mutually reinforcing processes: the development of the 
market permits a wider division of labor, which in turn enables a further extension of the market. 
Here is where he makes a powerful and in my view, a brilliant connection from the division of 
labor to the genesis of social stratification theory without using the term itself: 
If the scope of the market and the extent of the division of labor are mutually reinforcing, 
so too are the division of labor and the diversity of individual interests and abilities among men. 
For just as an ever greater division of labor is needed to give full scope to the abilities and 
powers of each individual, so does the existence of that very division depend upon the innate 
diversity of men.  For there would be no scope at all for a division of labor if every person were 
uniform and interchangeable. (p. 227) The reader can see that he is clearly speaking about social 
stratification being the result of the division of labor in this quote. 
As a result of Rothbard’s (1991) unveiling the mutually reinforcing natures of the 
division of labor and the naturally diverse abilities of man, this connects, in my view, to Adam 
Smith’s ‘Divine Providence’ of people created and placed in different strata of society; which in 
turn gives society as a whole a means to prosper. Recall Smith (1976) explaining his invisible 
hand argument said:  
They are led by an invisible hand to make nearly the same 
distribution of the necessities of life, which would have 
been made, had the earth been divided into equal portions 
among all its inhabitants, and this without intending it, 
without knowing it, advance the interest of the society, and 
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afford means to the multiplication of the species. When 
Providence divided the earth among a few lordly masters, it 
neither forgot nor abandoned those who seemed to have 
been left out in the partition. (p. 185) 
 I argue that any society can prosper and last only with this fundamental ‘Providential 
Structure’ of people in ‘unequal’ differential social strata because of their differing natural 
abilities. I recognize that this needs further clarification. I believe this to be an inescapable truth; 
though many refuse to accept this and see it instead as an oppressive idea. It is not; in my view. I 
further argue that forcing equality of all people will certainly lead to doom as that would in 
essence attempt to disregard that same ‘Divine Providence’ Adam Smith spoke of. As started 
earlier, this is a highly provocative and very sensitive idea filled with significant land mines 
because it of its innate connections to highly combustible human emotions and many other 
reasons. Nevertheless, it must be addressed as part of this study and I will do so at least on a 
cursory level, in Chapter Eight, the final chapter.  
Section Two Summary. I began with my rationale for using Adam Smith as a central 
figure in this study of neoliberalism with his division of labor idea; even though there is evidence 
of such thinking many years before him. Next, a brief biography of Smith’s life was presented to 
give the reader an initial sense of those people and ideas that greatly influenced him. His clear 
moral compass was explained via his connection to David Hume as an example of such 
influence.  
The thrust of this section and also that of this study, centered on Smith’s famous invisible 
hand argument. In my view, this argument was founded on his moral understanding of the world 
detailed in his Theory of Moral Sentiments and that that was also the basis for his writing the 
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Wealth of Nations some 17 years later; where he introduces the idea of the division of labor. It 
was shown that Smith attempted to address the philosophical problem of the 18th century of self-
interest versus morality; alternatively viewed as the problem of self-interest versus the public 
good.   
A critical analysis of Smith’s position on this problem was given by three theorists 
representing three different interpretations of Smith’s thinking. I made my position clear by 
agreeing with two of the three. I also posited that this invisible hand argument struck at the very 
heart of neoliberalism.  
Next, several examples of what the division of labor really means in modern times were 
presented using analogies and narratives. The critically important connection between the 
division of labor and stratification theory was introduced to show that their symbiotic and 
mutually reinforcing natures connect to Adam Smith’s invisible hand argument. In addition, how 
stratification theory impacts ethnic minorities was shown to be similar to meritocracy theory and 
that both are connected to the division of labor. Finally, once again the reader can see how the 
nature of capital simmers beneath the surface of this second section. A brief summary of this 
chapter is next. 
Chapter Conclusion 
An analysis on the nature and power of capital was detailed in the beginning of this 
chapter with the objective bolstering the current scholarship on neoliberalism. The chapter was 
then structured with two sections each critically analyzing homoeconomicus and the division of 
labor separately. 
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The next two chapters will, like much of this current chapter, be based on historical 
narrative as a means of creating understanding. The power of capital, once again, will be seen 
clearly as a creative force beneath the surface in the explanatory narratives. As a helpful preview 
of Chapters Five, Six and Seven, I refer to their combined discussions as the ‘path of 
neoliberalism from idea to dominant global phenomenon’; or the body of this study. I will 
suggest that the reader visualize this path as ‘building a bomb then lighting the fuse’. Such a 
visualization along with the power of capital as creative force, should prove helpful as a means 
to better understand how we got to where we are today and why. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
188 
 
Chapter Five 
The University of Chicago: From Inception to World War II 
Introduction 
 This chapter, and the next two, continue with the underlying theme stemming from the 
discussion on the nature and power of capital; this time with an emphasis on the how it actually 
works in social situations. For lack of a more sophisticated term, the reader can see these next 
three chapters as the ‘meat and potatoes’ of this study as they, via narrative, directly address the 
title: The Rise of Neoliberalism.  
Chapter Four suggested that upon close examination, the two fundamental ideas upon 
which neoliberalism rests, homoeconomicus and the division of labor, have both shown to be at 
best problematic and at worse, an intentional misuse and misrepresentation of the moral ideas of 
John Stuart Mill and Adam Smith. Nevertheless, if even these suggestions are true, there is 
ample support from the literature that neoliberalism has morphed into an unparalleled 
phenomenon of global dominance regardless of its possible lack of theoretical and ethical 
soundness. 
 Recall a few of the quotes from many different authors about what neoliberalism is from 
their perspectives in Chapter Two: Peck & Tickell (2002) stated that “it seems to be everywhere” 
(p. 380); Chopra (2003) calls neoliberalism “a global social science able to explain all rational 
conduct, or even simply all behavior” (p. 422); Ong (2007) said that neoliberalism is a “capitalist 
machinery that is structuring a new planetary geography” (p. 3), and finally Brenner & Theodore 
(2002) called neoliberalism “a utopia of unlimited exploitation” (p. 350); just to quote a few. 
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The obvious question is: how could any phenomenon possibly grounded on problematic 
theoretical foundations and with descriptors like these from so many different authors, have 
grown into such global dominance? The purpose of this chapter, then, and that of Chapter Six, is 
to attempt to answer this question.  We will see that, as discussed in Chapter Four, it is the power 
of capital that is being argued as a possible root cause in the rise of this phenomenon of 
neoliberalism.  
Chapter highlights. Leaning on N-H, this chapter will present a narrative on the 
importance of the idea of capital to this study by providing a history of the University of Chicago 
from its inception until the end of World War II. We will see that it was capital, provided by 
John D. Rockefeller, that, referencing Chapter Four, called to life this unique institution and that 
a prior University of Chicago went bankrupt; further illuminating the importance and power of 
capital. The reader will see that it is the University of Chicago that is given credit as the 
birthplace of neoliberalism.  
The chapter focus will be on the birth, growth and especially the thinking at the school. 
The reader will see that this is indeed a unique institution whose intentionally engineered 
environment ‘birthed the spirit’ of neoliberalism. Of equal importance, it will provide the reader 
with what I believe is the necessary philosophical and historical background needed for a more 
complete understanding of Chapter Six. Here, the discussion on the nature and power of capital 
should yield very significant fruit. 
This chapter will present the history of the University of Chicago with an emphasis on 
what is termed the Chicago Tradition; a uniquely hard-nosed conservative view of economic 
thinking popularly tied to the university. The intent is to give the reader a detailed understanding 
of specifically how the idea for the eventual development of neoliberalism started, in my view, 
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as a battle of opposing philosophies beginning in the 1930’s. This chapter will have a focus on 
the environment that supported and nurtured this combative thinking.  
I begin this chapter contextualized right here in Chicago at the University of Chicago; 
circa 1930’s and 1940’s. To get us started, Johan Van Overtveldt (2007) from his book: The 
Chicago School: How the University of Chicago Assembled the Thinkers Who Revolutionized 
Economics and Business will present a history of the Chicago School that will focus on those 
prominent people that built the ‘school’ from its early days. I should note that I use the term 
‘school’ in this study more in the sense of a specific definable thinking tied to the university as 
opposed to an internally structured part like a department.  
The author begins by giving solid reasons for the unique fame and power of the School of 
Economics as a prelude to the rest of the chapter. Of critical relevance to this study, Overtveldt 
(2007) will present an initial analysis of what is now famously referred to as the ‘Chicago 
Tradition’. With this, a better understanding of the intellectual origins of neoliberal thinking, that 
I believe may be often misunderstood, and at great social costs, will be brought to light.  
Included in this historical narrative and discussion on the University of Chicago, will be 
Murphy & Bruckner (1976) from their book: The idea of the University of Chicago: Selections 
from the Papers of the First Eight Chief Executives of the University of Chicago from 1891 to 
1975. We will read segments from the convocations of a selected few early presidents of the 
university that should help our understanding the uniqueness of this institution.  
Following this, Stapleford (2011) will present a discussion on the social and economic climate 
during the interwar period and after the end of World War II that will be included to help in 
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understanding what exacerbated the soon to be discussed ‘battle of worldviews’ at the University 
of Chicago, School of Economics.  
In addition, to enhance the understanding of this ‘battle’ and to further appreciate its 
richness of thought, integrated into this first section will be an important diversion on the nature 
of institutionalism; also captured as institutional economics. It represents, unfortunately in my 
view, the losing side of the battle. Featured in this diversion will be Philip Mirowski (1991) (Carl 
Koch Chair of economics and the history and philosophy of science at Notre Dame University), 
along with Geoffrey M. Hodgson (2004) (research professor in Business Studies at the 
University of Hertfordshire, U. K.) as primary authors. They both argue that institutionalism is 
grounded in the philosophy of pragmatism; a critically important point in this study of 
neoliberalism that will be discussed in Chapter Eight, the final chapter. 
This chapter will bring us up to the end of World War II where a climate that the reader 
will see invigorated classical conservatives at the School of Economics to push harder for their 
worldviews at the school and beyond. The ending discussion will present a brief summary of this 
chapter that segues us to Chapter Six entitled: The postwar University of Chicago School of 
Economics and the Birth of Neoliberalism’.  
The Uniqueness of the University of Chicago  
 Dominance from the beginning. Van Overtveldt (2007) begins by arguing that “it is an 
understatement to say that economists working at the University of Chicago played an important 
role in the development of economics as a science during the 20th century” (p. 1). He bases this 
statement on the way the university dominated the Nobel Prize in Economics. He goes so far to 
say that one is forced to conclude that Chicago is both a ‘Mecca and a Rome’ for economic 
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science. Statistically, since 1969 when the Nobel Prize was first established, of the 58 laureates 
in economics, 9 were primarily from the University of Chicago. These included Milton 
Friedman, Theodore W. Shultz, George Stigler, Merton Miller, Ronald Coase, Gary Becker, 
Robert Fogel, Robert Lucas Jr, and James Heckman. This amounts to more than double the 
amount of wins of the number two and three schools; Harvard University and the University of 
California at Berkeley. 
 Van Overtveldt (2007) asserts that since the last decade of the 19th century, economics at 
the University of Chicago was different from that which was taught and practiced at other 
centers of economic research in the country. According to him, it was James L. Laughlin, the 
first chairman of the department of political economy that made this difference. He adhered 
rigidly to the orthodox version of classical economics and did not allow much deviation from 
this orthodoxy. From his leadership, the economics department of the University of Chicago 
became isolated and known initially as a “center of doctrinal orthodoxy and extreme 
conservatism in matters of policy” (p 3).  
 After a few years, despite his myopic vision, Laughlin assembled a diversified faculty 
where the efforts of such scholars as Wesley Mitchell, Leon C. Marshall, John M. Clark and 
Jacob Viner, developed the department into one that was much less isolated. Even with this 
change, Van Overtveldt (2007) claims that until the 1930’s one could not refer to a so-called 
Chicago School of Economics. Before that time, the Chicago department would have been 
considered simply an extraordinarily strong part of mainstream economics. The author next 
mentions that British economist A. W. Coats argues that “beginning in the 1960’s echoes of the 
past sometimes linger on, and it is conceivable that traces of Chicago’s early reputation as a 
center of economic conservatism have survived until recent times” (p. 4).  
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 In continuing to discuss the growing reputation of the University of Chicago as a center 
of economics thinking distinguishable from the rest, Van Overtveldt (2007) mentions that Henry 
Simons, a very prominent economist who will be discussed later, slowly established himself as 
the head of a Chicago ‘school’ at the University. In an important and revealing letter by Jacob 
Viner, (Canadian economist considered along with Frank Knight and Henry Simons to be one of 
the ‘inspiring’ mentors of the early Chicago School of Economics in the 1930’s) to Don Patinkin, 
(an Israeli-American monetary economist who did his undergraduate study at the University of 
Chicago and became president of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem), Jacob wrote: 
It was not until I left Chicago in 1946 that I began to hear 
rumors about a ‘Chicago School’ which was engaged in 
organized battle for laissez-faire and the ‘quantity theory of 
money’ and against ‘imperfect competition’ theorizing and 
Keynesianism, that I was willing to consider the existence 
of a ‘Chicago School’. (p. 4) 
The reader will soon see that this organized battle quote from Jacob Viner to Don Patinkin 
represents the very core of this chapter and is a critical line of thought for this entire study of the 
Rise of Neoliberalism.  
Continuing with the growth in reputation of a ‘Chicago School’ Van Overtveldt (2007) 
tells us that from the late 1950’s forward, references became more commonplace. For example, 
in 1957, Edward Chamberlin of Harvard referred to the Chicago School of Anti-Monopolist 
Competition which was a rejection of his landmark book: The Theory of Monopolistic 
Competition, first published in 1933. It is believed that the first mention of the term ‘Chicago 
School’ was found in a paper on the history of economic thought in 1971. Van Overtveldt (2007) 
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argues that Spiegel (1971) referred to the ‘Chicago School’ in the context of its outright rejection 
of Chamberlin’s theory just mentioned. In this paper, Spiegel notes the following: “conservative 
leanings both in politics and in matters of doctrine members of the Chicago 
School…Libertarians all, they preferred rules to authorities and the impersonal forces of the 
market and they viewed with alarm the increasing scope of government activities in the 
economic sphere” (Van Overtveldt, 2007, p. 6). 
Van Overtveldt (2007) now claims that a few years later in 1974, internationally famed 
economist Milton Friedman describes what the term ‘Chicago School’ means to him. It is worth 
quoting at length as it introduces a few core ideas that will be necessary for understanding the 
rest of the chapter. It will also explain in more depth, the real meaning of the letter from Jacob 
Viner to Don Patinkin mentioned above. It will be followed by a short recap for clarification of 
terms and their importance in this study: 
In discussions of economic science, ‘Chicago’ stands for an 
approach that takes seriously the use of economic theory as 
a tool for analyzing a startlingly wide range of concrete 
problems, rather than as an abstract mathematical structure 
of great beauty but little power; for an approach that insists 
on empirical testing of theoretical generalizations and that 
rejects alike facts without theory and theory without facts. In 
discussions of economic policy ‘Chicago’ stands for belief 
in the efficacy of the free market as a means of organizing 
resources, for skepticism about government intervention into 
economic affairs, and for emphasis on the quantity theory of 
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money as a key factor in producing inflation. (p. 6, emphasis 
added) 
The above quote from Milton Friedman presents a nice summary of what, from his 
perspective, the ‘Chicago School’ stands for. This study of neoliberalism is of course not by any 
means meant to be a paper on economic theory in any significant detail. Nevertheless, certain 
terms need to be understood, at least on a very cursory level, for us to proceed. This said, in case 
the reader is not familiar, a few condensed lay words on the quantity theory of money (QTM) 
discussed in political terms should prove helpful.  
Heakal (n.d.) tells us that QTM was very popular in the 1980’s among some major 
economies such as the United States and Great Britain under Ronald Reagan and Margaret 
Thatcher respectively. At the time, leaders tried to apply the principles of the theory to 
economies where money growth targets were set. However, as time went on, many accepted that 
strict adherence to QTM was not necessarily the cure-all for economic malaise. Of very critical 
relevance to this study, the author adds that John Maynard Keynes challenged the theory in the 
1930s. It was conceded by many economists that Keynes' idea was accurate. What does this 
mean and how is it relevant? On its highest level TQM was a way for a country to manage its 
economy. The reader will soon see this quote from Milton Friedman is a very high level 
admittedly oversimplified description of ‘classical-neoclassical’ versus ‘welfare’ economics. 
Shortly, I will be presenting work by Van Horn, Mirowski & Stapleford (2011) who will 
detail much further the construction of the Chicago School. The reader will see clearly how, once 
this lay political definition of QTM is placed in its proper historical context, it is central to 
understanding the launching of neoliberalism. For now, I continue with the history of how the 
Chicago School grew in power and influence.  
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The Chicago Tradition- an introduction. Van Overtveldt (2007) begins describing this 
new ‘Chicago Tradition’ as having five basic characteristics that will gain more meaning as we 
go along. They include: 1.) a fanatical work attitude, 2.) the firm belief in economics as a true 
science highly relevant for daily life, 3.) the emphasis on scholastic and academic achievement, 
4.) the preparedness to put everything continually into question, and 5.) the apparently inspiring 
isolation of the University of Chicago. According to Van Overtveldt (2007) “the fact that these 
five characteristics occurred more or less simultaneously at the University of Chicago tends to 
give the place a somewhat unique character and distinct intellectual tradition” (p. 20).  Of these 
five, the one most identifiable to the University of Chicago School of Economics is its fanatical 
work attitude. 
As an example, Van Overtveldt (2007) tells us that Ernest DeWitt Burton, university 
president from 1923 to 1925 said that “Chicago is primarily a place for hard work. There is no 
room for the idler here. Amusement is not our principle business. At the University of Chicago, 
as the saying goes, you eat, sleep and breathe economics” (p. 20). This attitude should not be 
underestimated. 
I now introduce arguably two of the most important and prominent people in the history 
of the University of Chicago; William Rainey Harper and John D. Rockefeller to continue 
building this idea of a unique ‘tradition’.  
Van Overtveldt (2007) brings religion and drama to this history by discussing how this 
quote about William Rainey Harper above relates to the religious environment in Chicago before 
the formation of the ‘new’ University. He argues that Harper was very much aware that the start-
up of a ‘new’ University of Chicago presented a unique chance to “realize his visionary project 
and leave the past behind” (p. 21). What does he mean by this? 
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A University of Chicago run by a religious organization known as the Chicago Baptists 
existed from 1858 to 1886. However, according to Van Overtveldt (2007) this ‘old’ university 
disappeared because of inadequate funding and the financial panics of the 1870's. Additionally, 
he claims that what also caused its demise was a lack of vision by board trustees. Harper knew of 
this history of the ‘old’ university and was determined not to repeat the same mistakes that led to 
its downfall.  
Next, in steps a powerful and pivotal behind-the-scenes individual into this history. The 
importance and relevance of the upcoming discussion on the formation of this new University of 
Chicago and its connection to this study of neoliberalism is impossible to overstate; as it 
connects back to Chapter Four on the nature and power of capital. Van Overtveldt (2007) now 
tells us that in the Midwest, Baptist congregations were growing rapidly and through the 
auspices of the American Baptist Education Society, the Baptist clergy were anxious to create a 
new university in Chicago. The Baptists were successful in convincing the wealthiest of all 
Baptist laymen, John D. Rockefeller, to invest his money in a new university here in Chicago; as 
opposed to New York. 
While Rockefeller eventually agreed to fund this new school, his initial interest should 
not be described as one of love-at-first-sight.  As a devout Baptist, he refused to save the old 
University of Chicago as it moved closer and closer towards financial ruin. However, talks 
between Harper and Rockefeller developed into a good relationship between Rockefeller and 
Thomas Goodspeed, secretary of Harper’s Chicago employer; the Baptist Union Theological 
Seminary. 
The talks of a new University of Chicago had been on the table beginning in the early 
1880’s but it was not until late 1887 that Rockefeller became interested. This is where the 
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importance of this Rockefeller connection gains momentum. Why now? It was then that his 
business practices came under fire during the debate in Washington D. C. on the Interstate 
Commerce Act. Van Overtveldt (2007) claims that it was this that made Rockefeller instinctively 
realize that a major philanthropic enterprise would be a welcomed diversion and that locating it 
in Chicago and away from New York, his main business center, and Washington D. C., where all 
the scrutiny of his business was taking place, was a smart thing to do from a business 
perspective. The final push to get Rockefeller on board with the new University of Chicago 
project came from Frederick T. Gates, adviser of his many philanthropic endeavors.  
After a lot of effort, Gates was able to convince the American Baptist Education Society 
to get behind the project; as that was a non-negotiable aspect of Rockefeller’s support. The deal 
was now in motion. Rockefeller agreed to contribute $600 thousand to create the new university 
on two conditions: one; that William Rainey Harper become the university’s first president and 
two; that the local Chicago Baptists raise an additional $400 thousand. Harper agreed to come 
aboard and the local Baptists were able to raise the additional $400 thousand. As the last piece of 
the deal, one of Chicago’s leading merchants, Marshall Field, donated the site for the new 
university on the Midway Plaisance.  
The charter of the new University of Chicago was adopted in May 1890 and William 
Rainey Harper officially accepted the presidency in February 1891. The university formally 
opened its doors on October 1st 1892. Van Overtveldt (2007) tells us that there were some who 
quipped that “Rome was not built in one day, but the University of Chicago almost was” (p. 23). 
I wish to add a side comment in this narrative history of the creation of the new 
University of Chicago that the author did not mention, or may not have thought important. Since 
the power of capital is a central theme is this study; it makes sense to add it. It seems to me that 
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Rockefeller could just as easily have said that he would donate $400 thousand and that the local 
Baptists should raise $600 thousand. Obviously that would have been entirely feasible, doable 
and within reason. In that scenario, Rockefeller would still be the largest single donor and most 
influential in the organization, but this could have at some time in the future left him vulnerable 
to be voted out and forced to sell his stake by those hostile to his personal views. In other words, 
the $600 thousand to $400 thousand in his favor made him permanently in control. To my mind, 
it is this critical thinking and logic of a wealthy businessman that created a bulletproof 
environment for him to always be able to insist on his views at the new University of Chicago 
that may have possibly escaped the attention of Van Overtveldt (2007).  
Although we will soon see that Rockefeller left management of the new University 
wholly in the hands of William Rainey Harper, I strongly argue that is a grave mistake to not 
understand who was always really in charge; albeit behind-the-scenes. I think the reader will 
understand how this side comment relates to this study of neoliberalism as a critical point; as it 
once again represents, in my view, the real power of capital. As an example of the fear of the 
corporate influence injected by Rockefeller in the early history of the new University of Chicago, 
Coats (1963) describes the some of the public’s concern to his involvement in education. The 
reader can see the early connection to a neoliberal mindset: 
In the circumstances, the new university inevitably 
encountered widespread suspicion and hostility. Even 
intelligent and well informed commentators occasionally 
wondered whether John D. Rockefeller’s munificent 
donations meant that the corrupting influence of business 
wealth would soon be felt within the ivory towers, while 
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radical journalists and politicians had no hesitation in 
bestowing upon the new institution the opprobrious title 
The Standard Oil University. (p. 488) 
The public concerns did not stop with John D. Rockefeller. Coats (1963) also says that the 
driving ambitions of its first president William Rainey Harper “had methods that appeared to 
resemble those formerly employed by the university’s notorious benefactor” (p. 488).  
Van Overtveldt (2007) next tells us that William Rainey Harper was a man of 
extraordinary talents and gifts as both a student and soon to be very skillful and brilliant 
salesperson for the new University. After receiving his PhD from Yale, he taught Hebrew at the 
Baptist Union Theological Seminary in Morgan Park; a suburb of Chicago. Additionally, Harper 
exhibited a real talent for finding financial resources for various educational initiatives while 
showing an incredible amount of energy. Some colleagues said that he never seemed to sleep or 
rest. Rockefeller himself praised Harper for his extraordinary worth ethic and his executive 
organizing abilities. He said once that he “caught in some degree the contagion of Harper’s 
enthusiasm” (p. 21).  
In continuing to develop the uniqueness of the school, Van Overtveldt (2007) tells us that 
Harper, who had accepted a professorship at the Yale divinity school, dreamed of a university 
that focused more on research than teaching. This is important inasmuch as it was this vision that 
began to distinguish the University of Chicago from other universities. This same vision was 
attempted by Henry Phillip Tappan at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor but failed; 
mostly due to political interference. From Tappan’s experience, Harper concluded that a school 
where research was prioritized over teaching would be very difficult to near impossible in a state 
university; that an endowed university was the only hope. In other words, a privately funded 
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university was needed for his vision. He won the commitment of John D. Rockefeller in his 
mission and began executing it in a new university with a sizeable endowment. 
Van Overtveldt (2007) continues our historical look into Harper and asserts that when the 
University of Chicago opened in October 1st 1892, it was not the first school to pioneer research 
over teaching, but it was Harper who was the most effective institution-builder compared to 
Daniel Coit Gilman at Johns Hopkins University or G. Stanley Hall at Clark University. 
However, not everyone was enamored with what Harper was trying to create; he had his 
share of very strong and vocal critics. The daring and challenging nature of what Harper was 
doing at the University of Chicago met with some fierce criticism. For example, in looking back 
and discussing Harper’s original mission, Murphy & Bruckner (1976) claim that Edward Hirsch 
Levi, university president from 1968 to 1975 said: 
This combination of undergraduate and graduate work, of 
teaching and research, was regarded as a bold but foolhardy 
experiment; an attempt to put together the main attributes 
of the English colleges and of the German centers of 
learning and to do so in a most unlikely geographical place. 
Many of the experts were sure that the experiment would 
fail. The parts of such an institution, it was believed, hardly 
could exist together. They would not make for a common 
strength. The place would fly apart. The institution was 
called a veritable monstrosity- a ‘Harper’s Bazaar’. (p. 2, 
quotations in original text) 
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Next, I think a few words on the actual initial first days of operation at the university 
from Harper himself may add to increase our understanding of the underlying philosophy that 
helped this institution grow to what it is today. Murphy & Bruckner (1976) quote from Harper’s 
First Convocation, 1 January, 1893: 
First days are always days of uncertainty and anxiety, but 
they are also days of peculiar interest and significance. The 
very uncertainty which attends them adds to this 
significance; for there is during this period of indefiniteness 
a possibility of development which no longer exists when 
fixity is once attained. Our first days have seen little, 
perhaps too little, of this seemingly necessary uncertainty. 
From the beginning there has been a definiteness of plan 
which to some doubtless has appeared premature. Time will 
show- time indeed has already shown, that it is the definite 
conception which has the power to move men to action; and 
if this conception is only sufficiently flexible, the 
possibilities of growth are not diminished by the 
definiteness. (p. 3, emphasis added) 
To my mind, these words by Harper himself represent the managerial leadership and executive 
brilliance fueled by a very definite vision that philosophically undergirded the University of 
Chicago from day one. To the reader; I could not be more impressed. This explains why, after 
discussions with Harper, John D. Rockefeller was willing to fund the start-up of this new school 
and insisted on Harper as its first president. Leaders of this caliber, in my opinion, are very rare 
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indeed. I think the reader may see why the above quote from a later president, Edward Hirsch 
Levi, sounded like a bit of chest-thumping and flaunting of a foundation that was, in his mind, 
and justifyingly so in my mind, conceptually far above the thinking of the so-called experts who 
thought Harper’s vision would fail. I now continue with Van Overtveldt (2007) who discusses 
the wide variety of thinking at the school that helped build its uniqueness.  
Van Overtveldt (2007) argues that there exists a relentless questioning of accepted truths 
made at the University of Chicago. He calls this ‘fertile breeding grounds for scientific 
revolutions’. Where does this idea come from?  Murphy & Bruckner (1976) provide a somewhat 
scintillating and humorous segment from Lawrence Alpheus Kimpton, university president from 
1951 to 1960, in his Convocation(s) of 7 & 8, June1957 that explains this. The reader should 
begin to further appreciate the uniqueness of the school from this: 
The quest for truth like the chase, must be accompanied by 
baying hounds and tingling blood. The great university 
must be young, though this need not refer to chronology. 
Even the old in age must be young in heart. And what is 
more, an exciting university is not a particularly happy or 
well-adjusted institution. The great university, if it were to 
be personalized, would be a fit subject for the psychiatrist’s 
couch, and yet it would lose all its greatness if it were 
tortured into adjustment through analysis. It must always 
retain the excitement and rebellion of youth, if it is to retain 
its quality. I have no idea where the general public gets the 
notion that behind the walls of ivy, all is peace and quiet. A 
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week a without revolution is a lost week. (p. 48, emphasis 
added) 
Here, he gives an entertaining and explicit description of his vision of what a great 
university does that creates this fertile breeding ground for scientific revolutions. The reader 
should see that this describes the fierceness that is unique to the University of Chicago. Adding 
to this, Van Overtveldt (2007) also claims that Kimpton said that “the University of Chicago’s 
tradition is one of great men. The criterion of employment or of promotion is not one of length of 
service or administrative favoritism. Is he good? - is the only relevant question and always will 
be” (p. 30).  
At the University of Chicago, every argument, no matter how divergent from standard 
opinion, is taken seriously. In support of this, Van Overtveldt (2007) points out: 
Anyone who looks deeply into the often bewildering variety 
of ideas, arguments and counterarguments flowing around 
the University of Chicago campus will be amazed that 
European and East Coast intellectuals find Chicago 
economists to be little more than a bunch of narrow-minded, 
near fanatical defenders of capitalism, big business and 
speculative money. (p. 32) 
This is why I stated earlier that in my opinion, the intellectual and political origins of neoliberal 
thinking stemming from the University of Chicago may often be misunderstood. Those 
economists were not myopic, as some seem to think. This will become quite clear in Chapter Six 
when I discuss the thoughts of Henry Simons, once called the Crown Prince of the School of 
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Economics. Additionally, the broad diversity and deepness of thinking that is always challenged 
at the School of Economics will be evident later in this chapter when I discuss the nature of 
institutionalism. I now turn to discuss the ‘workshop system’, implemented in the late 1940’s, 
that also contributed to the uniqueness of the School of Economics. 
 The Chicago Workshop System. In detailing what is referred to as the ‘Chicago workshop 
system’ I add that I’ve had personal experience with something eerily similar and will elaborate 
on shortly. For now, Van Overtveldt (2007) asserts that this system was a major innovation in 
conducting economic research and in apprenticing students in research and that it had been 
copied at many other economic institutions, often at the instigation of Chicago graduates. He 
says that while this workshop system was somewhat successful elsewhere, they did not reach the 
intensity of the workshops at the University of Chicago. Why? In Chicago, faculty members 
were highly committed to the workshop system and to the extensive discussion of papers read 
prior to the meetings. Van Overtveldt (2007) argues that this workshop system was designed 
very similar to 19th century university workshops in Germany and that William Rainey Harper 
was quite familiar with it.  
 Van Overtveldt (2007) tells us that the workshops at the University of Chicago have three 
distinct and very interesting characteristics. First, every member of the audience has carefully 
read the paper presented and second, there is a high degree of attendance by senior faculty 
members and third, these meetings are characterized by what he terms an ‘intellectual 
bloodthirstiness’. According to him, absolute horror stories circulated around the Chicago 
campus about how badly some people have been treated in these meetings. He says that they 
were often characterized as ‘bullfights’ or the ‘gunfighter’s challenge’.  
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I mentioned that I had personal knowledge and experience of something very similar to 
this University of Chicago workshop idea: Many years ago, as a young bank operations 
department head back in New York, the Group Senior Vice President in charge of operations 
would hold monthly meetings with all department heads where we had to present data that 
reflected the results of the prior month’s operations to the entire senior management team. Just 
like the Chicago workshop system, we too were required to have our lengthy reports distributed 
to each attending manager at least one week prior to the meeting to give everyone a chance to 
digest and prepare questions that we had better have solid answers and explanations to. It was 
brutal; to say the least. I recall that only I and one other manager would be prepared enough to 
successfully defend our data satisfactorily month after month in front of the senior staff and other 
line managers. 
In the meetings themselves, I would often see some managers get sliced and diced right 
in front of everyone to such a degree that you could actually see them red-faced and slouching in 
their chairs from total embarrassment and humiliation. It was not a pretty sight. I recall a few 
times when certain managers would call in sick rather than face the music. To avoid this hurtful 
drama from happening to me, I would spend an inordinate amount of my personal time preparing 
for these meetings. In all honesty, it was knowing that I had to face that harsh and brutal reality 
month after month that made me a very studious manager. That in turn gained me a strong 
reputation among senior staff; and the personal benefits that that afforded me. It was not until I 
read Van Overtveldt (2007) that I realized that this potent management process has a real distinct 
history very similar to the Chicago workshop system and was not something that the bank had 
invented. But what does this discussion on this workshop system idea mean to this study of 
neoliberalism?  
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I’m quite sure the reader will correctly infer from this discussion that virtuous human 
concepts like those of love, kindness, helpfulness, mercy, empathy, etc. have no place within this 
Chicago workshop system. With this said, I remind the reader of two things; first that this 
workshop system and environment was indeed located in the birthplace of neoliberalism; the 
University of Chicago. Second, recall from Chapter Two when Dan Watson (2003) said that 
within the language of neoliberalism you are unable to convey any human emotion, including the 
most basic ones such as happiness, sympathy, envy, love. You cannot, he says, tell a joke in this 
language, or write a poem, or sing a song. This workshop system of the Chicago School presents 
an environment that, in my view, connects directly to neoliberalism with its complete absence of 
virtuous human characteristics. I now sum up the historical discussion to this point. 
Summarizing the history of the Chicago School. My intent was to paint a picture of the 
origins and environment of the University of Chicago, including thoughts and comments from a 
few of the university’s past presidents, that will set the proper background so the reader can 
obtain a better and fuller understanding of the environment that housed the thinking that comes 
out of the birth place of neoliberalism. Hopefully, I’ve shown that there are aspects of the 
Chicago School that some may not be aware of that contributed significantly to explaining the 
uniqueness and influence that exists to this day and extends into the ‘spirit’ of neoliberalism. 
In continuing the summary, Van Overtveldt (2007) started building the case for the 
school’s uniqueness by the sheer number of Nobel Prize laureates in economics that came from 
the University of Chicago. He said that that school had more than twice the number of winners 
than the second and third place schools combined. He next tells us that the school had become 
known as a center of doctrinal orthodoxy and extreme conservatism in matters of policy. 
Following this, a revealing letter written by Jacob Viner to Don Patinkin pointed to the fact there 
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was an ‘organized battle’ for laissez-faire and the quantity theory of money and against 
Keynesianism at the school of economics. I greatly reduced and possibly oversimplified this by 
arguing that this battle represented, in the final analysis, a battle of neoclassical versus welfare 
economics; with the former being victorious in the late 1970’s due to a financial crisis now 
referred to as Keynesian stagflation.   
Van Overtveldt (2007) then used five distinct characteristics to formally introduce the 
famous phenomenon known as the Chicago Tradition which he argues tends to give the 
university a ‘somewhat unique character and distinct intellectual tradition’. This historical 
background now prepares us for a more thorough and complete discussion of this ‘Chicago 
Tradition’ by looking more in-depth at how and why it was created. 
The Chicago Tradition – Further Analysis.   
Contentious from the beginning. Editors Van Horn, Mirowski & Stapleford (2011) begin 
our deeper investigation into the Chicago Tradition with a very recent controversial and highly 
emotional reaction to a decision concerning one of its most prominent members, Milton 
Friedman. “When the University of Chicago announced in May 2008 that it was establishing the 
Milton Friedman Institute for Research in Economics, (MFI), it provoked an intense campus 
debate that soon spread to the national media” (p. xv). They next added that over one hundred 
tenured faculty members signed a petition protesting these plans. “Even economists and other 
scholars not affiliated with the university argued about the propriety of the university’s actions in 
an atmosphere fraught with emotion” (p. xv). These editors tell us that these reactions to MFI 
owed less to specifics about the program’s contents, than to its funding structure and its 
connection to Milton Friedman, whose vocal advocacy of neoliberal economic policy had made 
him a polarizing figure. It should be mentioned that he was not just a polarizing figure here in 
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Chicago, but when Friedman was selected for the Nobel Prize in economics, the two other 
American Nobel laureates, George Wald from New York and Linus Pauling from Portland, 
accused him of being an accessory to human rights abuses in Latin America.  
Van Horn, Mirowski & Stapleford (2011) in their book: Building Chicago Economics: 
New Perspectives on the History of America’s Most Powerful Economics Program argue that by 
naming the proposed institute after Friedman, the university appeared to be reifying and formally 
supporting its longstanding association with the so-called Chicago Tradition. They refer to it as a 
cluster of methods, economic principles and free-market ideology strongly pushed primarily by 
Milton Friedman, along with some of his colleagues and students. This connection to Friedman 
in the proposal for MFI was reinforced by statements such as ‘the proper evaluation of economic 
policies must consider the essential role of markets’ and claimed that Friedman demonstrated 
‘how the design of public policy without regard to market alternatives has adverse social 
consequences’.  
Making matters even more contentious, the funding mechanism raised a lot of eyebrows 
about the MFI’s intellectual independence. The university announced that it would seek $200 
million in private donations to endow the institute an extraordinary sum for a social science 
institute. In addition, donors who contributed $1 million or more would be granted membership 
in the Milton Friedman Society and have access to a private annual conference. The reader will 
see later how similar this is to the Mont Pèlerin Society, possibly the single most powerful 
private conservative organization in the world founded by another Nobel laureate: Frederick Von 
Hayek.  
The editors argue that the public outcry of MFI illustrates how the doctrine and legacy of 
the Chicago Tradition remains controversial. So much so, they argue, that in the recent financial 
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turmoil of 2007 and 2008, many moderate and left-wing Americans blamed the crisis on the very 
kinds of deregulation and free-market policies and principles long established with the Chicago 
Tradition. They also claim that the public debate over MFI reveals how little most Americans, 
including economists, know about the history of the Chicago School, (the purpose of the 
beginning discussion of this chapter) and as a result are ill-prepared to analyze the ties between 
institutional structures, political conditions and the theoretical developments in economics. My 
intent in this segment of the chapter is to shed light on this. 
Next we have, in my view, probably the most critically relevant statement from Van 
Horn, Mirowski & Stapleford (2011) that at the same time, strikes at the very heart of this study 
of neoliberalism: “The Chicago School was not the product of ‘spontaneous order’ of the free 
market often lauded by its members; it was constructed, quite deliberately, for specific ends” (p. 
xvii, emphasis added). In my view, the ‘specific ends’ was to create an environment for an 
unbridled accumulation of capital by a few; connecting back to our discussion on the nature and 
power of capital. This also connects to my argument from Chapter Four that suggests that the 
current usage of Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand argument’ by some may be an intentional 
dismissing and warping of his moral ideas for the benefit of a few with agendas for wealth 
accumulation. 
Confirming what Van Overtveldt (2007) stated earlier, according to Van Horn, Mirowski 
& Stapleford (2011), the breadth of the school’s influence comes from the fact that twenty-six of 
the sixty-four Nobel Prizes in economics have been awarded to faculty members, researchers, or 
students from the University of Chicago’s School of Economics. The editors also add a very 
significant point that directly connects to Chapter Seven: Carriers of the Conservative Torch:  
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Many observers have tied the school to the rise of right wing 
orthodoxy in the American political scene starting in the 
1980’s with politicians such as Ronald Reagan, Margaret 
Thatcher and George W. Bush; all of who have been effusive 
in their praise of members of the school as informing their 
own policies. (p. xvii)  
I further argue that this is a clear example how the thoughts of Said (1993) where he 
posits that the past and the present are inseparable realities that inform each other, shows 
significant value. Leaning on this thinking, I now go back to the past to look at the genesis of the 
Chicago Tradition with the aim of explaining the present neoliberal environment.  
The interwar and postwar foundations of the Chicago Tradition. According to Van Horn, 
Mirowski & Stapleford (2011), their project was to simultaneously excavate and reconstruct the 
institutional and intellectual aspects of the Chicago School that have seen little study and 
therefore lacking in historical perspectives. They build their case around four major themes. 
First, the early leaders of the postwar Chicago School were not cloistered academics, but empire 
builders who set up and forged influential relationships with well-funded institutional 
organizations to provide vital support structures for their ideas; yet another connection to the 
power of capital.  Second, the postwar Chicago School did not remain unchanged over time, on 
the contrary, the views of its members sometimes underwent radical shifts. Third, beginning in 
the 1930’s, their leaders sought to construct an economics built for policy and fourth, 
understanding the growth of the Chicago School requires a nuanced consideration of the 
relationship between political ideology and economic knowledge.  
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What the editors assume of the reader is an understanding of exactly what it was about 
the interwar and postwar periods that undergirds these assumptions. Therefore, to assist the 
reader, a few words on the interwar and postwar social and political environment should set the 
stage for a better understanding and allow us to re-engage editors Van Horn, Mirowski & 
Stapleford (2011) as they discuss the creation of the Chicago Tradition. Note: the ‘interwar 
period’ covers years 1918 through 1939. 
For the interwar environment, Fishback (2008) points to the fact that the 1932 elections 
swept Franklin Delano Roosevelt and a large Democratic congressional majority into office as a 
result of the deepening recession. The author next presents a summary of what this election 
meant that presents a starting point in my timeline of explaining the background that led to the 
creation of the Chicago Tradition: 
The U.S. economy had always rebounded from sharp downturns, but after four years of 
continued decline, this downturn seemed different, and notions that market economies could be 
self-correcting were dismissed with increasing frequency. Problems could be found in nearly 
every nook and cranny of the economy.  State and local governments, which had long held 
responsibility for providing aid to those in trouble, were overwhelmed. Citing a peacetime 
emergency, the administration rolled up its sleeves and within the First Hundred Days in office 
established a ‘New Deal’ for America. (p. 385) 
Here, Fishback (2008) provides a very brief but succinct understanding of a major shift in 
American economic policy. It should be easy for the reader to see that the ‘New Deal’ mandate 
was to help millions in dire need from the depression and to hopefully prevent a reoccurrence of 
such an enormous economic tragedy. In support of this, the author tells us that “federal spending 
during the 1930s was less about macroeconomic stimulus in the modern sense of the word and 
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more about solving the harsh human problems that had arisen during the Great Depression. One 
of the central problems was determining how to aid the huge numbers of unemployed and 
discouraged workers” (p. 395).  
Fishback (2008) also says that ‘The Holy Grail’ among American economists is to 
provide an explanation of the cause of the Great Depression that is convincing to the majority of 
the profession at large. For our purposes, he specifically notes that “Milton Friedman and Anna 
Schwartz originated the argument that the Federal Reserve bears significant responsibility for the 
tremendous drop in output between 1929 and 1933” (p. 385). From this, the reader should begin 
to sense the sharp battle lines being drawn at the University of Chicago during the interwar 
period. In somewhat loose technical terms, this battle can be called Keynesian economics, or 
what many refer to as ‘welfare economics’, which supported the New Deal, versus orthodox 
classical and neoclassical economics; which strongly believes in the market as the best allocator 
of goods and services. 
 For the postwar environment, Ikenberry (1992) provides a nice summary of the social 
climate and conditions after world War ll that will lead us to better understand the why of the 
four perspectives from Van Horn, Mirowski & Stapleford (2011) mentioned above. He begins by 
claiming that even in the darkening days of World War II, British and American officials debated 
ideas about postwar order, but despite their differences, they were able to reach a watershed trade 
and monetary agreement. This is their critically relevant statement: “setting the terms for the 
reestablishment of an open world economy- an accomplishment that was a bit astonishing given 
the ravages and dislocations of war, and the multiple visions of postwar order. But the new 
system was different than anything that the capitalist world had seen before” (p. 289). What did 
he mean by this? 
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 Ikenberry (1992) argues that the Anglo-American agreements established rules for a 
relatively open and multilateral system of trade and payments, but they did so in a way that 
would reconcile openness and trade expansion with the commitments of national governments to 
full employment and economic stabilization. In lay terms, this was an incredible expansion of 
Keynesian economics; or what Offe (1983) referred to as a ‘mixed economy’ or the “Keynesian 
welfare state after World War II” (p. 228). Whatever it is called, it was the very antithesis of the 
core of the market-based conservative thinking of Milton Friedman and some of his colleagues at 
the University of Chicago, School of Economics. Ikenberry (1992) said “not surprisingly, the 
leading scholar of Anglo-American economic diplomacy characterized the postwar settlement as 
a political miracle." (pg. 290). He then asked; miracles aside, how do we explain this watershed 
agreement?  This is vitally important inasmuch as I argue that it sets the stage for the 
development of the Chicago Tradition to combat this postwar settlement. 
Charles S. Maier (1977) professor of history at Duke University continues our 
chronology. He tells us that the objective of his article: The Politics of Productivity: Foundations 
of American International Economic Policy after World War ll is to suggest how the construction 
of post- World War II Western economy under United States auspices can be related to the 
political and economic forces generated within American society. He next includes a very 
straightforward and meaningful summary of the global political environment that the reader can 
see as a watershed moment in American history that is at the same time highly relevant to our 
discussion: 
The close of World War II brought American policy makers a rare and heady opportunity 
to reshape the guidelines of the international economic order. The pretensions of the Axis powers 
to organize continental Europe and East Asia had collapsed. Soviet Russia seemed preoccupied 
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with its own huge tasks of reconstruction and the establishment of a glacis in Eastern Europe. 
Great Britain depended upon Washington's assistance to maintain its own international role and 
could not durably oppose American policies. Spared the losses incurred by the other belligerents, 
the United States inherited a chance to secure Western economic ground rules according to its 
own needs and visions. (p. 608) 
Ikenberry (1992) now takes a critical look at this question that grounded the postwar 
agreement that will segue us back to Van Horn, Mirowski & Stapleford (2011) and the early 
beginnings of the Chicago School. He asks: “why did an American government with a State 
Department that championed laissez-faire and free trade, end up backing a system more 
concerned with safeguarding welfare capitalism?” (p. 210). I suppose one could view this as the 
proverbial sixty-four-thousand-dollar question. In any event, with this very brief historical 
background of economic social policy before and after World War ll, hopefully the reader can 
begin to see why I argue that conservatives felt they were ‘fighting for the very life of their 
worldviews’. From the above quote by Ikenberry (1992) one could credibly argue that the 
economic and political environment after the end of the war, concerned with safeguarding 
welfare capitalism, forced conservatives to act……and act they did. 
Possibly the most important event resulting from the end of the war that relates to our 
discussion of the post war environment, was the establishment of the Mont Pèlerin Society in 
1947. What was this organization about and who initiated it? When many of the values of 
Western civilization were imperiled, 36 scholars, mostly economists, with some historians and 
philosophers, were invited by Professor Friedrich von Hayek to meet at Mont Pèlerin, near 
Montreux, Switzerland, to discuss the state and the possible fate of liberalism (in its classical 
sense) in thinking and practice. The group named itself as the Mont Pèlerin Society, after the 
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place of the first meeting. It emphasized that it did not intend to create an orthodoxy, to form or 
align itself with any political party or parties, or to conduct propaganda. Its sole objective was to 
facilitate an exchange of ideas between like-minded scholars in the hope of strengthening the 
principles and practice of a free society and to study the workings, virtues, and defects of market-
oriented economic systems. This will be discussed more in context in the next chapter. 
Conservatives: Fighting for the very life of their worldviews. Peck (2011) tells us that 
Milton Friedman and his colleagues waged a thirty-year war against the Keynesian intellectual 
occupation that began in the mid 1940’s until their moment of vindication in the mid 1970’s. 
What happened to turn the tide in their favor? He argues that the real critical turning point for 
conservatives came during the financial crisis of the late 1970’s. This crisis was something that 
conservatives like Milton Friedman at the Chicago School had ‘predicted’ for years; a claim that 
I criticize as fallacious. They refer to it as the nightmare of Keynesian stagflation. This is such a 
critical turning point for conservatives and our understanding of the thinking at the Chicago 
School, that a need to further explain this economic phenomenon known as stagflation is 
warranted.  
I should add here that, while I am not an economist, I strongly disagree with talk that 
Milton Friedman and others ‘predicted this for many years’ and saw this economic crisis of 
Keynesian stagflation as a moment of vindication. In my opinion, it was the oil embargo of the 
1970’s that no one had predicted that sent enormous shock waves through world financial 
markets that precipitated Keynesian stagflation; not some superior understanding of economics 
that predicted it; as they claim. In any event, whether I am right or wrong, at least a cursory 
understanding of this economic phenomenon known as stagflation is needed to proceed. 
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  To better understand the concept of Keynesian stagflation, Foley (2012) leans on the 
thoughts of Karl Marx to provide a cursory understanding of this critical point in the history of 
the Chicago School, and as you will see, a changing of our nation’s basic economic model. What 
was the Keynesian stagflation crisis of the 1970’s all about and why was it so critical? Much of 
Foley’s work is based on Karl Marx’s theory of exploitation; a highly technical formulation 
whose detailed understanding is past the scope of this study. Nevertheless, he does present an 
explanation of Keynesian stagflation that includes its repercussions that is not only within scope, 
but understandable and useful for our purposes.  
Foley (2012) begins by telling us that mainstream economists tend to represent the 
stagflation crisis of the1970’s primarily as a scientific turning point in economic theory. 
According to this view, during the post-World War II decades, a wrong theory had gained 
consensus acceptance and decisive influence over economic policy, particularly monetary policy. 
“The attempt to manage the U.S. economy on the basis of Keynesian principles failed with the 
emergence of stagflation, a combination of stubborn inflationary pressures and excess economic 
capacity” (p. 253).   
In case the reader is unfamiliar with this economic concept, a very high-level 
understanding that also validates the time line, and at least to some degree my criticism, is as 
follows: Investopedia (n. d.) defines stagflation as: 
A condition of slow economic growth and relatively high 
unemployment - a time of stagnation - accompanied by a 
rise in prices, or inflation. Stagflation occurs when the 
economy isn't growing but prices are; which is not a good 
situation for a country to be in. This happened to a great 
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extent during the 1970’s, when world oil prices rose 
dramatically, fueling sharp inflation in developed countries. 
For these countries, including the U.S., stagnation 
increased the inflationary effects. (p.1)  
Foley (2012) details this further in economic terminology by arguing that Milton 
Friedman’s demonstration of the existence of a ‘natural rate of unemployment’ plus Thomas 
Sargent and Robert Lucas’s development of ‘rational expectations equilibrium’, macroeconomic 
theories, and Lucas’s ‘critique’ asserting the philosophical necessity of grounding 
macroeconomics in the microeconomic foundations of Walrasian equilibrium theory, overturned 
and discredited Keynesian theories and policies. Put more simply in lay terms, he argues that the 
failure of Keynesian economics as seen during the stagflation crisis in the 1970’s, proved the 
need to return to the purely market-based mathematical modelling of classical and neoclassical 
economics discussed in Chapter Four.  
Foley (2012) goes on to add that the key innovation in academic economics during this 
crisis timeframe, according to him, was the replacement of structural dynamic macroeconomic 
models by real business cycle models. “In line with the vision behind these models, which holds 
that markets reliably and stably enforce a growth path on the real economy determined by tastes, 
technology, and resources, economic policy was reoriented to the empowering of markets 
through deregulation and privatization” (p. 254). This is the change in the nation’s basic 
economic model that I referred to earlier. 
From this cursory discussion on stagflation, the reader can see not only the substantial 
diametrically opposing views of economic life that was at stake, but also that it was the 
stagflation crisis of the late 1970’s that turned the tide in favor of conservatives towards the 
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thinking of specific members of the Chicago School, like Milton Friedman, and away from 
Keynesian theory; which Offe (1983) referred to as the economics of the welfare state. The 
opposing views in economic thinking could not be made clearer, in my opinion. I now return to 
Van Horn, Mirowski & Stapleford (2011) to complete our understanding of the development and 
importance of the Chicago Tradition. 
The first place to enhance our understanding of the powerful impact of the postwar 
Chicago School is to examine the relationship between this newly invigorated conservative 
thinking and its impact on American economic policy. I start with Stapleford (2011) who puts 
forth a very significant point that is core to this study that will require much more detail: 
“conventional wisdom would place early institutional economics and the postwar Chicago 
School on opposite ends of any methodological spectrum” (p. 3).  This cannot be overstated. He 
claims that prominent faculty and graduates from the postwar Chicago School totally disparaged 
the idea of institutional economics not merely as incorrect, but as actually devoid of content. The 
above quote presents a good description of the width and breadth of the battle I refer to. In 
dramatic literary terms, it argues that the wide difference between the two sides is as far as east is 
from west.  
Examples of this wide gulf in opposing views can be seen by popular denunciations of 
institutional economics like the one made by Thomas Sowell, Senior Fellow at the Hoover 
Institution of Stanford University who once called it ‘half economics, half sociology and all 
mush’. Add to this, George Stigler, Nobel Prize recipient in Economic Sciences in 1982, and a 
key leader in the Chicago School of Economics, argued that institutionalism was ‘vacuous and 
hostile’ to the standard theoretical tradition. With these highly disparaging characterizations of 
institutional economics, the reader can probably sense a dichotomy being portrayed here that, 
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when better understood, will explain the true nature of the battle at the Chicago School and its 
connections to this study of neoliberalism. The deep nature of this battle, as the reader may 
suspect, will not be easy to explain as it is not cut and dry; black or white. In actuality, there was 
plenty of grey, vacillation and fluidity among combatants. Nevertheless, I argue that at least a 
cursory understanding of the nature of institutionalism is necessary in explaining how the 
Chicago Tradition came about.  
Institutionalism 
Introduction. First, I’ve introduced a major new term in this study; institutionalism, also 
captured as institutional economics, that needs definition and explanation. Classical and 
neoclassical economics were defined in Chapter Four. The question before us now is: what is 
institutional economics? I am confident the reader will see that once explained, it connects nicely 
to ideas from Chapter Four; specifically, the problematic foundations of homoeconomicus. 
However, definitions and explanations of institutionalism will require a significant diversion 
before returning to Van Horn, Mirowski & Stapleford (2011) as they continue to explain the 
genesis and power of the Chicago Tradition.  
Philip Mirowski (1991) in his article: The Philosophical Bases of Institutional Economics 
will provide an introduction and analysis of this important new term. He does a nice job of 
organizing a rather complex set of ideas into a single coherent frame of thought that we can use 
to better understand the nature of the battle at the Chicago School of Economics.     
In defining Institutional economics, Mirowski (1991) sets the stage for his deep view of 
the nature of the battle in Marxian-style penetrating literary fashion. The reader will see right 
from the beginning which side he supports. I state that as researcher, I am in complete agreement 
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with his analysis; as it depicts the essence of the battle succinctly. For that, it is worth quoting at 
length: 
In economics, the facade of the repudiation of 
philosophical preconceptions is propped up by the 
widespread conviction that modern economics has 
successfully adopted the character and attributes of a 
science. This invocation of science is intended to settle all 
arguments once and for all and to expiate all sins. Of 
course, this has been a vain hope. Once we can get beyond 
the lab coats and the particle accelerators and the rest of 
the clanking machinery, it is not at all clear that ‘science’ 
is inextricably committed to any particular program or 
method, or to ontological construction. Science may at 
various junctures be realist or it may be idealist; it may be 
rationalist or it may be empiricist; or, most bluntly, it may 
be true or it may be false. Nothing is substantially 
illuminated by the mere invocation of science by 
economists, although it has in the past proved useful in 
cowering certain critics. (p. 74, italics in original text) 
This is, in my view, a brilliant way to describe exactly what this battle is all about. First, I 
interpret his ‘attributes of a science’ to mean ‘attributes of a natural science’. This should 
become crystal clear and evident shortly. We will see that the University of Chicago has indeed 
used the fallacious and intimidating use of economics as a natural science, along with their 
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fierceness as an institution, to ‘cower certain critics’ and successfully promote one side of this 
battle.  
Connecting Institutionalism to the Chicago School. Mirowski (1991) begins to dissect 
this battle by defining the overall philosophical foundations for each side. According to him, on 
one side we have classical-neoclassical economic theory that is grounded in the Cartesian 
analytic philosophical tradition. On the opposing side, we have institutional economic theory that 
is grounded in the philosophy of Pragmatism. The two founding and opposing philosophers are 
Rene Descartes and Charles Sanders Peirce.  
By looking into each one separately, the reader will get a better understanding of the 
sharp differences in the battle. I need to remind the reader that in reality, and especially at the 
Chicago school, the differences are not as distinct and separate as the following analysis seems to 
argue. As stated earlier, in actuality there was a considerable amount of grey area that existed 
between the two sides. This will become quite clear when I discuss the thoughts of Henry 
Simons and why his work and thinking was rejected in the next chapter. 
Before we begin, as a note, Mirowski (1991), prior to detailing the substantial differences 
between classical-neoclassical and institutional economics, presents a purely philosophical 
argument that claims they both actually originate from a common foundation. He derives this 
highly complex idea from what he refers to as the Durkheim/ Mauss/ Douglas (DMD) thesis. 
While very interesting and quite relevant to this study, it is a bit out of scope for our current 
purposes. For now, he begins to provide the philosophical differences that undergird the battle of 
worldviews at the Chicago School of Economics. Recall that the two sides in the battle are 
neoclassical versus institutional economic theories. 
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Neoclassical theory and the Cartesian analytic tradition. Chapter Four presented the 
theoretical, mechanical and social aspects of neoclassical theory; but not the philosophical 
foundation; which is about to be addressed. Mirowski (1991) begins by arguing that “the 
Cartesian tradition in philosophy has made its appearance in the British and American contexts 
as a penchant for ‘analytical philosophy’, especially in the twentieth century. Although many of 
the modern tenets are not intended to be faithful representations of Descartes’ original concerns, 
the ‘Cartesian tradition’ does serve as a shorthand for a certain sequence of canonical texts and 
attitudes” (p. 79). He now details his understanding of Cartesian philosophy, which he argues 
neoclassical economic theory rests upon.  
This brings us to a very critical point not only in this chapter, but in this entire study that 
at the same time, sums up the importance of Chapter Four that uncovered the problematic 
foundations of neoliberalism as a phenomenon. Recall Sen (1977) who strongly and powerfully 
rejected rational choice theory that grounds homoeconomicus; a pillar of neoliberalism. It strikes 
at the heart of the false claim that neoclassical economics is a natural science. In my opinion, it is 
this very precise point that gives the neoclassicists the false but intimidating rationale to pound 
opposing pragmatic views into submission.   
According to Mirowski (1991), analytical Cartesian philosophy is not too concerned with 
the thinking of an individual scientist or any group of scientists. Instead, it argues that science is 
itself mechanical and impersonal, and separates discovery from justification. The author is 
arguing, in my view, that the fascination of discovery tends to dwarf its justification to the point 
that if it is useful, little attention is paid on justifying it. This connects to the rejection of rational 
choice theory by Sen (1977) who argues that the very quantitative nature of the model itself is 
unjustified and meaningless, leaving it for use only for specific agendas that lack any real 
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quantifiable basis. In short, neoclassical economic theory is baseless when examined as a natural 
science. 
Mirowski (1991) goes on to add a very interesting aspect of Cartesian philosophy when 
he argues that in it, the separation of mind and body means that we know our own thought better 
than we can know the world. From this, he claims that all ‘proof’ is nothing more than the 
satisfying of personal doubt. This appears to be in synch with Michael Polanyi (1958) when he 
argues that “complete objectivity, as normally attributed to the exact sciences, is a delusion, and 
is in fact, a false ideal; a proper substitute is personal knowledge” (p. 18).  
Hammering the nail and connecting the above in explaining the neoclassical side of the 
battle at the Chicago School, Mirowski (1991) argues there exists a close correlation between the 
Cartesian epistemology and the structure of neoclassical economic theory. “There is a familial 
resemblance which serves to fuse the natural world and the social world into a single coherent 
entity for the analytic Anglo-American mind. The social order of the economic world is reflected 
in the scientific order of the natural world” (p. 81). We now move to the philosophical 
foundation of the other, unfortunately, losing side of the battle. 
Institutionalism and Pragmatism. Mirowski (1991) begins his explanation of institutional 
economic theory by posing the following question: where shall we search for philosophical 
foundations elsewhere than in the Cartesian analytic tradition? He says that the origins of this 
different phenomenon must be traced back a century to the situation that existed in philosophy 
and science in the America of the ‘Gilded Age’. “In the late nineteenth century, the predominant 
understanding of science in the United States was not that of the Cartesian analytic tradition” (p. 
81).  
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The following quote nicely places the battle at the Chicago School of Economics in plain 
historical terms such that the reader should begin to appreciate the demarcation of the two sides 
in opposing philosophical terms. It is worth quoting at length as I believe it to be a well thought 
through summary on the genesis of institutional economics:  
The main influences on the idea of science in the Gilded 
Age came not from Britain or France, but rather from the 
Germany of the research universities. The philosophy of 
science had not grown as separate and detached from social 
theory as it had elsewhere, and this was manifest in the 
three great movements in German philosophy: the 
dialectical idealism of Hegel, the historicist hermeneutics 
of Dilthey, and a revival of neo-Kantianism. These 
traditions took root in the US, and by a very convoluted 
route, sprouted an indigenous school of philosophy in 
America called ‘Pragmatism’. It is my thesis that it was this 
Pragmatic conception of scientific endeavor and 
epistemology which later induced a novel reinterpretation 
of the economy and the economic actor, and that this 
conception was consolidated into an institutionalist school 
of economic theory in the first three decades of the 
twentieth century. (p. 81, emphasis added) 
Next, a few words on pragmatism as a philosophical foundation for institutional 
economics is needed to enhance our understanding of the two opposing sides of the battle. In a 
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somewhat humorous description, Mirowski (1991) uses the thoughts of Richard Bernstein (1966) 
who claimed that it is still a common myth, even among philosophers, that positivism is a tough-
minded variety of a softer-minded and fuzzy pragmatism. Intent on combating this, Mirowski 
(1991) argues that such a myth is very unfortunate: 
It obscures the fact that it was the project of the pragmatists 
to provide a systematic alternative to the Cartesian 
analytical tradition, as well as to the naturalist doctrines 
characteristic of positivism.  We shall see that this confusion 
has subsequently spilled over into economic controversies, 
to the extent that, in some quarters, institutionalist 
economics is misperceived as a sort of naïve empiricism. (p. 
82)  
With this quote, Mirowski (1991) provides, I believe, an even clearer description of the battle at 
the Chicago school.  
Unfortunately, in what complicates matters even further by putting a ‘chink in the armor’ 
on the side of the institutionalists, Mirowski (1991) claims that the founder of pragmatism, 
Charles Sanders Peirce left no synoptic account of his philosophical system. He readily admits 
that reading Pierce is no fun and that “most who have a passing acquaintance with pragmatism 
base their knowledge on the more accessible but less reliable versions to be found in John Dewey 
or William James, or worse, simply upon their own understandings of the colloquial 
connotations of pragmatism” (p. 82).  Significantly adding to this unfortunate status of 
pragmatism as a philosophic discipline, Mirowski (1991) argues “Peirce was not concerned to 
sketch out an alternative political economy” (p. 87).  Combining these two points, I believe that 
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is it precisely here where this lack of a sound formulation of pragmatism as a whole, and 
especially that Pierce does not propose an alternative political economy that left the door open 
for the opposing side of the Cartesian grounded neoclassical theorists at the Chicago school to 
refute and disparage institutionalism.  
While a serious and deeper look into pragmatism itself is far out of scope with this study, 
it would seem obvious to me that anyone deeply influenced by Pierce’s thinking would certainly 
be skeptical and in opposition to traditional neoclassical economics. Why do I say this? 
According to Mirowski (1991) “a survey of his entire work reveals that he was openly hostile to 
the Cartesian analytic tradition” (p. 82).  
With this initial introduction to institutionalism, the stage is set to introduce Geoffrey 
Hodgson, Research Professor in Business Studies at the University of Hertfordshire, U. K. who 
will provide concluding thoughts on institutional economics that are in line with the main 
thoughts of Mirowski (1991).  
Ulrich Witt of the Max Planck Institute in Jena, Germany claims that Hodgson’s (2004) 
book: The Evolution of Institutional Economics: Agency, Structure and Darwinism in American 
Institutionalism reads like a crime novel. He also adds that its breadth and deepness of ideas, 
explanations, and philosophical underpinnings, goes far beyond any history of economic thought. 
The reader will soon see that Witt’s opinion that Hodgson’s (2004) book ‘reads like a crime 
novel’, will have very significant meaning as I piece together the main thoughts from his brilliant 
book with thoughts from Chapter Four on the problematic nature of neoliberalism’s intellectual 
foundations.  
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Hodgson’s (2004) work will also provide a deeper understanding of why Stapleford 
(2011) begins his article talking about the enormous gulf of economic views that existed in the 
early Chicago School. The objective here is to add to the thoughts of Mirowski (1999) to 
increase our understanding of institutional economics to better appreciate the richness of the two 
competing ideas at the Chicago School. 
In providing an additional understanding of institutionalism, Hodgson (2004) gives a nice 
straightforward introduction to this complex holistic phenomenon; including a powerful stinging 
opposition to Milton Friedman and his fellow neoclassical market based economists at the 
school. It is worth quoting at length; as it complements and solidifies the ideas from Mirowski 
(1999) and further clarifies further what the battle at the Chicago School of Economics is about: 
Institutionalism offered an approach to the study of 
economic phenomena that drew not from one discipline, 
but several. It appealed to psychology, anthropology, 
sociology, history and elsewhere, in an attempt to 
understand and explain the world as it is, has been, and 
may be. Its foremost concern was to understand the real 
world rather than to develop technique for its own sake. It 
is not as if everything in the garden of mainstream 
economics is bringing healthy fruit. The last few years have 
witnessed enduring global poverty, dubious practices of 
deregulation, prolonged recessions and extreme turbulence 
in financial markets. (p. 5, emphasis added) 
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From this he argues that what is at stake are rival conceptions of the nature and scope of 
economics as a discipline. In detailing the core of the battle further, Hodgson (2004) is quite 
clear when he says that it is widely known that the old institutionalists were hostile to what he 
calls the narrow vision of economics as the ‘science of choice’ and the utility-maximizing 
version of ‘economic man’, also referred to as homoeconomicus in this study. “So keen to 
dismiss these criticisms, many mainstream economists have resorted to the dismissive tactic of 
describing any broader version of their discipline, or any approach that is not based on individual 
utility maximization, as not economics” (p. 4). Here’s where it begins to get real interesting and 
even entertaining, as he further connects with Mirowski (1999) on institutionalism. 
I mentioned that I agree that Hodgson’s book reads like a crime novel. Why? For starters, 
I begin by pointing out that in responding to the unduly harsh, disrespectful and dismissive 
criticisms of institutionalism like those from Thomas Sewell and George Stigler mentioned 
earlier, Hodgson (2004) argues quite emphatically that he becomes very suspicious when he 
hears people repeatedly and energetically denounce institutionalism without ever once providing 
any evidence that they have carefully read or analyzed its texts.   
Concerning these denunciations, in a response very reminiscent of ‘Sherlock Holmes 
speaking to Watson as he analyzed a crime’, he says “any experienced historian of ideas would 
smell that proverbial rat. Something odd and dubious is going on. What is at the root of this 
academic desire to demonize the old institutionalism without recourse to scholarly evaluation? 
One is drawn to the conclusion that something important and fundamental is at stake” (p.4). In 
short, Sherlock Holmes would say: something’s afoot! The reader can visualize Watson shaking 
his head in affirmation. I say he is right. I further say that his use of the word demonize could not 
be more accurate and is wholly line with the ‘transrational approach’ to this study of 
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neoliberalism. Recall that this approach defines transrationalism as the seamless integration of 
the rational and the non-rational with the non-rational further defined as knowledge gained 
through narrative. Here, the word demonize is clearly non-rational yet presents to the reader, in 
my view, a deeper understanding of the battle at the Chicago school. There is still of course 
ample opportunity to disagree, but think of how much more thought is generated by this non-
rational word demonize. This is the desired effect of the transrational approach and why it brings 
value to an analysis of a phenomenon. So that we don’t lose focus, this discussion on 
institutionalism seeks to connect the dots from the intellectual core of the internal battle at the 
Chicago School in the 1930’s and 1940’s, to the eventual success of neoliberalism as policy in 
the 1980’s.  
To close out this rather lengthy diversion on institutionalism with something I agree with, 
according to Hodgson (2004) the only legitimate way to study human behavior on the level of 
social structures, such as the economy, requires a reengagement with the social science fields of 
anthropology, psychology, sociology, cultural studies, etc., as well as mathematics, in an attempt 
to break down the ‘Berlin Wall’ as he called it, between the natural and social sciences. In short, 
we can now define the battle at the school as a battle of the following: neoclassical economists 
like Milton Friedman and others one side, who believe that human economic behavior is 
predictable via the extensive use of mathematics alone, versus the institutionalists, like Henry 
Simons and others who believe that such an endeavor is both impossible and baseless; each side 
eventually disparaging the other.  
The pinnacle of this battle really began to ferment, in my view, during the Great 
Depression; where Roosevelt’s New Deal was grounded in the Keynesian economics of the 
welfare state. I should remind the reader that the term ‘welfare state’ does not represent any kind 
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of social judgement; it is simply being used in this study to describe an alternative economic 
theory to neoclassical.  
Ending discussion 
 Chapter summary. This chapter was intended as a necessary prelude so that the reader 
can better engage the next two chapters. This chapter and the next are divided into two distinct 
timeframes concerning the University of Chicago: pre and post-World War II; with this chapter 
focusing on the former.  
 One of the main objectives of this chapter was to provide the reader with a short but 
succinct history of the University of Chicago. It is hoped that the reader will begin to better 
appreciate the nature and power of capital as discussed from Chapter Four. This is shown in this 
chapter by discussing the school’s inception created by the capital provided by John D. 
Rockefeller that, using Habermas/Marxian thinking and phraseology, served to ‘call to life’ a 
unique organization that served his interests.  
 A discussion on the unique nature and character of this institution was included to give 
the reader a better understanding of the environment that ‘birthed the spirit’ of neoliberalism. I 
argue that that same spirit exists today and is clearly manifested in the neoliberal worldview.                  
The ‘fierceness’ of the school and where that came from was included in a discussion of the 
Chicago ‘workshop system’. Also, segments of a few early presidents’ convocations highlighted 
the ‘view from the top’ that provided the leadership style that steered the school from the early 
days. 
 A very critical emphasis of this chapter was the discussion of the two opposing 
philosophies coined ‘the battle’ at the school. Recall that this battle was defined as neoclassical, 
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philosophically represented by the Cartesian analytic tradition, versus institutional economics, 
represented by the philosophy of pragmatism. Mirowski (1999) provided a nice summary of 
these two opposing philosophies and how they were viewed at the school. He also added a strong 
connection to the transrational approach to this study by addressing the connection of 
Cartesianism to neoclassical theory; using a narrative approach. He argues, importantly, that the 
very nature of science separates discovery from justification. This in turn connects to Chapter 
Three with Polanyi (1958) where he argues that complete scientific objectivity is a delusion, and 
that a proper substitute is personal knowledge. I extended this line of thinking to link it to Sen’s 
(1977) total rejection of rational choice theory; a foundation of homoeconomicus; discussed in 
detail in Chapter Four.   
 Segue to Chapter Six. This chapter leaves us off in the late 1940’s to early 1950’s. Recall 
that the neoclassicists were now energized to do something about the increasing acceptance of 
Keynesian economic policy pushed at the end of World War II. We now have, in my view, the 
necessary background, both historical and philosophical, to engage the next chapter. There, I use 
what is referred to as the Van Horn & Mirowski (2009) central thesis on the rise of 
neoliberalism. According to this thesis, in analyzing the role of the University of Chicago, it is 
best understood as one component of a larger global project of newly established neoliberal 
doctrines for the postwar world.  
Van Horn & Mirowski (2009) pick of right where this chapter leaves off. My hope is that 
the reader will understand the next chapter as a seamless and logical ‘next phase’ in explaining 
the Rise of Neoliberalism. The undercurrent theme of the power of capital will be quite evident. 
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Chapter Six 
The Postwar University of Chicago, School of Economics and the Birth of Neoliberalism 
Introduction.  
Recall that Chapter Five ended in the late 1940’s to early 1950’s right after the end of 
World War II and the height of Keynesian economic policies; the opposing economic policies to 
market based neoclassical theory. This chapter starts from there and will feature the work of Van 
Horn & Mirowski (2009) in their article: The Rise of the Chicago School and the Birth of 
Neoliberalism. They discuss specific people and events that led to the launching of neoliberalism 
onto the world stage as a new intellectual movement. To repeat, they argue “our central thesis is 
that the rise of the Chicago school must be understood as one component of a specific larger 
transnational project of innovating doctrines of neoliberalism for the postwar world” (p. 140). 
Chapter preview. While there are many individuals involved in the rise of neoliberalism, 
this chapter elevates some of the more central figures like Henry Simons, Aaron Director, Milton 
Friedman, Frederick von Hayek and last but certainly not least, Harold Luhnow. The reader will 
see clearly that it is Harold Luhnow who, as the new President of the Volker Fund, in open and 
dramatic fashion, skillfully uses the nature and power of capital to ‘call things to life’ that led to 
the rise of neoliberalism.  
To my mind, the most significant part of this chapter, and I will go so far to say possibly 
this entire study, comes from the story of ‘Mr. Anonymous’: William Volker and the history of 
the Volker Fund. I will present a connection between the spiritual message found in the Gospel 
of Matthew, specifically its directions on ‘giving and how to give’, and the rise of neoliberalism. 
It is a powerful story that affected me very deeply as a researcher; as it struck a real chord with 
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my own beliefs. It is also a great story; connecting to both the birth of neoliberalism and the 
power of capital. 
As discussed in Chapter Five, in the aftermath of World War ll, Keynesian economics, or 
the economics of the welfare state, was in its heyday. It was the one thing, in my view, that really 
ignited the battle at the Chicago School; as it forced conservatives like Milton Friedman and 
others to ‘fight for the very life of their economic and social worldviews’. Chapter Five 
discussed the two opposing philosophies of the battle at the school; the Cartesian analytical 
tradition, representing neoclassical theory versus Pragmatism, representing institutional theory. 
One of the objectives of this chapter is to connect specific lives to each side of the battle to give 
it a more human and less philosophical dimension. 
What still needs to be discussed is how the battle was actually won by the neoclassicists. 
With this said, this chapter will look to answer such questions as: How did they win? What really 
happened? Why? Who were the main people involved?  Are there any root causes? Thoughts 
from Van Horn & Mirowski (2009) and Coase (1993) will shed light on these central questions. 
Now, the main narrative. 
The Rise of Neoliberalism 
Introduction. As stated in the chapter introduction, Van Horn & Mirowski (2009) begin 
by arguing that the rise of the Chicago School must be understood as one component of a 
specific larger transnational project of innovating doctrines of neoliberalism for the postwar 
world. Specifically, they say “now that The Chicago School no longer exists in anything like its 
original form, we believe the time has come to tell the actual story in detail that would satisfy the 
historian rather than the ceremonial after-dinner speaker. But more importantly, this account 
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begins to situate the Chicago School in the larger framework of the postwar creation of 
neoliberalism” (p. 140).  
I suggest that the reader understand and interpret Van Horn & Mirowski (2009) saying 
that ‘the Chicago School no longer exists in anything like its original form’ as putting aside all 
that Chapter Five has discussed about the beginnings of the Chicago School up to this point; at 
least for now. In other words, bypassing its initial inception with William Rainey Harper and 
John D. Rockefeller, up to Roosevelt’s New Deal of the Great Depression and on to the end of 
World War ll; where the authors begin.   
At the end of Chapter Five, I made the argument that their picking of the end of World 
War ll to start their excellent narrative and analysis is to some degree arbitrary in my view. It 
leaves out important groundwork that is required for a fuller understanding of the role the 
University of Chicago and what its uniqueness as an institution had in ‘instilling the spirit’ of 
neoliberalism.  Nevertheless, Chapter Five also argued that the end of World War ll did indeed 
create a climate for a renewed energy for neoclassical economists to push their worldview 
forward. This said, Van Horn & Mirowski (2009) now piece together their story of what actually 
happened at the school after the end of World War ll that gave rise to neoliberalism.   
I believe it makes sense to replicate, at least in concept, the part of Chapter Five where I 
discussed the creation of the University of Chicago from its inception using John D. Rockefeller 
as the one most responsible for creating the school and getting it up and running. Why? Once 
again we will see my argument that suggests that in the final analysis, it is the power of capital 
that is the real root force that, leaning on Habermas (1968) and Marx (1973), ‘calls to life things 
from the wills of people and brings them into existence’. This will make more sense to the reader 
as I proceed. 
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The following diversion will show what my argument about capital means in clear 
fashion in a critically important narrative on the history of the Volker Fund. For now, the reader 
will soon see that Van Horn & Mirowski (2009) build their case on the connections between the 
Chicago School and the Rise of Neoliberalism from the historical influence of the Volker Fund; 
directly connecting to my discussion on the nature and power of capital. 
Mr. Anonymous of Kansas City.  The following narrative is taken from Hoplin & 
Robinson (2008) in the first chapter of their book: Funding Fathers: The Unsung Heroes of the 
Conservative Movement. The chapter is entitled: William Volker and his Nephew Harold 
Luhnow. They begin: 
To Harry Wood: $1.00 to replace broken glasses. To 
Clarence Wonsetler: $3.00 for rent. To County Tax 
Collector: $24.87 on behalf of Laura Winn. To Nancy 
Bowsell: $115.00 to obtain hearing aids. To University of 
Kansas City: $42.00 for tuition on behalf of Harold Hein. 
To Bell Memorial Hospital: $100.00 for James Case’s 
operation. (p. 15)  
Hoplin & Robinson (2008) tell us that these notes were scratched on three-by-five yellow 
scrap paper to remind William Volker who would receive a check that day. These people were 
not relatives or even acquaintances. In fact, they were among the many people who lined up at 
his door daily in the wee hours of the morning to plead their case to him. He rarely turned 
someone away empty-handed. William Volker’s philanthropy inspired individuals, boosted their 
capacity to contribute to society, and empowered some of the most accomplished writers, leaders 
and thinkers of the twentieth century’s movement towards free enterprise and freedom from 
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intervention. “Dubbed ‘Mr. Anonymous’ by those who knew of his good works, William Volker 
and his nephew Harold Luhnow changed individual’s lives all around them, one person at a 
time” (p. 16). Who was this man and even more importantly, why did he do this? Recall the 
analysis of the power of narrative that is used in N-H from Chapter Three. It will help in 
understanding how this important question will be answered. 
William Volker was born on April Fools’ Day in 1859, on a small farm in Esperke am 
Neustadt, Germany. As the fourth of six children, their parents gave them considerable 
responsibilities at young ages. Each day, after long hours of labor, William returned home and 
entered through the doorway with the saying ‘Work and Pray’. In answering the important 
question of why he had such a charitable nature, William’s German mother, Dorothea Volker, 
taught her children the importance of charity according to the Gospel of Matthew; as it speaks of 
not only the idea of giving, but of how to give for the right reason: 
So, whenever you give alms, do not sound a trumpet 
before you…But when you give alms do not let your left 
hand know what your right hand is doing, so that your 
alms may be done in secret; and your Father who sees in 
secret will reward you. (p. 16) 
This message can also be found in Matthew Chapter 6 verses 3 through 4 (NIV) where it talks 
about giving to the needy. This, to my mind, is the powerful influence William Volker received 
from his mother as a child that led to his charitable nature as an adult. It should not be 
minimized; as it is critical to this study of neoliberalism.  
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At the age of 12 the family packed their belongings and emigrated from Germany to 
Chicago to escape the quickly growing and increasingly intrusive Bismarck German government. 
Hoplin & Robinson (2008) argue that it was this initial experience at a very young age that led to 
William Volker’s skepticism of a demanding government; an important factor that will be 
discussed later in the chapter. When he turned 14, his parents decided that it was time for him to 
make his own way. William swept, dusted and ran errands twelve hours a day to earn $1.00 a 
week at a dry-goods business. With his hard work, he was promoted to a junior clerk earning a 
robust $5.00 a week.  
Hoplin & Robinson (2008) now continue with the story by saying that for eleven years, 
William worked hard and saved every penny he earned. In 1882, his desire to own his own 
company led him to Kansas City, Missouri. He started it with $1,500 in savings and a $3,000 
loan from a mortgage placed on the family home. With two partners, he started William Volker 
& Company in 1882. His company initially intended to manufacture picture frames and moldings 
since he had some experience in that field. The company soon transitioned into wholesaling 
these products. 
William worked extremely hard; often putting in ninety hour workweeks and sleeping on 
a cot in the back room. Within just two years his company turned a small profit. Hoplin & 
Robinson (2008) remind us that not only did William work hard, he prayed all the time. William 
is now an adult looking back on the effect of the powerful influence he received from his mother 
as a child. His favorite poet Friedrich Schiller, once wrote that ‘chance’ comes from Providence 
and man must mold it to his own designs. From this, the authors say:  
Volker took this line of poetry to heart and believed 
strongly in the divine, yet simple Providence, the 
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significance of God’s omnipotence, the importance of his 
stewardship in the eyes of God, and his Christian heritage 
engrained in his soul from a young age. He read scripture 
every day; detached, creased pages filled his tattered Bible 
from its daily use. Scripture guided his actions, and he 
recognized God’s impact on his life: Providence has been 
good to me. (p. 18) 
First, this should remind the reader of Adam Smith’s invisible had argument where he 
posited the idea of Divine Providence. Continuing, Hoplin & Robinson (2008) claim that it is 
estimated that Volker gave away nearly one-third of his income every year. From this, his 
reputation as a very generous man grew more and more; as did the lines of people forming in 
front of his office each day. The authors tell us that by 1937, he wrote checks to more than one 
hundred individuals each month. Additionally, Volker personally wrote each check so that every 
transaction would remain secret, clearly looking to follow the message of the Gospel of Matthew 
taught to him by his mother. 
The list of causes and charities Volker supported also grew. He particularly enjoyed 
funding the Helping Hands Institute which provided employment for out-of-work citizens. He 
gave more than a half million dollars to Research Hospital, now called Research Medical Center; 
making nurse residents, a research lab and a diagnostic clinic possible. He also helped the state 
of Missouri with a very significant road building campaign by supplying the city with four 
hundred thousand barrels of cement each year for five years from his cement plant. Additionally, 
he helped the city acquire the Frederic Nelson Pugsley collection of Chinese art for $50,000 
which remains on display at the Nelson-Atkins Museum of Art.  
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The University of Kansas became one of the most important causes to him; as it was 
Volker who, more than anyone else, was responsible for its initial establishment and growth 
within the community.  In 1930, Volker gave the university forty acres of land to build the 
campus. He donated $100,000 for the science building, $75,000 for the library, $10,500 for the 
president’s residence, a cash gift of $200,000 in 1939 and a pledge of $1million over ten years. 
As to why he was so generous to the school he later said that “I am sure that the University will 
pay the biggest dividend to the most people. That is plain logic” (p. 21). 
Cornuelle (1951) in his book: “Mr. Anonymous”: The Story of William Volker summed 
up his life quite succinctly: 
William Volker kept his own counsel, left no records of his 
doings. Even his wife had no access to many of his secrets. 
William Volker did not expect anyone to write about him, 
nor would he have wanted his story told. He would have 
objected to the publication of this book. Many will find it 
unbelievable. William Volker chose to travel a unique 
route, to follow an unusual code of behavior. He 
established a singular pattern, a pattern considered my 
many but accepted by almost no one. (p. 7) 
At this point of the narrative so far, a detailed picture of an incredible and unique man of 
charity has put the story of the Volker Fund at a very significant crossroad. What do I mean by 
this? The reader will soon see that, in what at this point must seem like a massive contradiction; 
it is actually the Volker Fund that is largely responsible for the launching of neoliberalism. This 
seemingly gigantic twist in the narrative analysis will be supported fully by both Van Horn & 
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Mirowski (2009) and Coase (1993); as each build their cases separately in connecting the 
Chicago School to neoliberalism. The link that explains this almost unfathomable connection is 
found in the next two characters about to be introduced: Harold Luhnow, William Volker’s 
nephew and Tom Pendergast; known as ‘The Boss’ of Kansas City. Hoplin & Robinson (2008) 
now continue with their story.  
William Volker, having no children of his own, looked after his nieces and nephews by 
providing allowances for college tuition and summer camps. Volker’s younger sister Emma 
emigrated from Germany to Chicago with the rest of the family in 1871 when she was four years 
old. In 1890, she married William C. Luhnow, a wholesale coal merchant. They had six boys. 
One particular nephew, Harold, born in 1895, became closely involved with the Volker and Co. 
business, along with his uncle’s philanthropic interests.  
Harold attended Kansas State College of Agriculture in Manhattan, Kansas and graduated 
with a Bachelor of Science degree in agriculture and animal husbandry in 1917. He then served 
in the army as a private in World War l. Upon his return to Kansas City, he suffered from 
pneumonia and the flu from his military service. When his uncle William heard of his condition, 
he offered his nephew a position as a sales clerk in Volker and Co. for $15.00 a week until his 
health improved. Young Luhnow accepted the position so long as no favors would be granted on 
account of his uncle William being president of the company. Hoplin & Robinson (2008) tell us 
that this marked the beginning of a thirty-year professional relationship. 
Harold Luhnow climbed up the company ranks by hard work and gaining the trust of his 
uncle over the years. William Volker recognized the talent of his nephew and assigned him as 
the new Dallas, Texas branch manager in 1921; where he served in that post until 1928. He 
worked diligently to make the Dallas branch a healthy competitor in the Dallas market. In 
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acknowledgment of his success, in 1928, William Volker appointed his nephew Harold Luhnow 
general sales manager of the Kanas City headquarters. He was given the responsibility to 
overhaul the sales department to improve its operations. This is now where the entire story and 
its connection to neoliberalism begins to come together.  
Tom Pendergast. Who was Tom Pendergast? The reader will soon see that the difference 
between him and William Volker is so wide that I see it as critical to this study and therefore 
must be emphatically addressed. Recall that William Volker’s famous giving nature stemmed 
from his childhood; as his mother heavily influenced him by preaching the Gospel of Matthew. 
The background of Tom Pendergast is quite different.  
According to Hoplin & Robinson (2008), when Harold Luhnow returned to Kansas City, 
he arrived in a city overrun by crooks. Tom Pendergast, broad nosed and barrel-chested, led the 
city with an iron fist: 
He became ‘the boss’, bribing to fit his political ambitions 
whenever necessary. At the height of his Kansas City 
domination, Prendergast’s personal operatives, in collusion 
with local police, jailed poll watchers who tried to keep 
illegal voters from casting ballots; he accepted political 
kickbacks and in 1935-1936 he paid out more that $1 
million more than he reported on his income taxes. 
Additionally, Pendergast allowed rate increases by fire 
insurance companies in exchange for $400,000 in cash. (p. 
23)  
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Dorsett (1968) tells us that Tom’s famous older brother Jim Pendergast, after a few years 
of dissatisfying manual labor, got his start by hitting it big at the racetrack on a horse name 
Climax in 1881. From the winnings, he purchased a combination hotel and saloon and became a 
successful business man in Kansas City. His saloons would become very advantageous once he 
entered politics. He controlled what was known as Kansas City’s ‘West Bottoms’ neighborhood; 
populated by low-income Black, Irish, German and Native American workers. Also, Alderman 
Jim, as he was called, was in failing health.  
Sixteen years younger, his brother Tom worked as a bookkeeper in the Pendergast 
saloons. He looked quite a bit like his older brother Jim; big, stocky, round face with a huge 
mustache. According to Dorsett (1968) under the tutelage of Kansas City’s most powerful boss, 
his brother Jim, Tom learned to direct the Pendergast machine. “For sixteen years, Jim instructed 
him in the ABC’s of machine politics in Kansas City” (p. 43).  
In 1900, at the apex of Jim’s political strength, Mayor James Reed appointed young Tom 
to the patronage-laden office of superintendent of streets. For the next twenty plus years Dorsett 
(1968) details how Tom built the Pendergast machine. “Pendergast was clearly supreme in 
Kansas City and Jackson County. Soon, however, events beyond his control would conspire to 
make him the most powerful man in Missouri” (p. 91). Hoplin & Robinson (2008) argue that his 
accumulation of government power and stranglehold on Kansas City’s decision-making process 
directly threatened the values Harold Luhnow and William Volker held: citizenship, benevolence 
and principled character. The story now heats up. 
On an important side note, I mentioned earlier that William Volker was taught by his 
mother to give to those in need ‘for the right reason’; referencing the Gospel of Matthew. Why 
did I mention this? Dorsett (1968) spelled out many cases where the Pendergast regime ‘gave to 
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the needy’ but made it perfectly clear that his ‘giving’ was for political gains and that such 
giving (he often used the term welfare) created people, many of them Blacks, totally dependent 
on his ‘giving’ where the only requirement from them was their continued political support. This 
is precisely what William Volker detested; as his intent in giving was to make needy citizens be 
able to contribute to society, not become dependent on it. As a black man myself, this means a 
lot to me. In my view, I think the reader may recognize this unfortunate social dynamic in 
todays’ political environment as one that fuels the anger from many whites against this 
perception of dependency of many blacks. Sadly, there is a degree of historical truth that creates 
this perception. 
Developing the Volker Fund connection to neoliberalism. With this brief background 
about Tom Pendergast and his ‘machine politics’, Hoplin & Robinson (2008) now continue the 
story saying that Harold Luhnow grew more and more upset with the Pendergast regime and 
decided to join an initiative to remove Pendergast and his cronies from power. In 1934 Luhnow 
became a director of the National Youth movement, an organization which sought to destroy the 
Pendergast iron clad hold over the city. In 1938, he served as finance chairman for the 
Independent Voters League, trying yet again to rid the city of the vice grip of Pendergast but, 
once again, falling short. 
When William Volker retired in 1938, his nephew Harold Luhnow became president of 
the company. Their long relationship kept stride as Harold, now supported by the financial 
strength of his uncle William Volker, continued to work behind the scenes to rid the city of the 
corruption of Tom Pendergast. For example, Luhnow demanded financial audits of the city done 
by the Volker-supported Civic Research Institute. Of great significance, Luhnow acted as an 
organizer of the United Campaign Committee, a non-partisan group seeking to influence city 
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government elections. With Luhnow’s influence, the organization helped to pass an amendment 
to the city charter to term-limit city officials effectively ousting Pendergast from city government 
in 1940. 
While Luhnow spent a great deal of his time working to rid the city of Pendergast, 
William Volker, now retired and 80 years old, stayed in the office keeping the affairs of the 
company on track. Hoplin & Robinson (2008) tells us that the Pendergast era caused both 
William Volker and his nephew Harold Luhnow to doubt the ability of government to relieve 
social problems appropriately. As we approach the connection of this story to neoliberalism, I 
remind the reader that in addition to this recent Pendergast experience, that the Volker family 
emigrated from Germany to Chicago because of the intrusion of the Bismarck government. In 
my view, this is a very significant piece to add inasmuch as it paints a picture of a real deep-
seated ingrained disdain for government on the part of William Volker that extends all the way 
back to his childhood; now shared with his nephew Harold Luhnow.  
Continuing with the story, Hoplin & Robinson (2008) claim that William Volker 
recognized that his personal philanthropy worked much better than government sponsored 
welfare. As a prime example, when Pendergast maliciously used the Department of Public 
Welfare, a relief organization that Volker himself helped to start, to take hold over Kansas City, 
Volker said “I’ve learned something about government. Governments must be restricted to those 
activities which can be entrusted to the worst citizens, not the best” (p. 24). For Volker, it boils 
down to either organized charity or taxation. This simplicity in turn developed into his personal 
philosophy of government and one I admit forthrightly, strongly believe in myself. According to 
William Volker: 
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Organized charity relieves destitution, but in addition does 
the utmost to furnish employment, to remove the causes of 
misfortune, and to restore the individual or family to a basis 
of independence and productive citizenship. Besides all this, 
voluntary charity does something for the giver. To depend 
on taxation, would mean that many who are destitute would 
become used to dependence on others, confirmed paupers 
who would be a continuous charge of the community. (p. 
25) 
Even more explicit, Volker began to understand that good ideas, more so than 
government-sponsored improvement projects, could impact and change the future. As a result of 
this thinking, William Volker placed half of his wealth for the eventual distribution in the Volker 
Fund. This completes our very brief history of William Volker and the Volker Fund.  
To better understand this seemingly simple outlook, recall the early childhood religious 
influence he received from his mother that he remained with him through his adult life. William 
was raised to help others and carried this belief through his great success as a business man. 
There is nowhere in his story that indicates that he took time away from his business to study the 
nuances of politics or opposing ideologies; thus, the ‘pure’ nature of his giving. From this, the 
Pendergast experience was reacted to in the manner described in the above quote. 
Hoplin & Robinson (2008) now lead us toward our connection to neoliberalism. They 
argue that the Volker Fund made its philanthropic decisions based on ideas that support Volker’s 
philosophy of government; just quoted above. It supported individuals and their work, but left 
the individual free to complete his or her work without interference or restraint of any kind. The 
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Volker Fund Statement of Policy confirmed this: “Ideas do not originate in monuments but in the 
minds of creative individuals” (p. 25). The fund itself had a small staff dedicated to managing 
each gift personally. It had three original trustees: William Volker as president, his wife Rose 
Volker as secretary and his nephew Harold Luhnow as treasurer.  
Volker and Luhnow made most of the giving decisions together, supporting those causes 
and people they deemed responsible and necessary to their views. In 1944, Harold Luhnow 
assumed the role of president of the Volker Fund. With the blessing of his uncle William Volker, 
Harold led the Volker Fund’s transition to support scholars of liberty and freedom. William 
Volker died on November 4th, 1947 at the age of 88.  Already a heavy skeptic of government 
from the Pendergast experiences, Harold Luhnow was inspired by Friedrich von Hayek’s book: 
The Road to Serfdom. We now have our initial connection to the Rise of Neoliberalism. 
Of great significance to this study, and directly connecting to the Chapter Four discussion 
on the nature and power of capital, Hoplin & Robinson (2008) argue plainly that “one of the 
most seemingly insignificant monetary gifts given in the 1940’s by the Volker Fund led to the 
dramatic advancement of free-market and classical liberal ideas worldwide” (p. 26). This cannot 
be overstated. I now continue elaborating on this connection between the Volker Fund and 
neoliberalism with Van Horn & Mirowski (2009); as they corroborate and pick up the story right 
where Hoplin & Robinson (2008) leave off.  
The Van Horn & Mirowski (2009) central thesis. Van Horn & Mirowski (2009) clearly 
corroborate this history of the Volker Fund: 
Luhnow, who had become president of William Volker & 
Co. was a strident anti-New Deal conservative began the 
248 
 
process of converting a philanthropic fund originally 
intended to help the citizens of Kansas City into 
something completely different: a foundation to promote 
a rethinking of liberal politics in America. The fund 
played a major role in conservative intellectual politics in 
twentieth century America. (p. 141) 
Van Horn & Mirowski (2009) now beginning to detail their narrative, introduce Nobel 
laureate Friedrich von Hayek, who brings the international dimension into the discussion. On a 
trip to America in early 1945, they claim that Hayek was intent to warn the west of the 
impending threat of what he termed left-wing totalitarianism. According to them, Hayek, at the 
time still an economist at the London School of Economics, was in America giving lectures on 
his surprising best seller book: The Road to Serfdom. In his speech at the Detroit Economic Club 
on April 23rd 1945, in trying to proselytize his views, he said:  
We must make the masses of people learn and understand 
the problem that is before us, make them capable of 
discriminating between methods which will achieve the end 
and methods which are empty promises, and particularly 
tell them that there may be desperate palliatives like 
inflationary measures which in the short run may keep 
employment high, but in the long run make the situation 
much more difficult than it was before. (p. 140) 
This, in my view, is a formal attack against Keynesian economic theory from a well-respected 
economist and a call for the return to conservative neoclassical policy.   
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 In any event, Van Horn & Mirowski (2009) claim that within two days of this speech in 
Detroit, Hayek met with Harold Luhnow, president of the Volker Fund.  “Luhnow offered to 
provide financial support for Hayek in his educational quest, since he too had been searching for 
intellectual weapons to curb the power of government in the postwar era” (p. 141). As the reader 
should suspect, the plot now thickens. 
 At the meeting, Luhnow sought to commission Hayek to write an American version of 
his book: The Road to Serfdom. His reason was that the original text was written primarily for a 
British audience and was perhaps at a too high level of discourse for American audiences. While 
there are differing accounts as to how Hayek initially reacted to Luhnow’s proposal, Van Horn & 
Mirowski (2009) claim that in the end, Hayek saw it as something far larger than just writing 
another version of his book. In seeking to get others committed to this project, as he himself 
could not find the time to do it, Hayek wrote the following letter to Luhnow while in Chicago on 
May 3rd 1945 right before returning to England:  
My friend Mr. Friedrich A. Lutz of Princeton, whom I had 
in the first instance in mind and who came to see me here in 
Chicago to discuss it, is quite willing to take part in it 
although he is for some time committed to other work, and 
feels that we would need two or three other people to work 
with him as a team. It has since occurred to me that 
Princeton is not necessarily the best place and that there is a 
great deal to be said for conducting the investigation at the 
University of Chicago where there are a number of people 
whose collaboration would be extremely useful. (p. 141)   
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In showing the level of seriousness this project garnered at the University of Chicago, 
prominent faculty economists like Jacob Viner, Robert Hutchins, Karl Brandt, Henry Simons and 
Dean Robert Redfield all seemed eager to participate. In addition, Aaron Director and Milton 
Friedman, while not faculty members at that time, also wanted to get involved. This specific 
group was extremely influential within the university, as Robert Hutchins was a soon-to-be 
chancellor.  
We have now reached a point where the story becomes, in my view, somewhat explosive 
in its far-reaching implications with a re-emergence of the original philosophical battle at the 
school; now with guns blazing as a result of the Volker financed input initialized by Hayek. 
Recall that the battle was between neoclassical and institutional economic theories and that one 
of the objectives of this chapter was to attach specific people behind each of the opposing 
philosophies. To that end, I begin with Friedrich von Hayek and neoclassical economic theory.  
Van Horn & Mirowski (2009) begin this far-reaching part of their story by elaborating on 
a long standing intellectual friendship that deteriorated into philosophical combatants with very, 
very profound implications. The authors tell us that Hayek and Henry Simons’ intellectual 
friendship dated back as early as 1934 when Hayek sent a letter of appreciation concerning 
Simon’s acclaimed work: A Positive Program for Laissez Faire.  His appreciation was clear in 
the letter to Simons on December 1st 1934 where he said “I have the greatest sympathy for the 
general spirit which it expresses and I feel that it does raise the problems which economists 
ought to discuss today more than others” (p. 142). Van Horn & Mirowski (2009) next add that as 
a result of these communications, by 1939 a close comradeship had developed between the two.  
In that year, in displaying their mutual admiration for each other, Simons sent a letter to 
Hayek; as both were discussing the British political landscape at that time: 
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For England, however, it seems impossible to hold out even for a slender hope. England, to be 
sure, may still be saved, but not by her own actions- only by example of a wise and successful 
liberal program in the United States. So, I welcome your contributions to discussions here and, 
hoping that you will again write for American readers, I suggest that this may be the most useful 
contribution you can make toward the cause of liberalism in England and elsewhere. (p. 142) 
Notwithstanding this mutual respect, according to Van Horn & Mirowski (2009) “during 
the 1930’s they did not fully concur on some issues, which would later loom large” (p. 142). To 
that quote, I would adjust it to read: loom very large. The authors now begin to detail the 
deteriorating aspects of this seemingly once strong mutual admiration that will point directly to 
the fundamental philosophical differences that defined the battle at the Chicago School discussed 
in Chapter Five. How?  
First, it is clear that Hayek supports the neoclassical side of the battle with his above 
mentioned public opposition to Keynesian economics and his warning to Western civilization of 
the encroachment of what he termed left-wing totalitarianism. Furthermore, Hayek (2014) in his 
book: The Road to Serfdom spells out his intense feelings; not to be taken lightly. Most 
importantly, recall that Harold Luhnow of the Volker Fund was inspired by this book. With that, 
a few important introductory words about this book are warranted.  
According to Caldwell (2008): 
The Road to Serfdom is F. A. Hayek’s most well-known 
book but its origins are decidedly inauspicious. It began as 
a memo to the director of the London School of 
Economics, Sir Walter Beveridge, written by Hayek in the 
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early 1930’s disputing the then popular claim that fascism 
represented the dying gasp of a failed capitalist system. The 
memo grew into a magazine article and parts of it were 
supposed to be incorporated into a much larger book, but 
during World War ll he decided to bring it out separately. 
Though Hayek had no problem getting Routledge to 
publish the book in England, three American publishers 
rejected the manuscript before the University of Chicago 
Press finally accepted it. (p. 1)  
As the reader can see, Van Horn & Mirowski (2009) and Caldwell (2008) both consider   Nobel 
Prize economist Friedrich von Hayek as a central figure in the Rise of Neoliberalism; as do I. 
With this said, I now present an argument that will serve two purposes. First, to continue to 
connect Hayek to the neoclassical side of the battle and second, to present the thoughts of Hayek 
as what in my view can be seen as ‘intentional hypocrisy of the highest order’. 
In his book: The Road to Serfdom Hayek (1944) clearly expresses his reasoning for 
rejecting what he terms left wing totalitarianism by first denouncing the intelligence of the 
general public, then showing how science comes into play to justify preconceived opinions. To 
start, I argue that both of these points just mentioned are used strongly by neoliberalism today to 
create its high success and dominance. I also ask the reader to recall that Amartya Sen (1977) 
and Karl Marx (1973) in Chapter Four both admonished and rebuked the so-called science of 
rational choice theory that supports homoeconomicus; one of the pillars of neoliberalism. The 
following quotes come from Hayek’s (1944) book Chapter Xl aptly titled: The End of Truth. I 
present these to the reader as two significant points in this study of neoliberalism.  
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First, on the intelligence of the general public: 
Probably it is true enough that the great majority are rarely 
capable of thinking independently, that on most questions 
they accept views which they find ready-made, and that 
they will be equally content if born or coaxed into one set 
of beliefs or another. In any society, freedom of thought 
will probably be of direct significance only for a small 
minority. (p. 164) 
Second, on the use of science: 
The need for doctrines as an instrument of directing and 
rallying the efforts of the people has been clearly foreseen 
by the various theoreticians of the totalitarian systems. 
Plato’s ‘noble lies’, Sorel’s ‘myths’ serve the same purpose 
as the racial doctrine of the Nazi’s or the theory of the 
corporative state of Mussolini. They are all necessarily 
based on particular views about facts which are then 
elaborated into scientific theories in order to justify a 
preconceived opinion. (p. 157) 
 These two specific thoughts of Friedrich von Hayek should not be underestimated. Recall 
the question posed in the beginning of Chapter Five that asked: how could any phenomenon 
possibly grounded on problematic theoretical foundations and with pejorative descriptors from 
254 
 
so many different authors, have grown into such global dominance? I argue that these two above 
quotes by Hayek provide at least some initial answers to that question.  
 Furthermore, I contend that a man of Hayek’s considerable intellect fully realized the 
power of these above thoughts and was not about to abandon such power in his push for a global 
response to thwart what he viewed as the rising threat of totalitarianism. In other words, I suggest 
that Hayek in truth secretly admired such totalitarian power, but wished to corral it for those who 
thought as he did; all under the guise of ‘liberalism’. We will see shortly that Henry Simons 
understood this and responded accordingly. Morality aside, is Hayek being hypocritical? I say 
undoubtedly; nevertheless, it has a certain level of genius to it. 
Recall from chapter Four where I argue that Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand’ argument is 
used by conservatives to justify the ‘trickle-down’ economics that calls for the rich getting even 
richer as a necessary priority, completely dismissing and disregarding Adam Smith’s moral 
foundations. I see such intentional misuse as an insidious warping of ideas to present something 
that otherwise cannot be justified morally or quantifiably. Whatever one’s opinion, this is smart 
and it works. Let’s continue: 
Now that Friedrich von Hayek can be associated with the neoclassical side of the battle at 
the Chicago school, what still needs to be done is establishing the connection of Henry Simons to 
the side of the institutionalists. Whalen (1988) in his article: The Minsky-Simons Connection: A 
Neglected Thread in the History of Economic Thought provides a link to institutionalism in the 
thoughts of Henry Simons; a central figure in Van Horn & Mirowski (2009) in their connecting 
neoliberalism and the Chicago School.  
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Whalen (1988) begins by telling us that Hyman P. Minsky was no stranger to institutional 
economics. Minsky was trained in mathematics at the University of Chicago and received his 
doctorate in economics from Harvard in 1954.  Whalen (1988) argues that Minsky's work is 
appropriately considered ‘institutional economics’. In addition, he adds, and this is important, 
professor Minsky was well known to students of John Maynard Keynes; who is often referred to 
as the founder of welfare economics.  “In 1975, he performed what the late Sidney Weintraub 
described as the extraordinary feat of writing a new book on Keynes, and since then he has made 
a number of important contributions to the growing school known as post-Keynesian economics. 
No study of the post-Keynesian literature is complete without a review of Minsky's work” (p. 
533, emphasis in original text). 
Whalen (1988) next argues that absent from nearly all examinations of Minsky’s 
writings, is a discussion of the important connection between his views and the economic ideas 
of Henry Simons; with whom he studied with while at the University of Chicago. From this, the 
purpose of Whalen’s (1988) article, according to him, is to shed light on what he terms the 
missing thread in economic thought: The Minsky-Simons connection.  
At first glance, Whalen (1988) argues the suggestion that the perspectives of Minsky and 
Simons share common elements might appear somewhat fatuous and even contradictory. He 
adds that in most circles, Simons is viewed as a founder of the so-called ‘Chicago School’ of 
economics; an opponent of government intervention in general and Keynesianism in particular.  
Recall that Simons was once referred to by George Stigler as the ‘Crown Prince’ of the Chicago 
School of Economics. So far, to the reader, this must sound more like the description of a polar 
opposite to an institutionalist or post-Keynesianist than one in agreement with Minsky. 
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In Chapter Five on the discussion of the philosophical differences between neoclassic and 
institutional economic theories by Mirowski (1999), I warned that in reality, and especially at the 
Chicago School, the differences are not as distinct and separate as the analysis seems to argue. I 
added that there was considerable grey area and vacillation among members between the two 
opposing philosophies. With this reminder, according to Whalen (1988), throughout Minsky's 
works one also finds brief statements and notes suggesting that some important commonalities 
do exist between Minsky, a known institutionalist and Henry Simons identified most often as a 
classical theorist.  
Whalen (1988) argues that as far as vision and purpose is concerned, Minsky and Simons 
share common elements that are best appreciated when compared to neoclassical thinking. While 
a desire to rationalize the ‘existing state of affairs’ may be sufficient to motivate neoclassical 
theorists, the careers of Minsky and Simons have instead been driven by a desire to understand 
and resolve actual economic problems. In a concluding paragraph, Whalen (1988) mentions quite 
specifically that “more attention should be given to Minsky’s recent suggestion that the 
economics of Keynes and Simons "have much in common” (p. 541, quotations in original text) 
Whalen’s (1988) article has introduced a connection, at least a cursory one, between 
Henry Simons and institutional economics; something I will discuss in more detail in Chapter 
Eight, the final chapter. With a very relevant and important hint near the end, he argues that 
much of the common ideas between Simons and Keynes needs more attention. I agree and 
therefore now bring in Coase (1993) with his article: Law and Economics at Chicago where he 
‘picks up the ball’ where Whalen (1998) left off.  
Who was Henry Simons and what did he stand for? Much of the hoped for value of this 
entire study is grounded in his thinking and will be discussed in Chapter Eight; the final chapter. 
257 
 
For now, the reader will be presented with powerful very well-known ideas attributed to Henry 
Simons by Coase (1993) that without question represent the very antithesis of neoliberalism.   
Coase (1993) begins this introduction and analysis of Henry Simons with intriguing and frank 
honesty: 
I did not read Simons's writings with great care and never 
met him. What I know about Simons is largely based on 
what Aaron Director and George Stigler have said and on a 
study of his papers.  Unlike the four Chicago economists, 
Knight, Viner, Schultz, and Douglas, Simons was not an 
international figure. His name was known to me and when 
his pamphlet, A Positive Program for Laissez Faire, was 
published in 1934, I bought a copy (its American price was 
twenty-five cents), and I read it. I still possess my copy, but 
its excellent condition attests that it was not something that 
I studied with great attention. It is not difficult to 
understand why I was not attracted to Simon's pamphlet. It 
is, as Simons says, ‘a propagandist tract’. It is written with 
passion and a sense of impending doom: ‘the future of our 
civilization hangs in balance’. (p. 240, emphasis in original 
text)  
This says a mouthful. How should we interpret this?  
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Coase (1993) next claims that he did not share Simon’s fear and that his famous pamphlet 
was far more concerned with political philosophy than economics. Furthermore “and when it did 
touch on economics, or at any rate on those parts of economics in which I was interested, his 
views were such as to provoke serious reservations” (p. 240). Clearly, this is no ringing 
endorsement of Henry Simons. Why use it then? What does this have to do with this study? 
Coase (1993) now argues that Simons claimed that the state should consider the necessity 
of actually taking over, owning, and managing directly, those industries in which it is impossible 
to maintain effectively competitive conditions. Even with this, it is here where Henry Simons’ 
thoughts tie directly into this study of neoliberalism; his views and positions on the corporation: 
There must be an outright dismantling of our gigantic 
corporations. Few of our gigantic corporations can be 
defended on the ground that their present size is necessary 
to reasonably full exploitation of production economies: 
their existence is to be explained in terms of opportunities 
for promoter profits, personal ambitions of industrial and 
financial ‘Napoleons’, and advantages of monopoly power. 
(p. 241, quotations in original text) 
To my mind, this needs little interpretation as Simon’s position on corporations is crystal clear. I 
also think that the reader can see why, from the literature review of Chapter Two, I argue that his 
thinking on the corporation is the very antithesis of neoliberalism. In addition, if we use the 
thoughts of Whalen’s (1988) above that links Simons to institutionalism, it is my belief that 
while Van Horn & Mirowski (2009) build their case connecting the Chicago School to 
neoliberalism starting after Word War ll, in reality, it started, in my view, with the intellectual 
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battle of the two opposing philosophies, Cartesian versus Pragmatism during the early years at 
the school described in Chapter Five. Put more simply, I am arguing that as a result of the Great 
Depression and Roosevelt’s New Deal which was grounded in the Keynesian economics of the 
welfare state, that is where the real intellectual beginnings of neoliberalism started; even though 
it was not be manifested into policy until many years later.  
I begin to conclude this discussion on Henry Simons (1934) with quotes from his famous 
work, also called a pamphlet, titled: A Positive Program for Laissez-Faire. From the beginning, 
the reader can see an apparent strong mutual understanding between him and Friedrich von 
Hayek:  
We have witnessed abroad the culmination of movements 
from constitutional governments to dictatorships, from 
freedom back to authority. This spectacle, for most of us, is 
revolting, and the experience, something to be avoided at 
all costs. Yet, faced with the same problems, we adopt and 
accept political slogans which call explicitly for an 
‘American compromise’ that is to say for more authority 
and less freedom here and now. (p. 1) 
This should sound very familiar to the reader. Recall Van Horn & Mirowski (2009) claimed that 
Friedrich von Hayek on a trip to America in early 1945, tried to warn the west of the impending 
threat of what he termed left-wing totalitarianism. In my opinion these views are in line with the 
warning from both he and von Hayek in opposing extreme forms of left wing governments that 
are not supportive of free enterprise market-based economic systems.  
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Van Horn & Mirowski (2009) argue: “Like Hayek, Simons believed that the liberal 
safeguard of freedom is the most important objective for public policy, and denounced political 
control unless it was unavoidably necessary to promote a freer market” (p. 142). Their initial 
mutual admiration and respect is grounded here; soon to deviate dramatically.  How so? 
In the same book, he departs from the neoclassical view of avoiding left-wing 
government with an astonishing refutation and criticism that creates, in my view, a distance 
between the two opposing views of institutionalism and neoclassicism, as far as east is from 
west. According to Van Horn & Mirowski (2009) “Simon’s ‘Positive Program’ reads today more 
like a left-leaning attack on corporate prerogatives than anything we might associate with a 
neoconservative agenda” (p. 143). Simons (1934) speaks about justice and inequality; striking, in 
my view, at the very heart of neoliberalism: 
Turning now to questions of justice, of equitable 
distribution, we may suggest that equitable distribution is 
least as important as with respect to power as with 
reference economic goods or income; also, that the case of 
justice, perhaps in both directions would be better served if 
well-intentioned reformers would reflect seriously on what 
their schemes imply with respect to the distribution of 
power. If we dislike extreme inequality of power, it is 
appropriate to view with especial misgivings the extension 
of political and monopoly control over relative prices and 
incomes. An important factor in existing inequality, both of 
income and of power, is the gigantic corporation. We may 
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recognize, in the almost unlimited grants of powers to 
corporate bodies, one of the greatest sins of government 
against the free-enterprise system. (p. 13, emphasis added) 
I mentioned earlier that in my view, Simons understood the powerful hypocrisy of 
Hayek. What did I mean?  Recall I suggested that in my view, Hayek actually admired the power 
of the totalitarian regimes and intended to use the same two ‘power methods’ quoted from his 
book earlier that now, again in my view, undergird neoclassical economics. With that, recall 
Simons’ references in his book to ‘personal ambitions of industrial and financial Napoleons’. I 
argue that these are the same ideas found in Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom where he referenced 
‘Plato’s ‘noble lies’, Sorel’s ‘myths’ serve the same purpose as the racial doctrine of the Nazi’s 
or the theory of the corporative state of Mussolini’. In short, I argue that Simons’ ‘financial 
Napoleons’ are some of today’s corporate titans; individuals exercising extraordinary power over 
the multitudes primarily by means based on their demeaning views of society as described in 
Hayek’s chapter Xl: The End of Truth. In short, I am suggesting that the views of Hayek and 
Simons could not be farther apart with the latter striking at the very heart of the negative aspects 
of neoliberalism found in Chapter Two. 
And if this is not enough of a counter view to neoliberalism, in Part ll of his pamphlet, 
Simons (1934) puts forth his vision for a genuinely liberal program, in the traditional sense of 
liberalism; or what may be called classical economics. He starts with a somewhat humorous and 
sarcastic statement: “We hope the proposals described below may receive consideration, both 
from liberals who are not naively romantic, and from conservatives who are not stupidly 
reactionary” (p. 17). I will summarize them for sake of brevity: 
1. Elimination of private monopoly in all its forms 
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2. Establishment of ‘rules of the game’ 
3. Drastic changes in the tax system 
4. Gradual withdrawal of enormous subsidies in tariff system 
5. Limitation of squandering resources on advertising and selling activities 
It should be easy for the reader to now see that the views of Henry Simons, a renowned classical 
economist, outright rejects many of the pejorative views of neoliberalism expressed in Chapter 
Two; especially how he denounces the power of gigantic corporations. In what may be rightly 
termed an incredible reversal of original thinking, Shaviro (2013) reminds us that George Stigler, 
Nobel Prize laureate in Economic Sciences in 1982, and a key leader of the Chicago School of 
Economics once called Henry Simons the ‘Crown Prince of the Chicago School of Economics’ 
and others have agreed that he was its ‘prime architect’ (p. 3).  
This presents, in my view, a real paradox to solve inasmuch as I’ve been arguing all 
along that neoliberalism began as a battle of worldviews in the University of Chicago, School of 
Economics; and now see that its highly revered ‘prime architect’ Henry Simons, actually 
represented the losing side. How did this happen?  First, in an admitted attempt to pour salt into 
the wound, I will tell the reader that the circumstances surrounding Henry Simons’ reported 
suicide death was, and still is, very controversial. After reading the details, I am among those 
highly suspicious and curious of what really happened to him. In any event, what caused the 
neoclassicists to win? For our answer, we now return to Van Horn & Mirowski (2009) to 
complete this unusual story on the connection of neoliberalism to the Chicago School to explain 
the above paradox.    
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The Free Market Study. According to Van Horn & Mirowski (2009) significant political 
turmoil at the university pushed Simons to work with Hayek on his Volker financed project to 
spread liberal economic ideas that diminish the role of government. Simons proposed the 
creation of an ‘institute’ that would be comprised of various scholars dispersed across 
disciplinary boundaries at Chicago; and that it be without reliance on departmental or university 
policy. He nominated his good personal friend Aaron Director, then working in Washington, D. 
C., to head up this new ‘institute’ and suggested that Milton Friedman be hired as a part time 
statistician. His hope was that this institute be restricted to publication of scholarly and semi-
popular literature to promote liberal ideas that came from stimulation rather than ideas generated 
under contract. In other words, Simons was interested only in developing ideas generated from 
strong honest intellectual debate, not ideas clearly pre-injected to support funders’ self-interest.   
The institute’s other function was envisioned to bring in visiting libertarian professors. 
“The Institute should be mainly concerned with political philosophy and with major practical 
problems of economic policy such as monopoly, monetary policy and foreign trade” (p. 146). 
Simons went on to name several others he thought would further the institute’s values, including 
Friedrich von Hayek. The litmus test was ones’ political orientation. 
Fortunately, or unfortunately, this Simons plan for an ‘institute’ to promote liberal views 
went nowhere. According to Van Horn & Mirowski (2009) there was a meeting in Washington 
D. C. that included Aaron Director, Milton Freidman and others to discuss the specifics of 
Simons’ plans for this institute. After hashing out ideas on compromises and possible alternatives 
to shorter term academic projects, Aaron Director’s assessment was pessimistic and he decided 
that he would remain in D. C. for another three years. With this, Simons’ plan collapsed. Simons 
then wrote to Hayek to inform him of the letdown. Hayek in turn responded to Simons in a letter 
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that said you will see from this that I am in full sympathy with your scheme. “If I can keep 
Luhnow sweet till the right man is available we might well proceed on this combined scheme” 
(p. 148, emphasis added). Hayek then wrote to Simons requesting that he tell everyone involved 
in this project from the beginning that it was being postponed. From this the reader can see how 
Harold Luhnow of the Volker Find, using the power of capital, was the real key man in this 
entire endeavor.    
In the meantime, Hayek, who in essence reported to Luhnow, wrote a letter to him 
keeping him apprised of his progress: “for the time being the attempts to organize the 
investigation we discussed have failed” (p. 149). This failure however did not deter Hayek one 
bit. Anxious to still get this project done, Hayek requested Volker funding for a trip to the United 
States to personally look into what had happened. In his letter to Volker, Hayek attached the 
details of the vision of Simons concerning this ‘institute’ to promote liberal ideas telling Luhnow 
that the Simons plan had all the essentials of which he was in close agreement. He wrote: 
I enclose a memorandum which together with the second 
document explains in some detail the aims and organization 
of the society which I have mentioned before… I don’t 
know whether I have succeeded in expressing in these 
memoranda why such an organization as I sketch there 
seems to me one of the best contributions in the fight against 
the evil which threatens all mankind. (p. 149) 
Van Horn & Mirowski (2009) tell us that in this somewhat scary and dramatic letter to 
Luhnow requesting funding, Hayek was referring to his own plan for a similar international 
institute to promote conservative views of which the Acton-Tocqueville Society would have 
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been a part. The outline for this international academy eventually led to what later would become 
the Mont Pèlerin Society. The authors add that the “negotiations over Chicago and parallel 
construction of what became the Mont Pèlerin Society are all part of the same common 
endeavor” (p. 149). 
Referring back to Hayek’s thoughts quoted from his book above, that the reader can see 
and judge just how serious these near apocalyptic thoughts of Hayek are. In the Acton-
Tocqueville memorandum Hayek wrote to Luhnow in August of 1945, “the tide of 
Totalitarianism which we have to encounter is an international phenomenon and the liberal 
renaissance which is needed to meet it and of which first signs can be discerned here and there 
will have little chance of success unless forces can join and succeed in making the people of all 
countries of the Western world aware of what is at stake” (p. 149).  
At this point in our story, Van Horn & Mirowski (2009) begin to recap what in their view 
is the bigger picture. Recall in August 1945, after meeting with Hayek a few days after his 
speech to the Detroit Economic Club, Luhnow offered to finance an American version of his 
book: The Road to Serfdom. They argue that Hayek conceived of this offer of financial support 
from Luhnow, via the Volker Fund, as a project at the University of Chicago which would be a 
“subordinate part of a larger and more elaborate scheme – a political movement to counter the 
intellectual traditions that would, as Hayek thought, inexorably lead to the emergence of 
totalitarian regimes throughout the Western world” (p. 149). This elaborates nicely our 
connection between the Volker Fund and Friedrich von Hayek; a central figure in the Rise of 
Neoliberalism.  They begin to detail this connection further, “thus the Volker Fund financially 
supported and stage-managed Hayek’s 1946 American tour; it reimbursed Hayek for all his 
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traveling expenses while in the United States and arranged for Hayek’s sojourns or meetings at 
various universities” (p. 150). 
The project’s original idea between Luhnow and Hayek became known as the ‘Free Market 
Study’ and as such: 
Sought to define the political promise of a new, more 
economically oriented liberalism: The free market is the 
most efficient organizer of economic activity- the study 
will emphasize and explain that the free market is systemic 
and rational, not chaotic or disorderly – show how the free 
market performs some of the more difficult functions such 
as allocating resources to their best use and distributing 
consumption through time. (p. 152) 
Of important note, the authors add that the under the above ‘promise of the free market’ it also 
identified both private monopoly and public regulation as ‘the menace to the free market’; 
clearly the positions of Henry Simons.  
 Connecting this ‘Free Market Study’ back to our connection with Harold Luhnow and the 
Volker Fund, Hayek prepared the following proposal for approval: 
The William Volker Charities Fund of Kansas City, 
Missouri, is prepared to provide for the finance of the study 
of a suitable legal and institutional framework for an 
effective competitive system and that it is willing to 
contribute for this purpose the expense of the members of 
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an advisory committee consisting of persons sympathetic to 
the purposes of this investigation and whose advice is 
likely to assist in the work of the regular staff who might 
periodically meet in Chicago for the discussion of problems 
arising in connection with. (p. 153). 
 According to Van Horn & Mirowski (2009), sometime after Hayek mailed this Free 
Market Study proposal to Luhnow, the Chicago Law faculty formally approved it, with only the 
central administration of the university needed to authorize final approval. However: 
The faculty of the Law school is prepared to extend to Mr. 
Director an appointment as Research Associate with the 
rank of Professor and with permanent tenure, on condition 
that this salary be underwritten for a period of five years 
with funds from outside the university. The central 
administration objected at giving Director automatic 
permanent tenure after a Volker-funded five-year research 
stint. (p.153) 
 Harold Luhnow, quickly apprised of this rejection of what he saw as a small point, 
scribbled a note to Hayek: “I’m not one to interfere when I ask someone to do a job for me. Just 
take your time. Be cautious, and be as sure of your men as possible…. it’s in your hands” (p. 
153). Van Horn & Mirowski (2009) argue that this represented a real frustration of Luhnow; as 
his idea was so close to the finish line. Nevertheless, Luhnow demonstrated his persistence with 
his vision of establishing a cadre of liberals devoted to developing a very specific agenda of 
doctrines to be planted and nurtured at Chicago. Then; tragedy strikes. 
268 
 
The death of Henry Simons. Hayek responded to Luhnow with shocking tragic news: he 
just heard the sad news that Henry Simons suddenly died in Chicago; committing suicide on 
June 19th. He added that Simons was so much the intellectual center of the group he had in mind 
and the attraction which made Director willing to come to Chicago that he could not yet see what 
the consequences of it will be. Hayek went on to say “I had become very fond of him. I wish I 
knew somebody to replace him. But if my scheme collapses as a result, I really don’t know 
where to turn” (p. 153). At this point, according to Van Horn & Mirowski (2009), given the 
precise timing, it is difficult not to imagine some connection between Simon’s suicide and the 
Director snafu. I mentioned my own misgivings of what actually happened to Simons earlier. It 
thus seemed that the entire Free Market Study proposal had reached a completely unexpected 
abrupt end. Yet… 
In a strange twist that put the project back on track, Aaron Director, still stunned by the 
dreadful news concerning Henry Simons, received news that there was a misunderstanding 
within the University of Chicago and that they were still considering the proposal to bring him to 
Chicago for a five year Volker-funded period but without guarantee of tenure. Director, a bit 
confused, wrote to Hayek seeking his thoughts in this dramatic turn of events. Hayek responded:  
After your letter, I do want to say that in a sense it would 
seem to be even more important than before that you should 
accept. It seems to me the only chance that the tradition that 
Henry Simons created will be kept alive and continued in 
Chicago- and to me this seems tremendously important. 
After closer acquaintance with Milton Friedman I believe 
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without Henry, Chicago is still much the best place where to 
do it. (p. 154)  
 According to Van Horn & Mirowski (2009) this letter must have lifted the spirits of 
Aaron Director as he replied promptly informing Hayek that he would agree to the five year offer 
without guarantee of tenure and move to Chicago to head the project. Director told Hayek that he 
considered this project of great importance and that the original hesitation concerned the 
misunderstanding stemming from the university and that Henry’s death made him even more 
anxious to be involved. 
 Hayek contacted Luhnow informing him that disagreements have been settled and that 
Director was indeed still the best man for the job in Chicago despite Henry Simons’ death. 
Luhnow responded positively:  
William Volker Charities Fund, Inc. accepts Dr. Hayek’s 
proposal and we are prepared to contribute $25,000 per 
annum for three years in the course of which this study is to 
be completed. In addition, we agree to contribute a further 
amount of $10,000 per annum for a period of two years to 
cover the salary of Mr. Director for the periods of two years 
after the investigation is completed. (p. 155) 
The deal was done. We now approach the conclusion of this story with the final connection 
between the rise neoliberalism and the University of Chicago. The real far reaching implications 
of this story and its connection to this study are now about to be revealed.  
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The Luhnow Influence. Van Horn & Mirowski (2009) now claim that as soon as the ‘show got 
on the road’ Luhnow moved swiftly to assert his influence over ‘his’ Free Market Study. In my 
view, it is precisely here where the real nature and power of capital manifests itself. As you will 
soon see, our final connection between neoliberalism and the University of Chicago is beginning 
to take shape and become evident.   
Once all the specifics were worked out, Luhnow wrote to Hayek: “We presume that the 
Advisory Committee will be set up rather promptly and we believe that it should be well thought 
out and I would like to ask that Leonard B. Read and Loren B. Miller be included on this 
Advisory Committee” (p. 155). In really beginning to flex his financial muscle, Luhnow 
mandated that the suggested Advisory Committee be submitted to Loren B. Miller for his 
examination before it is actually announced. In this manner, Luhnow ensured that the Free 
Market Study done at the University of Chicago would be dominated by men who agreed with 
the Volker Fund’s political philosophy right from the beginning. Hayek had no choice but to go 
along with the wishes of Luhnow. 
Importantly, Van Horn & Mirowski (2009) spoke about the political views of Leonard B. 
Read whom they claimed was an important right wing business figure during the postwar period. 
Read had obtained a loan from the Volker Fund to purchase property in upstate New York to 
create the Foundation for Economic Education; an organization that the Volker Fund subsidized 
for many years. In my view, that makes him beholden to Luhnow; no small part of the story. 
Read, according to them, saw the world in black and white where there was no room for a ‘big 
tent’. Read advocated an inflexible program for defeating socialism by upholding its opposite; 
expertly, proudly, attractively and persuasively. Most significantly, in a letter sent to Aaron 
Director on November 24, 1947, Read criticized Simons’ posthumously published work: 
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Some of us here have carefully gone over the galleys of Economic Policy for a Free Society by 
Henry Simons.  We had hoped this was a piece we might assist in distributing, but it is so well 
loaded with the advocacy of collectivist ideas that it falls entirely out of our field. The book 
states many positions with which we are in agreement, but personally, I do not believe that the 
cause of individual liberty and a free market economy will be aided by it. (p. 156) 
 With this letter, we have reached a critical juncture in developing our connection. 
According to Van Horn & Mirowski (2009) Hayek was called upon to ‘smooth ruffled feathers’ 
and get the Free Market Study project back on track. Hayek, in responding to Read’s letter to 
Aaron Director, sent a letter to Luhnow: 
I am writing to draw your attention to Henry Simons’ book 
Economic Policy for a Free Society….it seems to me to 
represent the kind of attitude which must be taken if there is 
to be any prospect of preserving the competitive system and a 
free society generally…. it is certainly in the spirit of that 
book that Director will conduct his investigation at Chicago. 
(p. 157) 
These two positions, which may seem as opposing, represent the nuanced understanding 
of the work of Henry Simons. Recall that Simons and Hayek enjoyed a degree of mutual respect 
and admiration. In addition, also recall that at one time, Simons was referred to as the Crown 
Prince of the School of Economics. What needs to be stressed here to clarify things is that what 
we are in essence uncovering here is the vast difference between profit making and profit 
maximization. Simons, without question, believes in the idea of profit making, but profit making 
that needs to be controlled. While Hayek, on the other hand, represents the interests of Harold 
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Luhnow who strongly believes that corporations should be left alone and has shown an open and 
clear disdain for government.  
        The stage is set. Our story is reaching its apex. Van Horn & Mirowski (2009) now detail, in 
very plain language, the connection between the University of Chicago, via the Free Market 
project at the School of Economics and the Rise of Neoliberalism. They begin by reminding us 
of the fact that their conclusion is based on archived records and thus far more reliable than 
much of the ‘folklore’ bandied about on how the connection was really established; one reason 
why I chose their work to build on. The reader will see how this is all in line with the lens of 
powerful influence introduced by Milton (1974) from the ‘general story’ of Chapter Three and 
the nature and power of capital discussed in Chapter Four. 
According to Van Horn & Mirowski (2009) we can now see the major intense 
negotiations on what it meant to launch a Chicago School of Liberal Economics. They claim a 
number of things are now apparent that have been missing from previous historical accounts: 
First, it was the legacy of Henry Simons that was perceived 
to be at issue in the nascent formation. The mere fact of a 
seminar identifying itself as being ‘pro free-market’ was 
not sufficient for concocting a credo to which all parties 
could subscribe. Second, Luhnow and the Volker officers 
were not mere pecuniary accessories to the rise of the 
Chicago School: they were hands-on players, determined 
and persistent in making every dollar count, supervising 
doctrine as well as organization. (p. 157)  
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As a note: In my opinion, it may be here that caused Van Horn & Mirowski (2009) to argue that 
the Chicago school was ‘no longer anything like it was before’; as they see clear outside 
influence that is directing its course of action. 
  Returning to the story, additionally everything depended on Hayek to keep the project on 
even keel as no one else seemed to possess the intellectual gravitas or deft punctilio as he did. 
Frank Knight, often referred to in historical records as a major player in the connection between 
the Chicago school and neoliberalism, is nowhere to be found in the archived records of these 
negotiations. With all this, even with Hayek and Director pulling the strings, success of the Free 
Market Study from Luhnow’s perspective was not a foregone conclusion. Why not? There is one 
last but very important piece to go.  
Recall from the beginning that Luhnow met with Hayek after his Detroit speech to 
discuss funding an American version of his book: The Road to Serfdom. This would entail much 
more than just minor adjustments to the original. Here is the critical point: the politics of postwar 
America presumed not only a powerful state, but also a configuration of powerful corporations 
whose international competitors had mostly been reduced to shadows of their former selves.  
Thus, in promoting ‘freedom’ they were primarily intent on guaranteeing the freedom of 
corporations to conduct their affairs as they wished. Consequently, the Volker Fund was not 
interested in bankrolling a classical liberal economic position resembling that of Henry Simons, 
for it did not adequately correspond to their objectives. American corporations did not fear 
concentrations of power and generally favored the existence of a powerful Cold War state. Van 
Horn & Mirowski (2009) state that “it is our contention that the Volker Fund pushed for a 
reformation of classic liberalism in the American context to conform to its Cold War antisocialist 
agenda. The participants in the Free Market Study, and eventually Hayek would just have to 
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adjust to the emergent characteristic doctrines of neoliberalism” (p. 158). While a discussion of 
cold war economics is out of scope with this study, this is a very serious and somewhat ominous 
quote by Van Horn & Mirowski (2009) that appears to be suggesting that there are some 
American corporations who prefer a state of cold war to a state of peace. A few brief words on 
this are warranted: 
According to Jackson (2013) “in comparison to the political, diplomatic, and security 
aspects of post-1945 international relations, the economic factors behind the cold war have 
received scant treatment in the literature” (p. 1). He ends his article claiming “there is little 
consensus between historians over the role of economic factors in the cold war. There is need for 
a better understanding of the dynamics of political economy in post-1945 international relations” 
(p. 9).  
Presenting a more pertinent view of the economics of the cold war, we have Fusfeld 
(1998) who argues that “The cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union was a 
struggle for world hegemony between two great powers was a political, diplomatic, economic, 
and ideological conflict” (p. 505). For our purposes in what appears to support Van Horn & 
Mirowski (2009), the author argues:  
By the late 1940’s the U. S. was already suffering from 
recession and slow growth. Increased military spending 
would raise consumer incomes, which would stimulate 
business investment, enabling the private sector to move to 
full employment. Full employment would stimulate more 
investment and more rapid economic growth. The entire 
national economy would be strengthened-while the Soviet 
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economy would be weakened by a stepped-up arms race. 
(p. 506). 
Returning to the historical accuracy of who were the key people involved in the Chicago 
school’s role, Van Horn & Mirowski (2009) now explain why this is so important. Referring 
once again back to Frank Knight: 
We cannot count the number of times one encounters a 
variation in the assertion that Frank Knight’s main claim to 
fame is his undisputed position as the founder of the 
Chicago School of Economics. We indeed strenuously 
dispute this notion. But beyond the factual error of 
mistaking Knight for the actual progenitors (Simons and 
Director and, most of all, Hayek) it is necessary to insist 
that identification of the founder of the Chicago School 
makes a profound difference to our understanding of the 
rise of neoliberal economics in the postwar period (p. 158). 
In a further dismissal of Frank Knight and a possibly overdone denigration of him, they 
state “we have our personal doubts as to whether Frank Knight could have successfully 
organized and orchestrated a weekend picnic, much less a major transnational intellectual 
movement” (p. 158). Bypassing the slander, in my opinion, these comments cannot be overstated 
as they synch this entire story with two of the main thrusts of this study: the effect of powerful 
influences and the power of capital on the Rise of Neoliberalism.   
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The Mont Pèlerin Society.  According to Van Horn & Mirowski (2009), once we 
recognize the pivotal role Friedrich von Hayek had in getting the Chicago School up and running 
by the fall of 1946 and look at the first meeting of the Mont Pèlerin Society in Vevey, 
Switzerland in April 1947, we can begin to appreciate the profound interconnection between the 
two. They refer to them as “the dual startups of the two landmarks in the history of postwar 
neoliberal thought” (p. 158). They also add that ‘they were joined at the hip from birth’. This 
also refers back to the authors’ original thesis that said that “the rise of the Chicago School must 
be understood as one component of a specific larger transnational project of innovating doctrines 
of neoliberalism for the postwar world” (p. 140).   
The Mont Pèlerin Society, according to Van Horn & Mirowski (2009), is generally 
regarded as the central locus of the development of the neoliberal doctrine in the postwar world. 
They were not alone in this assessment. Cahill (2010) argues “while neoliberal ideas had been 
promoted by the likes of Hayek and Friedman since the 1940’s through forums such as the Mont 
Pèlerin Society, it wasn't until the 1970’s that they began to gain currency among policy makers” 
(p. 4). Additionally, Mudge (2008) supports the authors’ central thesis of this story in a section 
of her most excellent article entitled: Anglo-anchored transnationality:  
The Austrian economist Friedrich von Hayek was the 
charismatic center of a network of particularly pro-free 
market thinkers who, together, became neoliberalism’s 
highest profile intellectual protagonists. Marginalized from 
influence in mainstream politics in the early postwar 
period, this small and exclusive group of passionate 
advocates, mainly economists, historians and philosophers 
277 
 
built an intellectual sanctuary in Switzerland: The Mont 
Pèlerin Society that first met in 1947 under the auspices of 
Hayek, its first president (p. 6). 
Before summarizing this entire story, the reader should also know that funds for this first 
meeting in Switzerland came from European funds raised from various corporate sources and 
from American support provided mainly by the Volker Fund.  According to Van Horn & 
Mirowski (2009), Luhnow sent Miller and Read to monitor proceedings and to report back on the 
fruits of his investment. In keeping with his long range vision, Luhnow “continued to provide 
airfare for selected Americans to attend the Mont Pèlerin conclaves for a decade; only 
terminating his support in 1957” (p. 159). 
Van Horn & Mirowski (2009) summary. As stated, one of the strengths of this story is the 
author’s usage of an abundant number of quotes taken from nine different archived sources from 
the libraries of the University of Chicago, Columbia University, and Stanford University. In my 
opinion, this adds significant veracity to their thinking and conclusions as they attempt to satisfy 
the historian over the casual interested reader of neoliberalism. Furthermore, I am satisfied that 
their thoughts are very much in synch with this study as they argue that the rise of neoliberalism 
has quite a lot to do with influence and the power of capital. This is why I buttressed their story 
with a short diversion on the history of William Volker and the Volker Fund; later managed by 
his nephew Harold Luhnow. According to Van Horn & Mirowski (2009), it was Harold Luhnow, 
using his influence as the underwriter of the effort that led to the creation of the Free Market 
Study, later referenced as the Chicago School, that also in turn aided in the establishment of the 
Mont Pèlerin Society.  
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Van Horn & Mirowski (2009) end their narrative with an undated letter written by Henry 
Simons that in my view connects directly to the major thrusts of this study: “For advocacy of 
capitalism to mean anything, the proponents must be able to finance their cause…. Radical 
movements in capitalist societies…typically have been supported by a few wealthy 
individuals…. a role of inequality in wealth in preserving political freedom that is seldom noted” 
(p. 168). Their final sentence in the article was: “A better testimonial to Luhnow could not be 
imagined” (p. 168). This, in my view, is a firmly conclusive connection between the rise of 
neoliberalism and the power of capital. 
Ending Discussion. 
 The main purpose of this chapter was to directly address the title of this study: The Rise 
of Neoliberalism. In developing this chapter purpose from the beginning of this study, the first 
three chapters explained the passion and drive of the researcher, the current scholarship and what 
methodologies and method will be used. Chapter Four began with connecting the methodologies 
to the body of the study. It also presented a discussion, leaning on the thoughts of Marx, 
Habermas and Schopenhauer, on my understanding of the nature and power of capital.  
 The chapter concluded that the two intellectual pillars of neoliberalism; homoeconomicus 
and the division of labor, were problematic at best. Chapter Five provided an historical view of 
the University of Chicago since its inception with a focus the power of capital used by John D. 
Rockefeller to get is up and running. It also focused on the fierce intellectual environment at the 
school started by William Rainey Harper.  Introduced in that chapter was what was coined a 
‘battle’ of the opposing philosophies of Cartesianism versus Pragmatism at the school that I 
argued was the intellectual beginning of neoliberalism. 
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 The current chapter emphasizes how people, organizations and events, along with the 
power of capital, can be used in explaining the Rise of Neoliberalism. Finally recall the central 
thesis of Van Horn & Mirowski (2009) that claims “the rise of the Chicago School must be 
understood as one component of a specific larger transnational project of innovating doctrines of 
neoliberalism for the postwar world” (p. 140). In my opinion, they did an excellent job in 
presenting this thesis in an easily understood chronology that also shows the power of capital as 
a core force ‘calling things to life’.  Ultimately, it was the Chicago School of Economics and the 
Mont Pèlerin Society, both started just months apart, that were shown to create a new 
international intellectual movement that contained the necessary seeds to launch neoliberalism 
worldwide. Returning once again to my bomb analogy at the end of Chapter Four, Van Horn & 
Mirowski (2009) have completed the construction of the bomb; as all the necessary parts are now 
in place to launch neoliberalism worldwide.  
Segue to Chapter Seven.  What is left to explain?  What is missing is an explanation of 
how this new international intellectual movement, well explained by Van Horn & Mirowski 
(2009), transformed its ideas into actual policy. The reader will see that the answer to this will 
lead to ‘lighting the fuse’ of the bomb and exploding neoliberalism into actual policy worldwide. 
This takes policy makers and leads us to Chapter Seven entitled: Carriers of the Conservative 
Torch. 
For a peek ahead, it will examine, with heavy use of primary documents, the lives of 
Margaret Thatcher, Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan. The objective is Dilthean in principle; as 
I will show how various aspects of their lives, like their beliefs and relationships with others, 
influenced the political decisions they made. Chapter Seven is designed to bring to a crescendo 
the impact these leaders had on proliferating neoliberalism.  
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Returning once again to my bomb analogy, I argue that in doing so, Reagan ‘lit the fuse’ 
of the bomb that was completed in Chapter Six that ignited neoliberalism and changed the 
direction of this country in what McCartin (2011) called the ‘strike that changed America’. I 
extend his argument and add that in doing so, this strike, by default, also changed the world. 
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Chapter Seven 
Carriers of the Conservative Torch 
Introduction. 
  Our narrative from Chapter Six ended somewhere in the early 1950’s with both 
organizations; the postwar University of Chicago School of Economics and the Mont Pèlerin 
Society in full swing. I will focus on the lives of Margaret Thatcher, Richard Nixon and Ronald 
Reagan, in that order, to construct a bridge that connects from the end of Chapter Six in the early 
1950’s to August 5th 1981. That day, Ronald Reagan decommissioned the Air Traffic 
Controllers Union in what McCartin (2011) called the ‘strike that changed America’. This is 
what I argue ‘lit the fuse’ of the neoliberal bomb. The rest, as they say, is history.  
Chapter purpose. This chapter’s purpose is to ‘take the next step’ from the previous 
chapter and show a path from newly established neoliberal ideas to neoliberal policy. Recall that 
Chapter Six ended with an established global intellectual movement manifested at the University 
of Chicago, School of Economics and the Mont Pèlerin Society. The goal of these two 
organizations was to implement neoliberal policies worldwide to prevent the rise in what they 
viewed as an encroaching ‘left-wing totalitarianism’. Now that this newly energized global 
conservative movement is in place, it needs to go from ideas to policy. This means creating both 
the political and economic environments conducive to the global growth of neoliberalism. Ideas 
from thinkers in themselves do not do this; political leaders do. This chapter is therefore about 
the political leaders who created the global neoliberal environments.  
To accomplish this globalization, this chapter begins with Margaret Thatcher and will 
show how she had a very strong influence on British politics. For example, Desai (1994) 
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describes how Margaret Thatcher dominated British politics more completely than any other 
recent British politician. We will read a segment of a powerful speech she gave in New York in 
1991 that dramatically connects the U.S. and Britain as solid partners in a new global neoliberal 
world.  
Of critical importance to the globalization environment effort, this chapter will show that 
Richard Nixon’s 1972 diplomatic breakthrough trip to China began a new era of bilateral 
economic cooperation between the U.S. and China with a formidable list of U.S. global 
corporations set to benefit. Importantly, it is noted that this momentous breakthrough took two 
years of highly complex negotiations that stayed out of the public view; suggesting its enormous 
potential for major change in the world. 
Finally, since the U.S. is still the world’s foremost economic leader, this chapter will 
show that Ronald Reagan set the environment for higher corporate profits by first shrinking the 
power of unions in a bold and defiant act on August 5th 1981.  Included are a few quantitative 
conclusions of studies on the impact of that strike on corporate profits. That day, Reagan fired 
the air traffic controllers who had gone on strike for higher wages. In a dramatic expression of 
the strike’s impact, McCartin (2011) called it ‘the strike that changed America’. I argue that 
since the U. S. is the global economic power, that strike, by default, changed the world. With this 
chapter the reader should see that from the actions of the political leaders mentioned, the global 
environment conducive for neoliberalism to explode, is firmly set and in place. 
Chapter structure. While there are more than these three specific policy makers, I’ve 
chosen to introduce the lives of Margaret Thatcher, Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan. In my 
view, they were pivotal in turning the economic ideas from the postwar University of Chicago, 
School of Economics and the Mont Pèlerin Society discussed in Chapter Six, into the dominant 
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political ideology of our time; through the power of their offices and their personalities. Leaning 
on the ideas found in the German Historical School from Chapter Four that says that our 
environments are causal factors in our thinking, the reader should note that I use the phrase: 
introduce ‘the lives of’ instead of just introduce. This is to set the stage for including those they 
love and admire, friends, family, education backgrounds, early childhood experiences, and 
especially those who clearly influenced them as part of a complex set of environmental causes of 
their thinking and subsequent decisions. 
This will be followed by an ending discussion that summarizes the chapter and segues to 
Chapter Eight, the final chapter. Next, a more granular look ahead at this chapter of the Carriers 
of the Conservative Torch and the ending discussion.   
Margaret Thatcher. Margaret Thatcher was Great Britain’s first female prime minister, 
serving three consecutive terms in office 1979–1990. Her economic and social policies evolved 
into a political philosophy known as Thatcherism, similar to Reaganomics in the United States, 
and part of a world- wide neoliberal movement in the 1980s. She was dubbed the Iron Lady by a 
Soviet newspaper following a speech she gave in 1976—a nickname that she proudly claimed. 
Richard Nixon. Thirty-seventh president of the United States. Born in Yorba Linda, 
California, on the outskirts of Los Angeles, the second of five sons born to Frank Nixon, who ran 
a grocery store in Whittier, California, and Hannah Milhous. His mother's Quaker views and 
emotional restraint countered to a degree his father's combative and volatile nature: as an adult 
Nixon exhibited both characteristics. Hard work came naturally to him. He succeeded through 
perseverance rather than brilliance. A good student because he applied himself, Nixon excelled 
scholastically at both Whittier High School and Whittier College. His special talent was 
debating, although he doggedly tried to make ‘first string’ on his high school and college football 
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teams. These interests helped him develop skills he later used as a politician: perseverance and 
rhetorical attack. They also reinforced his combative, aggressive personality. It is Richard Nixon 
who, in my view, set the global stage for the explosive neoliberalism with his trip to China in 
1972. 
Ronald Reagan. Governor of California and 40th president of the United States. Born in 
Tampico, Illinois, the second son of John Edward ‘Jack’ Reagan, a shoe salesman, and Nelle 
Wilson. The future president lived in a series of rural Illinois towns before his family settled in 
Dixon in 1920. Jack Reagan struggled with alcoholism most of his life, forcing the family to 
relocate frequently, often just ahead of the bill collector. Nelle Reagan, a fervently religious 
member of the Protestant Evangelical Disciples of Christ, held the family together and 
encouraged her son, nicknamed ‘Dutch,’ to stay in school and participate in drama and sports. As 
a teenager and a young adult Reagan worked seven summers as a local lifeguard and was 
credited with saving over seventy swimmers from drowning. From 1928 until 1932 Reagan 
attended nearby Eureka College, a small, religiously affiliated institution, where he majored in 
economics and sociology. As he had in high school, he served as student body president at 
Eureka and acted in campus plays.  
Since the momentous decision by Reagan is central to my argument that connects this 
chapter to the rise of neoliberalism, included will be several quantitative results from studies on 
both the connection of unions to corporate profits and the economic impact of the strike itself. 
Ending Discussion. The intent here is to present a single picture to the reader, again, via 
narrative, that connects this chapter to Chapter Six with an emphasis on how corporate interests 
are thoroughly interwoven and aided with the explosion of neoliberalism. It also gives the reader 
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a peek ahead of what this study is hoping to accomplish by summarizing its connection to 
Chapter Eight, the final chapter. 
Carriers of the Conservative Torch 
Margaret Thatcher. Some have referred to Margaret Thatcher as possibly the most 
famous female conservative in history. This short overview on her will hopefully shed some light 
on that opinion. The data is taken from Margaret Thatcher (2010): The Autobiography. I begin 
with her thoughts on her childhood: “Family tradition has it that I was a very quiet baby, which 
my political opponents might have some difficulty in believing. But I had not been born into a 
quiet family. My father, who had wanted to be a teacher, had to leave school at thirteen because 
the family could not afford for him to stay on” (p.1).  
From this early background she recalls something I believe very important to our 
discussion. She said that years later when she was answering questions from left-wing Eric 
Heffer in the House of Commons, a regular sparring partner of hers, he tried to pull working-
class rank by mentioning that his father had been a carpenter at Oundle. She said that she floored 
him when she was able to retort that her father had worked in the tuck shop there. For the reader, 
a tuck shop is a small retail place usually situated in a school; clearly a lower status position than 
a carpenter at that school. I add this to remind the reader that many conservatives who clearly 
support the rich of society, themselves may have come from humble beginnings; a point that 
should not be forgotten in my opinion. It is not an effective weapon the left wing can use against 
them because it may not be true; as in the case of Margaret Thatcher. 
In a chapter in her autobiography titled; Seizing the Moment: The October 1974 general 
election and the campaign for the Tory Leadership, we can see that her early humble beginning 
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had a strong influence on her thinking as an adult. In a speech she gave at the Young 
Conservative Conference at Eastbourne she said: 
You can get your economic policies right, and still have the 
kind of society none of us would wish. I believe we should 
judge people on merit not background. I believe the person 
who is prepared to work hard should get the greatest 
rewards and keep them after tax. That we should back the 
workers and not the shirkers: that is not only permissible 
but praiseworthy to want to benefit your own family by 
your own effort. (p. 173) 
After this she said that conservatives had not heard a message like this for many years and it 
went down quite well. She was on her way. 
How did her education influence her politics and political beliefs? For that we turn to 
Auer (1979) from his article in the Central States Speech Journal entitled: The image of the Right 
Honorable Margaret Thatcher. He tells us, her ideas, said Margaret Thatcher, took form at 
Oxford. Aside from her education in chemistry, where she did well and received class honors, 
the Oxford influences appear to have affected most of her views on politics and religion. 
Between the years 1943 to 1947, her time at Oxford, the forces of both scientism and socialism 
were strong and pervasive, and while the inductive and experimental methods of the former were 
professionally attractive, the collectivism of the latter was philosophically disturbing. According 
to Auer (1979), her negative reaction to socialism had a stronger religious base than a political 
one. This was reflected in a speech she gave at St. Lawrence Jewry, in London, on March 30th, 
1978: 
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I never thought that Christianity equipped me with a 
political philosophy, but I thought it did equip me with 
standards to which the political actions must, in the end, be 
referred. It also taught me that, in the final analysis, politics 
is about personal relations, about establishing the 
conditions in which men and women can best use their 
fleeting lives in this world to prepare themselves for the 
next. Now all this may sound rather pious. But I still 
believe that the majority of parents want their children to be 
brought up in what is essentially the same religious heritage 
as was handed to me. To most ordinary people, heaven and 
hell, right and wrong, good and bad, matter. (p. 293) 
Auer (1979) concludes that from her religious base it seems an easy step for Margaret 
Roberts of academic Oxford to become the Margaret Thatcher of everyday politics and attack the 
socialist wing of the Labour Party for wanting every decision made a political one. She once 
said: "I hate the things which I believe deny each and every person's right to dignity and respect, 
and their right to live their own lives in their own way, provided it doesn't harm anyone else. . .. I 
dislike the way the party has sold itself to socialism to nationalization, to almost a Marxist 
philosophy." (p. 293). To my mind this clearly indicates her clear straightforward thinking being 
in lock step with the views of Friedrich von Hayek in his Road to Serfdom discussed in Chapter 
Six. In short, her strongly held views are an extension of the international neoclassical thinking 
nicely pieced together by Van Horn & Mirowski (2009) in their analysis of the rise of 
neoliberalism. 
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Also from her autobiography, one note of special interest; her views of the Royal Family, 
specifically the Queen. She tells us that the Queen’s authority to form a government comes to 
most Prime Ministers only once in a lifetime. “The authority is unbroken when a sitting Prime 
Minister wins an election, so it never had to be renewed throughout the years I was in office. All 
audiences with the Queen take place in strict confidence – a confidentiality that is vital to the 
working of both government and constitution. I was to have such audiences with Her Majesty 
once a week, usually on a Tuesday when she was in London and sometimes elsewhere when the 
royal family was at Windsor or Balmoral” (p. 255). She next says: 
Anyone who imagines that these meetings are confined to social niceties is quite wrong; 
they are quietly businesslike and Her Majesty brings to bear a formidable grasp of current issues 
and breadth of experience. And, although the press could not resist the temptation to suggest 
disputes between the Palace and Downing Street, I always found the Queen’s attitude towards 
the work of government absolutely correct. (p. 256)  
This obviously suggests that the neoclassical policy Thatcher initiated in Great Britain 
may have had had the backing of the Royal family; a point not to be underestimated. I now bring 
in a final secondary source to conclude our discussion of Margaret Thatcher. 
I begin with a quote from Desai (1994) who discusses his view of the enormous impact Margaret 
Thatcher had on British politics and how it connects to this study of neoliberalism: 
Mrs. Thatcher dominated British politics more completely 
than any other recent British politician. She seemed bent on 
imposing on British society and economy a thoroughgoing 
transformation, brooking no opposition, braving all 
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contention and division. However, already in her last years 
in office the much-touted ‘economic miracle’ seemed to 
have evaporated as familiar problems of inflation and 
recession, and newer ones of social and infrastructural 
neglect, came into view. (p. 27) 
Desai (1994) next adds that The Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) and the Centre for 
Policy Studies (CPS) were unquestionably the two most important channels for Thatcherite 
ideas. The connection to this study is that these organizations act “as the conduit and popularizer 
of neoliberal economic ideas in Britain, principally from the work of Friedman, and von Hayek” 
(p. 29).  
 Desai (1994) now describes a Thatcherite world of conservative think tanks. The think-
tanks’ relationship with the Thatcher government was serviced through a number of channels: 
the media; the various politicians who contributed to the think-tanks’ publications or participated 
in their lunches, launches, seminars and conferences. Mrs. Thatcher’s outside ideological 
advisors, served to transmit ideas to both the Conservative Party and the Thatcher government; 
and lastly and very importantly, the No. 10 Policy Unit. Chief among these was The Centre for 
Policy Studies, established in 1974 by Sir Keith Joseph and Margaret Thatcher. Other prominent 
think tanks were The Institute of Directors (IOD) and the Adam Smith Institute (ASI). 
 In a section of his article labeled Intellectual Sources of Thatcherism, Desai (1994) 
argues that Thatcherite ideas were alien in at least two senses. “Firstly, and most simply, the 
neoliberal theories of the British New Right, pre-eminently those of Hayek and Friedman. 
Secondly, at a deeper level, the character of the ideology of the New Right, that of free-market 
liberalism and later theoreticized versions of conservative thought, with their deeply ‘theoretical’ 
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thrust, seemed foreign to the ad hoc, atheoretical empiricism so characteristic of British 
intellectual life” (p. 41). In other words, in my view, Desai (1994) is saying that the neoclassical 
thoughts of Friedrich von Hayek and Milton Friedman with its extensive level of quantitative 
analysis, represented a new level of thinking to the British economists at that time making 
‘Thatcherism’ an alien and pioneering movement.  
In getting more detailed, his next section is titled: Reconstructing the role of the think-
tanks in Thatcherism. Here, he connects directly to the central thesis of the Van Ron & Mirowski 
(2009) narrative from Chapter Six: 
The development of a left-of-centre consensus in British 
politics during the Second World War alarmed some of 
them. In particular, F.A. von Hayek expressed his fears in 
his 1944 work, The Road to Serfdom. In 1947 he convened 
a conference inviting like-minded intellectuals from various 
disciplines and (European and North American) countries, 
who shared the sense of impending doom at the tide of 
‘collectivism’ which Popper expressed at the time: ‘The 
present situation is one in which we nearly despair’. The 
ten-day conference was held at Mont Pèlerin in 
Switzerland. It led to the formation of personal bonds and a 
basic agreement on common purposes which were 
formalized in the establishment of a club which took the 
name of the resort. (p. 43) 
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From the above, I believe that it is clear Margaret Thatcher represents a transformation of 
neoclassical ideas established by Van Horn & Mirowski from Chapter Five into actual policy in 
Britain. In other words, she is a carrier of the conservative torch and a connection from 
neoclassical ideas to neoclassical policy.  
Before I turn to Richard Nixon, Norton (1990) presents a very balanced look at Margaret 
Thatcher that needs to be included. He begins by arguing that “the impact of Margaret Thatcher 
on British politics has been profound” (p. 41). He defines and divides her closest followers 
known as ‘Thatcherites’ into two camps: 1.) Neoliberals who believe in the rigorous application 
of market forces and 2.) Tory Right who place a greater emphasis on morals and the need to 
maintain social order and discipline. But the reason for his article is to seek to pose and answer 
the question: Is the Thatcher revolution designed to last well into the twenty-first century? He 
concludes that “an empirical analysis of the parliamentary party suggests not” (p.43).  
Harris (1997) presents my final look at Margaret Thatcher that should provide a strong 
indication of the long term dynamic relationship between Great Britain and the U. S. that focuses 
on a clear common neoliberal global agenda. It provides a crystal clear example of the Rise of 
Neoliberalism in bold, unashamed brashness. The following is an excerpt from a speech she gave 
on June 18th 1991 at the Economic Club of New York: 
It is a great honor to be asked to address this distinguished 
audience- and a great pleasure to be back in New York, 
which never ceases to astonish, delight, intimidate, inspire, 
elevate and widen one’s horizons. New York remains the 
economic and financial capital of the world’s greatest 
military power, the world’s greatest defender of liberty, and 
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despite your real but short term difficulties, the world’s 
greatest economic power. So this is the right place to 
discuss the future direction of economic policy and, 
following the great victory of Desert Storm, the right place 
to discuss the economic aspects of President Bush’s ‘New 
World Order’. (p. 476) 
I now turn to Richard Nixon. 
Richard Nixon. While Nixon will forever be associated with the Watergate scandal, his 
accomplishments while president should not be underestimated. This short section on his life will 
show that he did indeed have a significant impact not only in this country but the world in 
general. The following narrative is taken from Nixon (1978) The memoirs of Richard Nixon. It is 
interesting to note the reflective and somewhat sorrowful mood he had right from the beginning 
of his autobiography when he said: “I had no room to discuss the establishment of the 
Environmental Protection Agency and could only spend 13 pages about the first American 
President to visit the Soviet Union since world War ll” (p. ix).  Nixon then apologizes to the 
reader for having spent so much of the 1,136 pages of his autobiography on Watergate in an 
attempt to ‘get the record straight’. Even with that giant effort, critics called it a whitewash.  
In any event, Nixon was born in Yorba Linda, California, on January 9th 1913. It was a 
farming community of about 200 people just 30 miles from Los Angeles. He tells us that despite 
his very humble beginnings, life in Yorba Linda was hard but happy. “My father worked at 
whatever jobs he could find. Thanks to a vegetable garden, and some of our own fruit trees, we 
had plenty to eat despite our low income. We also had a cow that provided milk from which our 
mother made our butter and cheese” (p. 4). 
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In a meaningful set of recollections that can help us understand his early influences, he 
tells us that his father tried to better himself through the many jobs he held. As examples, he 
drove an ox team hauling logs to a saw mill, worked as a carpenter, managed a potato farm, 
sheared sheep in Colorado and installed early hand-crank telephones. Of importance to our 
discussion, his father moved to Columbus Ohio and became a streetcar motorman: 
The insides of those early trolleys were heated by pot-
bellied stoves, but the vestibules where the motormen stood 
were open. During the winter of 1906, his feet became 
frostbitten. Complaints to the company went unheeded, so 
he organized a protest by the motormen and conductors. 
They managed to get a bill passed in the state legislature 
requiring that the vestibules be enclosed and heated. (p. 5) 
Nixon tells us that his father had an Irish quickness to both anger and humor. It was his 
temper that impressed him most as a small child. He had rough and loud arguments with his 
brothers Harold and Don where their shouting could be heard all over the neighborhood. He was 
a strict and stern disciplinarian and Richard usually followed his mother’s advice not to cross 
him. “Perhaps my own aversion to personal confrontations dates back to these early 
recollections” (p. 6). 
His father’s interest in politics made him the most enthusiastic follower of his political 
career from its beginnings. “My success meant to him that everything he had worked for and 
believed in was true; that in America, with hard work and determination, a man could achieve 
anything” (p.7). When he was running for Vice President, his father wrote a letter to one of the 
newspapers suggesting that it support his son Richard saying “this boy is one of five that I raised 
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and they are the finest, I think, in the United States. If you care to give him a lift, I would say the 
Ohio State Journal is still doing some good” (p. 8).  
What we have so far, is the picture of a man from humble beginnings and an early 
conservative foundation from a supportive father. While this very brief background is worth 
noting, the real reason for including Nixon in this study is his 1972 trip to China. With all its 
political complexities, it represents a true, in my view and that of many others, watershed 
moment in global economic growth; connecting it strongly to this study of neoliberalism. 
Surprisingly, I found researching Nixon and his time in office by far the most complex of tasks. 
The China trip itself is buried in layer upon layer of highly contentious political intrigue that 
seems to go on without end. For our purposes, and to keep this as brief and concise as possible, 
we will see what Nixon himself says about this trip first. Then I will introduce a few secondary 
sources to hopefully further highlight the magnitude of this trip and its connection to this study. 
What does Nixon himself have to say about this critically important trip? 
We begin with the chapter simply entitled: 1972 starting on page 541. He started by 
saying that he requested three and a half minutes of air time at a television studio in Burbank 
California for a speech at 7:30pm on July 15th 1971. His speech was to announce a ‘lasting 
peace in the world’. It was timed for a simultaneous announcement in Peking at that very 
moment: 
Premier Chou En-lai, on behalf of the Government of the 
People’s Republic of China, has extended an invitation to 
President Nixon to visit China at an appropriate date before 
May 1972. President Nixon has accepted the invitation with 
pleasure. The meeting between the leaders of China and the 
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United States is to seek normalization between the two 
countries and also to exchange views on questions of 
concern to the two sides. (p. 544)  
This announcement was the result of secret meetings between Premier Chou En-lai and Henry 
Kissinger, Nixon’s Assistant for National Security Affairs from July 9th to 11th of that year. 
Behind this announcement was more than two years of complex, subtle and determined 
negotiations. “Despite the almost miraculous secrecy we had been able to maintain, the China 
initiative was actually one of the most publicly prepared surprises in history” (p. 545). In 
summing up this meeting, Kissinger wrote: 
We have laid the groundwork for you and Mao to turn a 
page in history. But we should have no illusion about the 
future. Profound differences and years of isolation yawn 
between us and the Chinese. They will be tough before and 
during the summit on the question of Taiwan and other 
major issues. My assessment of these people is that they are 
deeply ideological, close to fanatical in the intensity of their 
beliefs. At the same time, they display an inward security 
that allows them, within the framework of their principles, 
to be meticulous and reliable in dealing with others…. Our 
dealings, both with the Chinese and others, will require 
reliability, precision, finesse. If we can muster this process, 
we will have made a revolution. (p. 554) 
The television announcement mentioned above happened just after this. 
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In dramatic fashion, Nixon now details his historic excursion to China on February 17, 
1972. The plane left Andrews Air Force base at 10:35am headed for Peking. “As the plane 
gathered speed and then took to the air, I realized that we were embarking on a voyage of 
philosophical discovery as uncertain, and in some respects, as perilous, as the voyages of 
geographical discovery of a much earlier time. Our plane landed smoothly and a few minutes 
later we came to a stop in front of the terminal. The door was opened and Pat and I stepped out. 
Chou En-lai stood at the front of the ramp, hatless in the cold. Even his heavy overcoat could not 
hide the thinness of his frail body” (p. 559). He details what happened next: 
When we were halfway down the steps, he began to clap. I 
paused for a moment and then returned the gesture, 
according to the Chinese custom. I knew that Chou had 
been deeply insulted by Foster Dulles’ refusal to shake 
hands with him at the Geneva Conference in 1954. When I 
reached the bottom step, therefore, I made a point of 
extending my hand as I walked toward him. When our 
hands met, one era ended and another began. (p. 559) 
It is precisely here why I include Richard Nixon as one of the carriers of the conservative 
torch in this study. Recall that Van Horn & Mirowski (2009) situated the rise of neoliberalism 
from an international perspective. Also recall from Chapter Two in the literature review, He & 
Wu (2009) argue that the elements of neoliberalization -- privatization, commodification, drastic 
inter- and intra-urban competition and radical urban socio-spatial transformation -- has 
penetrated urban China. A few additional secondary sources will help in seeing the importance 
of this visit and why it is included in this study. 
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Bao (n.d.) argues that “in 1970, relations between the United States and China were 
characterized by derisive propaganda, trade embargos, and mounting tension over international 
issues. In the ensuing forty years, the two countries developed into the two largest economies in 
the world, and the Sino-American liaison came to be described as the most important bilateral 
relationship of the 21st century” (p. 2).  Bao (n.d.) now describes what he believes is the most 
important aspect of this historic diplomatic breakthrough by Nixon that underscores why it is 
included in this study: 
Perhaps the most significant consequence of China’s opening, and the outcome that 
ultimately makes the “ping-pong diplomacy” a long-term success, was the birth of China’s giant 
economy. The opening of liaison offices in the spring of 1973 would prove to be instrumental in 
restoring trade, facilitating diplomatic machinery, and increasing channels of communication. 
Less than a decade after ping-pong diplomacy, China began to introduce aspects of a capitalist 
economic system; its economy showed average growth rates of 10% each year afterwards. Up to 
this day, the extent of the ties between the Chinese and US economies is staggering: as of 2010, 
China was the largest foreign exporter in the world, with a full 20% of its exports shipped to the 
United States. China was also the largest foreign owner of US treasuries. (p. 9, emphasis added) 
Finally, Sutter (2003) provides recent data on why Nixon’s success is so in line with this study. 
He argues that “The Chinese economy remains the main bright spot in Asia and a major source 
of international economic dynamism” (p. 77). Specifically: 
FDI (foreign direct investment) in China in 2002 grew by 
nearly 13 percent, an impressive figure considering that 
worldwide FDI in developing countries at the same time 
fell more than 25 percent. Pledged FDI to China was up 42 
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percent in the first five months of 2003. The Chinese 
government predicts that FDI will reach an annual utilized 
rate of $100 billion in 2005. Along with other foreign 
investors, large U.S. corporations, including Motorola, 
Atlantic Richfield, Coca Cola, BP Amoco, United 
Technologies, Pepsi Cola, Lucent Technologies, General 
Electric, General Motors, and Ford Motor, have all 
increased their foreign investment in China. (p. 78) 
             Without question the reader can clearly see how this breakthrough by Nixon synchs 
perfectly with fundamental neoliberal tenets of profit maximization. As you can see, Sutter 
(2003) provides a list of formidable U.S. global corporations that stand to benefit significantly 
from Nixon’s diplomatic breakthrough. This sets the environment to exploit the huge profit 
potential that exists in the Chinese economy. Next is my last, but definitely not least, final carrier 
of the conservative torch: Ronald Reagan.  
Ronald Reagan. To my mind, Ronald Reagan was by far the most influential 
conservative political leader of our generation whose impact is still keenly felt to this day. This 
short overview of him is taken mostly from his autobiography Ronald Reagan (1990): An 
American Life.  
Right after the standard book details page and even before the acknowledgments, he posts 
the following handwritten single sentence completely alone on its own page: 
 To Nancy, She will always be my First Lady. I cannot imagine life without her. 
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Why did he do this? Clearly his feelings about his wife could have been written in some later 
part of this autobiography, even in great detail if he so wished. In that case the reader would still 
be informed about this marriage aspect of his life. But no; this was different. The other leaders 
did indeed mention their spouses, but nowhere near in such prominence as Reagan. I admit that 
upon opening the book for the first time and seeing this immediately, I was a bit puzzled. 
However, as I began to read I quickly realized the inordinate number of times the phrase ‘Nancy 
and I’ was used throughout the entire 700-page book. It was striking. 
Relatively early in the book he writes: 
After we were married, Nancy asked to be released from 
her seven-year contract at MGM: Maybe some women can 
handle a career and a marriage, she said, but she wasn’t 
going to try. She was going to be my wife. I can sum up our 
marriage in a line I spoke when I played the great pitcher 
Grover Alexander, a line spoken by him to his wife Aimee: 
God must think a lot of me to have given me you. I thank 
Him every day for giving me Nancy. (p. 124) 
 What do I make of this? In my opinion, the autobiography of Ronald Reagan, besides its 
historical value, represents one of the great American love stories; most likely not seen as such 
by many. Nice and romantic, but even granting that this is true, what does that have to do with 
this study of neoliberalism? Why am I making this such a prominent issue?  
It is Dilthean in principle. What do I mean? Dilthey (1961) argues that meaning from 
history is created by what people do with their lives. He specifically mentions things like 
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‘clashes of wills’ that create moments that make history. With these points, I argue that a 
powerful dual influence on Ronald Reagan may be an explanation of the soon to be discussed 
momentous decision he made in August of 1981.  
For a quick peek ahead, for years, I’ve always wondered where Reagan got the nerve (I 
may have used a different term) to actually do what many thought a near insane thing to do: fire 
the Air Traffic Controllers. After all, they were responsible for the day to day safety of all air 
travel passengers. They went on strike for higher wages. From the details gained from his 
autobiography, I am formally putting forth the following hypothesis that may explain his soon-
to-be-detailed decision on August 3rd 1981: His love for his wife Nancy may have given him an 
extraordinary will, more so than most leaders have, coupled with very strong potential economic 
benefits that would positively impact many US corporations. A few quantitative articles will be 
presented soon to help give the latter part of the hypothesis idea some support. 
Let us now return to his autobiography to first learn a bit more about him and to hear 
from his own words what transpired to create that momentous act in history in what Joseph A. 
McCartin (2011) Georgetown University professor and expert on U.S. labor, social and political 
history called: ‘the strike that changed America’. 
Reagan (1990) tells us that he was raised to believe that God has a plan for everyone and 
that seemingly random twists of fate are all a part of His plan. To the reader, this is quite similar 
to my argument in Chapter Five about the rise of neoliberalism stemming from an incredible 
twist of fate; referencing the transition of the Volker Fund mission from charity to political 
support. He goes on to add that “his mother, a small woman with auburn hair, and a sense of 
optimism that ran as deep as the cosmos told me that everything in life happened for a purpose. 
She said all things were part of God’s plan, even the most disheartening setbacks, and in the end, 
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everything worked out for the best” (p. 21). Again, I ask the reader to recall the early life of 
William Volker from Chapter Five whose mother preached the Gospel of Matthew to him that 
turned out to be a very strong influence in his life.  
Reagan tells us that his father, while only completing a few grades in school, had what is 
now referred to as ‘street smarts’. Also similar to the life of William Volker and his nephew 
Harold Luhnow, his father passionately believed in the rights of the individual and the working 
man, and was very suspicious of established authority, especially the Republican politicians who 
ran Illinois state government; which he considered as corrupt as Tammany Hall. As a note to the 
reader, Tammany Hall was the name given to the Democratic political machine that dominated 
New York City politics from the mayoral victory of Fernando Wood in 1854 through the election 
of Fiorello LaGuardia in 1934. The similarities to the Volker narrative of Hoplin & Robinson 
(2008) in Chapter Six where they discussed the Tom Pendergast political machine is, in my 
view, startling. How so? 
Recall that Harold Luhnow and his uncle William Volker had a long history of strong 
ethics and were exasperated at the ‘crooked politics’ of Tom Pendergast in Kansas City. Luhnow 
engaged in several political activities that eventually forced Tom from office. We see that 
Reagan’s father also possessed strong ethics and detested ‘machine politics’ as did Volker and 
Luhnow. 
The following quote about his father represents thinking that I believe most may not 
associate with Ronald Reagan. He tells us that: 
Among the things he passed on to me were the belief that 
all men and women, regardless of their color or religion, 
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are created equal and that individuals determine their own 
destiny; that is, it’s largely their own ambition and hard 
work that determine their fate in life. (p. 22) 
In a strong endorsement of meritocracy theory, Reagan says that he grew up observing 
that the love and common sense of purpose that unites families is one of the most powerful glues 
on earth and that it can help them overcome the greatest of adversities. He says, “I learned that 
hard work is an essential part of life – that, by and large, you don’t get something for nothing – 
and that America was a place that offered unlimited opportunities to those who did work hard” 
(p. 27). We now have a picture of a man with a truly epic love for his wife, strong conservative 
beliefs engrained from childhood and validated by his own mind as an adult. I now fast forward 
to 1981 when is elected as the 40th President of the United States.   
As stated in the introduction, the intent of this chapter is to get us to this very specific 
date in history: August 5th 1981; the day Ronald Reagan fired the Air Traffic Controllers. Let’s 
hear from his own words how he understood and interpreted this momentous event: 
On the same Sunday that I decided to appoint Sandra Day 
O’Connor to the Supreme Court, I had made another 
decision: Transportation Secretary Drew Lewis came to 
Camp David that day and told me that the Professional Air 
Traffic Controllers Organization, whose members manned 
Federal Aviation Administration airport control towers and 
radar centers around the country, was threatening to strike 
the following day because of our refusal to meet its demand 
for a huge salary increase. Although I had accepted the 
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argument that the unusual pressures and demands in their 
occupation justified an increase, their demands would have 
cost taxpayers almost $700 million a year. I told Lewis to 
advise the union’s leaders that, as a former union president, 
I was probably the best friend his organization ever had in 
the White House, but I could not countenance an illegal 
strike nor permit negotiations to take place as long as one 
was in progress. I hoped the air controllers realized that I 
meant what I said. (p. 282, emphasis added) 
Rubbing salt into the wound, Reagan next adds that PATCO (the union acronym) was 
only one of a handful of national unions that actually backed him in the election. It seems to me 
that this is one logical reason why the union leaders felt confident that they could negotiate with 
this former union president and eventually reach an agreement. In any event, Reagan claims that 
by instinct and experience he supported unions and the rights of workers to organize and bargain 
collectively. After all, he served six terms in his own union and led the Screen Actors Guild in its 
first strike. He adds that he was the first president of the United States who was a lifetime 
member of the AFL-CIO union. But………he next adds:  
No president could tolerate an illegal strike by Federal 
employees. Unions can strike a business and shut it down, 
but you cannot allow a strike to shut down a vital 
government service. Governments are different from private 
industry. I agreed with Calvin Coolidge, who said ‘There is 
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no right to strike against the public safety by anyone, 
anywhere, at any time’. (p. 282)   
Providing more detail justifying his action, Reagan argued that Congress had passed a 
law forbidding strikes by government employees, and every member of PATCO had signed a 
sworn affidavit agreeing not to strike. Reagan said he told Lewis to tell leaders of the union that 
“I expected them to abide by it” (p. 282). After this meeting with Lewis, there was a brief 
resumption of negotiations. But on the morning of August 3rd, after the union’s executive board 
rejected a tentative agreement, more than 70% of the PATCO workforce of nearly 17,000 
controllers went on strike. Reagan admitted that that was the first real national emergency he 
faced as president. “The strike endangered the safety of thousands of passengers on hundreds of 
airline flights daily and threatened more harm to our already troubled economy. But I never had 
any doubt how to respond to it” (p. 283). 
That morning Reagan sent a directive to FAA supervisors and to those controllers who 
had crossed the picket lines and were at work in the control towers and radar rooms. He 
instructed them, above all, to maintain the safety of the airways. Flight operations were to be 
reduced to the level the system could accommodate safely.  He then called reporters to the Rose 
Garden and read a hand written statement he’d drafted in his study the night before. Citing the 
pledge made by controllers never to strike, Reagan said that if they did not return to work within 
48 hours, their jobs would be terminated. Reagan next adds that he thought that the members of 
PATCO were being poorly served by their leaders. “They apparently thought I was bluffing or 
playing games when I said that controllers who didn’t honor the no-strike pledge would lose 
their jobs and not be re-hired” (p. 283).  This, in my view, is Dilthey’s (1961) ‘clash of wills that 
creates history’ mentioned earlier. 
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Reagan now recalls that the airlines and the hard working FAA employees as well as the 
traveling public went through a difficult period. But as each day passed, there were more planes 
in the air. Reagan now claims that they discovered that before the strike, the air traffic control 
system had about 6,000 more controllers than it really needed to operate safely. He now proudly 
adds that training a new corps of controllers would take more than two years, but our air traffic 
control system would emerge safer and more efficient than ever. “I didn’t think of it in such 
terms at the time, but I suppose the strike was an important juncture for our new administration, I 
think it convinced people who might have thought otherwise that I meant what I said” (p. 283). 
Such is the view of the historic national course-altering strike from Reagan himself. But, how do 
others see and interpret it? As you will see, there are huge gulfs of interpretation. Finally, and 
more importantly, how does this connect to the Rise of Neoliberalism? 
In fairness, after a view from the ‘right’ by Reagan, I present what I see as a far-left 
perspective on the impact of this strike by Tom Mackaman (2011) from his article: Thirty years 
since the PATCO strike. From his perspective on August 3rd, 1981, 15,000 members of the 
union of air traffic controllers in the U.S. (PATCO) went out on strike against their employer, the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). For years, he argues, employment levels and safety 
measures failed to keep pace with increasing air traffic. According to him, excessive stress 
forced many controllers into early retirement. He says PATCO workers simply demanded a 
shorter workweek, increased wages and increased staffing. Note the difference to when Reagan 
argues that it was discovered that PATCO was overstaffed by 6,000 controllers.  
Mackaman (2011), in corroborating Reagan’s view of what took place, claims that hours 
after they walked out, President Ronald Reagan, speaking from the White House Rose Garden, 
invoked the anti-strike Taft-Hartley Act to fire the strikers if they did not return to work within 
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two days. The Reagan administration’s terms were simple: the ending of the strike and the total 
submission of the union to all White House demands. There would be no negotiations. By the 
end of the year, it was clear that the air traffic controllers had been defeated. The Reagan 
administration and the courts outlawed the union, and all of the striking air traffic controllers 
were blacklisted from their profession for life. 
In a rather startling, in my view, accusation of Democratic complicity, Mackaman (2011) 
claims that what really happened was that the union-busting operation was a bipartisan operation 
carried out with the tacit support of the Democrats. The plan Reagan implemented for smashing 
PATCO, including the military scabbing operation known as the Management Strike 
Contingency Force, had been drawn up under Democratic President Jimmy Carter in 1980. He 
argues that:  
The AFL-CIO gave the Reagan administration assurances 
that it would do nothing in response to government strike-
breaking and union-busting. In the face of pressure from 
workers calling for broader strike action in support of 
PATCO, AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland said early in 
the struggle that he opposed ‘anything that would represent 
punishing, injuring or inconveniencing the public at large 
for the sins or transgression of the Reagan administration’. 
So confident was Reagan in the acquiescence of the labor 
bureaucrats, he delivered his August 3 back-to-work 
ultimatum even as the AFL-CIO Executive Council was 
meeting in New York City. (p. 2)  
307 
 
I debated with myself whether or not to include this wildly opposing view of the PATCO 
strike as it sounds, at first glance, almost too surreal to give credence. But, upon my own 
interpretation of current political dynamics that says that Democrats and Republicans are clearly 
both pursuing the same neoliberal agenda, I decided to include it. Additionally, the literature 
review of Chapter Two also suggested a common agenda between Democrats and Republicans; 
at least in the arena of education.  
In any event, for academic integrity and a balanced approach, I will soon add some 
results of quantitative analyses on the connections between unions and corporate profits and on 
effects of the PATCO strike in hopes of presenting less scary, agenda driven one-sided 
interpretations; be they true or false or from the left or right. Before that, I want to add a few 
thoughts of McCartin (2011) from his well-researched book: Collision Course: Ronald Reagan, 
the Air Traffic Controllers and the Strike that Changed America. 
McCartin (2011) describes in my view, a critical background piece that adds a lot of 
contextual value in understanding what took place; something not discussed either by Reagan 
(1990) or Mackaman (2011).  He details just how and why PATCO, an entity of federal workers, 
became a labor union modelled after the private sector in the first place. It’s an interesting story 
germane to this study of neoliberalism. 
He begins by claiming that the fault lines that divided America in the summer of 1968 ran 
straight through Chicago. During the Democratic convention held there in late August, antiwar 
protestors clashed with then Mayor Richard J. Daley’s police force that riveted the nation and 
began unraveling the Democratic coalition. During that same time, PATCO’s convention held at 
the Pick-Congress hotel drew no press coverage and attracted no protests. PATCO convention 
organizers reserved a few hundred rooms but had no idea how many representatives would show 
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up. They had never gone to a hotel before. With just two days before the meeting, only a few 
dozen controllers had reserved rooms prompting the hotel to threaten cancellation of their bloc of 
rooms. Mike Rock, one of the PATCO leaders assured the manager “our guys are funny. We 
never went to hotels. We don’t know about this reservation bullshit. As it turned out, 350 
controllers representing every state showed up” (p. 75).  
McCartin (2011) now adds that over four days of discussion, the delegates made 
decisions that clearly moved PATCO toward becoming a union. First, the current federal model, 
the Federal Aviation Association (FAA) had been discredited in the minds of a slight majority of 
the controllers because of their ineffectual history. Second, the key leaders of the organizing 
drive themselves came from blue collar families with union histories. But the biggest factor was 
Executive Order (EO) 10988 section 6a -3. This section “forbade the inclusion of both 
supervisors who officially evaluate the performance of employees and the employees whom they 
supervise in any organization that sought recognition, the power to negotiate on behalf of 
employees, and dues checkoff privileges” (p. 76). In other words, it attempted to keep separate 
the supervisors from the employees so they could not collude against the government. McCartin 
(2011) claims that the organizers saw dues checkoffs as a matter of life and death and without it, 
PATCO could not survive. 
Even with this strong argument, the issue was not decided without a struggle. This 
contentious issue was finally pushed over the top when the controllers from Minneapolis Center 
introduced a resolution formally welcoming supervisors into PATCO ranks. This unleashed a 
final floor battle that the unionists won by a margin of less than three percent. “This was a 
moment of singular importance for controllers. For the first time publicly we were telling the 
FAA, hey, management, you are on one side and we are on the other, observed Rock” (p. 76). 
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For the final piece of this story, famed attorney F. Lee Bailey was named as PATCO’s executive 
director. After PATCO settled the major question of whether or not to become a labor union, it 
adopted a constitution unlike that of most unions. Bailey crafted this document. “As explained by 
William Peer, a labor lawyer who later replaced Bailey as PATCO’s general counsel, Bailey 
created PATCO in the image of the only organization that he was familiar with. And that is 
corporate America” (p. 77).  
An interesting story, but why do I consider it important? What is its connection to this 
momentous strike? Reagan clearly stated that he saw a big difference between the public and 
private sector when it came to unions.  He readily admitted that he himself was a union leader 
that led a strike with the Screen Actors Guild. But recall when he said ‘Governments are 
different from private industry’. This story clearly ‘blurs the line’ between the government and 
private sectors making Reagan’s adamant position of a rigid difference questionable at best. 
McCartin (2011) has provided us with something Reagan, in my view, clearly did not see. As 
stated, the union charter, which was written by F. Lee Bailey, structured the union around private 
corporate principles and that as a result they were more of a private sector union than a public 
one. I argue that while he saw this strike as different from what the private sector would allow, 
PATCO saw themselves as a private sector union. In my mind these are unnoticed contextual 
details that may explain the inevitable clash and lack of negotiations; all based on federal rulings. 
I now present a less emotional and more balanced and ‘scientific’ view of the PATCO strike. 
Connecting the PATCO strike to this study of neoliberalism. 
Unions and Corporate Profits: Quantitative views. I begin with Doucouliagos & Laroche 
(2009) in their article: Unions and profits: A meta-regression analysis. Going right to the heart of 
the matter, the authors argue that the effects of unions on economic performance has motivated a 
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considerable body of research. They claim that the big picture that emerges from the literature is 
that the impact of unions on profitability is a priori indeterminate i.e., any positive effect of 
unions on productivity may be offset by higher production costs, while any negative effect on 
productivity reinforces cost pressures, but this might be moderated if firms are able to charge 
higher prices.  
In the summary, Doucouliagos & Laroche (2009) report that five conclusions can be 
drawn from their analysis. The first two are quite germane to this study and my argument that 
seeks to connect the PATCO strike with the rise of neoliberalism: 
First, the results show conclusively that unions have a 
negative impact on financial performance in the United 
States, though not in the rest of the world. Second, much of 
what appears to be wide disagreement in the published 
union-profit effects can be explained through differences in 
data, measures used, and specification of the econometric 
model, as well as sampling error. Once these factors are 
controlled for, there is actually little disagreement that in the 
United States, unions depress profits. (p. 175) 
The obvious point here is that Ronald Reagan’s decision to fire the air traffic controllers in 1981 
has a clear potential economic benefit to corporations in the U. S. I have not seen any direct 
evidence that Reagan had talks with corporate leaders prior to his decision.  I would not expect to 
find any. However, I cannot fathom this mutually beneficial act being wholly coincidental 
without any discussions between government and the private sector.  
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Wolff (2003) in his article: What’s behind the rise in profitability in the U.S. in the 
1980’s and 1990’s?  begins by claiming that the recent surge in the stock market has called 
attention to movements in the underlying rate of profit. “The crude evidence does suggest that 
stock prices are linked to corporate profitability. As corporate profits slipped during the 1970’s 
until the early 1980’s, so did the S&P 500 index in real terms (both reached a low point in 1982) 
After 1982, both corporate profits and the S&P 500 index recovered quite strongly” (p. 479, 
emphasis added). 
In the summary section Wolff (2003) argues that one must conclude that economic and 
political power shifted in favor of capital, beginning in the early 1980’s. But, what explains this 
shift in power? He argues: 
The topic is beyond the scope of the current paper. 
However, some possible causes and manifestations of this 
phenomenon are as follows: The first is the decline in 
unionization rate. Though this has been going in since 
1953, it accelerated during the 1980’s. A relevant event is 
Ronald Reagan’s dismissal of unionized air controller 
workers during the 1982 PATCO strike, which further 
weakened organized labor. (p. 497) 
 Continuing with quantitative impacts on the strike, we have Traynor & Fitchenbaum 
(1997) in their article: The impact of Post-Patco relations on U.S. union wages who begin by 
claiming that a decline in union membership has been going on for more than forty years. Yet 
still, in the 1980’s, there seems to have been a qualitative shift in the power of unions which is 
independent of their decline. In the next paragraph they add: 
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However, the August 1981 dismissal and replacement of 
striking members of the Professional Air Traffic Controllers 
Organization (PATCO) coincided with a sharp change in 
U.S. labor policy. Siegel [1984], Reich, [1993], Esteicher 
[1994] and Spriggs [1991] argue that the firing of the 
PATCO workers sent employers a message that the hiring of 
permanent replacement workers was an acceptable business 
practice. (p. 61) 
In their caveats and summation section they conclude: 
Taken together, however, the results of this analysis 
provide fairly strong evidence that events surrounding the 
PATCO strike of 1981 significantly impacted the wage 
growth rate and, therefore, the average wage level among 
union laborers at least in the short-run. Most significantly, 
all estimates presented in this paper indicate that this in turn 
reduced the total wage bill paid by management to union 
labor over the 1982-90 period. (p. 71) 
In a somewhat contradictory quantitative view of the PATCO strike, Grimes (1995) 
argues that the average number of strikes involving 1,000 or more workers by organized labor 
peaked during the early 1970’s. Since then strike incidence has trended downward. A variety of 
factors contributed to this including structural shifts in the labor markets and an ever changing 
economic environment. Additionally, recent actions by the federal government is viewed as 
discouraging strike activity. “The most obvious of these was the firing by the Reagan 
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administration of 12,000 members of PATCO who went on strike during the fall of 1981” (p. 
155).  
However, his conclusions appear to differ from the above analyses as his findings seem to 
temper the impact of the strike.  He argues the following:  
Each of the control variables obtain coefficients with the 
expected sign and most are significant. The results indicate 
that there has been a downward trend in strike activity over 
the period in question, and that strike activity is positively 
correlated with union membership but negatively sensitive 
to the unemployment rate. Interestingly, PATCO does not 
enter the equation with a statistically significant coefficient. 
A wide variety of specification tests indicate that this result 
is robust. Even though the PATCO incident is often cited as 
a major contributing factor to the recent decline in union 
strike activity, the empirical evidence does not indicate it 
has had a significant independent effect. (p. 155)  
Finally, Farber & Western (2002) in their analysis of Ronald Reagan and declining union 
organization, start by claiming the common notion that declining membership in US labor unions 
throughout the 1980’s is most likely traced to political causes. They argue that during the first 
Reagan term, two political events symbolized the vigorous Republican opposition to organized 
labor. First, in the summer of 1981, striking air traffic controllers were dismissed by President 
Reagan and non-union employees were hired as replacements. Second, two seats on the five-seat 
National Labor Relations Board were filled by Reagan appointees. According to Farber & 
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Western (2002), the NLRB was now a solid pro-management majority that expanded employers’ 
rights to oppose union organizing. Upon reflection, this very well may have been even more 
impactful and supportive of my argument than the PATCO strike itself.  
In their concluding remarks they argue that there is strong evidence that the PATCO 
strike created a hostile climate for labor unions in the 1980’s, but there is little evidence that 
those developments precipitated the decline in union election activity. They claim that a 
convincing alternative explanation is difficult to come by.  
Quantitative summary. These five articles are included to lend support to the second part 
of my hypothesis that Reagan may have had an incentive to create the PATCO strike: to help 
bolster U.S. corporate profits through union destabilization.   
1-Doucouliagos & Laroche (2009) argue that results show conclusively that unions have a 
negative impact on the financial performance of U. S. corporations but not the test of the world. 
2-Wolff (2003) argues that there is evidence that stock prices are linked to corporate 
profitability. He says that one must conclude that economic and political power shifted in favor 
of capital, beginning in the early 1980’s. 
3-Traynor & Fitchenbaum (1997) argue that the August 1981 dismissal and replacement of 
striking PATCO workers coincided with a sharp change in U.S. labor policy.  
4-Grimes (1995) provides some less conclusive findings than the others. While arguing for a 
variety of factors that caused a downward trend in union strike activity, he still says that the most 
obvious of these was the firing by the Reagan administration of 12,000 members of PATCO in 
the fall of 1981. 
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5-Farber & Western (2002) says that declining membership in U.S. labor unions throughout the 
1980’s is most likely traced to political causes. He specifically mentioned the PATCO strike as 
one event. 
Ending Discussion.  
As stated, the main objective of this chapter was to present the lives of those who I refer 
to as the ‘Carriers of the Conservative Torch’. These are the political leaders who transformed 
neoclassical thinking developed in the late 1940’s into actual current political environments. The 
reader should view this chapter as the logical extension of the work of Chapter Six. 
Using the work of Van Horn & Mirowski (2009) and referring one last time to my ‘bomb 
analogy’, the bomb was completed at the end of Chapter Six with the final construction of two 
organized schools of neoclassical thinking: the postwar Chicago School of Economics, the 
offshoot of Harold Luhnow’s Free Market Study, and the Mont Pèlerin Society; the latter which 
gave it an international base of operations started by Friedrich von Hayek.  
Recall that conservatives were re-energized at the end of World War ll because it 
represented the heyday of Keynesian economics that threatened their worldview. Using, in my 
view, the overly dramatic words of Friedrich von Hayek, they saw it as ‘an encroachment of left-
wing totalitarianism’. Much of this newly organized intellectual effort to thwart this Keynesian, 
or welfare state economic perspective, was underwritten by Harold Luhnow; representing the 
Volker Fund. Recall from Chapter Six the critical point that Hoplin & Robinson (2008) argue 
plainly: ‘one of the most seemingly insignificant monetary gifts given in the 1940’s by the 
Volker Fund led to the dramatic advancement of free-market and classical liberal ideas 
worldwide’. Additionally, and just as important, if not more so, is the following: 
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The firm position of Harold Luhnow, underwriter of this entire effort who, directing the action 
through his perched status, strongly believed that the politics of postwar America presumed not 
only a powerful state, but also a configuration of powerful corporations whose international 
competitors had mostly been reduced to shadows of their former selves. Thus, in promoting 
‘freedom’ from his view, they were primarily intent on guaranteeing the freedom of corporations 
to conduct their affairs as they wished. This, in my view, is the underlying and unspoken intent 
of the newly constructed neoclassical thinking. This chapter picked up from there and hopefully 
showed that these thoughts were transformed into real political environments by those leaders I 
refer to as ‘Carriers of the Conservative Torch’.  
 The next and final chapter responds to the question: what have we learned from this 
study? Its center piece will be an illustrative snapshot of the analytic chapters followed by 
concluding remarks. 
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Chapter 8 
Findings and Conclusions 
‘Only ideas can overcome ideas’ - Ludwig von Mises 
Introduction 
This final chapter will attempt to summarize the entire study with a focus towards a 
proposed follow-up study. Recall from Chapter One that my experience as a volunteer math 
teacher in an urban adult education program is what precipitated this study. The organization I 
worked for was under tremendous financial stress to keep the doors open after successfully 
helping the adult poor in Chicago for over 20 years. Curious as to why this new stress all of a 
sudden, early research showed that similar urban adult education organizations all over the 
country were also under financial stress and beginning to close; some, like Hull House, after 
serving the poor for over one hundred years. Why was this happening? And why now? 
Further research showed that this pressure on urban adult education was at the same time 
affecting urban education in general. Lipman (2010), Goldstein (2014), Ravitch (2010, 2013), 
Knowles (1969), Russakoff (2015), Sleeter (2008), Giroux (2004), Hursh (2004), Hill (2003), 
Weiner (2004), Scott & Dimartino (2009), Rist (2002), Urciuoli (2010) and others provided data 
that strongly suggested that corporate interests were at the root of this. Kozol (2005) argued that   
their insidious plans were directed in urban schools as early as kindergarten.  
I was honest and upfront since the beginning of this study in stating that as an African 
American man, this new state of affairs in urban education made me very angry. But this 
emotion was indeed a good thing; especially so, for the research task ahead. Kuzmic (2014) in 
his article: Disturbing Masculinities: Epistemology, Outlaw Emotions, and the Gendered Self in 
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Self-Study Research provided me the rationale to show the reader that my anger, or what he 
refers to as ‘outlaw emotions’ are a positive; not a negative. He reminds us that one's emotional 
self is intimately connected to one's professional self; so just because one adds the role of the 
researcher to that identity, doesn't mean that we have to take up the traditional separation 
between analytic distance and emotional participation. Using the thoughts of Krieger (1991), 
Kuzmic (2014) argues that to fail to do so actually limits our ability to understand social and 
educational phenomena. 
Chapter Structure. After reminding the reader of my reason for this study and what it 
means to me, this chapter will be structured as follows: I start with how I address the research 
question with a focus on the methodologies used. The aim here is to provide a brief narrative on 
how the answer to the research question was arrived at and to align this study with most 
qualitative studies that use fieldwork to arrive at findings and conclusions.  
Next is a chapter by chapter review that highlights the important ideas, people, events and 
findings in this study. This is followed by a ‘snapshot’ of my understanding of the Rise of 
Neoliberalism. The intent here is to give the reader a visualization of the entire study with a 
special focus on the importance of the power of capital. After this, a follow up on two important 
points from the body of this study that I promised would be discussed in a cursory fashion in the 
final chapter. The first follow up is from Chapter Four and very briefly discusses Adam Smith’s 
(1952) invisible hand argument where he posited a ‘Divine Providence’ behind social structure. 
The second follow up is from Chapter Six where I will again, very briefly, discuss Henry 
Simon’s (1934) thoughts and how they connect to institutionalism. I argue that it is in this 
discipline, which opposes and rejects neoclassical economic theory, that I believe 
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philosophically grounds any potential solutions to neoliberalism. I will also mention that these 
two follow ups are, in my view, actually connected to each other. 
Finally, an ending discussion that very briefly discusses the findings from this study with 
a focus on how they can be used to inform a potential follow up study whose expressed intent is 
to address the ominous argument of Carter & Welner (2013) on the future of urban education.   
Addressing the research question 
Unlike many qualitative studies, fieldwork, in the normal sense, is not being used here. 
To arrive at findings and conclusions therefore, I use ‘analysis of ideas and narratives’ to address 
the research question and provide the overall thought structure of this study. Recall that I’ve 
coined this method; prismatic analysis. Borrowed from physics, this idea is designed to direct a 
single complex idea into a ‘prism,’ to refract it into separate distinct parts; in this case Chapters 
Four through Seven - the body of this study, to engage the research question.  
Recall the question: Can N-H provide a deep connection between the genesis of 
neoliberalism, its intellectual foundations, growth and its dominance in today’s global society? 
This study, using a transrational approach, i.e. combining rational and non-rational thinking and 
employing the prismatic analysis, answers YES. The deep connection is the nature and power of 
capital with its ability to create gigantic social forces. This was explained in the beginning 
narrative of Chapter Four. 
Chapter by chapter high level review and findings 
Chapter One. My voluntary work as a math instructor in an adult urban education 
program ‘pushed’ me to this study in the first place. Early research point to a phenomenon called 
neoliberalism as a causal factor in the deteriorating state of urban education. At that time, I did 
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not realize the dense nature of the phenomenon I was about to investigate. Early along the 
research path, it became evident that I could not do an adequate study of neoliberalism and 
address my desire to add my voice to possible solutions to the problems in urban education in a 
single study. The original plan was then adjusted to use the findings from this study to inform a 
proposed follow-up study.  
Chapter Two. The literature review and summary. Recall a few of the summary quotes: 
Peck & Tickell (2002) stated that “it seems to be everywhere” (p. 380).  Chopra (2003) calls 
neoliberalism “a global social science able to explain all rational conduct, or even simply all 
behavior” (p. 422). Forest & Hirayama (2009) argued that “neoliberalism has dominated policy 
discourse, policy formulation and policy implementation” (p. 998). Brenner & Theodore (2002) 
call neoliberalism “a utopia of unlimited exploitation” (p. 350); just to show a few. In short, this 
chapter found that neoliberalism is a highly complex global phenomenon that has significant 
impacts on almost all parts of society. One major focus of the review was to reveal its 
connections to racism, poverty with a special focus on education. The review found very strong 
connections to each. 
Chapter Three. This chapter presented a detailed discussion of H-I and N-H and their 
philosophical and analytical foundations. A focus on rational and non-rational thinking and the 
creative power of narrative was included. The combined use of these methodologies was referred 
to as transrationality. The analytic visualization termed ‘prismatic analysis’ was also introduced. 
The intent of this visual idea is to aid the reader in the use of this study’s central underlying 
theme of the nature and power of capital and to show how it is integrated into the analytic 
chapters that follow. It undergirds the narratives of each chapter. 
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Chapter Four. After starting with my own analytical understanding of the nature and 
power of capital, presented in this chapter is a discussion on the problematic natures of 
neoliberalism’s twin intellectual pillars, or foundations; homoeconomicus and the division of 
labor. The works of John Stuart Mill (1836) and Adam Smith (1952) are discussed in detail with 
reasons why I argue that their moral bearings and intentions may have been warped and 
misinterpreted, most likely intentionally so, for the benefit of specific agendas of wealth 
accumulation. This chapter found that the foundations of neoliberalism are at best problematic. 
  Chapter Five. This chapter is for the most part, a discussion of the background history of 
the University of Chicago from its inception; founded by John D. Rockefeller in 1892. The focus 
was on the unique environment that housed the thinkers of economics at the school beginning in 
the 1930’s. I argue that this environment ‘birthed the spirit’ of neoliberalism. This chapter brings 
us to the late 1940’s and the end of World War ll. This chapter found that the University of 
Chicago created the unique environment and established the ‘Chicago Tradition’; a now famous 
hardnosed conservative economic perspective associated with the school. This chapter also found 
that it was the great Depression of the 1930’s that swept a Democratic majority into office under 
Franklin D. Roosevelt that provided the political mandate for the New Deal to combat massive 
unemployment. This, I argue, really ignited the debate, or what I term the battle’ at the school 
between the two opposing economic philosophies of Cartesianism, representing the neoclassical 
side versus Pragmatism, representing the side of institutionalism; a foundation of Keynesian 
economics. 
Chapter Six. This chapter, coined the ‘meat and potatoes’ of this study, begins from the 
end of the previous chapter and builds on what is referred to as the Van Horn & Mirowski (2009) 
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central thesis. These authors’ very impressive narrative uses archived documents to explain their 
theory on the rise of neoliberalism.  
According to them, the University of Chicago’s role is best understood as part of a larger 
scheme to develop a new, well-organized and funded international platform to spread and 
implement neoliberal views in a post-World War II world. At that time in U.S. history, 
Keynesian economic policy, best known as the economics of the welfare state, was moving the 
country in a direction conservatives strongly opposed. They intended do something about 
it……and they did.  
The specific social engineering to accomplish this was heavily influenced by Friedrich 
von Hayek (1944) with his book The Road to Serfdom. The effort to spread his rather extreme 
conservative views was underwritten by Harold Luhnow of the Volker Fund highlighting the 
power of capital in the rise of neoliberalism. I show that these enhanced neoclassical views then 
emanate from the postwar University of Chicago, School of Economics and the newly formed 
internationally based Mont Pèlerin Society. According to Van Horn & Mirowski (2009), a 
critical piece was that the real intent of these Volker funded neoclassical views was not just 
installing market fundamentals to U. S. economic policy, but to take advantage of the diminished 
strength of corporations in Europe from the effects of World War II.  In other words, to design 
and implement policy that would let U.S. corporations behave as they wished because they were 
in a position to do so. In summary, this chapter found that the power and influence of capital 
played a very significant role in the rise of neoliberalism. From this chapter, I argued that the 
construction of the neoliberal bomb was now complete. 
Chapter Seven. This chapter focuses on those political leaders who were, in my opinion, 
the most pivotal in transforming this newly established intellectual movement discussed in 
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Chapter Six, into actual global neoliberal policy. I refer to them as the ‘Carriers of the 
Conservative Torch’. This chapter found that key leaders who had very strong personal 
conservative worldviews, used the power of their offices and their personalities to create and 
implement the global environment conducive for the explosive growth of neoliberalism. Richard 
Nixon’s (1978) historic 1972 trip to China is one prime example.  
 The lives of Margaret Thatcher, Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan are discussed here. 
This chapter was designed to point to a very specific date in history: August 5th, 1981. That day, 
Ronald Reagan decommissioned the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO) 
in what McCartin (2011) called the ‘strike that changed America’. Referring one last time to my 
bomb analogy, I argued that this event lit the fuse of neoliberalism.  
Next, a ‘study snapshot’ to provide the reader with a quick visualization that captures what in my 
view are the major events that led to the rise of neoliberalism. This is followed by a narrative that 
explains it.  
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Study snapshot: 
 
Key Phases in the Rise of Neoliberalism
Sources of Capital Analysis: People-Organizations-Events
Founder of the University of Chicago - October 1st 1892
William Rainey Harper - First President
School of Economics started debating two opposing economic 
philosophies: Cartesianism vs. Pragmatism
John D. Rockefeller
The Great Depression: The New Deal based on Keynesian 
economics enacted to combat massive unemployment.
The end of World War ll. Height of  Keynesian economics. 
Conservatives fight to save their worldview. Friedrich von Hayek 
through his book The Road to Serfdom warns Americans of the 
encroachment of ‘left-wing totalitarianism’. Draws interest from 
Harold Luhnow representing the Volker Fund.
Van Horn & Mirowski (2009) central thesis on the Rise of 
Neoliberalism. Hayek and Luhnow ignite push for neoclassical 
views at the University of Chicago. Mont Pèlerin Society 
established to create influential international platform to push 
global conservative agenda.
 The Volker Fund
Carriers of the Conservative torch. August 5th 1981: Ronald 
Reagan fires air traffic controllers lighting the fuse of 
neoliberalism with the strike that changed America.
 
 
Diagram narrative. This visualization of the key phases in the rise of neoliberalism starts 
with John D. Rockefeller funding, along with the local Chicago Baptists, the start of a new 
University of Chicago; an older one went bankrupt about seven years prior.  His insistence on 
William Rainey Harper as its first president set the foundation for a unique university that 
created the fierce intellectual environment and tradition that remains till this day. Their record 
number of Nobel laureates in economics attests to this.  
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The next phase represents the massive unemployment caused by great depression of the 
1930’s that swept a democratic majority into office and elected Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
president in a landslide victory over Herbert Hoover. This gave him the political mandate for the 
Keynesian economics based New Deal; a series of domestic programs enacted in the United 
States between 1933 and 1938 intended to focus what was then termed the ‘3 R’s’: Relief, 
Recovery, and Reform. Of critical importance to this study, this time in history represented a 
complete rejection of the conservative philosophy of classical economic theory that emphasized 
free market fundamentals.  
The next key phase is the end of World War ll. This period, the late 1940’s to early 
1950’s represented the apex of Keynesian economic policies. It was this time in history that 
sparked the conservatives to begin to rebel to ‘save the very life of their worldview’. Friedrich 
von Hayek (1944) on a book tour in America, gave a speech at the Detroit Economic Club in 
April of 1945. He argued to the audience that “we must make the masses of people learn and 
understand the problem that is before us” (p.140). The problem, from his view, was the 
encroachment of left-wing totalitarianism; something he considered an evil in the world. His 
surprisingly famous book: The Road to Serfdom was for all intents and purposes, a formal attack 
against Keynesian economic theory from a well-respected economist of the London School of 
Economics. It was a call for the return to conservative market-based economic policy. This book 
drew strong interest from Harold Luhnow, the new president of William Volker & Co. From this, 
as a twist of fate, Harold, with the blessing of his uncle William, shifted the direction of the 
Volker Fund from its historical beginnings of charitable giving to individuals and institutions 
that helped those who needed help, to underwriting and supporting ideas aimed at limiting 
government and bolstering private interests. This switch was fueled by their experience during 
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the political corruption era of Tom Pendergast in Kansas City. As an indication of the 
monumental impact of this switch, Hoplin & Robinson (2008) boldly claimed that one of the 
most seemingly insignificant monetary gifts given in the 1940’s by the Volker Fund “led to the 
dramatic advancement of free-market and classical liberal ideas worldwide” (p. 26). 
 The next key phase is the actual social engineering of the rise of neoliberalism based on 
the central thesis of the Van Horn & Mirowski (2009) narrative. Using archived documents, they 
situate the University of Chicago’s role in the rise of neoliberalism as “one component of a 
specific larger transnational project of innovating doctrines of neoliberalism for the postwar 
world” (p.140). From this, they construct their narrative that begins with the end of World War 
ll. 
Much of their argument has Harold Luhnow directing things in the background through 
his financial might as head of the Volker Fund. The key person-to-person connection here is 
between Harold Luhnow and Friedrich von Hayek. Together, they agreed on setting up a project 
to promote Hayek’s (1944) thoughts from his book The Road to Serfdom at the University of 
Chicago. Many important intellectuals within and outside the university were eager to participate 
including: Henry Simons, Aaron Director, Milton Friedman and others. The project was 
originally referred to as the ‘Free Market Study’. Through twists and turns this eventually led to 
the establishment of a conservative intellectual movement emanating from the combination of 
the postwar University of Chicago School of Economics and the newly created Mont Pèlerin 
Society headed by Hayek as its first president. The neoliberal intellectual platform was now 
officially in high gear. The bomb was now completed. 
 With this, the final phase represents the transforming of this new conservative 
international intellectual movement into actual neoliberal policy. This was accomplished through 
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transformative political leaders, specifically Margaret Thatcher, Richard Nixon and Ronald 
Reagan. I coined this group the ‘carriers of the conservative torch’. Together they, in my view, 
constructed the global environments needed to implement these newly invigorated conservative 
ideas. With this now accomplished, on August 5th 1981, Ronald Reagan (1990) ‘lit the fuse of 
the bomb’ by firing the air traffic controllers in what McCartin (2011) called the strike that 
changed America. This diagram explains, in a snapshot, the Rise of Neoliberalism from this 
researcher’s understanding. 
Chapter follow-ups 
Chapter Four follow up: A brief commentary on Adam Smith’s Divine Providence. In the 
Chapter Four critical analysis of the division of labor, Adam Smith (1976), using his 
philosophical brilliance on economics and morality, and as part of his ‘invisible hand’ argument, 
offered what would surely be a highly controversial idea today: life’s human stratification as 
‘Divine Providence’. I promised to say a few more words on this highly controversial idea in the 
final chapter.   
As a man of faith, I am in agreement in principle with his idea. What does this have to do 
with this study of neoliberalism? For the sake of brevity and as a very cursory response, in my 
view, Smith (1976) is arguing against the idea of a classless society. I believe Adam Smith 
recognized that differing abilities and desires of each human being naturally equate into social 
stratification, but that that in itself, is not a necessarily a bad thing. Recall Smith (1976) speaking 
about people on the lower rungs of society and what they have and share in the overall economic 
and social position scheme: 
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These last too enjoy their share of all it produces. In what 
constitutes the real happiness of human life, they are in no 
respect inferior to those who would seem so much above 
them. In ease of body and peace of mind all the different 
ranks of life are nearly upon a level, and the beggar, who 
suns himself by the side of the highway, possesses that 
security that kings are fighting for. (p. 185) 
Also recall a short narrative I presented on my wanting to promote a person on the lower rung of 
a corporate ladder when she kindly but emphatically refused my offer and instead wished to 
remain in place, turning down the added salary and benefits.  
 I interpret Adam Smith’s moral thinking and my own experience, and argue that human 
happiness and contentment ‘trumps’ social position. In other words, I ask: what kind of life is it 
if you are highly successful, perched on an upper rung of social strata if you are not happy? I say 
despite your social position and all that that affords, you may indeed be miserable……and life is 
short; an awful combination in my view.  To me, the human mind is so vastly complex that to 
think that we know what is best for another human, as far as one’s social position is concerned, is 
not only arrogant but wholly unjust and unjustifiable. This idea also critically questions the 
‘mathematical’ aspect of social structure which says that the higher you go up the social ladder, 
the better off you are. This is not true. In other words, in my view, Adam Smith’s Divine 
Providence in his division of labor, may be a transcendent social construction that has the ability 
to place people where they should be for their own happiness in this very short life.  
Neoliberalism, on the other hand, makes a strong statement against this idea with forcing, via 
intentional social engineering, the ‘mathematical’ aspect of social structure as if it were backed 
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by divine authority. In other words, Divine Providence, from the neoliberal view, means the 
richer you are the better off you are; something I strongly disagree with. This is what justifies 
profit maximization; an entirely different thinking from profit making; something that we saw 
Henry Simons (1934) firmly supported. I too share his thoughts.  
Dissecting this, I argue that without question, the raison d’etre of neoliberalism is the 
accumulation of extreme amounts of capital by a few. Also recall from Chapter Four that I 
connect the power of capital to the will of the individual. I now add the fact that in my view, 
neoclassical economic theory mandates that profit maximization requires a highly stratified 
social structure where the few on the top stay that way by keeping the many on the bottom in 
their position; whether they want to be there or not. 
This study on neoliberalism does not argue for a classless society, but rather something 
closer to Adam Smith’s (1976) ‘Divine Providence’ that rejects the daily media pounding of the 
relative positions of society that makes masses believe that they are ‘better off’ trying to become 
rich as opposed to what makes them happy.  Instead, I argue for a social structure that allows us 
to be what makes us happy and contented, wherever that places us.  
Recall Persky (1995) from Chapter Four who argues that John Stuart Mill’s ‘economic 
man’, the core idea of his political economy, has four distinct interests: wealth accumulation, 
leisure, luxury and procreation. Since ‘economic man’ has been classified in this study as one of 
the twin pillars of neoliberalism, it has created a social structure with this very limited version of 
humans in mind. Recall also the stinging opposition of Mill’s ‘economic man’ by both Sen 
(1977) and Marx (1971).  
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Connecting this to education, Mills’ political economy is, in my view, what fuels the 
recent surge in the importance of business studies at the expense of liberal arts in our 
universities. In other words, it is the neoclassical analytic thinking that maximizes the four 
characteristics of Mills’ ‘economic man’, as opposed to the pragmatic thinking that brings in the 
additional social sciences in a quest for a more well-rounded human being who possesses far 
more than the four neoclassical characteristic of Mills. There is ample support for this in the 
literature. As examples, McGrath (1959), Poovey (2001) and Lomas (1997) provide sound 
analysis of the decline of liberal arts education in our universities who they argue are now in the 
grips of neoliberalism themselves. 
This paper argues that the any future social structure where human happiness is 
paramount over wealth accumulation must begin in our universities by a new revitalization of the 
humanities. Philosophically, this means re-engagement with a pragmatic, as opposed to analytic, 
worldview where the more complex social sciences fields like philosophy, sociology, 
psychology, foreign language studies, feminist studies and anthropology, to name a few, are 
elevated to their rightful positions atop an intellectual, social and economic hierarchy. This is not 
a rejection of the natural sciences, but an elevation of the social sciences in a quest for a more 
human, human being. I believe this will support Adam Smith’s idea of Divine Providence and a 
fairer and more humane manifestation of his division of labor; at least this researcher’s 
interpretation of it. In recap, economics in my view, needs to be returned to its rightful and 
defined discipline as a social science and stripped of its false intimidating attempts as a natural 
science.  
Chapter Six follow up: A commentary on the philosophical grounds of Henry Simon’s 
anti-neoliberal positions. In this chapter, I promised to discuss the thoughts of Henry Simons 
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(1934) and how it relates to what I perceive as grounds for an alternative view of, and potential 
solutions to, neoliberalism.  
Recall I mentioned that Henry Simons’ (1934) views of the giant corporation represent 
the very antithesis of neoliberalism. He argues: 
There must be an outright dismantling of our gigantic 
corporations. Few of our gigantic corporations can be 
defended on the ground that their present size is necessary 
to reasonably full exploitation of production economies: 
their existence is to be explained in terms of opportunities 
for promoter profits, personal ambitions of industrial and 
financial ‘Napoleons’, and advantages of monopoly power. 
(p. 241, quotations in original text) 
Additionally, recall an even more terse denunciation of the giant corporation when Simons, 
arguing against injustice, said: 
If we dislike extreme inequality of power, it is appropriate 
to view with special misgivings the extension of political 
and monopoly control over relative prices and incomes. An 
important factor in existing inequality, both of income and 
of power, is the gigantic corporation. We may recognize, in 
the almost unlimited grants of powers to corporate bodies, 
one of the greatest sins of government against the free-
enterprise system. (p. 13, emphasis added) 
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From these quotes it is clear, at least in my view, that Henry Simons, ironically at one 
time referred to as the ‘Crown Prince’ of the University of Chicago, School of Economics, 
strongly rejects the heart of the neoliberal engine that dominates social life today; the giant 
corporation. But how does his passionate and defiant position on the giant corporation ground 
alternatives and possible solutions to neoliberalism? The first part of the answer is found in 
Chapter Five. 
In this chapter, Mirowski (1991) presented a strong argument that claims that there exists 
a close correlation between the Cartesian analytic tradition and the structure of neoclassical 
economic theory. This is the philosophy, based purely and solely on quantitative analysis, that 
supports thinkers like Friedrich von Hayek, Milton Friedman and other staunch neoclassicists. It 
grounds neoliberalism. This was shown to be at best problematic from the Chapter Four critical 
analyses of homoeconomicus and the division of labor.  
Mirowski (1991) then asks the question: where shall we search for philosophical 
foundations elsewhere than in the Cartesian analytic tradition? The answer is in Charles Sanders 
Pierce’s philosophy of pragmatism. Supporting this, he argues ‘it was the project of the 
pragmatists to provide a systematic alternative to the Cartesian analytical tradition, as well as to 
the naturalist doctrines characteristic of positivism’.   
After this, this I presented the connection of Henry Simons, mostly known as a classical 
economist, to the philosophy of pragmatism; which grounds institutionalism. In Chapter Six, 
Whalen (1988) argues that as far as vision and purpose is concerned, Hyman P. Minsky, a well 
know institutionalist, and Henry Simons share common elements that are best appreciated when 
compared to neoclassical thinking. He makes a strong argument for a Minsky-Simons 
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connection. Whalen (1988) mentions quite specifically that more attention should be given to 
Minsky’s recent suggestion that the economics of Keynes and Simons have much in common.  
From this, I conclude that any opposing views to neoliberalism, such as Henry Simons’ potent 
rejection of the giant corporation, be grounded in the philosophy of pragmatism; the 
philosophical base of institutionalism. According to Hodgson (2004): 
Institutionalism offered an approach to the study of economic phenomena that drew not 
from one discipline, but several. It appealed to psychology, anthropology, sociology, history and 
elsewhere, in an attempt to understand and explain the world as it is, has been, and may be. Its 
foremost concern was to understand the real world rather than to develop technique for its own 
sake. It is not as if everything in the garden of mainstream economics is bringing healthy fruit. 
The last few years have witnessed enduring global poverty, dubious practices of deregulation, 
prolonged recessions and extreme turbulence in financial markets. (p. 5) 
Recall the discussion in Chapter Five on the ‘battle of the two opposing philosophies’ at 
the University of Chicago School of Economics: neoclassical versus institutional economics with 
Whalen (1988) connecting Henry Simons to the side of the institutionalists. I conclude therefore 
that the philosophical grounds to oppose neoliberalism are to be found in pragmatism. 
Follow ups summary. In my, view these two follow ups, the Divine Providence of Adam Smiths’ 
(1952) invisible hand argument and institutionalism as solution to neoliberalism, are connected. 
The very idea of human happiness and contentment, eloquently spoken of by Adam Smith, 
obviously represents a non-quantitative concept. This is alien to the Cartesian analytic tradition, 
shown in this study to be a foundation of neoclassical economic theory. There is absolutely no 
room anywhere within the phenomenon of neoliberalism to address this idea of human happiness 
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and contentment; as its problematic base of total quantitative analysis can make no sense of it 
whatsoever. This was firmly established by Sen (1977) in his very potent denunciation of 
rational choice theory from the critical analysis of homoeconomicus in Chapter Four.  
Institutionalism, which rejects using quantitative measures for economic understanding 
solely, was shown to be based on many social disciplines from philosophy, psychology, 
psychiatry, history, sociology, anthropology, etc. as a means to understand economic and social 
life. So, to create a social structure where human happiness and contentment for everyone is a 
reality, institutionalism as an economic foundation is, in my view, a rational alternative to the 
Cartesian analytic tradition and possibly our only hope. 
Final discussion. 
The need for a proposed follow-up study.  Together, Prudence L. Carter, Jacks Family 
Professor of Education and Professor of Sociology at Stanford University and Kevin G. Welner, 
Professor at the University of Colorado, School of Education and director of the National 
Education Policy Center, argue that we deceive ourselves if we believe urban education 
outcomes can change without addressing things like racism, poverty and discrimination. I say 
they are right. BUT, if they are, then what are we to do? give up and admit that the most we can 
do is help the diminishing numbers of a few very fortunate urban students we can, while, sadly, 
unable to help the majority now clearly fated to a second class life or worse? I say NO!  
To the reader, I need to say that this is a very difficult thing for me to discuss, as there are 
large numbers of kind-hearted very intelligent people who have devoted their entire lives to 
helping urban students; often by paying for necessities out of their own pockets. All this while 
‘the neoliberal-based system’ frustrates them more and more and further clamps down on their 
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efforts; making their hopes for the majority of urban students seem more and more impossible to 
obtain. I personally know of many such people; some are in my own family. This breaks my 
heart; believe what I say. 
Recall the chapter opening quote from Ludwig von Mises: ‘only ideas can overcome 
ideas’. I am convinced that our only hope to change what appears to be a very dismal future for 
urban education and the communities they exist in, is to think our way out of this mess.  
Preview to a Proposed Follow-up Study  
Introduction.  A paradigm change in our thinking is required. Recall Peck & Tickell 
(2002) who argue that neoliberalism seems to be everywhere. The current study has shown that it 
is. As a result, it may not come as a surprise to many readers that the one of the main things I 
will focus on in this new study is a solid critique of modernity itself. We will see the infinite 
possibilities released in changing our way of thinking from either/or to and/both.  
A peek ahead. A significant piece of this new proposed study will take much of what was 
gained from this study on neoliberalism and analyze it against the concept of time within social 
acceleration theory. Much of this thinking will be based on the brilliant work of Hartmut Rosa. I 
am certain doing so will reveal very insightful aspects of neoliberalism and ground potential 
solutions.  
 This new direction will entail a very necessary introduction to basic principles of 
quantum theory from the also brilliant work of Danah Zohar, physicist and philosopher from 
MIT and Harvard, and her husband, psychiatrist and psychotherapist Ian Marshall. It will also 
require a cursory introduction to the laws (specifically the second) of thermal dynamics from 
Peter Atkins. I have read these works, some actually twice, and others on these topics with great 
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energy and enthusiasm with the insights from the current study as background seeking 
connecting bridges. I am more than eager to bring these thoughts to the reader in a coherent 
holistic framework in a search for an alternative vision of the future of urban education.  
Equally important, included in this new study is an introduction to critical and political 
theologies. While the idea of urban education may seem to some to be a focus on Christian and 
racial identities, I intend to show that they are constraints to future solutions. Connecting specific 
fundamentals of quantum theory to sociology will reveal why this is so. It promises to be eye-
opening to many. For example, I will show the need for Christians to love being Christians, 
Muslims to love being Muslims, Jews to love being Jewish, Buddhists to love being Buddhists 
and yes, even atheists to love being atheists. We will see why this is necessary and fundamental 
in a new paradigm of thinking that moves past the arbitrary limitedness of modernity. 
To reveal the logical source of hope that this proposed study will lean on, included will 
be a spiritual analysis by Walter Wink. I will attempt to place his thinking within the secular 
dimensions of critical theology from the thoughts of Jürgen Habermas and Alfredo Fierro. While 
Christian based, placing it within a critical theology will hopefully show people of all faiths and 
those without faith that this is a logical line of thinking.  
For a brief preview, Wink presents three fundamental characteristic of institutions that 
will connect from this study of neoliberalism. They will also provide grounds for my fervent 
rejection of all forms of violence to solve current problems. In addition, connecting back to 
Ferguson (2009) with something that we are for; not just what we are against. According to 
Wink (1998): 
1- Institutions were created by God 
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2- Institutions have fallen 
3- Institutions CAN BE REDEEMED 
These principles, once explained in detail, will become part of the foundations for a new vision 
for urban education.  
Finally, the engine that powers a new vision for urban education returns us to the current 
study. Specifically, where it speaks on the nature and power of capital as an underlying causal 
theme in neoliberalism. This will now be combined with the brilliant work of Eric. D Beinhocker 
(2006) from his book: The Origin of Wealth: The Radical Remaking of Economics and What It 
Means for Business and Society. The author uses a term he calls the ‘evolutionary algorithm’ as a 
fundamental way of understanding how mankind has reached the point we find ourselves today 
and what will power us into the future. To say that his thinking is fascinating and that it actually 
makes sense is a gross understatement.  
What will be the end game of this new study? Will see that it will propose a vision of the 
future of urban education that does not begin with a school; but with a new and special kind of 
bank.  
Below is a list of works cited for the proposed study. 
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